

# CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS (CSOs) IN TURKEY: HISTORY, THEORIES AND ISSUES


EMRAH AYHAN



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HISTORY, THEORIES AND ISSUES**

**EMRAH AYHAN**

**2020**



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## PREFACE

The idea of conducting research on “civil society organizations” (CSOs), and writing a book have emanated some major processes throughout my life. The first time I heard about the concept of CSO was on August 17, 1999. I was studying in Fethiye primary school in Bursa province, where I was born, when a **devastating earthquake** struck Western Marmara region of Turkey, causing thousands of deaths and injuries in and around Gölcük, İzmit. Although we felt this earthquake very badly, nothing happened to our homes and family members in Bursa. But still my family and I had to live in a hand-made tent for 2 weeks due to risk of another earthquake.

Two days after the earthquake, my mom and I went to visit my aunt living in Yalova province, where also many people were injured and died, because we could not contact her. Upon our arrival, we heard nothing but silence, saw ruins, and witnessed funeral coaches carrying death bodies. I was expecting to see a lot of bulldozers, trucks and ambulances to help people who were still under the collapsed buildings. On the contrary, I realized that the **resources and opportunities of the state were not sufficient** to help all these people, who died, injured or luckily still alive under the collapsed buildings. Nothing was moving around; it was very quiet. There were only **voluntary associations** and **people** who came to meet **victims’ needs** such as foods, drinks, clothes and tents. The limited availability of resources was met by **unlimited motivation** and **venture**. I realized that this tragedy revealed a very significant **solidarity**

between people by **volunterrism across the country**. Then, we finally found out that my aunt and her family are alive and safe, sheltered in a tent for their safety.

We went back to Bursa, and I watched news about **well-known voluntary organizations** like KIZILAY (Turkish Red Crescent) and AKUT (Search and Rescue Associations), in addition to **voluntary people** who were actively and bravely helping people in the cities where the earthquake struck very badly. **Our society** appreciated intervention of these organizations and volunteers, and this situation dramatically **increased the awareness and importance of other CSOs and volunteering** in terms of humanitarian aid in Turkey. At that time, I was also happy to learn about this type of voluntary organizations and volunteering that provide **help for people in times of distress**.

Secondly, I was working as an assistant of a lawyer in Bursa during summer holidays between 2007 and 2009 when I was in high school. I saw different signboards of “Fellow Countryman Associations” (*Hemşehri Dernekleri*) and “Professional Solidarity Associations” (*Mesleki Dayanışma Dernekleri*) on the buildings close to the main courthouse of Bursa where I worked. I learned that these organizations are expanding and **strengthening their networks, providing financial assistance, scholarships, occupational support and solidarity** for their members. In 2009, I was an undergraduate student at METU (Middle East Technical University), and started to look for scholarship to cover my education. I found out that there are **many**

**associations** that provide scholarships for hardworking students who need **financial support** in the form of scholarship. At that time, I was happy to learn about this type of voluntary organizations that aim to **facilitate education** in Turkey.

Thirdly, I learned about theories of **well-known scholars** like **Karl Marx, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Antonio Gramsci, Emile Durkheim, John Locke, Alexis de Tocqueville, Max Weber** and other famous thinkers during theoretical courses in the department of Political Science and Public Administration at Middle East Technical University. For example, **Hegel** describes the sphere of **civil society** as “a genuine form of society, a ‘universal family’ which makes **collective demands** on its members and has **collective responsibilities** toward them” (Hegel, 1821: PR § 239). On the other hand, **Gramsci** defines civil society as an **integral part of the state hegemony** because “civil society is the arena wherein the ruling class extends and reinforces its power by non-violent means” (Buttigieg, 1995: 26). Finally, **Tocqueville** argues that **voluntary associations** are important part of the society because they encourage **social participation** and **include people** who have different backgrounds and interests in the local communities. He adds that civil society **balances the relations between individual interests and central state**. Although there were **negative assumptions** about civil society like consideration of CSOs as **a tool serving capitalist interests of bourgeois class** or **state hegemony**, I was still willing to learn about the positive role of CSOs such as intermediating between state power

and individuals, encouraging social and political participation, and providing humanitarian aid, public goods and services (e.g., education, health and consultancy) for the society.

Finally, I embarked on **my academic journey** the fields of political science and public administration with academic publications (e.g., conference papers, articles and book chapters) since I started working as research assistant in 2015. In one of my articles, namely “New Public Service: A Door to Governance” (Ayhan and Önder, 2017), my PhD advisor and I evaluated whether there is **a paradigm shift in public administration** using comparative analysis of four different approaches as demonstrated below. In this publication, I intended to demonstrate that **civil society** has recently been considered as a **new sector**, namely “third sector”, like public and private sectors in the world. Therefore, public institutions, private sector organizations, and **CSOs** collaborate to deliver **public goods and services** for the society. The four public administration approaches are summarized as follows:

In the **Traditional Public Administration approach**, mainly based on **Weberian hierarchical bureaucratic model**, public goods and services are exclusively provided **by the state**. However, the efficiency of this traditional approach was questioned due to some developments during the 1970s and the 1980s such as economic crises, growing public debt, new expectations and interests of modern citizens, appearance of **New Right Governments** that pursued **neo-liberal policies**, convergence of public policies in different countries

by globalization processes, and increasing impact of **global organizations** like OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), IMF (International Monetary Foundation) and the World Bank Group.

**The New Public Management approach** emerged as an alternative to traditional public administration. In this approach, which is based on ideas such as “managerialism”, “public choice”, “market-based public administration”, “post-bureaucratic paradigm”, and “enterprising government”, public goods and services are provided by the collaboration of both the state and private sector organizations. Although this approach has been applied in many Western liberal countries since the 1980s, it was criticized due to **excessive focus on the market, the idea of treating citizens as consumers, disregarding humanitarian values, and considering the public benefit as a product.**

**The New Public Service approach** focuses on the deficiencies of the new public management and traditional approaches, and increases awareness on “democratic citizenship”, “active citizenship”, “civil society”, “post-modern public administration”, “post-modernism”, and “institutional humanism”. However, it is not very clear how an **ordinary citizen** can make judgement and give decisions about **complex public policies**, which necessitate deep knowledge, experience and expertise, through democratic participation processes. **CSOs** are important facilitators of **citizens’ participation**. However, theorists of new public service argue that strong civil society has been

weakening, because CSOs are also adopting market values and applications such as contract, competition, social entrepreneurship, and commercial income. This approach was theoretically discussed, but it could not gain ground in the practice because of focusing too much on direct inclusion of citizens into the decision-making process on public policies.

**The Governance approach**, also known as “New Public Governance” (Torfing and Triantafillou, 2013) or “State-Market-Civil Society Synergism” (Thynne and Peters, 2015), shares many similarities with the New Public Service approach, because it was adopted as an alternative approach to the New Public Management approach. The Governance approach suggests a cooperation between public sector, private sector and **civil society as a third sector** in decision-making processes. In this sense, it supports an **active citizenship form** through CSOs as a new actor and partner for public institutions and private sector organizations. Unlike the aforementioned approaches, the Governance approach is both **inclusive** and **citizen-oriented**, synergizing these three actors to solve problems appearing in decision-making processes.

**This book** conveys my interest on civil society and CSOs, running through different experiences. The significance of this work does not derive exclusively from personal interest or experiences, but from an **increased attention of this sector locally and globally since the 1980s**. However, compared to conceptual and theoretical researches, the number of empirical researches testing the validity and reliability

of theories by qualitative or quantitative data is insufficient in Turkey. Most of the researchers mainly **focus on philosophical explanations** like existence, conceptual and theoretical development for civil society **rather than providing empirical evidences** for the activities, organizational performance, size and socio-economic benefits of CSOs as the organizational form of civil society. Hence, in this book, readers will also find **empirical evidences for the organizational development of CSOs in Turkey** by a comprehensive analysis that includes different theories of CSOs. In this sense, this book does not only provide conceptual and theoretical development of CSOs, but it also gives **empirical explanations** and **policy recommendations** for decision-makers, CSO managers, students and researchers in terms of strengthening the **size and organizational performance of CSOs**.



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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

AK Party:	Justice and Development Party
AKUT:	Search and Rescue Association
ANAP:	Motherland Party
CEBAS:	Certified Beneficent Social Assistance Entity
CHP:	Republican People’s Party
CIVICUS:	Global Alliance of Civil Society Organizations and Activists
CSI:	Civil Society Index
CSOs:	Civil Society Organizations
DHS:	Demographic and Health Survey
DP:	Democratic Party
DW:	Durbin Watson
ECAS:	European Citizens Action Service
ELF Index:	Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index
EU:	European Union
EUROSTAT:	Statistical Office of the European Union
FETÖ:	Gülenist Terror Group
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
HHI:	Hirschman-Herfindahl Index
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
KIZILAY:	Turkish Red Crescent
LM Test:	The Lagrange Multiplier Test
MHP:	Nationalist Movement Party
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGOs:	Non-Governmental Organizations
NPIs:	Non-Profit Institutions
NPOs:	Non-Profit Organizations
OECD:	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLS:	Ordinary Least Squares
OSCIP:	Public Interest Civil Society Organization
PhD:	Doctor of Philosophy
SNCs:	Special Nonprofit Corporations
STGM:	The Association of Civil Society Development Center
TEGV:	The Educational Volunteers Foundation of Turkey
TL:	Turkish Lira
T.R.:	Turkish Republic
TOBB:	The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey
TURKSTAT:	Turkish Statistical Institute
TÜRK-İŞ:	The Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions
TÜSEV:	Third Sector Foundation of Turkey
UK:	United Kingdom
USA:	United States of America
WB:	The World Bank Group
WVS:	World Values Survey

**CHAPTER I**  
**INTRODUCTION**



## INTRODUCTION

CSOs have recently been operating in **diverse areas or segments of society** from education, humanitarian aid and immigration to protection of local identities, poverty and labor rights throughout the world. These CSOs do not only operate at the **local** level, they also operate at the **national, international or global levels** (Anheier, 2005; Salamon, 1987). They provide public goods and services for people in areas **where public and private sectors fail or unwilling** to fully meet the needs of the people due to **government** (Levitt, 1973; Steinberg, 2006; Weisbrod, 1975) and **market failures** (Hansmann, 1987; Ogus, 2004; Titmus, 1973) in communities, societies, cultures and countries throughout the world.

CSOs have **many functions** such as activities supporting the markets, providing public goods and services, strengthening democracy and equality, facilitation of civil participation in politics, and increasing social entrepreneurship (Anheier, 2005; Garton, 2009; Gassler, 1986; Kramer, 1981; Prewitt, 1999). These functions provide social, economic and political benefits for the people, but the degree of these benefits is based on historical tensions, culture, socio-economic and organizational factors **in different social settings**. For instance, CSOs can not develop in societies where there is a traditional tension between **strong state** and **weak civil society**. On the other hand, the lower level of size and organizational performance of CSOs as organizational factors negatively influences quality, quantity, sustainability, accessibility and efficiency of the provision of public

goods and services for the people in need. In this sense, **concentration on limited number of revenue streams** can cause **uncertainty for CSOs** (Despard et al., 2017; Hudock, 1995; Watkins et al., 2012), threaten **their autonomy** (Banks and Hulme, 2012; Elbers and Schulpen, 2013; Wallace et al., 2006), and results in **financial vulnerability** (Tuckman and Chang, 1991). On the other hand, **newly-established CSOs** tend to face “liability of newness” (Stinchcombe, 1965), “organizational failure rate” (death risk) (Halliday et al., 1987; Le Mens et al., 2011), or “absolute hazard risk” (Singh et al., 1986).

CSOs in **heterogeneous communities** are expected to be larger in size (Weisbrod, 1975) in order to provide better public goods and services for small and heterogeneous groups of people in need. Therefore, many theoretical and empirical studies focus on factors influencing existence, size and organizational development of CSOs in **different social settings** (Anheier, 2005; Ben-Ner and Gui, 2003; Benton, 2016; Ghatak and Müller, 2011; Hansmann, 1987; Matei and Dorobantu, 2015; Salamon et. al., 1999; Salamon and Anheier, 1998; Weisbrod, 1975). For instance, Salamon and Anheier (1998) analyzed data from eight countries in their comparative analysis to find out the factors that explained differentiation among these countries in terms of the size of CSOs. On the other hand, Ben-Ner and Hoomissen (2007: 520) evaluated CSOs, which are operating in service sector, and argued that “relative prevalence of nonprofit organizations depends on the nature of an industry’s output, industrial organization characteristics, and

economic, demographic, political and other locality-specific attributes”. Finally, Önder (2006) created two models to explain how local conditions affect the existence and capacity of CSOs in the United States of America (USA), and across different nations (35 countries). Therefore, it is necessary to increase the number of studies at different levels such as cross-national, national, regional (across the same country), sectoral, or organizational to contribute to the literature in explaining historical, theoretical and organizational issues about CSOs not only in developed countries, but also in developing and under-developed countries to provide a more comprehensive and comparative approach throughout the world.

CSOs experience **different paths** in societies **due to historical tensions**. Moreover, there are different theoretical explanations for their existence. In addition, recent studies have started focus on empirical evidences for the organizational development of CSOs since they emerged as **new actors** and **partners** in providing public goods and services. Therefore, it is essential to understand historical tensions, theoretical explanations and organizational development of CSOs in different social settings. In addition to historical and theoretical issues, it is also necessary to find out empirical evidences for organizational development of CSOs in different countries in order to explain how the role of CSOs increased throughout the world. This is because organizational development of CSOs directly influences the quality, quantity, sustainability, accessibility and efficiency of public goods and services that they provide for the people in need. In the

literature, there are **major theories** seeking explanations for historical, theoretical and organizational development of CSOs in **different social settings**. However, these studies stem from diverse fields and countries, and they provide partial, overlapping, contradicting, or parallel but significant explanations. For instance, **public goods theories** argue that CSOs are established to meet **diversified and heterogeneous demands** that cannot be sufficiently supplied by private sector organizations and public institutions due to **market and government failures** (Gronbjerg, 2001; Hansmann, 1987; Levitt, 1973; Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Weisbrod, 1975). On the other hand, both interdependence and resource dependence theories claim that CSOs are **not only gap-fillers** in the case of market and government failures, they are rather **third-party governments** (Salamon, 1987; Malatesta and Smith, 2014). However, interdependence theory suggests that **income from public institutions** increases the partnership between CSOs and public sector, while resource dependence theory argues that **excessive dependence** on income from public institutions can result in **resource dependence** that can **damage the autonomy of CSOs** (Banks and Hulme, 2012; Hudock, 1995; Cho and Gillespie, 2006; Lu, 2009), and increase their **financial vulnerability** (Tuckman and Chang, 1991).

As it has been argued above: (i) CSOs are operating in diverse areas or segments of society, and provide public goods and services at local, national, international and global levels, (ii) CSOs are diverse in terms of different historical tensions, theoretical explanations and

organizational factors in different social settings, and (iii) major theories on CSOs have partial, overlapping, contradicting, or parallel assumptions. Therefore, this book explains concepts, theories, history and organizational development of CSOs by reviewing the literature. While reviewing theories of CSOs, the **factors causing differentiation in presence and organizational development of CSOs** in different societies are noted in order to make an empirical analysis by a case study. In this direction, new hypotheses are determined based on the factors influencing presence and organizational development of CSOs. As a result; different insights, evaluations and assumptions are presented together **in one single comprehensive book**. Theoretical assumptions were tested by **primary and secondary data** that are collected for dependent and independent variables in the case of Turkey. For this purpose, **two different models** were created: first model to explain presence of CSOs by measuring **size of CSOs** in 81 NUTS-3 regions of Turkey<sup>1</sup>, and second model to explain organizational development of CSOs by measuring **organizational performance of 975 Youth CSOs** in Turkey. Data was analyzed by **Hierarchical OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) Regression Analysis** to reach empirical findings, and to generate discussions that are beneficial for scholars, public institutions, CSO managers, and funders of CSOs (e.g., individuals, private sector organizations, and other non-public organizations) in

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<sup>1</sup> In order to adapt European Union's regional classifications, Turkey also adopted Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). The list of NUTS statistical regions at three levels (regional, subregional and provincial) is available online. Retrieved March 27, 2019, from [https://infogalactic.com/info/NUTS\\_of\\_Turkey](https://infogalactic.com/info/NUTS_of_Turkey)

understanding the factors explaining the differentiation in size and organizational performance of CSOs in Turkey. There are some **major reasons** why **Turkey** was chosen as **case of the study** in this book.

Firstly, most researches on historical, conceptual, theoretical and organizational development of CSOs have been made through the cases of **developed countries** (e.g., the USA, the UK, Germany, Japan, Italy, and France). However, it is also necessary to understand and evaluate civil society in **developing** and **under-developed countries**. This is because previous studies have shown that there are insufficient resources for CSOs providing public goods and services where problems are most severe due to “free-rider problem”, “twists and turns of economic fortune” and “serious gaps in geographical coverage” (Salamon, 1987: 39-40). For instance, **financial resources** for CSOs are insufficient due to economic fluctuations and crises, and **lack of qualified human resources** is a serious problem in developing or under-developed countries. Therefore, it is necessary to make **comparative regional analysis by the case of Turkey** as a good example of a developing country.

Secondly, Turkey has a **unique culture** and **history of foundations** (waqfs) that are inherited from the periods of Great Seljuks and Ottoman Empires<sup>2</sup>, because **philanthropy** was the main concept to

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<sup>2</sup> Akman (2018: 197) quotes that “during the Ottoman rule; a man was born in a foundation, he slept in a cradle within a foundation, he ate and drunk in a foundation, read books in a foundation, taught in a madrasah within a foundation, received a fee from the foundation administration, and when he died he was put in

refer voluntary transfer and share of wealth from rich to poor people through foundations, which refer to mosque, madrasah, Islamic tomb and monastery (Odabaşı, 2015). These **waqfs** had a very strong cooperation with the state; they received some **subsidies from the state** (e.g., tax exemption and direct financial benefits especially by the royal family of sultans and bureaucrats), and developed under **Great Seljuks Empire** (and period of Beyliks) (Bal, 2015) and transferred to **Ottoman Empire**. Different from traditional form of CSOs as waqfs, Turkey experienced the increasing role of **modern CSOs** only after 1980s due to a **historical and traditional tension between strong state and weak civil society** (Heper, 1985). Therefore, it is necessary to understand the development of CSOs in countries with weak liberal traditions like Turkey. Because this development was interrupted many times by social, economic or political struggles in the history of Turkey such as military coups, unsuccessful party coalitions, economic crises, and oppositions between right-wing and left-wing political groups.

Thirdly, the significance and influence of CSOs have been increasing in terms of numbers, revenues, members and activities in Turkey **since the 2000s**. During this period, **Turkey's economic growth** has rapidly increased, **democratization process** was accelerated, and **international economic integration** was deepened. As a result of these developments, Turkey started to negotiate **membership to the**

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coffin in a foundation, after that he was buried in a cemetery that belong to a foundation”.

**European Union (EU)**, and this move positively influenced the civil society (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005: 1). For instance, the number of members in associations increased from 4,08 million people in 2004 to 10,99 million in 2017. On the other hand, the number of associations also increased from 54.628 in 2009 to 103.284 in 2017. Similarly, the revenues of associations also increased from 8,84 billion TL (Turkish Lira) in 2014 to 20,96 billion TL in 2019.<sup>3</sup>

Fourthly, organizational development of CSOs in Turkey **after the 2000s** was interrupted by some **major challenges** such as the 2008 global financial crisis, Gezi Parkı protests in 2013, and failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016 (Ayhan, 2018: 54). Especially after the failed coup attempt in 2016, many CSOs related to groups behind the failed coup attempt were closed down. Likewise, many volunteers involved in these CSOs, and related public officials were either arrested, or suspended from public institutions. Therefore, **trust in CSOs** was seriously damaged in the Turkish society. However, the significance and influence of CSOs are still increasing because civil society in Turkey has become **less fragile** to social, economic, and political crises by learning from unpleasant experiences in the history of the Turkish Republic. Moreover, many CSOs showed social solidarity against the coup attempt, and supported democracy and democratically elected government until recently so as to restore trust in civil society.

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<sup>3</sup> Data on Associations was obtained from the online database of Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society. Retrieved March 26, 2019, from [www.siviltoplum.gov.tr](http://www.siviltoplum.gov.tr)

Finally, **international organizations** like International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank Group (WB), and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have been urging developing countries since 1980s to implement **Governance approach** in their politics. In Turkey, for example, this approach has gained prominence after the implementation of new neoliberal reforms during Turgut Özal's period as Prime Minister in the 1980s (Ayhan et al., 2016: 64). The Governance approach takes **civil society as a new sector**, namely **third sector**, in addition to public and private sectors, so **a new partnership** between these three actors has become unavoidable.

### **Overview of the Book**

In order to explain definitions related to civil society and historical, conceptual, theoretical and organizational development of CSOs in different social settings, this book follows some major steps in each chapter. In this chapter (Chapter I), it was argued that **CSOs differ greatly** in terms of historical, theoretical and organizational issues in different communities, societies, cultures and countries throughout the world, because this differentiation influences the quality, quantity, sustainability, accessibility and efficiency of public goods and services provided by CSOs for the people in need. **Major theories** on CSOs seek explanations for the factors that cause this **differentiation** in **different social settings**. Therefore, this chapter covers the increasing importance of CSOs, aim of the book, case study and overview of the book chapters.

In Chapter II, **conceptualization of civil society** in Western and Turkish-Islamic political thoughts, **definitions of CSOs** are evaluated. It was argued that **CSOs are also diverse** in terms of their organizational size, area of activity, vision, mission and financial capacity within civil society sector that is too heterogeneous in different countries. After scrutinizing **sectoral, legal, and economic definitions of CSOs**, the **common features of CSOs** are also highlighted, because these features are used to determine organizations that are categorized as CSOs. In the **historical development** part of this chapter, historical evidences on the existence of CSOs in the world are evaluated. In addition, the historical development of CSOs in Turkey is explained through the **unique culture and history of waqfs** during Great Seljuks Empire and Ottoman Empire until today by **five different timespans**: (a) 1923-1945, (b) 1945-1960, (c) 1960-1980, (d) 1980-2000, and (e) after the 2000s. Furthermore, **types of CSOs** in Turkey were evaluated through legal definitions and descriptive statistics. These CSOs are associations, foundations, trade unions, cooperatives, and professional organizations. To demonstrate recent studies on CSOs in Turkey, some **major researches on civil society in Turkey** at the local, national and international levels are also reviewed in this chapter.

In Chapter III, the types of public and private goods and services are explained, because understanding the **types of goods and services** provided by CSOs, public institutions, and private sector organizations is necessary. It is argued that **pure private goods and services**

(excludable and rival) are best provided by **private sector organizations**, because these organizations can successfully meet individual consumer preferences for goods and services by minimizing transaction costs and maximizing profit. Secondly, **pure public goods and services** (non-excludable and non-rival) are best provided by **public institutions**, because these institutions can overcome problems like free-rider problem, serious gaps in geographical coverage, and lack of resources through taxation. Thirdly, **quasi-public goods and services** (excludable) are best provided by **CSOs**, because these organizations provide public goods and services that are non-rival, yet exclusion of non-payers is possible. In the second part of the chapter, **the functions of CSOs** were explained with a close focus on activities that support markets, democratic consolidation, political transformation, gender and equality, provision of social and cultural services, increasing social entrepreneurship, and protection of political rights. Finally, **key terms** and **main arguments of major theories** on conceptual, theoretical and organizational development of CSOs after the 1970s are explained, and their **main hypotheses** on size and organizational performance of CSOs are noted to be tested by empirical data in Chapter IV.

Chapter IV of the book covers the research question, hypotheses, unit of analysis, data collection, operationalization of variables, methods and models for the case study of CSOs in Turkey. Secondly, **data is empirically analyzed** to test main hypotheses from major theories

that explain presence and organizational development of CSOs in the literature. After using **multiple regression method**, it was explained whether these hypotheses were statistically supported by empirical data, or not. Thirdly, **findings and discussions** are presented depending on the analysis results.

Chapter V of this book provides **policy recommendations** for policy-makers, CSO managers, public institutions, and funders (e.g., individuals, private sector organizations, and other non-public organizations), who are interested in building and strengthening size and organizational performance of CSOs in the provision of quality, quantity, sustainable, accessible and efficient public goods and services. Moreover, **suggestions for scholars** are also evaluated, because the findings, discussions, limitations, methods and models in this book can be further developed for **future research**.

**CHAPTER II**

**CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND  
CSOs**



## 1.THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS

The main focus of this book is to explain the **historical, theoretical and organizational development of CSOs**, and to provide **theoretical and empirical explanations** of the factors causing differentiation in presence and organizational development of CSOs in different social settings. On the other hand, the concept of “civil society” has broader range that also includes CSOs which are essential actors in contributing to the growth of civil society considering their activities. Therefore, it is necessary to briefly discuss some major approaches to the **concept of civil society in different social contexts** before discussing different approaches to the definition of CSOs as an organizational form of civil society.

Recently, the concept of “modern society” has been on a **threshold of a great transformation** since the 1990s due to challenges that eroded traditional ways of self-understanding (Cohen and Arato, 1992: 1). For instance, challenges such as rising globalization, identity politics, democratization, and equality exposed a well-known classical question: “What are the relationships between individuals and their communities?”. Many scholars from Ancient Greek to modern thinkers ask the same question to explain how an individual can be best related to his/her community.

Similarly, the modern concept of “civil society” has also been at the center of theoretical debates in contemporary social and political

thoughts since the 1980s. In this sense, there are two different approaches: **supporters of civil society**, who associate this concept with resurrection, re-emergence, reconstruction, or renaissance (Cohen and Arato, 1992: 29), while some people relate it to poverty, democracy, governance, social conflict and human rights (Naidoo and Tandon, 1999); and others consider it as a “paradigmatic concept” (Howell and Pearce, 2001: 1), or a “big idea” on everyone’s lips (Edwards, 2004: 2). In contrast, there are also **sceptics of the civil society**, who tend to associate the concept of civil society with “fraud”, “illusion”, “too imprecise to be useful” (Fine, 1997: 7), “confusing” (Chandoke, 2005), “a mask for intellectual emptiness” (Colas, 1997: 4), “corrupted”, or “captured” by the elites (Edwards, 2004: vi). Hence, **tension between sceptics and supporters** of the concept of civil society causes a **deadlock** in the literature.

Today, it is obvious that the **liberal approach has dominance** on the conceptualization of civil society as we understand it today. However, it is questionable whether the relationship between the state and civil society can simply be understood by the recent dominant liberal ideology, since the notion of civil society has different **historical roots** in different countries. Moreover, Discussions about civil society are not confined to democratic societies, it extends to **different social settings** such as Islamic and non-democratic societies. In other words, the concept of civil society is mainly **Western-oriented** that emerged initially in the West during a certain period of history (Mardin, 1995), but it does not mean that this concept can only be discussed in the

Western context. This concept has been **circulating throughout the world**, and has gained **different meanings in different social settings**. For instance, Edwards (2004: 5) argues that civil society is very influential in the areas of politics, activism and foreign aid in many countries. However, instead of asking the question of “Does civil society exist in non-Western contexts?”, this part of the book deals with discussions on different conceptualizations of civil society in different political thoughts. Moreover, this book does not take a side between supporters or sceptics akin to Fine (1997: 7), who claims that it is necessary to point out validity of the concept “without romanticizing it, without idealizing it, and without abstracting it from its social and historical ground”.

### **1.1. The Concept of Civil Society in Western Political Thought**

The conceptualization of civil society in Western political thought has influenced understanding of the concept in many countries throughout the world. However, it is important to understand differences between **pre-modern and modern usages** of the concept, because **the former** does not make any distinction between **state** (political society) and **society** (civil society), while **the latter** focuses on the **tensions** between these two actors. Pre-modern thinkers accepted the state and civil society as **one single social structure**, because **political society** and civil society were used interchangeably. Therefore, as Colas (1997: 32) argues, the distinction between state and civil society was not always evident until new approaches of critical thinkers like Hegel and Marx emerged.

**Aristotle** (384-322 BCE) is a pioneer scholar who introduced the origins of the concept of civil society in his book “The Politics” by the term “*koinonia politike*” to refer to the political society, or community of citizens. **Koinonia politike** is similar to “polis” in which free and equal men are “political animals” by nature (Book I). In addition, he argues that:

“Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims, and in a greater degree than any other, at the highest good.” (Aristotle, Book I).

Therefore, civil society (*politike kononia*) was synonymously used for political society, or state (*polis*), and it was the “**highest form of community** or association, surpassing namely the ‘household’ (*oikos*) and ‘peoples’ (*ethne*) being defined negatively as a human grouping without political institutions” for Aristotle (Colas, 1997: 23). In other words, it can be said that civil society or political society includes all societies because it is the highest of all forms with a greater degree than any other.

### 1.1.1. Conceptualization of Civil Society by Social Contract Theorists in Western Political Thought

Social contract theorists did not make any distinction between state and civil society. However, they differ on concepts such as the state of nature and civil society, or namely political society. For example, **Hobbes** (1660: 86) explains the transition to political society, namely a society with a state, through ‘state of nature’ in which natural rights of individuals cannot be fully enjoyed, because there is a “war of every man against every man” in the state of nature. In this condition, “The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where there is no law, there is no injustice”. Therefore, people agreed to create a **society with state** by “mutually transferring of right is that which men call contract” in order to abolish insecurity that existed in the state of nature (Hobbes, 1660: 93). Similarly, **Locke** (1690) also explains the transition from state of nature to society with state, namely emergence of the **lawful governments** in his book “Second Treatise of Government”. He explains the establishment of civil society by arguing that “where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one society, as to quit everyone his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a political, or civil society”. Therefore, they authorized **one supreme government** that makes laws for the members of the **commonwealth** for their benefit (Locke, 1690: Section 89).

The conceptual understanding of Hobbes and Locke is different from the contemporary understanding of civil society, because they use it to explain the transition from a **society without a common authority** in the state of nature to a **civil society with a common authority**. Therefore, they both focus on civil society as protection of liberty, property, interests, security and rights of individuals. However, Locke (1690: Section 19) distinguishes **state of nature** from **state of war** by arguing that state of nature is “a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservation”, while state of war is “a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction”. Therefore, he differs from Hobbes who associates state of nature with “war of every man against every man” (Hobbes, 1660: 86). Of course, Locke (1690: Section 13) also accepts that there are **inconveniences in the state of nature** as “it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on the other side, that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others”. However, these inconveniences can be avoided by the civil society established for the “comfortable, safe and peaceful living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of it” (Locke, 1690: Section 95).

As a social contract theorist, **Rousseau** (1754) has different point of view in his comparison of civil society and state of nature. He explains the emergence of civil society through **the emergence of private property**, while Locke (1690) and Hobbes (1660) explain it

through the emergence of a society with a common authority. Rousseau (1754: 23) argues that “The first man, who, after enclosing a piece of ground, took it into his head to say, ‘This is mine’, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society”, but “the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody”. Therefore, he perceives this kind of civil society as a negative development, because it causes inequality, rivalry, competition, and profiting at the expense of others.

Rousseau (1754) argues that values like **freedom** and **equality** were not founded by the civil society, they were rather evident in the state of nature in which single person “did not require the joint labour of several hands, they lived free, healthy, honest and happy lives, so long as their nature allowed, and as they continued to enjoy the pleasures of mutual and independent intercourse” (Rousseau, 1754: 27). In other words, people were **independent**, and they had **self-sufficiency** until they required joint labor of several hands, after that moment “equality disappeared, property was introduced, work became indispensable...” (Rousseau, 1754: 27). Although the emergence of private property was associated with negative consequences for Rousseau, he points out the **benefits of civil society**. He argues that man lost his “natural liberty” and “unrestricted right to anything he wants and can get” due to transition from state of nature to civil society by social contract, yet he gained “civil liberty” and “the ownership of everything he possesses” (Rousseau, 1762: 9). Finally, Locke and Hobbes focus on **individual self-interest** and **liberty**, while Rousseau focuses on

**general will** because he states that “each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole” (Rousseau, 1762: 7). He also claims that this general will is known as a “republic” or a “body politic”, but its members call it either a “state”, a “sovereign, or a “power”.

### **1.1.2. Conceptualization of Civil Society by Early Thinkers in Western Political Thought**

Scottish enlightenment thinker, **Ferguson** (1766) associates the **emergence of civil society** with the **emergence of market economy** in his book “An Essay on the History of Civil Society”. He mainly focuses on the “fluctuating historical influence of civic virtue in shaping society”, a similar view to **Machiavelli’s** who argued that people should make a choice between **virtue** (the common good) and **fortune** (individual interest) (Powell, 2010: 354). Ferguson (1766) posited that increasing importance of self-interest in the market economy (instead of common good) had weakened civic virtue. Therefore, he describes civil society as “a socially desirable alternative both to the state of nature and the heightened individualism of emergent capitalism” (Lewis, 2001: 1).

Like Ferguson, **Hegel** (1821) also perceives the concept of civil society as part of modern societies. Nevertheless, he mainly focuses on the **realm of particularism of individuals**, because he argued that “self-organized civil society needed to be balanced and ordered by the

state, otherwise it would become self-interested and would not contribute to the common good” (Lewis, 2001: 1). Moreover, Hegel (1770-1831) **distinguished civil society** (Bürgerliche Gessellschaft) from **political state** (der Staat) by describing civil society as a realm of market economy that exists in modern industrial capitalist societies. He claims that civil society serves the **interests of capitalism** such as private property and individual rights. Therefore, there are **conflicts** and **inequalities in civil society** that influence decisions of the members of CSOs, and he sees these conflicts and inequalities as inevitable outcomes since **people are born unequal by nature**. Hegel describes civil society as:

“a realm in which individuals exist as persons and subjects, as owners and disposers of private property, and as choosers of their own life-activity in the light of their contingent and subjective needs and interests. In civil society, people’s ends are in the first instance purely private, particular and contingent, not communal ends shared with others through feeling (as in the family) or through reason (as in the state)” (Hegel, 1821: PR § 185).

In addition, the sphere of civil society regulated by **civil code**, is defined as “a genuine form of society, a ‘universal family’ which makes collective demands on its members and has collective responsibilities toward them” (Hegel, 1821: PR § 239). In other words, civil society includes **social relationships** between people who came together by their free and self-interested behavior. These

members of civil society seek **mutual** and **collective benefit** through civil society. But still, as Keane (1988: 50) argues, there is a need for state **supervision** and **control over civil society** to overcome **conflicts** and **inequalities in civil society**. However, Hegel also claims that it is possible to overcome these problems in civil society, because “individuals can attain their ends only in so far as they themselves determine their knowing, willing and acting in a **universal way** and make themselves links in this chain of social connections” (Hegel, 1821: 124). As it is seen, Hegel lived during Prussia where democracy was not evident or dominant, consequently, he tried to balance “the realities of monarchical absolutism against the liberating potential of civil society” (Powell, 2010: 3549). Therefore, his theoretical discussions have contributed to the evolution of later theories.

### **1.1.3. Conceptualization of Civil Society by Liberal Thinkers in Western Political Thought**

In his study, namely “Democracy in America” published in two volumes (1st volume in 1835 and 2nd volume in 1840), **Tocqueville** (1805-1859) argues that “the liberty of association has become a necessary guarantee against the tyranny of the majority” in the United States, as such **voluntary associations** can protect the community from **anarchy** and **oppression** (Tocqueville, 2000: 338). In the 1830s, Tocqueville observed that voluntary associations were an important part of the American society, and they were separated from the state, because they encouraged social participation, plurality, equality, and individualism, as well as included people from different backgrounds

and interests in the local communities. In this sense, he considers voluntary associations, namely civil society, as a **balance between individual interests and central state** that has potential to be despotic in case of increasing its power (Onbaşı, 2008).

It is important to note that Tocqueville argues that **political equality** and **despotism** are connected, because “these two things mutually and perniciously complete and assist each other” (Tocqueville, 2000: 625). Interestingly, he claims that “equality places man side by side, unconnected by any common tie; despotism raises barriers to keep them asunder; the former predisposes them not to consider their fellow creatures, the latter makes general indifference a sort of public virtue” (Tocqueville, 2000: 625). In other words, he thinks that the idea of equality in democracies imposes individuals that they can do everything by themselves, and do not require any help from other individuals, so this idea can facilitate despotism at the end. These individuals might forget their need for help from others, considering their selfish nature, because “they care for nobody but themselves”, but they should learn voluntarily to help each other (Tocqueville, 2000: 623-631). He supposes that “associations which are formed in civil life” can solve this problem, because these **associations** establish **closer ties** and **cooperation between individuals** through voluntary action to protect themselves against despotic regimes which want to keep individuals separated from each other.

Similar to Tocqueville, **Oakeshott** (1962) is close to the liberal approach in defining the concept of civil society but with a **conservative perspective**. Discussing **spontaneous development of society** and **critique of rationalism** shapes his theoretical approach to relationships between state and society. Oakeshott (1962: 1) describes rationalism as “the most remarkable intellectual fashion of post-Renaissance Europe”, and influential in politics. However, it is not the only productive approach in modern European political thinking. In other words, he is against rationalism but not reason. Although, rationalists take reason to find universal truth, “the ideal” and “the best” for all in politics, Oakeshott (1962) argues that it is not so simple to cope with our world which **frequently, spontaneously and irregularly changes**. He accepts that “technical knowledge” can help us to decrease “chaos” in our world, but “practical knowledge”, namely “traditional knowledge”, is also necessary. He criticizes rationalism, which underestimates the importance of practical knowledge, because he thinks **that technical knowledge and practical knowledge** are inseparable (Oakeshott, 1962: 7-13). Therefore, he rejects rationalist view on the relationships between individual, society and the state. For instance, rationalists introduce the state as an ideal “enterprise association” which is based on collective good and common purpose, whereas Oakeshott (1975: 114-118) defines state as “civil association” that is based on individuals who have reason, different goals and purposes, and interpretations of their environment. Finally, he assumes that the **historical, political, legal and institutional heritage of a society** is important, so change

can only be implemented by a **spontaneous development of society**, rather than a planned or imposed change (Onbaşı, 2008).

To sum up, **liberal concept of civil society** mainly refers to an area that is separated from the direct control of the state, because individuals with different interests, income level, skills, ethnic and religious backgrounds can enjoy their rights and freedoms through voluntary action. Moreover, it is important to note that this area is still under political control justified by the rule of law.

#### **1.1.4. Conceptualization of Civil Society by Republican Thinkers in Western Political Thought**

Republicans perceive liberty as **non-domination by others**, while **liberals** explain liberty through **non-interference** which refers to negative liberties (Brugger, 1999: 5-8). There are three dimensions of non-domination. Firstly, the role of **active citizenship** for human fulfillment is an important virtue, because a republic is based on the **virtues of its citizens** and pursues the **common good**. Secondly, **private sphere** in a republic is described by the degree of **domination of the public sphere**, because excessive domination can result in marginalization (Brugger, 1999: 8). Thirdly, non-domination should be guaranteed by a **strong constitutional state**, otherwise civil war or a culture of perpetual deterrence can occur (Brugger, 1999: 7). On the other hand, this kind of guarantee by the state is considered as violation of individual liberty by liberals who support negative liberty.

**Liberal Republican thinkers** argue that the classical **distinction between private and public spheres** should be challenged, because political participation and active citizenship can be increased by forming a new public sphere open to differences that belong to private sphere such as identities, lifestyles, cultural or ethnic differences. This kind of **interaction** between public and private realms can overcome conflicts between them. **Habermas** (1992: 452) defines civil society through the concept of “political public sphere” in which citizens acting as public can solve issues of general interest by freely assembling, uniting, expressing and publicizing their opinions (Habermas, 1992: 103). Habermas adopted his own definition of civil society:

“Current meaning of the term ‘civil society’, which no longer includes a sphere of an economy regulated via labor, capital, and commodity markets and thus differs from the modern translation, common since Hegel and Marx, of ‘societas civilis’ as ‘bourgeois society’ (Bürgerliche Gesellschaft)...the institutional core of ‘civil society’ is constituted by **voluntary unions** outside the realm of the state and the economy and ranging from churches, cultural associations, and academies to independent media, sport and leisure clubs, debating societies, groups of concerned citizens, and grass-roots petitioning drives all the way to occupational associations, political parties, labor unions, and alternative institutions” (Habermas, 1992: 453-454).

Therefore, Habermas believes that **active citizenship** equally increases **political participation** of every citizen in the public political sphere by **democratic processes** which enable citizens to freely express their self-interests and opinions.

**Communitarian Republican thinkers** are different from liberal republican thinkers, because they see active citizenship and political participation as **virtues**, while liberal republican thinkers see them as **tools** to achieve self-interests and needs in the public political space. Similarly, **Brugger** (1999) claims that communitarian republican thinkers have “virtue-centered approach”, while liberal republican thinkers have “act-centered approach”. Therefore, the **virtues of active citizenship** and **political participation** make it possible to develop the **common good of the community**. For instance, **MacIntyre** (2007), a well-known communitarian republican thinker, considers community as a form of **human association** in which members seek not only their own good but also common good of the community. Therefore, he claims that “in a society where there is no longer a shared conception of the community’s good as specified by the good for man, there can no longer either be any very substantial concept of what it is to contribute more or less to the achievement of that good” (MacIntyre, 2007: 232). In his analysis, MacIntyre (2007) analyzes the Greek “polis”, and argues that it is a good example of this type of community which no longer exists today, because as Aristotle says “the ‘polis’ is concerned, with the whole of life, not with this or

that good, but with man's good as such" (MacIntyre, 2007: 156). Similarly, Ferguson (1766) also analyzes the same period, and claims that "to the ancient Greek, or the Roman, **the individual was nothing, and the public everything**. To the modern, in too many nations of Europe, **the individual is everything, and the public nothing**" (Ferguson, 1766: 92). Therefore, both thinkers believe that a community that is similar to "polis" does not exist in modern societies. Finally, based on their empirical analysis, Putnam et al. (1993: 113) state that "citizens of civic regions are much more satisfied with life. Happiness is living in a civic community". To sum up, communitarian republican thinkers mainly state that the **virtues of active citizenship** and **political participation** are built-in for the members of a community for the pursuit of human happiness.

### **1.1.5. Conceptualization of Civil Society by Marxist Thinkers in Western Political Thought**

Like Hegel, **Marx** (1818-1883) also sees **civil society as a realm of capitalist economy** which includes private and alienated relationships. However, he mainly differs from Hegel's views on the distinction between civil society and the state. In this sense, he firstly argues that civil society is shaped by **private interests** that compete against each other. Therefore, he considers modern state as a tool serving capitalist interests of bourgeois class, but the **state cannot solve inequalities and conflicts** unlike Hegel. He asserts that these problems can only be solved by the state if **working class** takes the democratic control of the society.

Secondly, unlike Hegel, Marx anticipates the **reunification of private and political realms** in addition to abolition of the separation between civil society and state. This is because “the abstraction of the state as such belongs only to modern times, because the abstraction of private life belongs only to modern times” (Marx, 1972: 22). Moreover, **Marx and Engels** (1998) claim that “the anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy”, which is also different from Hegel who thinks that civil society was formed by other factors such as competition, property and division of labor, not political economy.

Thirdly, Marx criticizes Hegel’s work, which distinguishes “real” and “ideal”. The former refers to **conflicts between individuals** who seek their self-interests in civil society, while the latter means that it is possible to reach **principle of universalism** to enhance civil society. Marx also argues that citizens are politically equal but there are inequalities in civil society because individuals pursue their interests instead of the benefit of all people in the society. Moreover, he criticizes Hegel’s idea on the principle of universality that is present in civil society, because civil society “embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite stage of the development of productive forces” (Marx and Engels, 1998: 98). Finally, **Mostov** (1989: 201) gives Marx’s ideas on individuals acting in civil society that “in the political community he [the citizen] regards himself as a **communal being**, but in civil society he is active as a **private individual**, treats other men as means, reduces himself to a means, and becomes the plaything of alien power”. Therefore, he sees civil

society as a **product of material conditions** from the perspective of political economy.

**Gramsci** (1971) was influenced by Marx's view on the concept of civil society, but his conceptualization of civil society differs. Marx explains civil society through **material conditions** (superstructure of ideologies and institutions) that are shaped by economic relations in history, whereas Gramsci argues that **civil society is one of two superstructural levels** (Bobbio, 1989: 29), so civil society is an area out of economic relations (Bülbül, 2006). Gramsci (1971) thinks that it is necessary to fix:

“Two major superstructural ‘levels’: the one that can be called ‘civil society’, that is the ensemble of organisms called ‘private’ and that of ‘political society’ or ‘the State’. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of ‘hegemony’ which the dominant group exercised through the state and “juridical” government. The functions in question are precisely organizational and connective” (Gramsci, 1971: 12).

Therefore, Gramsci (1971) differs from Marx by adding civil society versus state dichotomy to base versus superstructure. Firstly, Gramsci explains civil society through **hegemony of one ruling class** to control other social classes that are “economic fact” in the society (Gramsci, 1971: 269). He re-defines the concept of “civil society” through changing capitalist relations by hegemony which uses both “coercion” and “spontaneous consent”, and refers to a domination of

the state not only in economic and political relations, but also in social relations by the activities of civil society (Çaylak and Dinç, 2017: 183). Gramsci (1971) questions why these social classes do not react to the control of this single ruling class, and then he states that the state is also ruled by hegemony of the same ruling class. On the other hand, state is based on **coercion** and **political power**, while civil society is based on hegemony that includes **consent of people in the society**. In addition, state is equal to the sum of political society and civil society that are strengthened by hegemony (Bülbül, 2006: 99-100). He defines state as “the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules...” (Gramsci, 1971: 244). Therefore, he explains hegemony of ruling class over the state through **dominance** and **consent** that are closely interrelated. He claims that the ruling class gets consent and gains dominance over other social classes by **coercive force** and **conviction**. In other words, Gramsci assumes that coercive power is not sufficient, so this dominant class uses **ideology** to convince people that are ruled.

Gramsci asserts that civil society is dominated by one ruling class through cultural and ideological operations (Tocco, 2014: 60). These operations should not be considered as coercion, they can rather be regarded as a **consensus within the society**. Unlike Marx, Gramsci does not see civil society as a realm of capitalist economy which includes private and alienated relationships, but rather as a result of a

superstructure that consists of “civil society” on the one hand and “political society” or “the state” on the other hand. In other words, civil society is also affected by the political society that is under the hegemony of one dominant class, because civil society contributes to the cultural and ideological hegemony of the capitalists. Therefore, Gramsci **considers civil society as an integral part of the state** due to organic relationships between them, because “civil society is the arena wherein the ruling class extends and reinforces its power by non-violent means” (Buttigieg, 1995: 26). In other words, the ruling class, which has hegemony over civil society, can also be considered as the state, since they also control the state by hegemony.

## **1.2. The Concept of Civil Society in Turkish-Islamic Thought**

Different conceptualizations of civil society in the Western political thought can be grouped under two categories; (i) the ones which depart from state-civil society dichotomy, and (ii) power relations in the civil society in terms of consensus-oriented or antagonistic approaches. Therefore, approaches to concept of civil society in other regions of the world like Turkish-Islamic geography can also be evaluated according to these two categories.

In Western political thought, **liberal thinkers** and **liberal republican thinkers** mainly focus on the role of a limited state which needs to guarantee and enlarge the space for rights and liberties of individuals without interference by constitution under rule of law. In other words, these thinkers locate **civil society as an autonomous space** in which

individuals enjoy their rights and liberties **by voluntary action** without interference of the constitutional state. **Turkish-Islamic political thought** also follows the same pathway, because the concept of civil society was mainly argued through the discussions of “strong state-weak civil society”, but there are also other discussions such as “the role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in democratization”, “the relationship between Islam and civil society”, “nationalist discourses and civil society”, and “political culture and civil society” (Onbaşı, 2008: 131-132). On the other hand, studies on the concepts of civil society and CSOs following **communitarian republican** (active citizenship, political participation, and community goals), **Hegelian** (separation of civil society and the state, and principle of universality), or **Marxist** (class struggle, power relations, unification of civil society and the state, or hegemony) **approaches** are very limited in Turkey.

### **1.2.1. Comparative Approach: Turkish-Islamic and Western Conceptualizations of Civil Society**

Unlike other scholars who accept strong state as a tradition in Turkey, **Mardin** (1995) evaluates the state structure and existence or non-existence of civil society and CSOs by comparing **different contexts of Ottoman Empire, Turkish Republic, and Western European countries**. He argues that certain elements of civil society like compassion, justice and individuals, which developed throughout **socio-historical processes** in the Western Europe, can also be found in the Ottoman society (Mardin, 1994). He assumes that

“confrontation between center and periphery was the most important social cleavage underlying Turkish Politics and one that seemed to have survived more than a century of modernization” (Mardin, 1973: 170). In this formulation, the “**center** has always been **dominant over the periphery** and any encounter between them has been **one-dimensional** and resulted in **a clash rather than a compromise**” in the relationship between the ruler and the ruled (Çaylak, 2008: 117; Çaylak, 1998). Therefore, Mardin (1973) mainly explains the evolution of civil society and CSOs with reference to traditional **center and periphery relations** in Turkey.

Mardin (1995) argues that civil society as a structural dimension was **a dream** and **a historical aspiration for Western societies** that transformed into a **reality** through urbanization of Western medieval towns. He claims that “legally legitimated protection”, “city governments”, “concept of law”, “limitation of the power of rulers”, and “rule of law” appeared with the establishment and development of medieval towns in Western countries (Mardin, 1995: 279). Especially, individual rights and liberties as core concepts of civil society are products of these developments. When it comes to **dream of Muslim societies**, he assumes that Muslims mainly visualize a society in which **political obligations** are determined firstly by the **Qur’an**, secondly by **Qur’anic verisimilitude of the Qur’an’s commentators**, and thirdly **aegis of a Prince** (the ruler) (Mardin, 1995: 285). Especially, **charismatic authority of the ruler** is a very influential factor in Muslim societies, because it fills “the cracks of a

compromised, unrealized system of justice”, whereas “rationalization of legal practice and the self-referential aspect of law” decreases the authority of the ruler in Western societies (Mardin, 1995: 286). Moreover, Mardin (1995: 286) adds that “...compassion, respect for the individual as an emanation from one of the divine attributes, and respect for justice seen as the harmonizing of rival claims were elements of Islamic-Ottoman civilization; ‘freedom’ was not”. For instance, the word “freedom” did not have a Turkish equivalent when it firstly appeared in Ottoman Empire, so the word “serbestiyet” was invented. Moreover, limitation of political authority with reference to individual autonomy could not develop during this period until the Turkish Republic was established in 1923.

Mardin (1995: 288) argues that it was not possible to develop a **corporate personality** that represents collective interests in Muslim societies, because “Islam only recognized the physical person – not corporations as endowed with legal personality and rights”. In this sense, representation of individual interests in collective organizations was not very possible in Muslim societies, while it was very important in Western societies. Furthermore, Mardin (1995) assumes that “**ulema** were often leaders of populist outbreaks against the unjust ruler” in Muslim societies, and this can be thought as similar to civil society movements in Western societies. However, these populist outbreaks were mainly “episodic” and “diffuse”. Therefore, a civil society that is similar to Western type could not flourish in Muslim societies until recently. Mardin (1995) thinks that this will not be

possible until Muslim societies have the same dream of Western societies that made it possible for civil society to appear and develop. In this sense, rights, liberties, autonomy of individuals and corporate personalities can be possible through limitation of political authority. Consequently, his ideas on civil society are based on individual rights and liberties that are formulated by Kant and John Stuart Mill, and he argues that opposition to these rights and liberties means opposition to civilization (Mardin, 1994: 28-29). For instance, there are radical and moderate Islamist groups in Muslim societies. If moderate groups attend democratic processes in the organizational form without using violent methods, they can be regarded as part of civil society (Uğur, 1998: 220).

There are two different approaches to the conceptualization of civil society and CSOs in Islam. Negative approach argues that civil society and CSOs is not embedded in Muslim societies, while positive approach states that the emergence and development of civil society and CSOs is a corner stone of the Islamic state, because civil society is an example of an original and ideal society for Islam (Duman and Barut, 2015: 875; Sarıbay, 2001: 197). On the contrary, Gellner (1994) argues that it is not possible for civil society to emerge in Muslims societies due to incompatibility of the religious ideology with secularism, and influence of radical religious and tribal groups. In addition, he states that Islam is resistive against secularism despite the fact that civil society necessitates identification with religious belief (Sunar, 1998: 12). Similarly, Sariolghalam (1998: 79-81) also claim

that there are three constraints against the emergence of civil society and CSOs: one-dimensional religious doctrine that is based on ethereal teaching and culture, conformist attitude of people among the state, and negative stance against cooperation and teamwork between free individuals who form autonomous organizations.

**Sarıbay** (2001: 198-199) claims that the emergence of civil society is based on limitation of state's action and its interference into society, but the state is a reflection of ethical unification and oneness (*tevhid*) that can not be questioned or limited. This type of society mainly focuses on the equality of people as "ummah" which stands above all differences in the society from social classes to ethnic groups. Therefore, separation of the society into different groups against the idea of **ummah** is considered as sin, or evil against the unity of the society. In this sense, the change in this unity is prohibited against the human will, or external factors such as democracy and civil society. In contrast, **Çaha** (2004: 247) argues that Islam is based on a civilian religion that teaches people to choose good instead of bad by his/her own will in order to find the true path to heaven. He claims that Islam did not perceive a central and rigid understanding of the state, but civilian tendencies has transformed into political tendencies that are based on rigid-central organization of the state (Çaha, 2004: 251). Çaha (2004) adds that Islam is open to social differentiation, diversity, and social participation. Moreover, he assumes that the emphasis on "human being" is similar to the emphasis on "individual" in liberal understanding. Therefore, modern conceptualizations of individual,

social group, civil life, private life, free enterprise, political participation, election, rights, law, and limited state coincide with human being, community, private living space (*mahrem yaşam alanı*), free commercial environment, council (*şûra*), justice, and equity (*hakkaniyet*) in Islam (Çaha, 2004: 248-251). Similarly, Kukathas (1999: 39-41) also discusses that Islam does not only coincide with tolerance (*hoşgörü*), and existence of people in peace in practice, but it also includes opposition, conflict, consensus (*icma*), negotiation (*istişare*), freedom of thought and expression in theory as tradition.

Recently, civil society and CSOs were introduced to the developing and under-developed countries as a tool for democratization and modernization by a neo-liberal perspective. However, the explicit purpose was to integrate all national economies into the international market economy. For such purpose, civil society was consolidated to play a functional role in disseminating neo-liberal ideology throughout the world. This process has also influenced Islamic countries by liberal and secularist re-interpretation of Islamic values in comparison to Western values such as individual rights and freedom, freedom of association, civil and political participation. **Glisson et al.** (2009: 12) argues that this **interaction between Islamic and Western values** is not one-sided, because Islam also influences Western values in terms of education, market economy, communication, consumption, and civil society. Therefore, traditional discussion whether religious doctrine in the Quran enables secularism, private space, democracy, individual rights and liberties, and pluralism is not valid today. This

discussion is only discursive, considering the apparent influence of social, cultural, economic and political values of both the neo-liberal ideology and market mechanisms in Muslim societies

### **1.2.2. Conceptualization of Civil Society by Statist-Institutionalist Approach in Turkish-Islamic Thought**

The **strong state-weak civil society** discussions are mainly directed by **socio-historical processes**. For instance, **Heper** (1985: 98) argues that there is tension between strong state (center) and “an ill-organized and politically subordinated periphery” (civil society). He claims that **weak civil society** and **lack of democratic consolidation** is an eventual reality of a **strong state tradition** in Turkey (Heper, 1992). Therefore, Western type of a civil society could not flourish in Turkey, and this situation is considered as an obstacle against the development of democracy for scholars who focus on this tension.

In his statist-institutionalist approach, Heper (1992) takes the **state as an independent variable** being an autonomous entity in itself, because it shapes politics and society. Similarly, **Mann** (1985: 185) also argues that many theories like Marxist, or liberal explained the existence of civil society through the **reduction of autonomous power of the state** in which different struggles of classes, interest groups and individuals are represented and institutionalized. However, this autonomous power is still evident, and there is still an ongoing attention to analyze it despite the fact that it is considered to be reduced through history by different processes and factors. Therefore, the state is considered as a social actor that autonomously shapes

social structures through its power. Similarly, Heper argues that **political life** is mainly shaped by **state tradition** since early Ottoman centuries (Heper, 1985: 11). In this sense, the **state** can be positioned **as center**, because “the major goals for society are designated and safeguarded by those who represent the state, independent of civil society” (Heper, 1985: 5). This type of “stateness” results in a certain type of political culture that can be categorized under transcendentalism, or statist orientation on the one side, and instrumentalism, or societal orientation on the other side. The former category refers to a man who is primarily “part of a moral community”, while the latter means that this man is primarily “part of an interest community” (Heper, 1985: 7-8). Heper (1985) claims that Ottoman-Turkey state tradition represents a moderate transcendentalism in which “a consensus is imposed upon society in the form of **static norms**”, so the state shapes political life around these norms. On the other hand, civil society represents instrumentalism in which “goals for society are set” (Heper, 1985: 8). However, civil society and CSOs are not able to overcome conflicts, and create consensus in the society due to Ottoman-Turkish tradition of strong state-weak civil society (Heper, 1985: 103), because state-society relations are determined by a “dominant state faced by an ill-organized and politically subordinated periphery” (Heper, 1985: 98).

### 1.2.3. Conceptualization of Civil Society by Liberal Approach in Turkish-Islamic Thought

Liberal thinkers start with the analysis of statist-institutionalist approach that focuses on strong state-weak civil society relations. They argue that it is necessary to establish **control over state's action** and **minimize its interference into society** (Onbaşı, 2008: 169). Therefore, they expect a civil society being functional, improving democracy, encouraging political participation, and giving ability to society rather than the state in controlling social affairs. In this sense, it is necessary to develop a stronger, autonomous, active, influential and functional civil society and CSOs that can protect plurality, individual rights, interests, and liberties against strong state for liberal thinkers.

One popular view of liberal thinkers in Turkey sees state as “omnipotent”, or “fearsome tool” that has the power to shape and control political system and “every nook and cranny of social life” (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 250). Therefore, this kind of a state tradition limits the development of periphery (civil society) that can control and limit state's action and its interference in society. **Toprak** (1988: 119) argues that the state-civil society relationships are mainly shaped by “a long tradition of a dominant state controlling the social fabric” since the Ottoman rule. This tradition has continued in the Turkish Republic **through military coups** that guaranteed state's dominance over politics, civil society and CSOs. In addition, Toprak (1988: 120) sees an overpowering bureaucracy as a major obstacle, because it

“leaves little room for individual initiative and collective pursuit of interests within autonomous domains, free from state interference”. Similarly, **Göle** (1994: 213-214) also argues that “every attempt on the part of civil societal elements to free themselves from the domination of the state had led to repression by the state” since the 1980s. Furthermore, **Çaha** (2005: 14) assumes that state can control civil society activities by limiting it to organizational life, and CSOs can only operate if they are recognized by the state. In another publication, **Çaha** (2000: 9) defines CSOs as groups of individuals who aim to separate themselves from the state, because they compose **an autonomous social sphere**. Therefore, it is necessary to develop this social sphere, individual rights and liberties through limiting state’s activities and interference (Çaha, 1999).

**Kalaycıoğlu** (2002) argues that CSOs cannot fulfill their **watchdog function over the state in Turkey**, because he found that CSOs have tendency to cooperate with the state rather than cooperating with other CSOs, and this situation harms the idea of a separate civil society from the state. Similarly, **Çaha** (2000: 10-12) also claims that it is necessary to establish a civil society separated from state in Turkey through “civil consciousness” that provides a distinct identity, liberal and democratic culture for civil society, but these features are not evident in Turkish civil society. Like Çaha, other scholars with liberal approach see CSOs as voluntary organizations that have self-generating, self-governing and autonomous structure, likewise seeking individual, national and group interests (Erdoğan-Tosun, 2005a: 29;

Erdoğan-Tosun, 2005b: 135; Özbudun, 1997). Liberal thinkers mainly assume that harmony and consensus of different individuals and groups can be achieved through competition between these actors under equal conditions if state's action and its interference on social sphere is once limited. This kind of pluralist context can increase **political participation** in the society. For instance, **Özbudun** (1997) argues that the **consolidation of democracy** can be achieved by increasing a balanced relationship between civil society and political society, namely political parties. This situation can also increase the role of civil society in politics, because CSOs can negotiate, pressure and monitor political parties that compete with each other to obtain state power.

#### **1.2.4. Conceptualization of Civil Society by Conservative Approach in Turkish-Islamic Thought**

This approach has **conservative motives** in explaining the conceptions of civil society and CSOs as a result of **spontaneous**, or **natural development of the society**. Like liberal thinkers, the state's action and its interference in social, economic and political life should be limited, so self-development of the society will not be interrupted. However, the state tradition in Turkey resulted in **external interference to the social transformation** since the single party period (Erdoğan, 2005: 190-191). Moreover, state has mainly designed the society according to state ideology, and left **no room for an autonomous social sphere** in which civil society and CSOs can flourish, therefore, democratic consolidation could not be achieved

until recently (Erdoğan, 2005: 189-193). **Erdoğan** (2001: 30-31) criticizes state's position located above the society, but there is a need to have a state "serving" the society rather than ruling it. He claims that **society** is not an organization to be ruled, it is rather **an organism that evolves and develops spontaneously** without an external interference, so state should not intervene, or mobilize the individuals and society in accordance with state ideology, or common purpose. This can be achieved **by the rule of law** which limits state's action and its interference to the society. Like **Oakeshott**, Erdoğan (2000: 29) also argues that the state should not see individuals as agents forced to follow some certain task that are determined by central authority, because he considers individual preferences, rights, liberties, choices, interests and aims as main priorities. And it is not easy to eliminate this plurality in the society, so individuals may choose to unite and organize as a group by voluntary action as a free choice (Erdoğan, 2000).

#### **1.2.5. Conceptualization of Civil Society by Citizenship-Oriented Approach in Turkish-Islamic Thought**

Like republican thinkers in Western political thought, **citizenship-oriented approach** in Turkey also focuses on the values of civic virtue, active citizenship, social responsibility, individual rights and freedoms in the relations between state and society. However, this approach also evaluates civil society and CSOs through the traditional argument of strong state-weak civil society dichotomy in Turkey.

**Fuat E. Keyman** has been an influential and leading scholar that contributed to civil society literature in Turkey since 1990s. In his publication “A Transforming Turkey in A Changing World” (*Değişen Dünya Dönüşen Türkiye*), he has a liberal-republican approach to citizenship, because he considers individuals as **active citizens** who participate in politics to influence state’s actions (Keyman, 2005). **Keyman and İçduygu** (2005: 1-4) argue that Turkish modernity since the establishment of the Turkish Republic has been directed by a **state-centric modernity** through “strong state tradition, national developmentalism, an organic vision of society and a republican model of citizenship”. In addition, the Turkish state has played a dominant role, operated independently from society, and transformed society from above. Therefore, he thinks that it is necessary to scrutinize social processes through using individual right of political participation. Because it is not only enough to explain individual rights and liberties through limiting state’s actions and interference to society, but it is also necessary to focus on individual capacity to construct his or her own environment, to make a difference, and to have critical thinking among social processes through **active citizenship** and **political participation** (Keyman, 2005: 174). In this sense, CSOs play an important role that contribute to active and participatory citizenship in the transformation of Turkey.

**Tekeli** (2004: 8) argues that the meaning of democracy and the concept of individual has changed with **global developments** and **transformations**, so it is necessary to re-define and re-conceptualize

them. In line with these developments, the terms “participatory democracy” and “civil society” have gained much consideration. Today, individuals have responsibility because they are active citizens, and members of civil society compared to individuals who were previously passive citizens, and only obliged to fulfill some duties given by the central authority in the past (Tekeli, 2004: 142). However, Turkish society has not demanded a more active political participation due to **state-centric modernization process** until recently. Tekeli (2004: 44-48) claims that attempts of a **small minority** for increasing political participation and active citizenship is not enough to make a comprehensive change within the current political culture in Turkish society, so this situation has resulted in **nepotism** and **patronage** in the recent representative democracy. In this sense, the **passiveness of the majority** in the society should be replaced by a **consciousness of active citizenship** as a primary requirement for Turkey’s democratic consolidation (Tekeli, 2004: 47).

**Keyman and İçduygu** (2005) claim that **state-centric modernization process** has been challenged and its legitimacy has increasingly been questioned since the 1980s by radical changes and transformations in Turkish social and political life. They argue that the first challenge was the **transformation of Turkish economy** from import-oriented to export-oriented economy by ideological and institutional developments that caused a shift from state-economy to free market economy. Secondly, **a conservative approach to society as an organism** has been challenged by the increase of three factors;

“the resurgence of Islam”, “Kurdish question”, and “the emergence of civil society”. Thirdly, the first two developments caused **a crisis within the republican model of citizenship**, because society has started to demand more participatory democracy, individual rights and liberties by limiting state’s action and its interference in social sphere (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005: 7-8). As a result of these developments, the state realized that it needs to govern the society more democratically, to provide more rights and freedoms for citizens, and to ensure plurality rather than sameness in the social relations (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005: 17). In line with the ideas of Habermas who claims that the state centric world can be democratized by interaction of active citizens, Keyman and İçduygu (2003: 232) also argue that civil society plays a positive role in constituting “necessary condition for democratizing the state centric world” in Turkey.

As a communitarian-republican thinker, **Sarıbay** (2005: 32-37) criticizes different approaches in Turkish-Islamic Political Thought, which consider civil society **a means to achieve another end**; limiting state’s action and its interference in social sphere. On the contrary, civil society should be considered **as an end itself**, because civil society is an ethical community in which **ethics** and **virtues** are based on the consideration that “there are other individuals who are all at least as respectable as me” (Sarıbay, 2005: 36; Sarıbay, 2001: 18). Like citizenship-oriented approach, Sarıbay (2000: 56) also gives importance to individuals who can achieve their self-determination within civil society as a factor that limits the danger of despotism.

However, individuals can realize their self-determination only within the community, because they should consider **benefit of the community as a whole** (Sarıbay, 2005: 37). Therefore, he criticizes **atomistic** and **autonomous individual** in the community, and uses the conceptualization of **Ernest Gellner** for individuals, namely “modular individuals”, who are aware of the fact that they are all parts of the **civil society as an ethnical community/entity** (Sarıbay, 2001: 19). Therefore, civil society fulfills a basic role to “unite the individuals and groups that are isolated and excluded within the social order without harming their differences and hence autonomies” (Sarıbay, 2001: 18). Moreover, he claims that “dialogical democracy” is a beneficial tool to achieve unification of these individuals and groups, because it is based on **dialogue** that is “the only means that makes it possible to live together with the other in **a state of reciprocal tolerance**. While doing this, in turn, it does not consider who and what the other is, and hence it opposes to all kinds of fundamentalism” (Sarıbay, 2000: 12). Finally, he warns against **despotism among civil society**, because **struggle for power** can result in domination and suppression of certain groups/individuals among other groups/individuals. Furthermore, this struggle can also cause a **fragmented society** in which individuals and groups do not have understanding of **civil society as single ethnical community/entity** (Sarıbay, 2005: 31-36).

## 2. DEFINITIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS (CSOs)

In the previous part of this chapter, the conceptualization of civil society in Western and Turkish-Islamic political thoughts were discussed in detail. However, the focus of this book is the historical, theoretical and organizational development of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)<sup>4</sup>, because they function as facilitators of civil society through their voluntary action in the direction of people's common interests in many different areas. In this sense, they are mainly regarded as an organized form of civil society (Anheier, 2005: 9). There are various terms associated with **civil society** and **CSOs** in the literature. Civil society, for instance, is known as “charitable sector” (Lange et al., 2017), “not-for-profit” (Ghatak and Müller, 2011), “social economy” (Matei and Dorobantu, 2015), “non-profit sector” (Macedo et al., 2016; Önder, 2006), “independent sector”<sup>5</sup>, “voluntary sector” (Kendall and Knapp, 1996), “third sector” (Hodges and Howieson, 2017), “organized civil society” (Garton, 2009). There are also different terms for CSOs such as “NGOs – Non-

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<sup>4</sup> Akşit et al. (2002: 408-409) argue that it is misleading to use the term “Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları” (STK) in Turkey as a synonym for the term “Non-Governmental Organizations” (NGOs) that is used in the Western literature. The term NGO refers to organizations that are independent from the government, while it is hard to consider a “STK” as an independent organization from the government. Therefore, he assumes that the term “Civil Society Organizations” (CSOs), which is mainly used in the Soviet-Bloc countries and some third world countries, has the closest meaning for STK in Turkey.

<sup>5</sup> There is an Independent Sector coalition which brings together different CSOs, and offers American Express NGen Fellows Program. Retrieved March 27, 2019, from [www.independentsector.org/about/](http://www.independentsector.org/about/)

Governmental Organizations” (Brass et al., 2018), “not-for-profit providers” (Besley and Malcomson, 2018), “voluntary organizations” (Benton, 2016), “NPOs – Non-Profit Organizations” (Weerawardena et al., 2010), “voluntary associations” (Olson, 1971) or “NPIs-Non-Profit Institutions” (European Commission et al., 2009). However, defining civil society organizations (CSOs) is not an easy task, although most people would agree that they are an essential element of society.

There are CSOs that are small in size and serve as community-based groups, while there are also others that are large in size and operate as umbrella organizations or provide financial support to other CSOs. On the other hand, some CSOs operate in the market to provide favorable conditions and resources for private sector organizations, known as “extra-market activities” (Gassler, 1986). These include educational institutions that provide human resources for the markets. Others operate outside the market to provide humanitarian aid. Secondly, it is not possible to explain non-profit sector by one specific theoretical approach because the **sector is too heterogeneous** (Badelt, 1997: 169). Therefore, there are many different approaches focusing on different functions of CSOs such as market support; provision of public goods, private goods analogous to public goods, and cultural services; facilitation of political action, self-determination, and entrepreneurship (Garton, 2009: 41-87). Finally, CSOs can be created by people, corporations, or state with different purposes. They might be created for “the benefit of households or corporations who control

or finance them; or they may be created for charitable, philanthropic or welfare reasons to provide goods or services to other people in need; or they may be intended to provide health or education services for a fee, but not for profit; or they may be intended to promote the interests of pressure groups in business or politics; etc.” (European Commission et al., 2009: 72). Therefore, there are different concepts for defining civil society and CSOs. These concepts are used by different scholars interchangeably.

**Charity:** it is an “individual benevolence and caring” embedded in different cultures and religions (Anheier, 2005: 8). For instance, ‘almsgiving’, which is regarded as charity, is one of the five pillars of Islam to alleviate poverty or increase solidarity between believers. On the other hand, charity is also very essential in Christianity, Judaism, and other beliefs.

**Philanthropy:** This concept is mostly associated with making material donations to people in need (Çarkoğlu and Aytaç, 2016). The term includes all types of voluntary individual contributions to avoid social problems such as poverty, human rights, and starvation. These contributions are mainly carried out by voluntary donations and personal efforts by using their skills. For instance, a doctor can voluntarily treat poor people in regions where access to health services is very difficult, or that doctor can donate money to CSOs that help these people.

**Volunteering:** Individuals carry out voluntary activities by donating their time to help people in need. For instance, they can visit sick people, clean up natural parks or distribute food. The concept is mainly associated with “the expansion of social capital” and “activities for the benefit of society” (Markova, 2017).

**Giving:** Individuals or organizations that make voluntary donations for people in need in the form of money or public goods and services. For instance, many citizens prefer to make private donations, while organizations like Turkish Red Crescent provide humanitarian aid in Turkey and abroad including accommodation, food and education.

**Civil Society:** In a modern sense, civil society is “the sum of institutions, organizations, and individuals located between the family, the state, and the market, in which people associate voluntarily to advance common interests” (Anheier, 2005: 9). In this sense, CSOs are the organized form of civil society.

**Social Capital:** This concept is mainly understood as the resources embedded in individual’s social network, because individuals can access to information, influence, or social status by their social contacts (Benton, 2016). It is also created by skills, social networks, actual and potential qualifications, experiences and characteristics of individuals which are shared and mobilized through CSOs. The sharing and mobilization of these features of individuals are mainly based on reciprocity and trust in the civil society.

With the establishment of modern nation-state, civil society was **re-conceptualized horizontally** and **vertically** within the discussion of “social contract” (İçduygu et al., 2011: 49). **In the horizontal conceptualization**, civil society functions as **intermediary between the rulers and ruled**, while it refers to **expansion and development of the space** where citizens live together **in the vertical manner**. On the other hand, Keane (1988: 35) argues that civil society is a space that arises in the areas of “state and society” and “state and citizen”. **During the modernization process**, scholars like Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant focused on the **functional and regulatory role of civil society** through the discussion of relations between state and society. **After the modernization process**, scholars like Hegel and Gramsci considered civil society as **an area between state and society**, and **an area of conflicts between social classes and markets** (Seligman, 1992: 3). **Today**, civil society is considered to be **filling democratic deficit** in liberal democracies, because they represent a **new sector** where citizens can enjoy their rights and freedoms without state interference.

Alternative definitions of CSOs, as the organized forms of civil society, are a result of different **legal, sectoral or economic approaches**. Firstly, **legal definitions** mainly focus on **charitable purposes**, therefore, these definitions disregard some types of organizations which are also accepted as CSOs such as political pressure groups, trade unions and mutual organizations. Secondly, **sectoral definitions** locate civil society as **a new sector** which has

certain borders, but the borders between civil society, public sector and private sector are blurred. For instance, education can be provided by CSOs, private sector organizations, or public institutions at the same time. Finally, the **financial definition** of CSOs is based on their **source of income** and **economic activity**. However, CSOs do not only operate in economic activities, but they also operate in **social activities**. In addition, some types of CSOs can seek profit in the markets by investing on assets or interest, although this profit is not distributed to the owners of these organizations. To sum up, this book focuses on common features of CSOs that categorize them as CSOs. Therefore, the term “**civil society organizations**” (CSOs) are preferred in this book in order to have a more **comprehensive conceptualization** than legal, sectoral or economic definitions.

## **2.1. Sectoral Definition of CSOs**

There had only been private sector (marketplace) and public sector (state) until 17<sup>th</sup> century. Since then, the idea of **informal sector** (family sector) and **organized civil society** has also recently emerged (Garton, 2009). However, the distinction between these sectors is not very clear, so it is hard to decide whether an organization certainly belongs to a specific sector, or not. Moreover, there is not a consensus on the sectoral definition of civil society, there are rather competing explanations by different scholars (Scott, 2003: 2). Salamon (1995) argues that civil society had been considered as part of public sector until the boundaries between public and private sectors emerged. Similarly, Hall and Keith (2000: 1) suggest that the sectoral definition

of civil society is mainly discussed through description of the “**common space** between the state and market”. This common space is considered as something different from public and private sectors, because CSOs serve members and non-members with a broader public interest (Önder, 2006: 8).

The project of Civil Society Index<sup>6</sup> describes civil society as the area created to develop common goals of individuals, groups, and organizations separate from family, public and private sectors (İçduygu et al., 2011: 16). This definition is a comprehensive one which includes CSOs and other actors, because **the borders** between civil society, public and private sectors are **blurred**. Therefore, these types of generalizations for civil society make it hard to determine the typology of CSOs.

In general, **private sector organizations** seek maximum profit in the marketplace and distribute it amongst their owners; **public institutions and bodies** derive their powers from the state, and they exercise “public function”; **informal sector** consists of family units which support **social network** amongst their members, and consume goods and services in the private sector; **organized civil society** consists of CSOs, and seek **charitable purposes** mainly based on **public benefit** which are different from other sectors (Garton, 2009:

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<sup>6</sup> This project, which was made between January 2009 and December 2010, aims to use various participatory research methods to find out the recent situation of civil society in Turkey. In the analysis, it evaluates five core dimensions: civic engagement, level of organization, practice of values, perceived impact and external environment in Turkey (İçduygu et al., 2011).

20-23). However, it is still difficult to make a clear distinction between organizations in different sectors, especially in some areas like education and health), where more than one type of organizations from different sectors are operating. In order to avoid functional overlap between these organizations that belong to different sectors, it is more useful to focus on “structural or operational features” of these organizations as argued later in this chapter (please see *2.4. Common Features of CSOs*).

## **2.2. Legal Definition of CSOs**

Globally, CSOs are legally defined by the **charitable purposes** which are determined in national legislations. However, there are **five types of CSOs** with different legal definitions based on **Turkish legislation**. These are **(i)associations, (ii)foundations, (iii)unions, (iv)cooperatives, (v)chambers of commerce/industry and commodity exchanges**. The legal definitions of these CSOs are given in more detail later in this chapter (please see *3. Types of CSOs in Turkey*). In this part, there are mainly different **legal definitions of CSOs in different countries**: Japan, Australia, Brazil, the UK, and the USA. These countries were chosen to compare legal definitions of CSOs in different countries, because each country has a unique culture, and different socio-historical processes. Therefore, the development of civil society follows different paths that are similar, contradicting or overlapping throughout the world. For instance, as an Asian country, **Japan** has a unique culture of “**harmonious**” society, and Japanese people are mainly described as “hardworking, docile,

and politically rather passive, preferring to leave the important decisions about the future of their nation to bureaucrats and politicians” (Vosse, 2017: 31). In other words, there is **no liberal tradition** of individual rights and liberties, political participation, and active citizenship that develop civil society, namely *shimin shakai*, in Japan until the 1980s. Therefore, **Western way of civil society** could only develop after the 1980s, but it has mainly been considered as weak in Japan until recently. Similarly, civil society in **Brazil** could only develop after the **democratization process** in 1988 by the **Democratic Constitution** that “changed virtually all aspects of government, decentralized many government functions, and allowed for the creation of citizen councils at the local level as oversight mechanisms for health, education, and the environment, among other policy areas” (Leeds, 2013: 2). Like Turkey, Brazil was also ruled by a **military regime** between 1964 and 1985, so there were not appropriate conditions for civil society to develop until the new democratic constitution was adopted (Wampler, 2012: 342). On the other hand, the USA, the UK and Australia are mainly considered as liberal countries in which civil society has more appropriate conditions to emerge and develop throughout the history.

**Table 1:** List of Charitable Purposes in Different Countries

<b>JAPAN</b>	<b>BRAZIL</b>	<b>USA</b>
General Incorporated Association and Foundation Law (Article 34)	Civil Code (Law 13.151/2015, Article 1)	Internal Revenue Code (Section 501 (c) (3))
<i>advancing of health, medical treatment, or welfare</i>	<i>advancing health care</i>	<i>scientific literary</i>
<i>advancing social education</i>	<i>advancing education</i>	<i>education</i>
<i>advancing community development</i>	<i>advancing social assistance</i>	<i>maintenance of public buildings, monuments</i>
<i>promotion of science and technology</i>	<i>advancing scientific research, development of alternative technologies</i>	<i>religion</i>
<i>advancing culture, arts, or sports</i>	<i>advancing culture</i>	<i>prevention of cruelty to children</i>
<i>protection of consumer, promotion of economic activities</i>	<i>advancing historical preservation and cultural heritage</i>	<i>eliminating prejudice and discrimination</i>
<i>promotion of human rights or peace</i>	<i>advancing protection of rights</i>	<i>defending human and civil rights secured by law</i>
<i>advancing community safety</i>	<i>advancing nutrition and food security</i>	<i>testing for public safety</i>
<i>advancing a society with equal gender participation, and sound nurturing of youth</i>	<i>advancing economic and social development</i>	<i>prevention of cruelty to children</i>
<i>conservation of the environment</i>	<i>advancing environmental defense, preservation, conservation and promotion of sustainable development</i>	<i>fostering national or international amateur sports competition</i>
<i>disaster relief</i>	<i>advancing citizenship and democracy</i>	<i>relief of the poor, the distressed or the unprivileged</i>
<i>international cooperation</i>	<i>promotion of voluntary work</i>	<i>lessening the burdens of government</i>

**Source:** General Incorporated Association and Foundation Law of Japan (Article 34),<sup>7</sup> Civil Code of Brazil (Law 13.151/2015, Article 1),<sup>8</sup> Internal Revenue Code of the USA (Section c-3)<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> General Incorporated Association and Foundation Law of Japan is available online. Retrieved March 12, 2019, from <https://www.cof.org/content/nonprofit-law-japan>

**Table 1** displays charitable purposes in Japan, Brazil and the USA. Charitable purposes of CSOs are mainly similar in these countries. The definitions of the term “charity” are similar in the American, English and Australian regulations. For instance, Charities Act 2013 of **Australia** defines charity as an entity:

- (a) that is a not-for-profit entity; and*
- (b) all of the purposes of which are:*
  - (i) charitable purposes (see Part 3) that are for the public benefit (see Division 2 of this Part); or*
  - (ii) purposes that are incidental or ancillary to, and in furtherance or in aid of, purposes of the entity covered by subparagraph (i); and*
- (c) none of the purposes of which are disqualifying purposes (see Division 3); and*
- (d) that is not an individual, a political party or a government entity.*

On the other hand, a charity is defined in Charities Act 2011 of **England** as:<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Civil Code of Brazil is available online. Retrieved March 12, 2019, from <https://www.cof.org/content/nonprofit-law-brazil>

<sup>9</sup> Details about the organizations exempted from federal income tax and charity purposes can be found online. Retrieved March 12, 2019, from <https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-purposes>

<sup>10</sup> Details of these charitable purposes can be found at the official website of the Charity Commission for England and Wales under the topic “Guidance: Charitable Purposes” published on September 16, 2013. Retrieved March 12, 2019, from <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/charitable-purposes/charitable-purposes#descriptions-of-purposes>

*(1) For the purposes of the law of England and Wales, “charity” means an institution which—*

*(a) is established for charitable purposes only, and*

*(b) falls to be subject to the control of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction with respect to charities.*

*(2) The definition of “charity” in subsection (1) does not apply for the purposes of an enactment if a different definition of that term applies for those purposes by virtue of that or any other enactment.*

Internal Revenue Code (Section 501 (c) (3)) of the USA states that a public charity is:

“organized or operated for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition, and preventing cruelty to children or animals”. Therefore, a charity must not be “organized or operated for the benefit of private interests, such as the creator or the creator's family, shareholders of the organization, other designated individuals, or persons controlled directly or indirectly by such private interests”.<sup>11</sup>

**In Japan,** CSOs are mainly defined as **associations and foundations** that are established on the basis of **public interest**. There are also subtypes of CSOs under Article 34 of Civil Code: “social welfare

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<sup>11</sup> Section 501 (c) (3) of USA’s Internal Revenue Code is online. Retrieved March 12, 2019, from [www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/inurement-private-benefit-charitable-organizations](http://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/inurement-private-benefit-charitable-organizations)

organizations”, “educational organizations”, “religious corporations”, “medical corporations”, “relief and rehabilitation enterprises”, and “SNCs - Special Nonprofit Corporations”.<sup>12</sup> The Committee for Public Interest Organizations screens applications of organizations in terms of some requirements.<sup>13</sup> For instance, the activities of the organization should fall under the categories displayed in **Table 1**. Moreover, revenues which are earned from activities of the organization for public benefit should not exceed the expenses for these activities. On the other hand, a maximum of one third of the board members or auditors of the organization can be appointed or elected from the same family or a given company. The requirements are determined to guarantee nonprofit structure of the CSOs that does not belong to one family or a given company. If the organization fits these requirements, it can receive tax privileges (e.g., exemption from taxes on grants and other types of income that are earned from non-business activities), but this is not possible for CSOs established for profit making activities.

**In Brazil**, associations are traditionally regarded as **not-for-profit organizations** when they are established by at least two and more individuals or legal entities that seek public interest purposes. On the other hand, foundations are recognized as private legal entities that also seek public interest purposes. **Public foundations** are established

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<sup>12</sup> SNCs are created by the Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities Law in 1998. Tax-deductible status is given to these organizations by government for 5 years.

<sup>13</sup> The full list of requirements for the establishment of a CSO is available online. Retrieved March 12, 2019, from <https://www.cof.org/content/nonprofit-law-japan>

under public institutions, and these organizations are created by law. They carry out public activities not necessarily assigned to the government. However, **private foundations** are established by legal entities and individuals. These organizations need to have sufficient assets to achieve their organizational missions.

Under the new Law (13.019/2014) in 2014, the following organizations are also regarded as CSOs in Brazil: (i) non-profit private entities that do not distribute any benefits (e.g., portions of its assets or shares) among their shareholders, employees, donors or third parties etc., (ii) cooperative societies that are mainly focused on poverty, employment, training of laborers, etc., (iii) religious organizations that mainly seek religious purposes for public interest. Like the category for nonprofit organizations in the Internal Revenue Code (501 (c) (3)) in the USA, CSOs that seek social assistance and advancing education are also exempted from taxes in Brazil. These organizations are eligible for **tax benefits** only if they do not distribute profits, have valid accounting records, and carry out legal activities. There are **three special designations** that CSOs obtain to receive tax benefits: (i) Public Interest Civil Society Organizations (OSCIPs) that have public employees and officials in their governing bodies, and they are established by the Ministry of Justice (Law 9.790/1999), (ii) Social Organizations (OSs) that have public officials in their governing bodies, and they are established by the federal government (Law 9.637/1998), and (iii) Certified Beneficent Social Assistance Entities (CEBASs) that mainly operate in the areas of

health, education, or social assistance (e.g., children, disable people, rehabilitation, and elderly) (Law 12.101/2009). It is important to note that associations and foundations can generally engage in legislative or political activities, while OCSIPs are explicitly restricted to take part in political activities.

Legal definitions of CSOs above are similar, and these definitions mainly focus on **charitable purposes**, therefore, these definitions disregard some types of organizations which are also accepted as CSOs: “political pressure groups, mutual, religious institutions, trade unions and recreational societies” (Garton, 2009: 31-32). These organizations are not fully attached to **charitable purposes** and **philanthropy**, but they are still based on **mutuality**. Douglas (1983: 5) claims that the distinction between different types of CSOs is “somewhat artificial and arbitrary”. For instance, he argues that activities of political pressure groups are not directly related to charitable purposes or philanthropy, but these activities are “a natural and almost inevitable extension” of charitable purposes because they cover the provision of public goods (Douglas, 1983: 51).

**In Turkey**, a CSO is mainly considered as **an association and a foundation** although there are also other types of CSOs: trade unions, cooperatives, and professional organizations (chambers of commerce/industry, and commodity exchanges). For instance, associations refer to “the societies founded in the status of legal entity by at least seven real persons or legal entities by continuously pooling their knowledge and efforts in order to realize a given and common

objective not prohibited by the laws excluding those at profit sharing purposes” (Associations Law, numbered 5253, Article 2, published on 04.11.2004). On the other hand, a public servant’s trade union refers to “any institution with artificial personality formed by public servants for the protection and improvement of their common economic, social and occupational rights and benefits” (Law on Public Servants’ Trade Unions and Collective Agreement, numbered 4688, published on 12 July 2001). The first definition emphasizes the **exclusion of profit-making for CSOs**, while the second definition underlines the role of CSOs in representing **common economic, social and occupational rights** as well as **benefits for their members**.

### **2.3. Economic Definition of CSOs**

The financial definition of civil society is based on their **source of income**. European Commission et al. (2008: 72) refer to CSOs as Non-Profit Institutions (NPIs) which are “legal or social entities, created or the purpose of producing goods and services, whose status does not permit them to be a source of income, profit or other financial gain for the units that establish, control or finance them”. There are also some other characteristics of CSOs in terms of economic issues (European Commission et al., 2009: 72-73):

- CSOs are **legal entities** created by process of law whose existence is recognized independently of the persons, corporations or government units that establish, finance, and control or manage them.

- There are **no shareholders** with a claim on the profits or equity of the NPI. The members are not entitled to a share in any profits, or surplus...
- Members of the association controlling the NPI are **not permitted to gain financially** from its operations and cannot appropriate any surplus that it may make.
- CSOs **engage in market and non-market production** as this affects the sector of the economy, and they also engage mainly in non-market production.

In addition, Salamon and Anheier (1998: 219) define **11 areas of economic activity** of CSOs: “culture and recreation, education research, health, social services, environment, development/housing, civic/advocacy, philanthropy, international, business/professional, and other”. However, it is important to note that CSOs do not only operate in particular areas of economic activity, but they might also operate in different areas like political and social at the same time. As Garton (2009: 34) argues “CSOs have a rich history of innovation, frequently entering new markets”, therefore, any attempt to classify CSOs according to specific areas of economic activity will be invalid over time.

## 2.4. Common Features of CSOs

In general, “hospitals, universities, social clubs, professional organizations, day care centers, environmental groups, family counseling agencies, sports clubs, job training centers, human rights organizations, and many more” are accepted as CSOs (Salamon et al., 1999: 3). These organizations operate in any areas or segments of society from education, humanitarian aid and immigration to protection of local identities, poverty and animal rights. Therefore, there are very different explanations to define CSOs in the literature. However, these organizations share some **common features** despite their diversity.

In the literature, there is an attempt to describe common features of CSOs based on **structural or operational features of CSOs**. It is very beneficial to distinguish CSOs from other organizations and institutions that belong to public and private sectors. These features are (Salamon and Anheier, 1998):

- CSOs have an institutional presence and structure as **organizations**,
- CSOs are institutionally separated from the state, because they have **private basis**,
- CSOs do not return profits to their managers or to a set of owners, because they **are not distributing profit**,
- CSOs are fundamentally in control of their own affairs because they have **self-governing structure**,

- Membership of CSOs is not legally required and they attract some level of voluntary contribution in the form of time or money, because they are **voluntary-based organizations**,

There are also some other features which help us to distinguish CSOs from other entities:

- CSOs are mainly **small-size** organizations so they are **flexible** to follow public purposes (Salamon, 1987),
- CSOs contribute to building of **social capital resources** by expanding and strengthening network ties for their members (Benton 2016; Salamon, 1999),
- CSOs are **insulated from political distractions**, because they do not have to worry about being elected in the next elections (Salamon, 1987),
- CSOs have different values from the state and the market such as **philanthropy, altruism, charity, reciprocity and mutuality** (Douglas, 1983; Garton, 2009; Salamon, 1987),
- CSOs are mainly financed by **voluntary donations** (Garton, 2009; Önder, 2006),
- Activities of CSOs are mainly carried by **voluntary workers** (Kendall and Knapp, 1996).

Although these features are common to majority of CSOs, there are **some exceptions** since some of these features can intersect with entities in private and public sectors. For instance, CSOs are not necessarily small in size compared to private sector organizations and

public institutions. Kendall (2003: 169) empirically found that CSOs are relatively larger compared to private sector organizations in the provision of “residential care”, in the UK. Moreover, Gassler (1986) argues that some CSOs operate in the market and provide favorable conditions and resources for private sector organizations, known as “extra-market activities” (*please see in Chapter III*). Additionally, activities of CSOs are not necessarily carried out only by voluntary workers, because some CSOs need full-time professional paid workers in some areas such as health and education sectors. Finally, government funding is one of the financial resources for CSOs, so they should consider the political interests of the government to increase chances to secure its future income (Garton, 2009: 61); therefore, they are not fully insulated from the political distractions. Although, there are exceptions, these common features are still very beneficial to distinguish CSOs from other types of entities which belong to other sectors.

### **3. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CSOs**

This part firstly evaluates a short history of CSOs in the world. Then it broadly explains the historical development of CSOs in Turkey in terms of five different periods with reference to Great Seljuks and Ottoman Empires: (i) 1923-1945, (ii) 1945-1960, (iii) 1960-1980, (iv) 1980-2000, and (v) after 2000.

### 3.1. Historical Development of CSOs in the World

It is not possible to determine a certain date when CSOs, as we understand it today, emerged in history. However, it is still possible to argue that CSOs have existed throughout history in different forms, because there are some **historical evidences** about their presence. For instance, the word “collegia” was used to refer to activities of some type of organizations in **Ancient Greece** and **Rome Empire** such as “guild, club, society, fraternity (of men belonging to the same trade or having some common ties or interest)” as the word is defined by the Oxford Latin Dictionary written by Glare (1968: 350). Therefore, this type of organizations, which were based on social objectives, had existed “earlier than recorded history” (Duff, 1938).

**In England**, for instance, the significance of civil society was understood by the state during Elizabeth I (1533-1603), because the Court of Chancery recognized the “charitable use” and “charitable trust” as new legislation. After that, the law of the Charitable Uses Act of 1597, which was redrafted in 1601, remained as a guarantee of **charitable gift** until 1853, and this law created a basis for the current concept of charity in the modern common law of England (Garton, 2009: 3-4). In 1998, Charity Commission (a non-ministerial government department), which determines the **charitable status** of organizations according to the popular understanding of charity and recent social and economic conditions since the Charitable Uses Act of 1601, was established. After that Charities Act was passed in

2006.<sup>14</sup> There is definition and list of charitable activities in this Act on the second page. Similarly, in Australia, reformation attempts for CSOs started with the “Charities Definition Inquiry” in 2000,<sup>15</sup> because after this a “Report of the Inquiry into the Definition of Charities and Related Organizations” was published in 2001.<sup>16</sup> This report proposed many reforms in the existing law of charity. Definition of **charity**, **charity purposes** and **public benefit** are defined according to Charities Act 2013 which clarified complicated definitions of these terms.<sup>17</sup> Today, charities still play an important role as the CSOs because it was estimated that 31 billion sterling of the third sector’s income was generated by charities alone in England (Reichardt et al., 2008: 4). These organizations are significant but have some differences, because they have specific purposes.

**In the USA**, there were some **colonial associations** such as Church of England providing educational, social and religious services in many states like Maryland, New Jersey, and New York (Hammack, 2001:

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<sup>14</sup> Detailed list of charitable purposes can be checked under the official online text of Charities Act 2006. Retrieved March 27, 2019, from [www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/50/pdfs/ukpga\\_20060050\\_en.pdf](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/50/pdfs/ukpga_20060050_en.pdf)

<sup>15</sup> The details of the Charities Definition Inquiry can be found in the official website of The Treasury, Australian Government. Retrieved March 27, 2019, from [www.treasury.gov.au/review/charities-definition-inquiry/](http://www.treasury.gov.au/review/charities-definition-inquiry/)

<sup>16</sup> The details of Report of the Inquiry into the Definition of Charities and Related Organisations can be found online. Retrieved March 27, 2019, from [www.trove.nla.gov.au/work/33957823?q](http://www.trove.nla.gov.au/work/33957823?q)

<sup>17</sup> For instance, purposes for the public benefit are defined in Charities Act 2013 as “(1) A purpose that an entity has is for the public benefit if: (a) the achievement of the purpose would be public benefit, and (b) the purpose is directed to a benefit that is available to the members of: (i) the general public; or (ii) a sufficient section of general public”. The online version of the Act is available. Retrieved March 27, 2019, from [www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2013A00100](http://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2013A00100)

159). During the colonial period each federal state had similar legislation to English charity law until the end of American Revolution (1775-1783), because, for instance, Charitable Uses Act of 1601 and English common law became invalid when the English legislation was repealed in Virginia in 1792. However, today the concepts of charity, charity purposes and charitable trusts in all 50 States of the USA are very similar to those in the UK (Garton, 2009: 4). Although, support for colonial CSOs ended after the American Revolution, many CSOs have flourished after the revolution, because constitutional settlement and establishment of USA Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall opened a new area for CSOs (Önder, 2006: 11). After the termination of support, many CSOs started to seek for voluntary donations and purchasers for their services, and they started to provide more public goods and services in many areas such as education, health, religion, orphanages and elderly (Wright, 1993).

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, especially Protestant **Church-based CSOs** and **welfare organizations** have increased dramatically in **North America** (Ryan, 2001). The CSOs grew slowly between 1900 and 1960 due to some limitations like World War II, decrease of government subsidies during 1950s, and the denial of nonprofit charters for dissident activities (Önder, 2006: 12-13). After the 1960s, CSOs started to grow faster especially due to the increase in federal subsidies, voluntary donations, affluence of people, and civil rights movements (Hall, 1995; Önder, 2006; Van Til and Ross, 2001). In

2013, there were around 1,41 million CSOs officially registered in the USA, and these CSOs contributed approximately \$905,9 billion dollars to the US economy which was equal to 5,4% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the USA in 2013. Moreover, 62,8 million adults, presenting 25,3% of the American population, volunteered at least once in 2011 (Urban Institute, 2015: 1-11). Therefore, CSOs in the USA have very large influence in economic, social and political spheres.

Recently, new regulations and reformations have been established to develop CSO activities and to meet new social needs in many countries. Salamon et al. (1999) explain the increasing attention on CSOs in recent years as **global associational revolution**, because they think that there has been a **crisis of the state** for two decades or more in virtually every part of the world. Firstly, there has been a **crisis of traditional welfare state policies** in the developed countries of the Northern part. Secondly, the **state-led development** in the significant parts of the developing South has been in a crisis. Thirdly, Central and Eastern European countries have also been in a state-crisis due to the **collapse of state socialism**. Fourthly, **environmental concerns** have been increasing due to bad influences on human health and safety in the world. Finally, there is a new attention and expectation of CSOs due to **failure of market-oriented economic policies of the states** in the world (Salamon et al., 1999: 4).

**Neo-liberal policies** have been questioned in developed and developing countries due to global financial crises influencing all market economies, and social distress for two decades. Therefore, political leaders have been seeking **alternative ways** to sustain benefits of the market-economy, and decrease social distress. For instance, Tony Blair's "Third Way" in the UK, Gerhard Schröder's "New Middle" in Germany, and Lionel Jospin's "Yes to a market economy, not to a market society" declaration are results of this search (Salamon et al., 1999: 4-5). Therefore, **civil society** has been considered as **the new strategic partner** for the state in addition to private sector. In other words, civil society is considered as the **third sector** in addition to public and private sectors, so a new **partnership between these three actors** has emerged (Ayhan and Önder, 2017: 41). This **three-dimensional partnership** is mainly based on "governance" approach which refers to a complex system, network of relationships between these three actors, and interaction between them (Özer, 2006: 67). Therefore, citizens are now able to join decision-making processes through CSOs and similar mechanisms (e.g., social media and internet) as a result of the influence of the **Governance approach**. In this sense, CSOs are the main facilitators of active citizenship especially in democratic countries where governments appreciate the needs and interests of citizens (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2007). State can share responsibility of public policies not only with private sector organizations but also with citizens as active voluntary members of CSOs.

In addition to increasing numbers, revenues and members of CSOs, there has also been an **increasing scientific attention** to the presence and organizational development of CSOs **since the 1980s**. Anheier (2005: 13) explains this attention by four main factors: “the crisis of the welfare state, the limits of state action in dealing with social problems, the political challenge of neo-liberalism, and the end of the Cold War”. New academic journals, graduate programs, centers and institutes were established especially after the 1980s.<sup>18</sup> Parallel to these developments, **new theories** appeared to explain the presence of CSOs in different contexts: sectoral, local, regional, national or international (*please see Chapter III*). These theories influenced many studies, and created new perspectives on CSOs.

### **3.2. Historical Development of CSOs in Turkey**

Historically, the role of CSOs has been increased economically, socially and politically as a result of the Western modernization since the Second World War. Therefore, the presence of CSOs is mainly explained by the modernization approach. However, it is important to note that globalization and modernization follow different paths in different countries, so there are different experiences of civil society

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<sup>18</sup> There are journals like “VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations” (1st Volume in 1990), “Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly” (1st Volume in 1972), and “International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law” (1st Volume in 1998), “Social Sector Management Program at Schulich School of Business” (started in 1983). There are also “Center for Civil Society at London School of Economics” (established in 1995), “The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies” (established in 1991), “Centre for Civil Society (CCS) in New Delhi” (established in 1997), “Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society at The City University of New York” (established in 1986), “The Center for Civil Society Studies at Peking University” (established in 2005).

(Keyman and İçduygu, 2005). Turkey experienced the increasing role of CSOs in the modern sense only after the 1980s due to a historical and traditional **tension between strong state and weak civil society** throughout its history (Heper, 1985). After the 1980s, new developments such as internalization, democratization and economic growth facilitated a new atmosphere for CSOs to emerge.

### **3.2.1. The Heritage from Great Seljuks Empire and Ottoman Empire**

If civil society is described as “an organizational form that is separated from the political space” (İçduygu et al., 2011: 55), **the roots of CSOs in Turkey can be found in the heritage of Great Seljuks Empire and Ottoman Empire** that had **unique cultures and history of foundations**, originally called as “waqf”. For instance, these **waqfs** were mainly associated with the brotherhoods and religious organizations that were exempted from tax, and carried out important economic and social tasks in the Ottoman society (Özçetin and Özer, 2015). It is better to evaluate the presence of waqfs in history through **philanthropy**, which refers to voluntary transfer and share of wealth from the rich to the poor people, so these organizations were playing an important role in **decreasing income inequality** (Genç, 2014: 15). Moreover, they were the basic funders of hospitals, universities, schools, hash houses and many other social institutions. Although the importance of these organizations declined due to centralization reforms during the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, waqfs are still playing an important role in the provision of public goods and

services such as education and health care in modern Turkey (Çizakça, 2006: 21).

The first waqfs were seen during **Karahanlı State** (Karakhanid) in the Turkish-Islamic history. Furthermore, **Nizamülmülk** as vizier of Seljuks established **Bagdad Nezamiyeh Madrasah** in 1067. After that, the Seljuks and Ottomans have developed this type of voluntary associations. For instance, hospitals were established by waqfs, not by the state during Seljuks and Ottoman periods (Akman, 2018: 198-202). In addition, **caravansaries** (*kervansaray*), which were established and developed during statesman **Celalettin Karatay** in Great Seljuks Empire, have played important roles as waqfs in providing accommodation, food, health service, cleaning and other needs of people and their livestock (Kayaoğlu, 1985: 25). During the Ottoman Empire, the amount of public goods and services provided by waqfs has increased within various areas such as education, health, public work and social security (Akman, 2018: 200). The **main idea of waqf system** was based on transformation of private/personal property into waqf property for public benefit. For instance, especially Sultans, state officials and top-level bureaucrats, especially the ones who converted from another religion to Islam, supported properties of waqfs by donating their **demesne** (*miri arazi*) to acquire reputation in the eyes of the Sultan during the Sejuks period (Odabaşı, 2015: 96-97).

Waqfs were the basic organizations of philanthropy that had mainly been operated by **religious motivation** in the borders of the Ottoman Empire from Balkans to Yemen, because many **Muslims** think that they are **obliged to help people** in need to be a better Muslim. In this sense, they seek to help others as much as possible in order to **go to heaven**, because of the belief in another **life after death**, so they aim **salvation** from their creator in the day of judgement. In addition to religious waqfs, there were also other types of waqfs such as **guilds** and **Ahi communities** which were very influential in the area of economic relations during this period. Therefore, these trade bodies were very important in the protection of rights of artisans and craftsmen (İçduygu et al., 2011: 55).

It is also important to note that foundations had a very **strong cooperation with the state**, so they received some **subsidies** from the state (e.g., tax exemption and direct financial benefits especially by the royal family of Sultans), and developed under the Ottoman rule. In 1546, for instance, there were around 2.515 foundations in Istanbul alone (Çizakça, 2006: 22). However, there are only 1.912 foundations (including community foundations, annexed and fused foundations, foreign foundations, and new foundations) in Istanbul in 2018.<sup>19</sup> This comparison is important because the population of Istanbul was only about 400.000 people in 1546 (Afyoncu, 2018), while it reached about 15,5 million people in 2019.

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<sup>19</sup> 2018 data on the number of foundations in İstanbul is collected from online database of T.R. Directorate General of Foundations. Retrieved March 29, 2019, from [www.vgm.gov.tr](http://www.vgm.gov.tr)

There were **some major roles of foundations** in the provision of public goods and services in the Ottoman Empire (Çizakça, 2006: 22-23):

- Creation of a unique non-public space
- Protection of property rights against the strong state
- Providing financial support for old and disable people
- Creating an insurance system for guilds (lonca)
- Building bridges, roads, lighthouse, ports, fountains, and cisterns

Today, most of these public goods and services are provided by the state, but foundations have started to increase in number, role and influence in providing these goods and services again since the 2000s.

By the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, **Western type of modernization process** during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire resulted in the emergence of **modern type of CSOs** (İçduygu et al., 2011: 55). Similarly, Hatemi (1983: 201) also asserts that CSOs in the form of associations have emerged during “II. Constitutionalism” (*II. Meşrutiyet*) through the creation of a new law on the establishment of legal associations in 1901. Civil society in Turkey has transformed radically due to social and political developments during the modernization period of the country since its establishment in 1923. In this period, there were falls and rises of the presence of CSOs. Therefore, it is necessary to divide historical development of CSOs in Turkey into **five different timespans**: (i)

1923-1945, (ii) 1945-1960, (iii) 1960-1980, (iv) 1980-2000, and (v) after the 2000s.

### 3.2.2. The Period Between 1923 and 1945

In 1901, a new law was created for the first time to legalize the presence of associations in Ottoman Empire (Hatemi, 1983). **The 1908 Constitution** gave freedom of association as a constitutional right, and around **40 women's associations** were formed during the last years of the Ottoman Empire (Toprak, 1983 and 1996). After that **Community Law in 1909** regulated the details on associations, and this law lasted until 1938 even after the creation of the newly established Republic of Turkey in 1923 (İçduygu et al., 2011: 55). Toprak (1996) argues that 37 political or social associations, and 157 local chambers of commerce were established during the last years of the Ottoman Empire between 1908 and 1918 – this period is also known as “Young Turks”. However, these developments in civil society suffered due to a **secular-based social engineering focus** by the new republic regime during period from 1923 until the 1980s (Toprak, 1996).

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, **Mustafa Kemal Atatürk**, the founder of the Turkish Republic in 1923, made some **radical changes** such as providing free and compulsory primary education, giving women equal civil and political rights, transforming Turkey into a secular nation-state, changing the alphabet from Arabic to Latin alphabet, and adopting Western living standards as the main target in

order to bring prosperity to the newly established Republic of Turkey (Ayhan, 2018: 52; Huijgh and Warlick, 2016: 6). In addition, his efforts to establish a **modern and central nation state** reshaped the structure of the relations between the state and civil society. At the first years of the republic, there was **an organic relation between the state and CSOs**, because state used these organizations as an **ideological tool** to consolidate republican ideas (İçduygu et al., 2011: 55). Moreover, the majority of population was living in the rural areas, so it was hard to say that civil society was developed as a result of a demand from the society. On the contrary, the existence of CSOs was only possible by supporting the **state ideology** under single party regime. Similarly, Toprak (1996) also argues that CSOs as modern organizations were only allowed if they were not against the **agenda of the government** during single party regime between 1923 and 1945. Özçetin et al. (2014: 6) state that only some CSOs like “The People’s Houses” (*Halkevleri*), which operated to disseminate information about the regime’s values to society, could survive. In contrast, CSOs like Turkish Hearts Movement (*Türk Ocakları*) and Turkish Women’s Union (*Türk Kadınlar Birliği*) were closed down because they were not in line with the **Kemalist ideology** of the state (Zürcher, 2004: 180).

### 3.2.3. The Period Between 1945 and 1960

In Turkish history, there have always been some **critical tensions** between different camps such as liberal democracy versus authoritarianism; civil administration versus military coups;

sustainability versus economic crises; stability versus political crises; social unity versus ideological or ethnical fragmentations movements; and internationalization versus nationalization (Ayhan, 2018: 52). In 1945, for instance, the Turkish Republic transitioned to **multi-party democratic system**, so this has become an important development in terms of freedom of association. Similarly, **Association Law in 1945** enlarged freedoms for civil society, so the number of associations and trade unions relatively increased (TÜSEV, 2005: 37). During this period, about 2.000 CSOs (mainly sport clubs and professional organizations) were established, but very few of them carried out **political activity** (Özçetin and Özer, 2015), because these CSOs were under **state scrutiny**. In addition, **Democratic Party (DP)** under the leadership of Adnan Menderes came into power by defeating the Republican People's Party (CHP) in the first multi-party elections in 1950. Under the leadership of DP, **different social classes in the periphery** had chance to rule the country for the first time, and individual rights and freedoms were enlarged. This situation accelerated the creation of new CSOs directed by the **will of the civic engagement** instead of **state's will**, or **interest**. In this period, there were also developments in the **foreign policy** of Turkey, because the country gained full membership in The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and became one of the creators of Central Treaty Organization together with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and the UK (Huijgh and Warlick, 2016: 6). Moreover, the **industrialization** and **urbanization** rate increased dramatically, so more people became interested to form CSOs.

It is important to note that the **statist approach** (top-down) continued during this period, because DP also restricted the civil society area for those who **confronted the ideology of the party**. For instance, the membership of the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (TÜRK-İŞ) to an international workers' trade union was not approved by the DP government (İçduygu et al., 2011: 56). This situation shows that **social dynamic** was strong enough to develop civil society, but the **statist approach** was still a barrier against this development, so CSOs could not develop adequately between 1945 and 1960 (Toksöz, 1983: 373).

#### **3.2.4. The Period Between 1960 and 1980**

The rule of DP government was ended by a **military coup** in 1960. Although this coup damaged the democratic regime, parliamentary system and multi-party system, the **1961 Constitution** positively developed freedom of association, pluralism, individual rights and freedoms, and liberal democratic system (Özbudun, 1994). During this period, civil society was strengthened through high rate of unionization, increasing number of associations, unions and chambers, and appearance of new social movements that were supported by different social classes from rural and urban areas (İçduygu et al., 2011: 56).

The transformation of Turkish society during the 1960s and the 1970s can be regarded as **demilitarization of Turkey** against the dominance of statist understanding and dominance of the military in politics. However, it is essential to note that the Turkish military has mainly determined its role as the **guardians of the state** (Altundal, 2016: 12), so the military coup in 1960 was followed by other coups in 1971 and 1980. **Military coups** to the politics have resulted in a **negative influence** on democracy, organizational life, pluralistic political culture, and civil society in Turkey (Hazama, 1999; İçduygu et al., 2011; TÜSEV, 2005). For instance, the number of associations had increased from 42.170 in 1970 to 45.000 in 1972 (Toksöz, 1983), but this number decreased to 18.000 associations in 1972 due to politics after military coup in 1971 (Yücekök et al., 1998: 309). On the other hand, **multi-party coalitions** between the 1970s and the 1980s resulted in political instability, and many people were killed, imprisoned or injured because of social and political conflicts between leftist and rightist groups, so social and political coherence was heavily eroded (Ayhan et al., 2016: 68).

### 3.2.5. The Period Between 1980 and 2000

After the **military coup in 1980**, the military regime became very **oppressive against CSOs**, because the number of CSOs was 38.254 but more than 20.000 CSOs were closed down after the coup, and the activities of other CSOs were limited (Şimşek, 2004: 48). Although the **1982 Constitution** promised to reconsolidate democracy, it is questionable whether it strengthened freedom of association or not

(Aslandaş, 1995). The 1982 Constitution restricted individual rights, and freedom of association that were brought by the 1961 Constitution. Moreover, the **inspection and control over associations and trade unions** were stimulated by the new **Law of Associations** in 1983, because membership of public servants to CSOs were prohibited, the state institutions obtained new powers to inspect and control CSOs (İçduygu et al., 2011: 57).

In 1983 elections, **Motherland Party** (ANAP) under the leadership of **Turgut Özal** won the elections as single party, and ruled the country until 1989 as single party government (Çavdar, 2013). During this period, ANAP mainly focused on the **chronic problems of the economy** by establishing **radical reforms** to internationalize the Turkish economy **in direction of liberalism** (e.g., privatization and demilitarization of the state) (Ayhan et al., 2016). Despite the reformist and **liberal approach** of the leader of ANAP in the economic area, he followed **authoritarian and conservative approaches** in the political and social areas at the same time (Öniş, 2004). But still, the **number of CSOs tripled** between 1983 and 2004 (Şimşek, 2004). After ANAP lost elections in 1989, Turkey experienced **political and social divisions** because of multi-party coalitions. Moreover, the **Kurdish issue** related to terrorist activities and economic problems occurred again (Ayhan, 2018: 53). Therefore, state policies mainly focused on **security and economy rather than social issues** at the beginning of the 1990s. Heper and Yıldırım (2011: 1) describe state policies on CSOs during the 1990s as a **systematic**

**oppression of civil society** in Turkey. In 1995, amendment of **Article 33** on freedom of association in the 1982 Constitution increased the democratization once again, and the **pressure of state on the civil society** was alleviated (İçduygu et al., 2011: 57). For instance, the number of associations was 61.000 in 1994 (Erder, 1996: 92), and this number increased to more than 72.379 in 2000 according to database of T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society.<sup>20</sup>

CSOs also became visible by **The Global Habitat II Conference** in Istanbul in 1996 (Çaha, 2001: 39). Moreover, high performance of some CSOs (especially AKUT-Search and Rescue Association) in helping people in need right after the **Marmara earthquake** disaster on August 17, 1999 increased the significance of CSOs in Turkey (Seyrek, 2004). However, **domestic and international problems** such as 28 February military coup in politics, increase of terror problem, economic crises in Asia and Russia influenced Turkish civil society very negatively (Ayhan et al., 2016). For instance, before **28 February military coup** in 1997, military forced businessmen and secular civil society groups to support its activities against the government that was ruled by **Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan**. After the **military coup on February 28, 1997**, social life was restricted through the closing down many religious and political CSOs, and the military established a strict control over other CSOs (Heper and Yıldırım, 2011).

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<sup>20</sup> Please see the official database of Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society that is available online. Retrieved May 19, 2019, from <https://www.siviltoplum.gov.tr/yillara-gore-faal-dernek-sayilari>

### 3.2.6. The Period After 2000

At the beginning of the 2000s, the economic and political struggles have continued due to coalition governments. However, the **Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit** developed the **1983 Associations Law in 2001**, which opened a **new space for CSOs** during this period (Heper and Yıldırım, 2011). After 2000 and 2001 economic crises, a newly established party, namely **Justice and Development Party (AK Party)**, came into power as single party during the 2002 elections, and has been ruling the country since then. After 2002, Turkey's economic growth has rapidly increased, democratization process was accelerated, integration with international economy was deepened. As a result of these developments, Turkey has started to negotiate **membership to the EU**, and this development has positively influenced the civil society (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005: 1). In addition, AK Party government reduced the **role of the military** by radical legislation, and improved **records on human rights issues** (Nye, 2004: 92). For instance, criticizing military considered almost an assault to the identity of the Turkish military, however, this situation was changed by the AK Party government which succeeded **demilitarization** in Turkey (Önder, 2010).

Despite the positive developments within civil society, the sustainability of AK Party government was tested by some **major challenges** such as online declaration of the military (also known as e-intervention) on April 27, 2007, 2008 global financial crisis, increasing terrorist activities after 2010, Gezi Parkı protests in 2013,

and failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016 (Ayhan, 2018: 54). Especially, 241 people died, and 2.196 people were wounded, but the Turkish political spectrum and society were able to overcome this serious threat to democracy (European Commission, 2016: 5-6). After the failed coup attempt, about 1.500 CSOs were closed down (Kinglsey, 2017), because they were found guilty related to FETÖ (Gülenist Terror Group) behind the coup attempt by the Turkish courts. Moreover, about 40.000 people were arrested, and 140.000 people were fired or suspended from public institutions due to their connection to FETÖ (Kinglsey, 2017). Although, trust in civil society declined due to CSOs that supported FETÖ behind the failed coup attempt. After that, Turkish society realized that FETÖ were “particularly well-organized in civil society and the Turkish education system” (Duran, 2016: 162). In contrast, other CSOs have campaigned against the failed coup attempt, and supported democracy and democratically elected government until recently (Belli and Aydın, 2018: 74). Moreover, CSOs from different camps, political parties (AK Party, Nationalist Movement Party-MHP, and CHP), and millions of people united against the failed coup attempt in Istanbul’s Yenikapı<sup>21</sup> district on the 7<sup>th</sup> of August in 2016 (Duran and Altun, 2016: 7).

Today, the number, revenues and influence of CSOs are still increasing despite the social, economic, and political crises. For instance, the number of associations increased from 76.379 in 2002 to

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<sup>21</sup> This meeting also refers to “Yenikapı Spirit” to support democracy and democratically elected government against coup attempts in Turkey.

118.299 in 2019, while total revenues of associations increased from 7,51 billion Turkish Lira in 2013 to 21,09 billion Turkish Lira in 2019, and finally the number of members in associations also increased from 4,1 million people in 2004 to 11 million people in 2018 in Turkey.<sup>22</sup> This increase proves that civil society in Turkey has become **less fragile** to social, economic, and political crises by learning from unpleasant experiences in the history of the Turkish Republic. The participation in civil society is essential for reducing **polarization**, encouraging **democratic and active citizenship**, and increase **tolerance** and **social cohesion** in Turkish society (Çakmaklı, 2017).

#### **4. TYPES OF CSOs IN TURKEY**

CSOs are mainly considered as associations and foundations in Turkey. However, there are other types of CSOs that are described under the Turkish legislation. There are **five types of CSOs** that have legal status in Turkey: (i) Associations, (ii) Foundations, (iii) Unions, (iv) Cooperatives, (v) Professional Organizations, as shown in **Table 2**.

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<sup>22</sup> Data on Associations was obtained from online database of T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society. Retrieved April 10, 2019, from <https://www.siviltoplum.gov.tr>

**Table 2:** Types of CSOs under Different Public Institutions in Turkey

<b>Type of CSO</b>	<b>Responsible Public Institution</b>
Associations	T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society ( <a href="http://www.siviltoplum.gov.tr/">www.siviltoplum.gov.tr/</a> )
Foundations	T.R. Directorate General of Foundations ( <a href="http://www.vgm.gov.tr/">www.vgm.gov.tr/</a> )
Trade Unions	T.R. Ministry of Family, Labour, and Social Services ( <a href="http://www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/">www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/</a> )
Cooperatives	T.R. Ministry of Trade ( <a href="http://www.trade.gov.tr/">www.trade.gov.tr/</a> ) T.R. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry ( <a href="http://www.tarimorman.gov.tr/">www.tarimorman.gov.tr/</a> ) T.R. Ministry of Environment and Urbanization ( <a href="http://www.csb.gov.tr/">www.csb.gov.tr/</a> )
Professional Organizations under TOBB - The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey: Chambers of Commerce/Industry and Commodity Exchanges	T.R. Ministry of Trade ( <a href="http://www.trade.gov.tr/">www.trade.gov.tr/</a> )

Although, these organizations are considered as CSOs, some of them do not meet the **criteria of voluntary membership**, or **not-profit seeking**. For instance, some unions are established by law, and membership to these unions is **obligatory**. On the other hand, cooperatives are **seeking profit intrinsically**, and the members of professional organizations are mainly **private sector organizations**. However, these types of CSOs are also included in the analysis because their **profits are not shared to the owners/executors** of these organizations or their members. These CSOs are based on **mutuality**, and they encourage **citizen participation**. Finally, they are considered as organizations providing **public benefit** by law.

Civil society in Turkey has developed since the last two decades, the number of CSOs and their size are not at a satisfactory level in solving the social, economic and political problems. For instance, the number of CSOs (including all five types) in 2018 was about 203.709, as shown in **Table 3**. The data for cooperatives is dated as 2012 due to lack of updated data. In addition, the data for associations also dated as 2017 due to changes in 2018 data, and this is because of the late entries of the responsible public institution. However, this information is still significant in showing the number of CSOs in Turkey. Considering that the total population of Turkey was 82.003.882 people in 2018,<sup>23</sup> so the number of CSOs per 100.000 people in Turkey is only 248 in the same year. Moreover, most of the CSOs are mainly located in the Western part of the country, especially in big provinces like Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana and Bursa. On the contrary, the least number of CSOs exist in the provinces located in the Eastern part of Turkey, such as Siirt, Batman, Şırnak and Tunceli.

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<sup>23</sup> Data on total population was obtained from TÜİK - Turkish Statistical Institute population statistics. Retrieved March 15, 2019, from [www.tuik.gov.tr](http://www.tuik.gov.tr)

**Table 3:** Types and Numbers of CSOs in Turkey

Types of CSOs	Year	Number of CSOs
Associations <sup>24</sup>	2017	110.787
Foundations <sup>25</sup>	2017	5.608
Unions (including employer's, worker's and public servant's unions) <sup>26</sup>	2018	2.717
All Cooperatives under three Ministries of Turkey <sup>27</sup>	2012	84.232
Professional Organizations under TOBB (Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Commodity Exchanges) <sup>28</sup>	2018	365
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>203.709</b>

**In the Turkish legislation**, there is no single legal definition of CSOs, instead of this there are **different legal definitions for each type of CSOs**. These CSOs are subject to supervision by different public institutions, but they have similar features in practice despite the fact that they are different in size, number and activity areas. In this sub-chapter, the similarities and differences of five types of CSOs are evaluated in the following parts.

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<sup>24</sup> 2017 Data on **Associations** was obtained from online database of T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society. The number of associations in 2018 might change due to collection of 2018 data by the responsible public institution until June 2019. Therefore, we preferred to use 2017 data. Retrieved April 15, 2019, from [www.siviltoplum.gov.tr](http://www.siviltoplum.gov.tr)

<sup>25</sup> 2017 Data on **Foundations** was obtained from online database of T.R. Directorate General of Foundations. Retrieved April 15, 2019, from [www.vgm.gov.tr](http://www.vgm.gov.tr)

<sup>26</sup> 2017 Data on **Unions** was obtained from online database of T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society. Retrieved April 15, 2019, from [www.siviltoplum.gov.tr](http://www.siviltoplum.gov.tr)

<sup>27</sup> 2012 Data on **Cooperatives** was obtained from online database of T.R. Ministry of Trade, T.R. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and T.R. Ministry of Environment and Urbanization. Since there is no specific data for 2018, the data for 2012 was used (Ministry of Trade, 2012).

<sup>28</sup> Data includes **Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Commodity Exchanges** in Turkey. Data was obtained from online database of The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB). Retrieved April 15, 2019, from <https://www.tobb.org.tr>

## 4.1. Associations

Associations refer to “the societies founded in the status of legal entity by at least seven real persons or legal entities by pooling continuously their knowledge and efforts in order to realize a given and common objective not prohibited by the laws excluding those at profit sharing purposes” in the Turkish legislation (Law on Associations, No. 5253, Article 2, published on 04.11.2004).<sup>29</sup> In other words, associations are organizations that are based on values such as voluntary membership, not-profit seeking, and they can be established by real or legal persons.

There are some **major laws** that facilitate the presence of associations under the Turkish law. Firstly, **Article 33 of Turkish Constitution** states that “everyone has the right to form associations, or become a member of an association, or withdraw from membership without prior permission. No one shall be compelled to become or remain a member of an association...”. These associations are under the supervision of T.R. Ministry of Interior, and T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society.

**(i) Law on Associations, (No. 5253), published on November 23, 2004:** This law regulates “illegal and subject to permission acts, liabilities, auditing, punishments and other issues of the nonprofit organizations regarding opening a branch in Turkey apart from representations and branches of associations, federations,

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<sup>29</sup> English version of **Law on Associations (No. 5253)** is available online. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from [www.lawsturkey.com/law/law-on-associations-5253](http://www.lawsturkey.com/law/law-on-associations-5253)

confederations, foreign associations whose headquarters are abroad” (Article 1).

**(ii) Law on Associations and Foundations’ Relations with Public Institutions and Authorities, (No. 5072), published on January 29, 2004<sup>30</sup>:** “The purpose and scope of this Law is to set forth the relations of associations established to support public services or personnel and foundations established in accordance with the Turkish Civil Code with public institutions and authorities...” (Article 1).

**(iii) Turkish Civil Code, (No. 4721), published on August 6, 2003<sup>31</sup>:** Article 54 (assignment of assets), Article 56 (definition), Articles 57 and 58 (right to form association), Article 59 (initial stage of being a legal entity), Article 60 (examination of associations), Articles from 61 to 100 (rules, conditions, membership, discharge, fees, organs, income etc. of associations).

**(iv) Law on Collection of Aid, (No. 2860), published on June 25, 1983<sup>32</sup>:** “The purpose of this Law is to determine the persons and entities entitled to collect aid, the purposes for which such aid may be collected and to set forth the principles and procedures applicable to the collection, usage and inspection of aid” (Article 1).

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<sup>30</sup> English version of **Law on Associations and Foundations’ Relations with Public Institutions and Authorities (No. 5072)** is available online. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from [www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Turkey/lawassoc.pdf](http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Turkey/lawassoc.pdf)

<sup>31</sup> English version of the **Turkish Civil Code (No. 4721)** is available online. Retrieved March 11, 2019, from [www.tusev.org.tr/ustfiles/files/Turkish\\_Civil\\_Code.pdf](http://www.tusev.org.tr/ustfiles/files/Turkish_Civil_Code.pdf)

<sup>32</sup> English version of the **Law on Collection of Aid (No. 2860)** is available online. Retrieved March 12, 2019, from [www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Turkey/lawaid.pdf](http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Turkey/lawaid.pdf)

**(v) Law on the Exemption of Certain Associations and Institutions from Certain Taxes, All Fees and Dues, (No. 1606), published on July 20, 1972:** There is also a **presidential decree**, numbered 1, published on July 10, 2018.<sup>33</sup> This first presidential decree reorganizes; presidential offices, policy councils and directorates that work directly under the president, and organization and duties of ministries. Specifically, Article 263 reorganized duties and permissions of the old Department of Associations, and changed its status to T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society.

In 2019, there were 384 associations that are categorized under “**public benefit association**”,<sup>34</sup> and these associations have some privileges in terms of taxation, and collection of aid compared to other associations. Their privileges status and criteria were determined by Article 27 in the **Law on Associations (No. 5253)**, and from Article 48 to Article 52 in the **Association Regulation (No. 25772)** published on March 3, 2005.<sup>35</sup> For instance, the donations of real and legal personalities to public benefit associations can gain 5% tax reduction, and this rate is 10% in the regions with development priority (TÜSEV, 2017: 2). However, “public benefit association” status is still

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<sup>33</sup> The **presidential decree (No. 1)**, published 10 July 2018, is available online in Turkish. Retrieved March 13, 2019, from [www.siviltoplum.gov.tr/kurumlar/siviltoplum.gov.tr/Mevzuat/1\\_Nolu%20Cumhurbaşkanligi\\_Kararnamesinin263Mad.PDF](http://www.siviltoplum.gov.tr/kurumlar/siviltoplum.gov.tr/Mevzuat/1_Nolu%20Cumhurbaşkanligi_Kararnamesinin263Mad.PDF)

<sup>34</sup> The updated list of the number of **384 public benefit associations** is available online. Retrieved March 15, 2019, from [www.siviltoplum.gov.tr/kamu-yararinalisan-dernekler](http://www.siviltoplum.gov.tr/kamu-yararinalisan-dernekler)

<sup>35</sup> The **Association Regulation (No. 25772)** is available online in Turkish. Retrieved March 15, 2019, from [www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=7.5.8038&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch=Dernekler%20Y%C3%B6netmeli%C4%9Fi](http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=7.5.8038&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch=Dernekler%20Y%C3%B6netmeli%C4%9Fi)

debatable because only 0,33% of associations (only 384 within 114.251 associations) have this status. This status was also criticized in **Turkey 2014 Progress Report** by the European Commission, which states that “...public funding for civil society organizations was not sufficiently transparent and rule-based, as **tax exemption** and **public benefit** status were granted to a very **limited number of CSOs** by the Council of Ministers, using unclear criteria” (European Commission, 2014: 13).

There were only 81.922 associations in 2009, but this number increased to 110.787 associations in 2017 and 118.299 associations in 2019 in Turkey. Associations have the highest number compared to other types of CSOs. In the official classifications of associations, there are 20 areas existing. In 2017, the highest number of associations were operating in the areas of (i) Occupation and Solidarity (32.040 associations); (ii) Sport (21.067 associations); (iii) Religion (17.123 associations); (iv) Education (5.607 associations); (v) Culture and Art (5.065 associations); and (vi) Human Aid (4.958 associations), and these associations have the highest number of members compared to associations operating in other areas such as disable people, human rights, old and young people, environment, and animal rights.


A larger number of CSOs and their members were concentrated in Istanbul, Ankara and İzmir provinces. On the other hand, Bayburt, Ardahan, Tunceli, Siirt and Şırnak provinces have the lowest number of associations and members. The data of T.R. Directorate General of

Relations with Civil Society shows that 35% of associations are in the Marmara Region, while 18% of associations are in the Central Anatolia Region geographically. The total number of associations in these two regions is more than the total number of associations in the other five geographical regions. In addition, the percentage of female members in the associations within the total population of Turkey is only about 2,85% (2.304.016 people), while this percentage is around 10,86% (8.775.522 people) for male members in associations.<sup>36</sup>

**Figure 1** shows that total revenues of associations have continuously increased from 10,89 billion TL in 2015 to 21,09 billion TL in 2019. The data shows that the average of total revenue in 2015 per association (106.396 associations) amounts to 102.379,00 TL, while this amount increased to 178.357,00 TL per association (118.299 associations) in 2019. This information proves that the total revenues of associations increased during the last decade.

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<sup>36</sup> The data on **Associations** was collected from online database of T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from [www.siviltoplum.gov.tr](http://www.siviltoplum.gov.tr) However, it is necessary to note that proclaims of associations in 2018 are collected until June 2019 by the responsible public institution. Therefore, the current number of associations in 2018 might change due to new data entry.



**Figure 1:** Total Revenues of Associations in Turkey, 2014-2018 (Billion Turkish Lira - TL)

(Online database of T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from [www.siviltoplum.gov.tr](http://www.siviltoplum.gov.tr))

## 4.2. Foundations

The roots of foundations in Turkey emanates from the **heritage of the Great Seljuks Empire and Ottoman Empire** due to their unique culture and history of waqfs. **The value of philanthropy** is the basic source of foundations, because philanthropy played an important role in the **transfer and share of wealth from rich to poor people** in the Turkish history. Today, there are different types of foundations: Cemaat (Non-Muslim Community) Foundations, Mülhak (Annexed) Foundations, Esnaf (Artisans) Foundations, and Mazbut (Fused) Foundations, Yabancı (Foreign) Foundations, and Yeni (New) Foundations.

Foundations refer to “the fused, annexed, Non-Muslim community and artisans’ foundations, and new Foundations” in the Turkish legislation (Foundations Law, No. 5737, Article 3). These foundations are under the supervision of T.R. Directorate General of Foundations. There are five types of foundations that are determined in the same Article in the **Foundations Law (No. 5737)** published on February 27, 2008.<sup>37</sup>

**(i) Fused Foundations** refer to “those ones to be administered and represented by the Directorate General under this Law, and those ones which were founded before the enforcement date of the abolished Turkish Civil Law (No. 743) and are administered by the General Directorate of Foundations in accordance with the Foundations Law (No. 2762)”;

**(ii) Annexed Foundations** refer to those foundations which were set up before the enforcement date of the abolished Turkish Civil Law (No. 743), whose administration is granted to the descendants of the founder-grantor;

**(iii) Non-Muslim Community Foundations** refer to those foundations that belong to the non-Muslim communities in Turkey, whose members are citizens of the Turkish Republic and that are vested with a legal body status under the Foundations Law (No. 2762), irrespective of their charter or not;

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<sup>37</sup> The English version of **Foundations Law (No. 5737)** is available online. Retrieved April 26, 2019, from [www.vgm.gov.tr/en/Sayfalar/SayfaDetay.aspx?SayfaId=2](http://www.vgm.gov.tr/en/Sayfalar/SayfaDetay.aspx?SayfaId=2)

(iv) **Artisans' Foundations** refer to foundations that were established before the enforcement of the Foundations Law with (No. 2762) and which are managed by the Board of Directors selected by the artisans’;

(v) **New Foundations** refer to the foundations set up under the abolished Turkish Civil Law (No. 743) and the applicable Turkish Civil Law (No. 4721).

Like associations that have “public benefit association” status, foundations also have status of “tax exemption” according to Article 50 in the **Regulations for Foundations (No. 27010)** published on September 27, 2008.<sup>38</sup> This Article states that:

“Foundations with a gross annual income above the sum set forth in article 177(2) of the Tax Procedure Law no. 213 of 4/1/1961 and determined by the Ministry of Finance every year and foundations with a **tax exemption**, enterprise, participation, branch or representation office shall have to keep books according to the balance sheet method”.

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<sup>38</sup> English version of the **Regulations for Foundations (No. 27010)** is available online. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from <https://www.vgm.gov.tr/en/Sayfalar/SayfaDetay.aspx?SayfaId=2>

In addition, Article 20 of the **Law Regarding Amendments to Several Laws and Granting Tax Exemption to Foundations (No. 4962)** also states that:<sup>39</sup>

“Foundations that are established to give service(s) relating to issues that are in the scope of general, annexed and special budgeted administrations with at least two thirds of their revenues, **may be exempted from tax** by the decision of Council of Ministers with the recommendation from Ministry of Finance.”

There are some major areas of activity for foundations to qualify for tax exemption according to Law No. 4962 such as health, social welfare, education, scientific research and development, culture and environmental protection and afforestation. It is also necessary that foundations should operate their activities transparently, and they must decrease duties of public institutions. Şahin and Ersen (2018: 25) argue that these areas are very limited, because there are many critical areas that are internationally accepted as areas of “public benefit”:

- Prevention of discriminatory activities determined by race, ethnicity, religion or law
- Supporting amateur sports and athletes
- Helping refugees

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<sup>39</sup> **Law Regarding Amendments to Several Laws and Granting Tax Exemption to Foundations (No.4962)** is available online. Retrieved March 25, 2019, from <https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin1.aspx?MevzuatKod=1.5.4962&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch=4962&Tur=1&Tertip=5&No=4962>

- Civil rights or human rights
- Consumer protection
- Democracy

Therefore, it might be beneficial to increase the number of CSOs that have either “public benefit” or “tax exemption” in order to increase their financial capacity, and cooperation between CSOs and state.

The geographical proportion of the foundations in terms of seven regions is as follows: 40% in Marmara Region, 25% in Central Anatolia, 10% in Aegean Region, 9% in Black Sea Region, 7% Mediterranean Region, 5% East Anatolia Region, and 4% in South-East Anatolia Region (Önder et al., 2019: 29).


**Table 4:** The Numbers of Members in Foundations in Turkey (2017)

<b>Numbers of Members</b>	<b>Non-Muslim Community Foundations</b>	<b>Annexed Foundations</b>	<b>Foreign Foundations</b>	<b>New Foundations</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
Real Persons	3.705	N.A.	6	N.A.	<b>3.711</b>
Legal Persons	42	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	<b>42</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3.747</b>	-	<b>6</b>	-	<b>3.753</b>

**Source:** Online database of T.R. Directorate General of Foundations. Retrieved March 29, 2019, from [www.vgm.gov.tr](http://www.vgm.gov.tr)

**Table 4** illustrates that Non-Muslim Community Foundations have 3.747 members (real and legal persons), and Foreign Foundations have only 6 members (real persons) in 2017. There is no available data on the number of members in other types of foundations.

Total number of foundations is 5.547, and New Foundations have the highest number, while Foreign Foundations have the lowest number. Most of the foundations are in Istanbul (1.877 foundations), Ankara (826 foundations), İzmir (248 foundations), and Konya (168 foundations) provinces. On the other hand, Şırnak (8 foundations), Bartın (8 foundations), Hakkari (6 foundations), and Iğdır (5 foundations) provinces have the lowest number of foundations.<sup>40</sup>




**Figure 2:** Total Assets of Foundations in Turkey, 2014-2017 (Turkish Lira - TL) (Online database of T.R. Directorate General of Foundations. Retrieved March 29, 2019, from [www.vgm.gov.tr](http://www.vgm.gov.tr))

<sup>40</sup> Data on Foundations was collected from the online database of T.R. Directorate General of Foundations. Retrieved March 29, 2019, from [www.vgm.gov.tr](http://www.vgm.gov.tr) It is important to note that there is not available data for Artisans and Fused Foundations.

**Figure 2** illustrates that New Foundations have the **highest amount of total assets** between 2014 and 2017, although the amount of total assets was divided by 10 (/10) in order to have a better visibility. For instance, total assets of these foundations increased from 50.579.000.000,00 TL in 2014 to 60.519.700.000,00 TL in 2017 without dividing by 10 (/10). In contrast, Foreign Foundations have the **lowest amount of total assets** between 2014 and 2017 compared to other types of foundations.

It is essential to consider that New Foundations have the highest number by 5.158 foundations, while Foreign Foundations have the lowest number by only 21 foundations. Therefore, it is necessary to take average of total assets for each type of foundations since number of these foundations is also different. It was found that the average of total assets per Non-Muslim Community Foundations (167 foundations in 2017) is about 15.397.363,00 TL, while this amount is 5.465.672,00 TL for Annexed Foundations (260 foundations in 2017), 41.832,00 TL for Foreign Foundations (21 foundations in 2017), and 12.786.232,00 TL for New Foundations (5.099 foundations in 2017). In this calculation, the amount of average of total assets per foundation within New Foundations is lower than the amount of the average of the total assets per foundation within Non-Muslim Community Foundations.



**Figure 3:** Total Revenues of Foundations in Turkey, 2014-2017 (Turkish Lira - TL)  
 (Online database of T.R. Directorate General of Foundations. Retrieved March 29, 2019, from [www.vgm.gov.tr](http://www.vgm.gov.tr))

Similar to data on **Figure 2**, total revenues of New Foundations have the **highest amount of total revenues** between 2014 and 2017, although the amount of total revenues was divided by 10 (/10) in order to have a better visibility, as **Figure 3** illustrates. The total revenues of New Foundations have increased from 15.514.000.000,00 TL in 2014 to 24.479.000.000,00 TL in 2017. Foreign Foundations have again the **lowest amount of total assets** between 2014 and 2017 compared to other types of foundations. It is also important to find out the average of total assets for each type of foundations, since their numbers are different. It was found out that the average of total revenues per Non-Muslim Community Foundation (167 foundations in 2017) is about 1.589.753,00 TL, while this amount is 412.018,00 TL for Annexed Foundations (260 foundations in 2017), 604.302,00 TL for Foreign

Foundations (21 foundations in 2017), and 4.800.745,00 TL for New Foundations (5.099 foundations in 2017). In this calculation, the amount of average of total assets per foundation within New Foundations is the highest among other types of foundations. However, Foreign Foundations have this time higher amount of the average of the total assets per foundation than Annexed Foundations.

**Table 5:** The Numbers of Voluntary and Paid Workers in Foundations in Turkey (2014-2017)

Foundation Type	2014		2015		2016		2017	
	Paid	Voluntary	Paid	Voluntary	Paid	Voluntary	Paid	Voluntary
Non-Muslim Community	1.559	402	1.670	317	1.795	302	1.725	283
Annexed	59	24	76	4	71	4	73	3
Foreign	18	0	15	0	16	0	16	0
New	16.845	1,02 million	17.107	1,02 million	17.093	1,02 million	17.093	1,02 million
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>18.481</b>	<b>1,02 million</b>	<b>18.868</b>	<b>1,02 million</b>	<b>18.975</b>	<b>1,02 million</b>	<b>18.907</b>	<b>1,02 million</b>

**Source:** Online database of T.R. Directorate General of Foundations. Retrieved March 29, 2019, from [www.vgm.gov.tr](http://www.vgm.gov.tr)

New Foundations have the **highest numbers of voluntary and paid workers** between 2014 and 2017 compared to other types of foundations, as shown in **Table 5**. However, there is no significant increase within the numbers of voluntary and paid workers in all types of foundations between 2014 and 2017. For instance, the total number of paid workers in all types of foundations slightly increased from 18.481 workers in 2014 to 18.907 workers in 2017. Similarly, the number of voluntary workers has constantly remained around 1,02

million workers between 2014 and 2017. It was observed that 1,8% of total workers (about 1,04 million voluntary and paid workers) is paid workers (18907 workers), and the rest of the workers are voluntary workers (about 1,02 million workers).

### **4.3. Trade Unions**

There are **three types of Trade Unions** in Turkey: Workers' Trade Unions, Employer's Trade Unions, and Public Servants' Trade Unions. These unions are organized under freedom of association, and they protect **common economic, social and occupational rights and benefits** of workers, public servants, and employers in private and public sectors. The members of these unions can defend their interests collectively by collective bargaining with other stakeholders (e.g., social partners and government). The activities of trade unions were limited during the 1980s.

Today, especially worker's trade unions are very influential after the unification of trade unions from different ideologies under federations or confederations, because this situation increased the cooperation and common action (İçduygu et al., 2011: 64). These trade unions are under the supervision of the Ministry of Family, Labour, and Social Services. Trade union refers to “any institution with artificial personality formed by public servants for the protection and improvement of their common economic, social and occupational rights and benefits” in Turkish legislation (Law on Public Servants' Trade Unions and Collective Agreement, numbered 4688, published

on 12 July 2001). There are major legislations that facilitate the presence of Unions under Turkish law.

**(i) Law on Public Servants' Trade Unions and Collective Agreement (No. 4688), published on December 7, 2001<sup>41</sup>:** The objective of this Law is:

“...to determine the establishment, organs, powers and activities of the trade unions and confederations formed for the protection and improvement of the common economic, social and occupational rights and benefits of the public servants and is to lay down the principles and procedures related to concluding collective agreements” (No. 4688, Article 1).

There are some **major amending texts** that changed some articles of No. 4688:

- 14 April 2016, Law No. 6704 on granting pensions to destitute, weak and helpless Turkish 65 years and older citizens and Amending some laws and Decree Laws: This text adds a new clause to Article 19 of Law No. 4688.
- 4 April 2012, Law No. 6789 Amending the Law No. 4688 of June 25, 2001 on Public Servants' Trade Unions: This text amended the title of Law No 4688 from “Law on Public

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<sup>41</sup> **The Law on Public Servants' Trade Unions and Collective Agreement (No. 4688)** is available online. Retrieved April 11, 2019, from [www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin1.Aspx?MevzuatKod=1.5.4688&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch=KAMU+G%u00d6REVL%u0130LER%u0130+SEND%u0130KALARI&Tur=1&Tertip=5&No=4688](http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin1.Aspx?MevzuatKod=1.5.4688&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch=KAMU+G%u00d6REVL%u0130LER%u0130+SEND%u0130KALARI&Tur=1&Tertip=5&No=4688)

Servants’ Unions and Collective Bargaining” to “Law on Public Employees’ Unions and Collective Bargaining”. Moreover, it includes some other changes such as allowing membership of the unions during probation period, abolition of the time limitation of two years to establish a union, and simplification of the statutes of unions and confederations.

- 27 March 2010, Regulations of March 2010 of the Labour and Social Security Ministry: This text amended the annexed list of regulations on the determination of the competent branch services for institutions and establishments entering under the scope of Public Servants’ Trade Unions Act (Law No. 4688).
- 16 July 2004, Law No. 5192: This text includes major amendments on membership of unions such as membership fees, travel expenses of members and resignation from membership.

**(ii) Law on Trade Unions and Collective Labour Agreements (No. 6356), published on October 18, 2012<sup>42</sup>:** The objective of this Law is:

“...to establish the principles and the procedures on the establishment, management, operation, audit, activities and organization of workers’ and employers’ trade unions and confederations, on the conclusion of collective labour

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<sup>42</sup> The **Law on Trade Unions and Collective Labour Agreements (No. 6356)** is available online. Retrieved April 11, 2019, from [www.mevzuat.gov.tr/AramaSonuc.aspx?searchText=Sendikalar%20ve%20Toplu%20%C4%B0%C5%9F](http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/AramaSonuc.aspx?searchText=Sendikalar%20ve%20Toplu%20%C4%B0%C5%9F)

agreements in order for workers and employers to mutually determine their economic, social and working conditions, on the settlement of disputes through peaceful means and on strikes and lock-outs” (Law No. 6356, Article 1).

**(iii) Regulations related to trade unions in Turkey**

- 2 June 1995, Law No. 22325
- 7 September 2001, Law No. 24516
- 7 September 2001, Law No. 24516
- 9 November 2001, Law No. 24578
- 9 July 2013, Law No. 28702
- 26 November 2013, Law No. 28833

**Table 6:** The Statistics of Public and Trade Unions (July 2018)

	<b>Public Servants’ Trade Unions (without branches)</b>	<b>Workers’ Trade Unions (without branches)</b>
Number of Unions	217	224
Number of Members in Trade Unions	1.673.318	1.802.155
Total Number of Public Servants/Workers in Turkey	2.473.461	14.121.664
Unionization Rate (%)	67,65%	12,76%

**Source:** Online database of Ministry of Family, Labour, and Social Services, “Statistics - Work Life Statistics – Statistics for Unions”, Retrieved April 8, 2019, from [www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/istatistikler](http://www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/istatistikler)

**Table 6** shows that **unionization rate** for public servants is 67,65% in 2018, while it is only 12,76% for workers. Therefore, unionization rate within public servants is much higher than unionization rate within workers. On the other hand, data of Trade Unions on the

database of T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society illustrates that Public Servants' Trade Unions have the **highest number** (1.652 with branches) in 2018, and Employers' Trade Unions have the **lowest number** (104 with branches).<sup>43</sup>

There is not available data for the number of members in Public Servant's Trade Unions and Employer's Trade Unions in terms of 81 provinces of Turkey. On the other hand, the Ministry of Labour, and Social Services (2016) published the number of workers in Workers' Trade Unions in 2016. The data shows that unionization rate for worker members is highest in Rize (27,22%), Tunceli (25,47%), Zonguldak (25,02%), and Muş (23,82%) provinces. In contrast, the lowest levels of unionization rates are in Ordu (7,54%), Antalya (6,21%), Yalova (5,96%), and Denizli (5,10%) provinces.

#### 4.4. Cooperatives

Cooperatives do not have an **economic value** by themselves, because they normally provide **social value**. However, after they bring small-scale producers together, they supply a significant number of products to the market. Cooperatives have an essential function in creating employment and source of income especially in the developing regions (İçduygu et al., 2011: 64). There are **three groups of cooperatives** that are under control of **three ministries**: T.R. Ministry of Trade, T.R. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and T.R. Ministry

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<sup>43</sup> Data for trade unions was collected from online database of T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society. Retrieved April 9, 2019, from <https://www.siviltoplum.gov.tr/sendikalara-iliskin-istatistikler>

of Environment and Urbanization. There are some **major laws** that facilitate the presence of cooperatives in Turkey.

**(i) Law on Cooperatives (No. 1163), published on 24 April 1969, which was amended by a new Law on Cooperatives (No. 3476), published on October 6, 1988<sup>44</sup>**

Law on Cooperatives (No. 1163) determines establishment and dissolution of cooperatives, requirements for membership, rights and liabilities of members, cooperative accounts and organs, and operational principles of cooperatives. The law defines a cooperative as:

“a body with variable members, variable capital and legal identity that is established by natural and public legal entities and private administrations, municipalities, villages, societies and associations in order to ensure and maintain certain economic interests and specifically the needs of their members toward professional life and living standards by means of mutual assistance, solidarity and service as trustees to each other”<sup>44</sup>  
(Law No. 1163, Article 1).

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<sup>44</sup> The English version of the **Law on Cooperatives (No. 1163)** is available online. Retrieved April 11, 2019, from [www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwj3udSqxu3hAhUs0aYKHTdgD50QFjAAegQIA RAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tarim.gov.tr%2FTRGM%2FBalikciOrgutu%2FBelemler%2F%2520k%25C3%25BCr%25C3%25BCphane%2Fingilizce%2520d%25C3%25B6k%25C3%25BCmanlar%2FCOOPERATIVES%2520LAW%2520NO%25201163%2520Eng.doc&usg=AOvVaw3UJXdkqHVBnmeA1miObD0K](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwj3udSqxu3hAhUs0aYKHTdgD50QFjAAegQIA RAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tarim.gov.tr%2FTRGM%2FBalikciOrgutu%2FBelemler%2F%2520k%25C3%25BCr%25C3%25BCphane%2Fingilizce%2520d%25C3%25B6k%25C3%25BCmanlar%2FCOOPERATIVES%2520LAW%2520NO%25201163%2520Eng.doc&usg=AOvVaw3UJXdkqHVBnmeA1miObD0K)

**(ii) Law on Agricultural Sales Cooperatives and Unions (No. 4572), published on June 16, 2000<sup>45</sup>:** This law was issued particularly for the agricultural sales cooperatives and unions to make these organizations more influential, autonomous and financially independent in a more sustainable way.

**(iii) Law on Agricultural Loan Cooperatives and Unions (No. 1581), published on April 28, 1972<sup>46</sup>:** This law includes specific provisions on the establishment and functions of agricultural loan cooperatives and unions. For instance, the law arranges establishment and dissolution of these cooperatives that aim to meet economic benefits and mutual assistance of producers.

**Table 7:** The Number of Cooperatives, and Their Shareholders Under Three Ministries (2012)

<b>Responsible Ministry</b>	<b>Cooperatives</b>	<b>Shareholders</b>
Ministry of Trade	13.384	2.003.037
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry	12.990	3.890.478
Ministry of Environment and Urbanization	57.858	2.215.710
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>84.232</b>	<b>8.109.225</b>

**Source:** T.R. Ministry of Trade (2012)

**Table 7** shows that there were 84.232 active and inactive cooperatives in total, while the number of shareholders were 8.109.225 people in 2012. The number of cooperatives is the highest (57.858) under T.R.

<sup>45</sup> **The Law on Agricultural Sales Cooperatives and Unions (No. 4572)** is available online in Turkish. Retrieved April 26, 2019, from [www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.4572.doc](http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.4572.doc)

<sup>46</sup> The Law No. 1581 is available online in Turkish. Retrieved April 26, 2019, from [www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin1.aspx?MevzuatKod=1.5.6102&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch=&Tur=1&Tertip=5&No=6102](http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin1.aspx?MevzuatKod=1.5.6102&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch=&Tur=1&Tertip=5&No=6102)

Ministry of Environment and Urbanization compared to other cooperatives in 2012. Moreover, according to report of T.R. Ministry of Trade (2018), there were 8.183 active cooperatives, and 1.515.956 shareholders in 2018. Since there were no data available on the numbers and shareholders of cooperatives under T.R. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and T.R. Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, this data was not included in the table. **The highest number** of active cooperatives are in Izmir (395 cooperatives), Istanbul (376 cooperatives), Muğla (352 cooperatives), Aydın (326 cooperatives), and Antalya (312 cooperatives) provinces. On the other hands, **the lowest number** of active cooperatives are in Aksaray (17 cooperatives), Bartın (17 cooperatives), Kırşehir (14 cooperatives), Bayburt (12 cooperatives), and Kilis (9 cooperatives) provinces.

**Table 8** shows the numbers of active and inactive cooperatives, and their shareholders under three ministries (T.R. Ministry of Trade, T.R. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and T.R. Ministry of Environment and Urbanization) in 2016 in terms of area of activity. There are 37 areas of activity in which cooperatives operate. In 2016, the highest number of cooperatives were operating in the areas of (i)Residential Building (27.361 cooperatives); (ii)Agricultural Development (7.201 cooperatives); (iii)Motor Vehicles (5.803 cooperatives); (iv)Irrigation (2.523 cooperatives); and (v)Consumption (2.170 cooperatives). In comparison with the 2012 data, total number of active and inactive cooperatives under three ministries decreased from 84.232 cooperatives in 2012 to 53.259 in

2016, while the number of shareholders decreased from 8.109.225 shareholders in 2012 to 7.422.994 shareholders in 2016.

**Table 8:** The Number of Cooperatives, and Their Shareholders by the Area of Activity (2016)

No	Area of Activity	Cooperatives	Shareholders
1.	Residential Building	27.361	1.273.274
2.	Agricultural Development	7.201	775.563
3.	Motor Vehicles	5.803	171.265
4.	Irrigation	2.523	303.586
5.	Consumption	2.170	183.463
6.	Agricultural Credit	1.625	1.001.418
7.	Collective Shop Building	1.161	84.035
8.	Credit and Bail	1.004	659.406
9.	Small-size Industrial Sites Building	922	125.632
10.	Enterprise	655	116.368
11.	Fisheries	553	30.889
12.	Production and Marketing	408	17.591
13.	Main Road Passenger Transport	390	7.873
14.	Development of Tourism	309	17.002
15.	Agricultural Sale	306	323.596
16.	Supply and Delivery	256	22.807
17.	Craftsman	233	7.770
18.	Main Road Carry Load	75	2.117
19.	Woman Entrepreneurship, Production and Management	55	640
20.	Education	49	2.880
21.	Beet Planters	31	1.448.171
22.	Raw Vegetable and Fruit	29	3.066
23.	Real Estate Property Management	26	922
24.	Publishing	23	508
25.	Solidarity	18	13.449
26.	Maritime Lines Passenger Transport	17	381
27.	Production of Renewable Energy	13	95
28.	Service	11	145
29.	Supply	8	606
30.	Insurance	6	827.765
31.	Porter Transportation(Hamal)	6	522
32.	Stallholders	5	67
33.	Health Service	2	53
34.	Scientific Research and Development	2	31
35.	Maritime Lines Carry Load	1	8
36.	Media, Broadcast and Communication	1	23
37.	Intellectual Property Rights and Project Consultation	1	7
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>53.259</b>	<b>7.422.994</b>

**Source:** Ministry of Trade (2017)

#### **4.5. Professional Organizations under the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB)**

These types of CSOs are also regarded as **trade bodies or professional organizations** which bring members from different professions together under their umbrella. They facilitate **professional activities** in order to meet common interests of their members. These CSOs are united under The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) which gains its legal status from the Article 135 of the Turkish Constitution:<sup>47</sup>

“Professional organizations having the characteristics of public institutions and their higher bodies are public corporate bodies established by law, with the objectives of meeting the common needs of the members of a given profession, to facilitate their professional activities, to ensure the development of the profession in keeping with common interests, to safeguard professional discipline and ethics in order to ensure integrity and trust in relations among its members and with the public; their organs shall be elected by secret ballot by their members in accordance with the procedure set forth in the law, and under judicial supervision”.

There are some **major laws** that facilitate the presence of professional organizations under TOBB in the Turkish law.

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<sup>47</sup> The English version of **Turkish Constitution** is available online. Retrieved April 15, 2019, from [https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution\\_en.pdf](https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf)

**(i) The Law of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey and the Chambers and Commodity Exchanges, (No. 5174), published on June 1, 2004:** The Law aims to “regulate the principles of the establishment and the operation of the chambers of commerce and industry, the chambers of commerce, the chambers of industry, the chambers of maritime commerce, commodity exchanges and the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey” (Law No. 5174, Article 1).<sup>48</sup>

On the other hand, this **Law (No.5174)** replaced the previous **Law on the Chambers, Commodity Exchanges and Union (No. 5590)**. Article 3 of the Law (No. 5174) describes the following concepts:

- (a) Chamber: Chamber of commerce and industry, chamber of commerce, chamber of industry and chamber of maritime commerce
- (b) Commodity Exchange: Product exchanges having the title of commodity exchange and product specific commodity exchanges
- (c) Union: The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey
- (d) Personnel: Employees of chamber, commodity exchange and the Union

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<sup>48</sup> The English version of **The Law of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey and the Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (No. 5174)** is available on the TOBB website under “legislation” topic. Retrieved April 11, 2019, from [www.tobb.org.tr/Sayfalar/Eng/Tarihce.php](http://www.tobb.org.tr/Sayfalar/Eng/Tarihce.php)

## **(ii) Other Laws that facilitate professional organizations under TOBB**

- Law on Licensed Warehouses for Agricultural Products, (No. 5300), published on 10 February 2005.
- Law on the Restructuring of Certain Receivables and Amendment to the Law of Social Security and General Health Insurance and Certain Other Laws and Decree Laws, (No. 6111), published on 25 February 2011.

On the official database of TOBB,<sup>49</sup> there are officially 5 types of professional organizations: (i) Chambers of Commerce and Industry, (ii) Chambers of Commerce, (iii) Chambers of Industry, (iv) Chambers of Shipping, and (v) Commodity Exchanges. There are 365 professional organizations under TOBB in 2018. According to data, the **highest number of professional organizations** are in Konya (16 professional organizations), Balıkesir (14 professional organizations), Bursa (13 professional organizations), and Manisa (13 professional organizations) provinces. On the other hands, **the lowest number of active professional organizations** are in Bartın (1 professional organization), Ardahan (1 professional organization), Yalova (1 professional organization), and Kilis (1 professional organization) provinces. There is **no available data** on the **number of members** in

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<sup>49</sup> Online database of The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB). The Data includes the numbers of chambers of commerce and industry, chambers of commerce, chambers of industry, and commodity exchanges. Retrieved March 29, 2019, from [tobb.org.tr/OdaveBorsalarDB/Sayfalar/oda--borsa-sorgulama.php](http://tobb.org.tr/OdaveBorsalarDB/Sayfalar/oda--borsa-sorgulama.php)

professional organizations under TOBB in the 81 provinces of Turkey. Some of 365 professional organizations publish the number of their members on their official website while some of them do not. Moreover, the members of professional organizations are mainly private sector firms, while members of other four types of CSOs are mainly individuals.

## **5. RECENT STUDIES ON CSOs IN TURKEY**

Although the role of CSOs has increased in Turkey as well as in the world, the studies in Turkey are very limited. In this part, some major global, individual and organizational research on CSOs in Turkey are given.

### **5.1. Global Studies**

This part evaluates global studies that aim to facilitate civil society development in more than one country. These studies are mainly based on a large scale of research within many countries at the global level. There are some well-known global studies that are stated below.

**(i) Project of Civil Society Index (CSI)** aims to evaluate weaknesses and strengths of civil society, create data source on civil society, and strengthen civil society at the global level (İçduygu et al., 2011: 31). The basics of the project were established with the first project, namely “New Civic Atlas”, for 60 countries by the cooperation of CIVICUS and Helmut Anheier in 1997 (CIVICUS, 1997). After that, the methodology of CIVICUS STEP was announced in 1999, and the

project was applied to 13 different pilot countries between 2000 and 2002 (Anheier, 2004).<sup>50</sup> The revised version of the project was applied to more than 50 countries (including Turkey) between 2003 and 2006, and more than 7000 civil society stakeholders were contacted during the project.<sup>51</sup> The final version of the project was applied to 53 countries (including Turkey) between 2008 and 2010.<sup>52</sup>

There is a country report for Turkey in 2010 under STEP project, which was applied to 400 people in Turkey, in cooperation with TÜSEV – Third Sector Foundation of Turkey: “Civil Society in Turkey: at a Turning Point CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI) Project Analytical Country Report for Turkey II” (İçduygu et al., 2011).<sup>53</sup> For the report a new data source was created by the following methods: external stakeholder survey (e.g., media, academia, government representatives, and donors), field study (e.g., stakeholder surveys, and CSO representatives in 7 geographical regions of

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<sup>50</sup> Pilot countries are listed as: Belarus, Estonia, Indonesia, Gallar, South Africa, Croatia, Canada, Mexico, Pakistan, Romania, Ukraine, Uruguay, and New Zealand. The report is available on the official website of CIVICUS. Retrieved March 19, 2019, from [www.civicus.org/index.php/media-center/reports-publications/csi-reports](http://www.civicus.org/index.php/media-center/reports-publications/csi-reports)

<sup>51</sup> The 2003-2006 report, namely “The Global Report on the State of Civil Society: Findings from the CIVICUS Civil Society Index Project: Phase 2003-2006”, is available on the official website of CIVICUS. Retrieved March 19, 2019, from [www.civicus.org/index.php/media-center/reports-publications/csi-reports](http://www.civicus.org/index.php/media-center/reports-publications/csi-reports)

<sup>52</sup> The 2008-2010 report, namely “Assessing and Strengthening Civil Society Worldwide - An updated programme description of the CIVICUS Civil Society Index: Phase 2008 to 2010”, is available on the official website of CIVICUS. Retrieved March 19, 2019, from [www.civicus.org/index.php/media-center/reports-publications/csi-reports](http://www.civicus.org/index.php/media-center/reports-publications/csi-reports)

<sup>53</sup> The country report for Turkey is available on the official website of CIVICUS. Retrieved March 19, 2019, from [www.civicus.org/images/stories/csi/csi\\_phase2/analytical%20country%20report%20for%20turkey.pdf](http://www.civicus.org/images/stories/csi/csi_phase2/analytical%20country%20report%20for%20turkey.pdf)

Turkey), literature review between 2001 and 2008, case studies, population survey on individual participation and perceptions on civil society, and national forum with more than 150 stakeholders from all regions and sectors of Turkey. There are some major findings of this report:

- The civil society was in a conceptual and operational area of transition since two decades, but acceleration of civil society's transition has decreased between 2006 and 2010 due to **weaknesses** (insufficient human resources, lack of citizen participation, limited funds, lack of financial sustainability, and weak organizational structures) more than **strengths** (level of communication and cooperation among civil society actors, relations with private sector, and access to support infrastructures and technology) of civil society.
- The number of CSOs (including associations, foundations, trade unions, professional chambers and cooperatives) in proportion to population of the country is still not sufficient to provide necessary goods and services for people in need, because there is only one CSO for every 780 people in Turkey.
- The major activities of associations were concentrated on social services and solidarity instead of advocacy and policy oriented activities. Similarly, foundations mainly operate in the areas of social aid, education, and health.

- Civic engagement of Turkish citizens, the representation of disadvantaged groups (e.g. youth, women, and ethnic minorities) in CSOs, membership in CSOs, amount of voluntary donations, volunteerism, and helping a stranger are low in Turkey. The civil society activities of people are very deeply and intensely active, although their number is few.
- There are organizational problems within institutionalization, good governance, financial sustainability, human resources (both paid and voluntary workers), physical and technological infrastructure, and stakeholder relations (cooperation and communication among civil society actors).
- The negative values such as violence, corruption, racism/discrimination, etc. in civil society are rarely perceived by stakeholders. On the other hand, values such as equal opportunities, labour standards, environmental standards, and the functionality of democratic structures remain questionable. These positive values should be promoted to increase transparency, trust and participation of people in civil society.
- The impact of civil society is limited in promoting non-violence, peace, democracy, transparency, and in political spheres. However, civil society has a higher impact in education and human rights, as well as in social spheres.
- Socio-cultural environment and low levels of social capital in Turkey limits the growth of civil society sector. Moreover,

relations with the public sector have worsened for CSO representatives, because they perceive that legal reforms and mechanisms are not enough to increase autonomy of the civil society sector, and dialogue or cooperation with public institutions. On the other hand, relations with the private sector remain a better area of cooperation that have more opportunities. Finally, relations among different CSOs remain insufficient.

- The EU accession process has positive influences on the legal framework for civil society sector.

There is also another report that was written in 2005 under the same STEP project. The name of the report is “Civil Society in Turkey: An Era of Transition” (TÜSEV, 2005), and it has similar findings as the report in 2010 (İçduygu et al., 2011).

**(ii) World Values Survey (WVS) Results** for Turkey in 2012 was prepared under World Values Survey Wave 6 between 2010 and 2014. This global project aims to launch data for researchers covering 60 countries and societies around the world with more than 85.000 respondents (Inglehart et al., 2014). There are aggregated and country data on beliefs, values and motivations of people in different countries. This data is very useful for researchers to comparatively analyze economic development, democratization, religion, gender equality, social capital, and subjective well-being in different societies. In Turkey, the sample size was 1.605 male and female

respondents from the following age groups: 18-29, 30-49, 50 and more. There are some major findings in Turkey under WVS Wave 6:

- 68,1% of respondents claimed that “religion” is very important for them.
- 97,3% of the respondents are “not a member” of any religious CSO like association, foundation or similar voluntary organizations.
- 96,6% of respondents are “not a member” of any CSO operating in the areas of education, art, music or similar voluntary organizations.
- 93,3% of respondents do not want a neighbor who use “drugs”, while this rate decreases to 35,8% for a neighbor from another ethnicity or skin color, and 36,8% for a neighbor from another religion.
- Answers for the question of “Would you attend a boycott against something as a political activity?” are as follows: 4,5% “have done”, 23,2% “might do”, 67,6% “would never do”, 2,5% “no answer”, 2,2% “don’t know”.
- 98,7% of respondents claimed that they trust completely, or trust somewhat their family whereas this rate is 34,6 for someone from another religion, %36,4 for someone from another nation, 39,7% for media (newspapers and magazines), 38,2% for Workers’ Trade Unions, 58,9% for the government, 46,6% for big private sector organizations, 39% for banks, 49,4% for environmental organizations, %54,5 for women rights

organizations, and 54,8% for philanthropy and human aid organizations.

- 27,1% of respondents think that it is “very good” and “fairly good” that military rules the country, while 83,2% of respondents think that Turkey should be ruled by a democratic political system.
- Religious denominations of the respondents are as following: 99,0% is “Muslim”, 0,1% “Jewish”, 0,1% “No answer”, and 0,8% is “None”.
- Only 4,2% of respondents claimed that racist assaults happening around their district is “very frequently” and “quite frequently”.

**(iii) ECAS – European Citizens Action Service** (2015) published a report titled “Triple A: Access to Information, Advice and Active Help” evaluating the availability of citizens’ information and assistance services in Turkey and Western Balkan countries (e.g., Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Romania). The Association of Civil Society Development Center (STGM) was formed as a Turkish organization, which is also a partner of ECAS. There are some major findings of the report about Turkey (ECAS, 2015: 103-104):

- There is not a comprehensive system that informs and helps citizens on topics such as consumer’s rights, tax system, municipal services, accommodation, social benefits, wages, social security and retirement in Turkey.

- In particular, rights-based CSOs engage in public advocacy for establishing rights-based laws on critical issues, carry out activities to raise citizens' awareness on the importance of a rights-based approach in judicial procedures, and generally inform citizens of their rights.
- Unions, trade associations and bar associations have been very active since the early 1990s in providing access to information for citizens on their rights.
- Many CSOs have had recourse to specialized committees such as human rights, children's rights, and women's rights.
- New regulations after the 2000s resulted in increasing number of CSOs in Turkey.
- Turkey's accession process to the EU is another factor that encourages the development of CSOs.

## **5.2. Civil Society Studies that are Supported by Public Institutions and Non-Public Organizations**

TÜSEV, STGM and YADA foundations are the most well-known non-public organizations that make broad studies on civil society and CSOs in Turkey. However, they mainly focus on national level of analysis, therefore they do not often provide regional or provincial statistics in their research. On the other hand, their studies are very influential in strengthening CSOs, increasing awareness, and creating guidebooks for CSOs in Turkey. Especially, STGM organizes

organizational trainings and workshops for CSOs in terms of special topics such as project management, institutional capacity, fund-raising, social media and legislation. This organization is funded by the EU, so they can open “call for project”, and fund some of these projects financially. For instance, the budget of “Civil Society Development for Active Participation Project” that has been carried out by STGM is announced as 2,4 million Euro which is funded by the European Commission.<sup>54</sup> There are some major studies of these organizations that have significant influence on civil society studies in Turkey.

**(i) YADA Foundation** (2015) published a report titled “Civil Society with Data” under the Strengthening Civil Society Development and Civil Society-Public Sector Dialogue in Turkey Project. This report makes a broad analysis on:

- Current situation of CSOs in Turkey
- Representation of CSOs in mainstream media
- Public relations and communication experiences of CSOs
- Perceptions and attitudes of public institutions about CSOs
- Perceptions of the society about CSOs
- Perceptions of CSO representatives about civil society
- Statistics of CSOs at the national level

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<sup>54</sup> Details for the STGM can be found on the official website. Retrieved 01 May, 2019, from <http://www.stgm.org.tr/en/icerik/detay/project-budget>

**(ii) STGM** published a report titled “The Adventure of Civil Society in Turkey: An Oasis within Impossibilities” prepared by E. Fuat Keyman (Keyman, 2006). The report evaluates the following major topics in detail:

- The Significance of Civil Society and Turkey-EU Relations in 2000s
- Modernization, Democracy and Civil Society in Turkey
- Civil Society in the Context of Turkey-EU relations
- Civil Society and Full Membership Negotiations Between Turkey and the EU
- Turkey-EU relations and Democratization

**(iii) TÜSEV** published a lot of influential studies on civil society. For instance, “Civil Society in Turkey: An Era of Transition” (TÜSEV, 2005), “Tax Legislation Related to Foundations and Associations in Turkey and Public Benefit Status Current Situation and Recommendations” (Şahin and Ersen, 2018), “Individual Giving and Philanthropy in Turkey” (Çarkoğlu and Aytaç, 2016), and “Active Participation in Civil Society: International Standards, Obstacles in National Legislation and Proposals Report” under Strengthening Civil Society Development and Civil Society-Public Sector Dialogue in Turkey Project (Ayata and Karan, 2015) are some of these well-known publications.

(iv) There are also **some public institutions** that support national level of studies on CSOs. For instance, many public institutions have started to support studies on CSOs that operate particularly in their area of interest. For instance, the Ministry of Family, Labour, and Social Services is motivated to support CSOs that operate in the areas of disadvantaged people, woman, children or workers' rights. Moreover, some of the public institutions like T.R. Ministry of Youth and Sports established a separate department namely "Office of Relations with Civil Society Organizations" under General Directorate of Youth Services. This ministry also published a report titled "The Profile of Youth CSOs in Turkey" prepared by Önder, Akın and Ayhan (2019) under the project "Cooperation with Civil Society Organizations Meetings" organized in the form of 21 workshops between 2017 and 2019. About 1500 CSO representatives attended these workshops to discuss problems and solutions for topics such as cooperation between civil society and public, financial problems of CSOs, and legal infrastructure of civil society in Turkey. The results and oral discussions during these workshops introduced the current situation, problems, and needs of Youth CSOs in Turkey. In addition, strategic goals and solutions were suggested in the report on "The Profile of Youth CSOs in Turkey". The Educational Volunteers Foundation of Turkey (TEGV) also published a report titled "Volunteering and Social Capital in Turkish Youth" in 2008 (Atilgan et al., 2008). The project team of the report made face-to-face interview with 750 young people aged between 18 and 35 in 15 provinces of Turkey. The results revealed that only 5% of the young

people attended a volunteering activity at least once in the last year. In addition, only 7% of young people donated to CSOs, and this rate is about 30% within the young people who attended volunteering activities before. The report also gives details about the differences between young people in general and voluntary young people in TEGV, as well as values and attitudes of young people.



## **CHAPTER III**

### **THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CSOs**



## **1. TYPES OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE GOODS AND SERVICES**

In the academic literature, most of the scientific studies were conducted on the analysis of **two sectors until the 1980s**: market versus state. However, this “two-sector world view” was challenged by new studies on **a new sector**, namely civil society sector. Therefore, the main theoretical development on CSOs have been **after the 1970s by new approaches** such as Weisbrod’s (1975) theory of market failure, Hansmann’s (1987) theory of contract failure, and James’s (1987b) heterogeneity argument. In addition to these theorists, Dimaggio and Anheier (1990: 138-139) mentioned three main questions in 1990 regarding the research on CSOs. Firstly, the question of “Why do non-profit organizations exist?” focuses on organizational origin and institutional choice. Secondly, the question of “How do they behave?” addresses organizational behavior of CSOs. Thirdly, the question of “What impact do they have and what difference do they make?” directs us to a well-known question of “So what?”. Anheier (2005: 114) suggest that these questions can be answered at three different levels:

- (i) that of the organization or case, or for a specific set of organizations
- (ii) that of the field or industry (education, health, advocacy, philanthropy)
- (iii) that of the economy and society

This framework is still valid for researches on CSOs. In the literature, there are some major empirical and theoretical studies explaining the presence, size, composition, performance, and financing of CSOs (Anheier, 2005; Salamon and Anheier, 1998: 220), and these theories are from different fields such as economics, political science and sociology. It is important to note that most of the theories are mainly developed for the liberal market economies, therefore, it is hard to apply these theories to other types of economies (Anheier, 2005: 120). However, these theories are still significant to understand factors that explain presence and organizational development of CSOs in developed and developing market economies.

In order to present major theories of CSOs, it is firstly necessary to evaluate why some of public goods and services are provided by CSOs, while others are provided by either public institutions or private sector organizations in market economies. Scholars mainly explain this situation by market failure, government failure, or voluntary failure. For instance, Titmus (1973) asks a basic question of “Why some valuable goods and services do not have market price in a market economy?”, because the value of goods and services are normally determined by price mechanism based on the supply and demand in the markets. He evaluates this question by giving the example of **donation of blood** as individual gift by voluntary action in market economies. Blood is a valuable thing that needs to have a higher price, because it has paramount importance especially for people in emergencies. However, blood is collected by a **voluntary**

**system** that is encouraged by CSOs, instead of private sector companies that seek profit-making. The main explanation for this situation is market failure as discussed more in detail below. As in the case of giving blood, it is necessary to divide goods and services in the market economies as “public” or “private”, because this makes it easier to understand goods and services are interchangeably provided by either CSOs, public institutions, or private sector organizations. **Table 9** introduces types of good and services in one framework that is beneficial to understand their features.

**Table 9:** Types of Goods and Services

	<b>Excludable</b>	<b>Non-excludable</b>
<b>Rival</b>	pure private goods and services	non-excludable quasi-public goods and services
<b>Non-Rival</b>	excludable quasi-public goods and services	pure public goods and services

**Source:** Anheier (2005: 118)

### 1.1. Pure Public Goods and Services

They are **available to all citizens** regardless of their contributions, **and no property rights** can be established for these goods and services (Anheier, 2005: 117). They are also known as “common” or “collective” goods and services (Olson, 1971: 14; Salamon, 1987: 35). There are two significant characteristics of pure public goods and services, and both of them need to be present in the nature of these goods and services to talk about pure public goods and services.

***Non-excludability:*** It means that it is costly or impossible to keep some citizens (e.g., non-tax payers) from consuming or using these goods or services for free, or little cost once they are produced or provided by supplier (Steinberg, 2006: 119). For example, all citizens benefit from the national defense system, which provides collective security for all, and it does not matter how many citizens pay their taxes or not (Ogus, 2004: 33). In other words, it is not possible to exclude some citizens, who do not pay their taxes, from enjoying the benefits of national defense system once it is provided.

***Non-rivalry:*** It means that public goods and services are “nonrival” and always available to all citizens no matter how many people consume or use them (Cooter and Ulen, 2000: 15). In other words, individual use does not decrease the amount of these goods and services that are available for citizens. For instance, public transport is available to all citizens no matter how many people use it every day.

If only one of these features is present in the nature of these goods and services, while other is either not present or less present we should talk about **quasi-public goods**.

***Non-excludable quasi-public goods and services:*** They refer to common-pool or congestion goods and services that are rival, but it is possible to keep some citizens (e.g., non-payers) from consuming or using them only at a certain price. For instance, fishing is rival for all citizens until the situation of overfishing occurs. However, it is costly

and difficult to enforce exclusion, limitation and controlling for overfishing.

***Excludable quasi-public goods and services:*** These goods and services are non-rival, but exclusion of non-payers is possible as in the case of museum exhibitions is only available to payers no matter how many people are present there.

## **1.2. Pure Private Goods and Services**

There is **no externality** for the production, exchange, and consumption of these goods and services, and **individual property rights** can be established. Contrary to pure public goods and services, there is **excludability** and **rivalry** for the pure private goods and services. These features can exist in different degrees for pure private goods and services.

***Excludability:*** It means that it is possible to keep some citizens (e.g., non-payers) from consuming or using some goods or services for no or little cost once they are produced or provided by suppliers. Products in the shopping centers are only available to those who pay the full price.

***Rivalry:*** It means that some goods and services are only available for individual use that reduces the amount of these goods and services.

After explaining the types of goods and services, it is important to understand which one of them is provided either by private sector organizations, public institutions, or CSOs. Anheir (2005) developed a

very beneficial framework for types of goods and providers as shown in **Table 10**.

**Table 10:** Types of Goods and Providers

	<b>Pure Private Goods and Services</b>	<b>Quasi-public Goods and Services</b>	<b>Pure Public Goods and Services</b>
<b>Private Sector Organizations</b>	Yes	Contested	No, due to <b>market failure</b>
<b>Public Institutions</b>	No, due to <b>government failure</b>	Contested	Yes
<b>CSOs</b>	Contested	Yes	No, due to <b>voluntary failure</b>

**Source:** Anheier (2005: 119).

Firstly, **pure private goods and services** (excludable and rival) are best provided by **private sector organizations**, because these organizations can successfully meet individual consumer preferences for goods and services by minimizing transaction costs and maximizing profit. These organizations do not prefer to provide pure public goods and services due to non-excludability, non-rivalry, and especially “free-riders” problem which means that most of the consumers, who are assumed to be rational, will choose free-ride, and they will prefer not to pay for public goods and services. Although, some of them will choose to pay for these goods, they will be discouraged by the fear of bearing the cost because of the “free-riders” (Olson, 1971: 14-16). Secondly, **pure public goods and services** (non-excludable and non-rival) are best provided by **public institutions**, because these institutions can overcome free-rider problem, serious gaps in geographical coverage, and lack of resources

through taxation. Thirdly, **quasi-public goods and services** (excludable) are best provided by **CSOs**, because these organizations provide public goods and services that are non-rival, but exclusion of non-payers is possible. For instance, a CSO can provide health care service for free or little cost, and exclude non-payers from benefiting this service. Consequently, the reason why private sector organizations, public institutions, and CSOs prefer to provide different types of goods and services is because of three failures: **market failure**, **government failure**, and **voluntary failure**.

### **1.3. Market Failure**

In the literature there are similar explanations for market failure by different scholars (Ahneier, 2005; Garton, 2009; Titmus, 1973). In order to discuss reasons of market failure, it is firstly necessary to understand some/the fundamentals of microeconomics. There are two important actors in the market: **consumers** and **private sector organizations**. These organizations provide pure private goods and services, and seek to maximize their profits for their owners and investors, but these profits are depended on some constraints such as decrease of consumer demand, increase on cost of production or wages. On the other hand, consumers also seek to increase their satisfaction and utility from buying goods and services provided by private sector organizations. There are again constraints (e.g., consumer's budget, cost and quality of goods and services) for consumers in increasing their satisfaction and utility.

In an efficiently operating market, private sector organizations and consumers are able to **maximize their profit and utility** (Cooter and Ulen, 2000: 29-30). In this sense, provision of pure private goods and services by private sector organizations is mainly depended on the utility level of consumers from these goods and services. This dependency can be explained by **supply and demand theory**. In the market, if private sector organizations supply more of a product than consumers demand, then the price of this product will decrease, and these organizations will produce less from this product, so consumer demand will increase. Conversely, if consumers demand for a particular product increase more than supply, then the price of the product will increase, so private sector organizations will supply more of the product. However, price increase will cause a decrease on the demand, so after some time the prices will level off to a certain point as a result of initial fluctuation, namely **market equilibrium**, where the level of supply is equal to level of demand (Cooter and Ulen, 2000: 29). This is also called as **Pareto Efficiency**, where marginal cost is equal to marginal return (Okun, 1975). At the situation of market equilibrium, “it is impossible to increase the output or make someone better off without making someone else worse of” (Önder, 2006: 20). There are some conditions that cause **market failure** through harming **perfect competitiveness, market equilibrium, efficient allocation and provision of goods and services**. Some of these conditions can also cause voluntary failure, because CSOs also operate in market economies. In addition, CSOs do not only provide

quasi-public goods and services, but they also provide private goods and services for consumers.

**(i) Monopoly Power Against Competitiveness:** In a competitive market, there should be **free competition** between a large number of private sector organizations. If the market price and production are controlled by single or a small number of players, **market equilibrium** cannot be achieved, because the one(s) holding monopoly power, for instance, can decrease production in order to increase prices and get more profit at the end. Monopoly is mainly a result of **excessive competitiveness** which means that single or a small number of players fix or lower prices to force other players out of the business, and maximize their own funding sources. In order to overcome monopoly problem, state can pass competition law to guarantee free and fair competition in the market.

Like private sector organizations, there are two cases in which CSOs can hold monopolistic power. There are some CSOs holding monopoly power in terms of regulating entry into some professions. For instance, General Medical Council in England, providing market support as a CSO, is the only organization which determines training requirements and standards for doctors who want to exercise their profession (Garton, 2009: 95). Gardner (2000: 21) argues that some CSOs are going to be looser due to competition for the energy, time or money. In this competition, duty of a CSO can no longer be a duty of charity in his opinion, because competition is not compatible with the moral virtue of charity. Similarly, Morris (1995) states that there are

scarce sources of donations, therefore some CSOs will not be able to exist or continue its functions properly in the future. In this sense, he asserts that CSOs should also compete for scarce resources of funding such as voluntary donations, project revenues or membership fees. However, Dawes (1998) claims that CSOs have the same ultimate goals for public benefit so they should not compete each other. Moreover, CSOs are more trustworthy than private sector organizations in providing social service for citizens in theory, because they do not seek profit (Hansmann, 1987). Although, the literature mainly focuses on “fund-raising issues and the problems associated with revenue accumulation”, there are also other factors that competition between CSOs is based on, such as “the quality of service, the ability to meet constituent needs, and reputation” (Tuckman, 1998: 26-28). In summary, competition between CSOs seems to be inevitable to reach scarce funding sources available to a large number of rival organizations, and CSOs might engage in anti-competitive actions. Therefore, this situation can also result in failure of civil society in the provision of public and private goods and services.

**(ii) Provision of Public Goods and Services:** Most of the private sector organizations do not prefer to provide public goods and services which do not have enough profit due to “free-rider” problem (Weisbrod, 1975). In addition, non-rivalrous and non-excludible characteristics of these goods and services makes it harder for measurement and pricing (Önder, 2006: 21). As a result, profit-

seeking private sector organizations will not prefer to provide these public goods and services (Olson, 1971: 14-16). Therefore, market failure occurs when private sector organizations do not stay in business due to low demand to pay for goods and services by consumers. State can compensate non-payers through taxation. On the other hand, CSOs are also alternative actors that can provide public goods and services, because they are more trustworthy for people, and they mainly focus on quality rather than profit (Hansmann, 1987). In addition, Salamon (1987) states that CSOs provide better public goods and services than the state because they are more efficient, expertised, and insulated from political distractions. Transaction costs are higher for private sector organizations because these costs increase the price of goods or services (e.g., extra detection process for blood to find out whether quality is sufficient or not). On the other hand, transaction costs are lower for the CSOs since they are exempt from taxes and fees, and they have ability to subsidize their services and operational costs by voluntary donations (Gronbjerg, 2001). However, free rider problem can also cause voluntary failure for CSOs. For instance, if all blood in the market is collected by CSOs as donations, some people will choose not to give their blood if they do not get money, so this might potentially discourage voluntary donations of blood by others (Titmus, 1973).

**(iii) Externalities:** “Externalities” are extra costs that are not accounted for the price of a good or service but influence third parties (e.g., price of air pollution due to gas emission is not included price of

cars) (Titmus, 1973). If private sector organizations do not consider the externalities or spillovers in pricing, which mean “social costs” of a product or service (Breyer, 1982: 15), this will lead to market failure (Ogus, 2004: 19-22). For instance, if the production processes of a manufacturer cause pollution, the citizens, who are influenced by the pollution, can coordinate to force this manufacturer to bear the cost of pollution by the regulations of private law. And this extra cost would increase the prices of products produced by this manufacturer. However, it is hard to calculate the causes of pollution in the short-run, because many inhabitants in the region realize the negative consequences of pollution after years. In addition, it is often hard for large number of inhabitants to coordinate and organize against the pollution caused by manufacturers. Giving such condition, organized activities of CSOs (e.g., environmental CSOs campaigning against the pollution caused by manufacturers) are more effective, and cause externalities for private sector organizations. Therefore, CSOs play a more important role in calculating the social costs of a product or service than individuals and private sector organizations. Some activities of volunteers of CSOs can cause social cost for the ones who benefit from it, and it can result in voluntary failure as well. For instance, if a teacher abuses his students at school, it is possible that these students feel afraid to complain, or too young to recognize that they are being abused by their teachers. Therefore, this situation can cause social costs for that educational CSO in which this teacher acts as volunteer.

**(iv) Information Deficit and Lack of Accountability:** Information deficit, which is also known as “information asymmetry”, refers to lack of information about the quality of a good or service offered by private sector organizations (Hansmann, 1987; Titmus, 1973). Accountability is a solution for private sector organizations to solve information deficit problem, because consumers should be able to make rational choices for goods and services of private sector organizations in an efficiently operating market, otherwise they cannot evaluate the quality and quantity of a product until buying it. If these consumers are not informed properly by the producers, information deficit and accountability problems can appear, and this can cause market failure.

The state can solve information deficit problem by compulsory regulations for the private sector organizations to increase their accountability through available data for consumers about their products for consumers; however, there are still some intangible services (e.g., babysitting or massage) for which it is hard to increase available data. For instance, the state can pass a compulsory regulation to meet some standard level of skills for babysitters and masseurs, but it is still hard for consumers to make a rational choice due to diversity of abilities and skills of these babysitters and masseurs. On the other hand, the market can provide information about the past experiences of some selected consumers, however, private sectors organizations have tendency to feature positive reviews than negative ones. In this sense, CSOs can play complementary role by pressing private sector

organizations to provide more information about their products and activities for consumers.

There are also information deficit problems for CSOs. Firstly, CSOs are alternative to private sector organizations, because they do not seek profit in providing public goods and services. However, it is possible that the resources of CSOs can attract dishonest persons who seek to exploit them (Kendall and Knapp, 1996: 257-258; Ortmann and Schlesinger, 1997). These people can seek profit through CSOs to make money for themselves, and hide this from donors and other stakeholders. Secondly, it is also possible that some activities of CSOs are considered as profit-making. Tuckman (1998: 36) states that there are four conditions in which CSOs can operate on the basis of profit-making:

- CSOs must feel that additional financial resources are necessary to achieve their organizations goals.
- CSO managers must be sure that profit-making activities do not “substantially interfere with” the organization’s mission.
- The products of the CSO should be sellable for the market.
- These products should increase or at least meet demand from the consumers.

Moreover, Weisbrod (1998: 67) discusses that profit-making activities, like “ancillary activities, which though not mission related do provide revenue for cross-subsidizing the mission-related output”, have two direct negative consequences for organizational mission:

- Profit-making activities can distract CSO managers, and this can weaken their attention on the main mission of the organization.
- Profit-making activities can cause “mission displacement”, because CSOs may change some elements of their goals to satisfy prospective purchasers who benefited from ancillary activities of CSOs.

**(v) Irregularity of Production and Lack of Coordination:**

Irregularity of production appears due to three major factors. Firstly, private sector organizations may be unwilling to produce goods in remote locations if the cost of production is higher than the cost of production in closer locations due to geographical and other reasons (e.g., delivery costs and lack of demand) (Ogus, 2004: 32). Secondly, resources can be temporarily available due to scarcity (Breyer, 1982: 11). Thirdly, demand can be “cyclical”, which means that private sector organizations decrease the prices which results in a reduction of production capacity, dismissal of workers, or closing plants during cycles (Ogus, 2004: 43). Because of these three factors, some consumers will not be able to purchase goods or services they demand because of their location. Therefore, there is a strong need for regulation to coordinate of production in order to make these goods and services available for everyone without any constraints.

Irregularity of production and lack of coordination are also problems for CSOs. For instance, lack of financial and human resources affects the presence of CSOs, because CSOs can survive where they can find enough resources (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). In the **voluntary**

**failure theory** of Salamon (1987), “**philanthropic insufficiency**” and “**philanthropic particularism**” are strongly related with irregularity of production for CSOs. Philanthropic insufficiency appears where CSOs cannot attract sufficient resources in their activities due to free-riding, while philanthropic particularism means that CSOs can move from activities attracting fewer resources towards activities attracting more resources (Salamon, 1987: 39-41). This situation might cause unavailability of activities in some places, because donors will not be able to find some specific CSOs activities, while there will be accumulation in other activities of CSOs due to philanthropic particularism. Moreover, Salamon (1987) also suggests that particularism can lead to inadequate representation of “all segments of the community equally” due to insufficient resources. He additionally argues that there is also “favoritism” problem which causes “wasteful duplication” of goods and services provided by CSOs (Salamon, 1987: 41).

#### **1.4. Government Failure**

Public goods and services are “nonrival” and always available to all citizens no matter how many people consume or use them (Cooter and Ulen, 2000: 15). In addition, they are “nonexcludable” which means that it is costly or impossible to keep some citizens from consuming or using these goods or services once they are produced or provided by supplier (Steinberg, 2006: 119). These features of public goods and services also show us rationale why private sector organizations do not prefer to provide public goods and services, because “market

method of allocation” cannot be easily applied to supply of these public goods and services (Ogus, 2004: 33). However, Weisbrod (1975) argues that governments mainly focus on the demands for public goods and services from “median voter”, who composes the majority of the society so influences political power during the elections. Because party(s) in power seeks to be re-elected in the next elections, it will not be able to meet conflicting and various demands from different groups in society. That means government cannot provide different levels of public goods and services for numerous minority groups, and satisfy their preferences, because its actions are mainly driven by the majority will (Levitt, 1973). Therefore, government failure due to heterogeneity is an essential factor in explaining the presence of CSOs theoretically (Garton, 2009: 47; James and Rose-Ackerman, 1986: 60).

### **1.5. Voluntary Failure**

Voluntary failure theory was introduced by Salamon (1987), and it focuses on the deficiencies of CSOs in the provision of public goods and services as a rationale behind the partnership between the state and CSOs. Voluntary failure theory is the opposite of market failure theory, which explains the presence of CSOs in the case of government failure, because CSOs exist due to voluntary action that arise from people’s natural tendencies for collective action and sense of social obligation (Anheier, 2005:130). In addition, they have advantages (e.g., less transaction costs, flexibility, minimum bureaucracy, tax and income benefits, voluntary and collective action)

compared to public institutions and private sector organizations in responding to social problems. For instance, well-known voluntary organizations like KIZILAY and AKUT were very active in helping people in the cities badly struck by earthquake on August 17, 1999 in Turkey. Turkish society appreciated activities of these organizations, and their quick response to victims of earthquake in comparison to public institutions and private sector organizations. However, voluntary action is still limited. Although CSOs are considered to be better in the provision of especially quasi-public goods and services than public institutions, or private sector organizations. However, there are some conditions that cause voluntary failure in providing optimal levels of public goods and services by CSOs: “philanthropic insufficiency”, “philanthropic particularism”, “philanthropic amateurism” and “philanthropic paternalism” (Salamon, 1987: 39-42).

**(i) Philanthropic Insufficiency:** It arises when CSOs cannot attract sufficient resources to provide public goods and services (Salamon, 1987: 39-40). In these cases, financial resources will not be enough for CSOs because human beings have incentive to let others bear the cost. Sufficient resources can only be supplied sufficiently and consistently by involuntary action which is forced by the state through taxation. In addition, economic fluctuations (e.g., Great Depression and financial crises) can also discourage people to contribute to the resources of CSOs. Finally, Salamon (1987: 39-40) discusses that the resources are insufficient for CSOs in the provision of public goods and services where problems are most severe due to “free-rider

problem”, “twists and turns of economic fortune” and “serious gaps in geographical coverage”.

**(ii) Philanthropic Particularism:** Philanthropic particularism means that CSOs move towards some particular public goods and services, which attract more resources, due to scarcity of resources. Salamon (1987: 40) claims that particularism is an essential theoretical rationale for the existence of CSOs, because these organizations were formed as a result of interests and preferences of subgroups (e.g., ethnic, religious, or economic). However, this particularism can also lead to inadequate representation of “all segments of the community equally” due to insufficient resources. Similarly, there is also “favoritism” problem which causes “wasteful duplication” of goods and services provided by CSOs (Salamon, 1987: 41).

**(iii) Philanthropic Amateurism:** It is a result of “amateur approaches to cope with human problems” (Salamon, 1987: 42), because the activities are mainly carried out by voluntary workers who are managing CSOs in the voluntary basis. This is an advantage because the structure of CSOs encourages entrepreneurship and civic participation, but CSO cannot always attract qualified and experienced personnel due to limited amount of resources to provide sufficient wages (Salamon, 1987: 42), so amateurism can cause poor quality of public goods and services. Therefore, there is a need for professional trainings of their voluntary workers and counsellors in CSOs, since these CSOs cannot provide adequate wages to attract professional paid personnel. In this sense, professional management of voluntary

workers by organizational trainings (e.g., project management, fund-raising, capacity development, and performance management) can influence the contributions of these workers in organizational performance of CSOs in achieving major activities.

**(iv) Philanthropic Paternalism:** It is the result of preferences of some members “those in command of the greatest resources” of CSOs, because these members have resources of “time”, “money” and “knowledge” to influence activities of CSOs (Salamon, 1987: 41). At the end, some specific activities of CSOs (e.g., arts and sports) are favored by the preferences of these members while other activities demanded by poorer members are being ignored (Salamon, 1987: 41). This paternalistic behavior of CSOs can cause failure in the provision of goods and services demanded by different members, or people in need.

## 2. FUNCTIONS OF CSOs

There are sectoral, legal and economic definitions of CSOs because they operate in diverse areas, and have different tasks and roles to perform. In addition, they are different in terms of financial capacity, organizational size, and type of fund-raising activities. Similarly, Badelt (1997: 169) argues that it is not possible to explain non-profit sector by one specific theoretical approach because the sector is too heterogeneous. Scholars have determined some major functions of CSOs that contribute to the society: (i) activities of CSOs that support the markets, (ii) providing public goods and services, (iii) providing

private goods that are analogous to public goods, (iv) protection of political rights, (v) providing social and cultural services, (vi) increasing social entrepreneurship (Anheier, 2005; Garton, 2009; Kramer, 1981; Prewitt, 1999).

## **2.1. Activities of CSOs that Support Markets**

Some CSOs operate in the market while other CSOs do not. However, all CSOs provide benefits for the operation of a market. Therefore, their support for the market is also called as “extra-market activities” (Gassler, 1986). Market activities of CSOs are divided into two types of activities: systematic activities and environmental activities. Systematic activities of CSOs provide favorable conditions (Gassler, 1986), while environmental activities of CSOs provide resources and shape environment for private sector organizations functioning in the market (Garton, 2009: 42).

**(i) Systematic Activities:** CSOs play an important role in the distribution of property rights which is normally carried out by the market (e.g., bargaining between individuals or parties) or the state (e.g., creating laws that allocates rights between individuals or parties). For instance, some CSOs like Amnesty International contribute to these rights by campaigning against violation of human rights. Moreover, minimalization of ‘transaction costs’ is very essential for the markets to operate efficiently. In this sense, some CSOs like trade unions and professional bodies can reduce transaction costs by their bargaining power and other forms of co-operative

activities with the state. Thirdly, as argued above, lack of information for consumers about the products and activities of private sector organizations is one of the main reasons for market failure. Therefore, CSOs can resolve information deficit by pressing and monitoring private sector organizations in terms of providing more data on their products and activities available for consumers.

**(ii) Environmental Activities of CSOs:** There are two types of environmental activities that provide resources and shape environment for private sector organizations functioning in the market (Garton, 2009). Firstly, some educational CSOs like universities provide human resources for private sector organizations. In addition, research institutions and consumer organizations provide an environment that facilitate entrepreneurship and innovation. Secondly, religious and educational CSOs can shape consumer preferences through educating attitudes of their members towards product utility.

## **2.2. Providing Public Goods and Services**

One explanation of functions of CSOs is focusing on their complementary role in areas where public and private sector fail to provide public goods and services. CSOs have important functions in the provision of public goods and services for the minority preferences in comparison to the government, because government programs are typically large scale and uniform (Anheier, 2005: 174). In addition, CSOs can be main providers of public goods and services where neither public institutions nor private sector companies are either not

willing, or not able to provide these goods and services (Kramer, 1981). Similarly, Weisbrod (1975) notes that society “resort” to CSOs only after they cannot find a service provided by public institutions and private sector organizations. Douglas (1983: 14) explains the function of CSOs as curing “the ills of society”. On the other hand, the final report of “Panel on Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary Sector” in 1999 states that CSOs operate independently, or in cooperation with governments in various areas such as “in stitching a torn social safety net, educating and caring, responding with compassion and resources to disasters, large and small, environmental and individual, at home and abroad”.<sup>55</sup> In conclusion, scholars mainly discuss this function of CSOs through government and market failure, because they believe that CSOs provide public goods and services when public institutions and private sector organizations fail to provide these goods and services sufficiently (Weisbrod, 1975; Hansmann, 1987; Levitt, 1973).

### **2.3. Providing Private Goods Analogous to Public Goods**

CSOs have two advantages in providing some types of **private goods** compared to private sector organizations (Garton, 2009: 68-69). Firstly, CSOs can better provide intangible services in areas such as academic and physical education, social housing and mental health.

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<sup>55</sup> The final report of “Panel on Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary Sector” in 1999, namely “Building on Strength: Improving Governance and Accountability in Canada’s Voluntary Sector”, is available online. Retrieved March 27, 2019, from [www.sectorsource.ca/sites/default/files/resources/files/2458\\_Book.pdf](http://www.sectorsource.ca/sites/default/files/resources/files/2458_Book.pdf)

Secondly, CSOs are playing an essential role in the redistribution of wealth by transferring resources gathered from donors to beneficiaries who receive them.

#### **2.4. Protection of Political Rights**

Due to their independent and self-directed characteristics, CSOs are very influential on the facilitation of political rights (Anheier, 2005; Kramer, 1981). There are some political activities of CSOs that can be categorized under three interrelated areas.

**(i) Protection of Minority Rights:** CSOs carry out some political activities to foster self-determination for their members. Human rights groups like Amnesty International are good examples for this type of function that is carried out by CSOs. CSOs are important vehicles for “mutual support” which refers to the desire to help one’s self through support networks (e.g. connecting socially-disadvantaged citizens, and providing financial support for those in need) and financial institutions (e.g., trade unions seeking financial benefits for their members) (Garton, 2009).

**(ii) Pressuring Governments:** CSOs give voice to increase awareness of under-represented, or discriminated groups, because their preferences are not always taken into account (Anheier, 2005: 175). In this sense, these organizations create pressure on public policies by getting feedback from government, or by spreading out their feedback publicly in order to force the government to reconsider a particular

policy. Therefore, they force government to change or make improvements in social policies for people in need.

**(iii) Facilitating Pluralism and Civil Participation:** CSOs are important “platforms for ideological expression”, because political engagement of CSOs promotes pluralism and encourages citizen’s involvement (Prewitt, 1999).

## **2.5. Providing Social and Cultural Services**

There are some constraints for public institutions such as constitutional grounds or majority will in fostering diverse values of minorities in the society. Similarly, private sector organizations do not pursue fostering these values, because it is not profitable for them (Anheier, 2005: 175). Therefore, CSOs dominate the provision of cultural services (e.g., expression of religious, ideological, cultural and social values) better than public institutions and private sector organizations. In addition, CSOs are more trustworthy than others since they do not seek profit making, because they focus on public benefit (Hansmann, 1987). For instance, when a CSO organizes a cultural event, ticket prices are not fixed because some people would like to pay or donate more than others for the event. In this way, this CSO can continue to provide cultural services for people without worrying about the costs of the event such as hiring a place, technical tools, or other spending for the organization. Moreover, CSOs can redistribute funds from better off to the less affluent parts of the society more effectively (Anheier, 2005; Prewitt, 1999).

## **2.6. The Facilitation of Entrepreneurship**

Scholars argue that CSOs are small in size, and they encourage professionalism and innovation. Anheier (2005) states that CSOs have innovative characteristics because they are able to pioneer new approaches, processes, or programs in the provision of public goods and services. He adds that private sector organizations should meet expectations of stakeholders who demand some return on their investment. Moreover, public institutions are subject to elections, so government entities need to care about median voters' preferences. However, CSOs do not have these concerns, so they can serve as change agents that produce innovative goods and services.

CSOs provide an environment which can facilitate entrepreneurship, and this makes career in these organizations more attractive. Firstly, the innovative characteristics of some CSOs like research institutions and consumer organizations provide market support. Secondly, CSOs are more trustable than private sector organizations (Hansmann, 1987), so they can easily attract voluntary donations from entrepreneurs as funding source. CSOs can also increase their funding by membership fees. In this sense, there is a need to retain managerial control over the financial sources and their spending. The last reason why entrepreneurs are attracted to CSOs is the intangible notion of civil society, namely "ethos" (Garton, 2009: 87), in which there is non-profit distribution of sources. As a result, entrepreneurs want to benefit from these characteristics of CSOs, because they can utilize

their demand for prestige and altruistic purposes by supporting CSO activities.

### **3. THEORIES OF CSOs**

CSOs have a long history, but theories of CSOs have developed much later than the civil society itself. In addition, these theories were shaped by the different socio-historical contexts, because they are product of real world implications (Önder, 2006: 10). In the world, a significant number of empirical and theoretical studies on CSOs has increased after the 1970s by the establishment of academic journals, graduate programs, centers and institutes. Anheier (2005: 13) explains this increase by four main factors: “the crisis of the welfare state, the limits of state action in dealing with social problems, the political challenge of neo-liberalism, and the end of the Cold War”.

#### **3.1. Major Theories of CSOs After the 1970s**

The provision of quasi-public goods and services is very complex, because they can also be provided by private sector organizations, and public institutions as in the case of healthcare, and education services. For instance, healthcare and education services can be provided either by public hospital, private clinic, or nonprofit hospital. In order to understand why CSOs prefer to provide these goods and services, it is necessary to look at **supply and demand conditions** in market economies that lead to do organizational form of CSOs as an institutional choice (Anheier, 2005: 119).

There are also organizational theories that evaluates the relationship between organizational factors and organizational performance. Therefore, this part firstly introduces major theories of CSOs that explain the presence and organizational development of CSOs by focusing on supply and demand conditions. Then, it presents organizational theories that explain relationships between organizational factors and organizational performance. Finally, main hypotheses of these theories will be driven from these theories, and tested in the data analysis part (please see *Chapter IV*). Key terms and main arguments of these major theories are shown in **Table 11**.

**Table 11:** Major theories of CSOs

Theory	Demand / Supply	Key Terms	Main Arguments/Assumptions
<i>Public Goods Theories</i>	demand side	-demand heterogeneity -median voter -government failure -quasi-public goods and services -free rider problem -CSOs as “gap-fillers” -per capita income	-Government failure: the state is unable to satisfy the preferences of minority groups. -Market failure: private sector organizations are unwilling to supply “non-rival” and “non-excludable” public goods and services since they cannot make profit. -The social diversity/heterogenous demand and per capita income increase size of CSOs.
<i>Trust-Related Theories</i>	demand side	-information deficit, or asymmetry -trust dilemma -contract failure -non-distribution constraint	-CSOs are more trustworthy than private sector organizations due to non-distribution constraint and focusing on quality rather than profit. -Demand for trust goods and services for people are not met by private sector organizations.
<i>Interdependence and Resource Dependence Theories</i>	supply side	-contract between CSOs & state -voluntary & government failures -resource dependency -autonomy from the government	-CSOs are not alternative for the state; they are rather partners for the state due to their strengths and weaknesses. -Dependence on the resources of a provider can result on dependence of the receiver, and this can cause adaptation of the receiver according to interests and requirements of the providers.
<i>Entrepreneurship Theories</i>	supply side	-specific supply behavior -social entrepreneurs -social value -religious/ideological motivation	-Social entrepreneurs strategically form a new CSO or change an existing CSO in the direction of heterogeneous demand. -CSOs that operate with ideological or religious motivation are expected to have larger size.

<i>The Stakeholder Theory</i>	demand & supply side	-information asymmetry -non-rivalry -stakeholder control -market, government, and voluntary failures	-A combination of trust-related theories (market failure) and public goods theories (government failure), and entrepreneurship theory -Stakeholder control in CSOs is necessary, because CSOs can also fail like other organizations.
<i>The Social Origins Theory</i>	supply side	-complex relation among “social classes” and “social institutions” -cross-national analysis -non-profit regimes	-The theory identifies four models of nonprofit regimes: (i) liberal model, (ii) social democratic model, (iii) corporatist model, and (iv) statist model in terms of the extent of government social welfare spending (high or low) and the size of nonprofit sector (high or low).
<i>Financial Capacity</i>	-	-revenue diversification -revenue concentration index -annual budget -financial vulnerability	-Social mission and organizational goals of CSOs are directly related to their financial capacity. Therefore, larger annual budget can result in higher organizational performance. -Revenue concentration might result in the failure of social mission and organizational activities, so CSOs should diversify their revenue streams.
<i>Organizational Age</i>	-	-adulteration -newly-established CSOs -long-established CSOs	-Organizational age is very related with organizational performance in achieving organizational goals, because younger CSOs have more tendency to face liability of newness, organizational failure rate (death risk), or absolute hazard risk.
<i>Physical and Technological Infrastructure</i>	-	-physical (e.g., student dormitory & kindergarten) and technological (e.g., internet & website) facilities of CSOs	-Organizational infrastructure is essential for organizational capacity, because it provides basic administrative and operational abilities to achieve organizational missions.
<i>Cooperation with External Actors</i>	-	-cooperation with CSOs -cooperation with public institutions -cooperation with private sector organizations	-CSOs should generate new resources from their external partners if they are not able to generate resources internally. -There is a strong need for cooperation in order to overcome problems of irregularity of production, fund-raising, and lack of resources.
<i>Managerial Competence</i>	-	-professional management of voluntary workers -experience of organizational leaders	-Experienced and qualified managers can: reallocate financial resources efficiently; pursue organization’s mission and goals; react to opportunities, crises and threats effectively; and increase fund-raising activities.

### 3.1.1. Public Goods Theories

These theories mainly focus on why provision of quasi-public goods and services by CSOs is more attractive for citizens/consumers instead of public institutions and private sector organizations in market economies. They suggest that CSOs emerge to meet **diversified and differentiated demands** that cannot be sufficiently supplied by the

private sector organizations and public institutions due to **market and government failures**. It is important to note that diversity does not necessarily cause market or government failures, it is rather an intensifying factor for the increase of the number of CSOs, because CSOs are very influential to represent **particularly different needs and interests of minority groups**. Therefore, these theories argue that CSOs are either primary, or complementary suppliers of some certain public goods and services under certain circumstances. In this sense, these theories give explanations for the presence and size of CSOs, and argue why market and government fail to provide services for citizens/consumers (Gronbjerg, 2001; Hansmann, 1987; Önder, 2006; Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Weisbrod, 1975).

### **(i) Burton Weisbrod's Theory of Market Failure**

In 1975, Burton Weisbrod was the first theorist to explain the presence of modern CSOs in market economies. In this sense, he published a book chapter titled "Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy", in which he explains why CSOs should provide public goods and services due to economic reasons (Weisbrod, 1975). He developed his theory by **extending public choice theories** where constraints in the provision of public goods and services are solved by the collected action of the individuals who are affected from these constraints (Anheier, 2005: 121). His theory provides explanations for **quasi-public goods and services** for which voluntary donations compensate undersupply of these goods and services, not for pure public goods and services.

In his book chapter, Weisbrod (1975) argues that private sector organizations do not prefer to supply public goods and services due to the problem of **free-ride**, which refers to rational consumers preferring not to pay for these goods and service to maximize their utility (Olson, 1971: 14-16). Although, some consumers will choose to pay for these goods and services, they will be discouraged by the fear of bearing the cost because of the “free-riders”. As a result, consumers either do not want to pay or want to pay but discouraged by “free-riders” (Garton, 2009: 48). This is because of the “nonrival” (Cooter and Ulen, 2000: 15) and “nonexcludable” (Steinberg, 2006: 119) characteristics of public goods and services. In this sense, private sector organizations are unwilling to supply these goods and services since they cannot make profit.

In order to avoid free-rider problem, the state can provide these goods and services through taxation as funding resource. However, public goods and services provided by the state are unable to satisfy the **preferences of minority groups**. There are two reasons for this according to Weisbrod (1975). He firstly explains that there is **demand heterogeneity** in the society, which means that demand for public goods and services is divergent in terms of quality and quantity. Secondly, he argues that states mainly focus on the demands for public goods and services from **median voter**, who composes the majority of the society so influences political power during the elections. Because party(s) in power seek to be re-elected in the next

elections. Therefore, the only practical way for small groups of people is to form CSOs or associate with existing CSOs in order to provide necessary public goods and services for their members (Weisbrod, 1975). In other word, the provision of public goods and services by CSOs is a response to state and market failures.

Anheier (2005: 121) argues that CSOs are “gap-fillers”, because they provide public goods and services for minorities, whose demand was not supplied by the state, or private sector organizations. In this sense, the Weisbrod’s theory suggests that **the more diverse/heterogenous the society is, the more number of CSOs exist**. This is because demand of the median voters, who represent almost the whole population, might already be supplied by the state in homogenous societies. Here diversity should not only be considered as ethnicity, religion or language, but also “age, lifestyle preferences, occupational and professional background and income” (Anheier, 2005: 121). Kingma (2003: 58), for instance, claims that the USA is a good example of heterogenous society, so he supports Weisbrod’s theory. There are also some scholars who empirically found that heterogeneity in a society increases the number of CSOs (Feigenbaum, 1980; Chang and Tuckman, 1996). In addition, Anheier (2005: 122-123) empirically proved that **religious heterogeneity** in different countries increases the size of civil society sector, despite some exceptions such as Ireland, Belgium, Israel and Czech Republic. Similarly, Feigenbaum (1980) found that the size of CSOs is larger in societies where heterogeneity in terms of income, education, and age

is also higher. James (1987b) also found that diversity in terms of social, religious, and linguistic influences the size of CSOs. Similarly, Chang and Tuckman (1996) used four variables (per capita income, population density, racial homogeneity and percentage of Catholic population) to measure community characteristics in a country. For instance, they applied “Race Herfindahl Index” to measure degree of **racial heterogeneity** of different counties in terms of black and white population. Their findings support Weisbrod’s heterogeneity hypothesis, because they show that counties with low Herfindahl value (higher racial diversity) have more number of CSOs (Chang and Tuckman, 1996: 30-32). They also find that diversity in a society (e.g., ethno-linguistic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, and income per capita) results in more voluntary donations for CSOs. In contrast, Gronbjerg and Paalberg (2001) argue that there is no direct relation between the social diversity and the size of CSOs. However, we can still test the general hypothesis on the positive influence of social diversity on the size of CSOs. Hence:

**Hypothesis 1:** Social diversity is more likely to increase size of CSOs.

In his later work with Segal in 1998, Weisbrod suggested a “collectiveness index”, which refers to “the proportion of an organization’s total revenue derived from donations” (Segal and Weisbrod, 1998: 111). The more donors want to make donations to CSOs, the more CSOs depend on donations as revenue source. Therefore, they have lower level of collectiveness index, which means that they provide more collective goods and services. In this sense, it

is easy to find out the degree of “publicness” of a CSO by measuring the proportion of voluntary donations, income by profit-making activities, and state subsidies which this CSO receives (Anheier, 2005: 124). Minorities support CSOs by voluntary donations, and expect CSOs to provide public goods and services in terms of their preferences and interests, which are not provided by state due to median voter problem. According to Salamon and Anheier (1998: 221), Weisbrod’s theory suggests that CSOs are mainly be funded by voluntary donations instead of market transactions and state subsidies in the case of state and market failures. Therefore, they assume that CSOs will get more voluntary contributions in societies where diversity is higher. To conclude, the amount of voluntary donations shows the degree of public demand for a particular public good or service provided by CSOs. For this reason, state can decide which CSO has higher degree of publicness, and so deserves more tax subsidies than others.

In addition to heterogeneity, **per capita income** also has a positive influence on the size of CSOs in different communities, because CSOs provide public goods and services mainly by **voluntary donations as financial source** compared to state’s provision of goods and services through involuntary taxation (Weisbrod, 1975). Therefore, there are studies in the literature proving that CSOs have larger size in the communities where income level is high, because they receive more voluntary donations (Corbin, 1999; Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen,

1992). The discussions and empirical findings show that per capita income has a positive influence on the size of CSOs. Hence:

**Hypothesis 2:** Per capita income is more likely to increase size of CSOs.

Weisbrod's theory of market failure is very beneficial in understanding why **quasi-public goods and services** are provided by CSOs. However, the theory focuses on the market failure and state's inability to satisfy the preferences of minority groups, instead of focusing on why CSOs are better option for the provision of public goods and services in detail. In addition, the theory does not explain why small group of people cannot form a private sector organization in order to provide necessary public good for their members, instead it recommends that it is better to form a CSO or associate with an existing CSO. Finally, Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen (2007) object to Weisbrod's argument on the relation between heterogeneity of society and size of civil society sector. They argue that it is also necessary to have sufficient number of "stakeholders" (e.g., donors, managers, volunteers, and employees), who seek common preferences different from preferences of median voters in order to establish a "social cohesion" for the formation and operation of CSOs. This is discussed more detailed below in this part of the study (please see 3.1.5. *The Stakeholder Theory*). However, Weisbrod's theory is still an important theoretical source, because it is a basic source for scholars to understand why there are more CSOs in heterogeneous societies than

homogeneous societies where the preferences of median voter is larger.

### **(ii) Theodore Levitt's Theory of Government Failure**

Levitt (1973) develops a very similar theory to Weisbrod's theory of market failure, because he provides a new understanding of market failure and explains why the state is not the best provider of public goods. In traditional microeconomic theory, it is recommended that state should supply public goods and services when market fails to provide these goods and services (Garton, 2009: 54). As argued in Weisbrod's theory of market failure, private sector organizations do not prefer to provide public goods and services which do not have enough profit due to "free-rider" problem. Therefore, these goods and services can be provided by the state with taxation as funding resource. However, state cannot provide different levels of public goods for **numerous minority groups in heterogenous societies**, because its actions are mainly driven by the majority will. Similarly, Salamon (1987: 35) also claims that "the more diverse the community, the more extensive the nonprofit sector it is likely to have", because CSOs are substitute for the state in terms of the provision of public goods and services. Therefore, Levitt (1973) suggests that CSOs should provide public goods and services for minority groups instead of the state when market fails.

Like in Weisbrod's theory of market failure, Levitt (1973) also focuses on market failure and state's inability to satisfy the **preferences of minority groups** are central, but he fails to explain why CSOs are better option for the provision of public goods and services rather than the state. The idea that activities of state are mainly driven by the **majority will** is more complex, because there are also domestic and international forces which influence the actions of states. For instance, some interest groups can be in minority, but their voice can be louder than majority of people. In addition, states cannot ignore international pressures on energy consumption (e.g., coal, nuclear energy sources) with reference to environmental issues.

### **3.1.2. Trust-Related Theories**

Public goods theories focus on the state's failure in the provision of quasi-public goods and services, while trust related theories mainly focuses on **information deficit** for goods and services between consumers and suppliers, and they associate **trust dilemma** with this **information asymmetry**. In this sense, these theories argue that CSOs are more trustworthy than private sector organizations due to non-distribution constraint and focusing on quality rather than profit.

#### **(i) Henry Hansman's Theory of Contract Failure**

Henry Hansmann (1987) is an economist and one of the earliest scholars who try to explain why CSOs exist. His theory is mainly influenced by the ideas of Olson (1971) and Weisbrod (1975), whose ideas are widely accepted in the explanation of presence of CSOs. The

theory demonstrates why CSOs are better than private sector organizations in the provision of **small-size (or quasi) public goods and services** in the market economy. In other words, CSOs exist because **demand for trust goods and services** for people are not met by private sector organizations (Anheier, 2005: 129). Hansmann (1987: 61) claims that consumers are “incapable of accurately evaluating” the quantity and quality of public goods and services, which are provided by private sector organizations, due to **lack of product information**. Therefore, it is hard for consumers to choose which private sector organization is more **trustworthy** due to **information asymmetry**. He suggests that CSOs “arise in situations in which, owing either to the circumstances under which the service is purchased or consumed or to the nature of the service itself, consumers feel unable to evaluate accurately the quantity and quality of the service a firm produces for them” (Hansmann, 1987: 29). At that point, CSOs are more trustworthy for consumers compared to private sector organizations because they mainly focus on quality rather than profit-making, so CSOs are **second best** to the market (Hansmann, 1987: 62). In addition, **non-distribution constraint**, which refers to “the prohibition of distributing profits to owners and equivalents”, makes CSOs more trustworthy than private sector organizations (Anheier, 2005: 124-125). For instance, some groups of people (e.g., children, old, or cancer patients) are not capable of judging the quality of the service provided for them by private sector organizations (e.g., kindergarten, day care or medical treatment). Therefore, it is better to pay for these services provided by more

trustworthy organizations. In this sense, these people are attracted by the non-distribution constraint feature of CSOs.

In the case of private goods, which are “goods with individual property rights, and their production, exchange, and consumption generates no externalities” (Anheier: 2005: 117), consumers can easily evaluate the quality of these goods and services (e.g., except from those which necessitate longer period of time to evaluate durability) once they purchase it, so they will have enough information and experience about these goods and services. In addition, the **information deficit** between consumers and private sector organizations can be minimized by some methods. Firstly, the state can pass compulsory regulations for suppliers to meet some standards and provide available data of their goods and services, but it is still hard for consumers to make a rational choice due to differentiation of these goods and services. On the other hand, the private sector organizations can provide information about the past experiences of some selected consumers, however, these organizations have tendency to feature positive reviews than negative ones. Therefore, consumers believe that private sector organizations are not trustworthy, because they can increase prices and decline in quality of these goods and services (Hansmann, 1987: 62). In this sense, CSOs can also play complementary role by pressing private sector organizations to provide more information about their products and activities for consumers.

In conclusion, Hansmann (1987) argues that information asymmetry between consumers (demanders) and private sector organizations (suppliers) can result in **contract failure** due to increase of prices and decline in quality. Therefore, CSOs are more trustworthy than private sector organizations in this context, because they focus on quality rather than profit due to their **non-profit nature** and **non-distribution constraint**. In this direction, it can be implied from the theory that lower levels of trust in private sector organizations likely to increase size of CSOs. Hence:

**Hypothesis 3:** The lower the level of trust in private sector organizations is more likely to increase size of CSOs.

**(ii) Ortmann and Schlesinger: Trust, Repute and the Role of Non-Profit Enterprise**

Ortmann and Schlesinger (1997) examine Hansmann's theory of contract failure which is based on trust hypothesis. They argue that Hansmann's explanation for the presence of CSOs through information asymmetry between consumers and private sector organizations has to meet three challenges: (a) reputational ubiquity, (b) incentive compatibility, and (c) adulteration (Ortmann and Schlesinger, 1997: 97). They argue that CSOs should meet these challenges to be regarded as less opportunistic and more trustworthy than private sector organizations.

(a) *Reputational Ubiquity*: Ortmann and Schlesinger (1997: 101) argue that “repeat encounters and reasonable information flows” could overcome **information asymmetry** in the market, so there will be no need for CSOs. For instance, when a private sector organization builds a bridge as a public good, consumer trust will appear naturally. In addition, provision of public goods by private sector organizations for a long period of time can also result in consumer trust. Today, some private sector organizations highlight their support for ‘social responsibility’ projects, or their ‘environmental friendly’ character to prove that they are not only motivated by profit.

(b) *Incentive Compatibility*: Workers of CSOs are not very different from those working in private sector organizations. In some cases, it is possible that the resources of CSOs can attract **dishonest persons** who seek to exploit them (Ortmann and Schlesinger, 1997: 102-103). These people can seek profit through CSOs to make money for themselves, and hide this from donors and other stakeholders (Garton, 2009: 104). In other words, CSOs can also seek profit to compensate their losses, but **profit-making activities** can have some negative consequences without some form of control: CSOs can overcharge “administration costs unnecessarily in order to line the pockets of trustees” (Garton, 2009: 136); in the absence of internal control, profits can be unequally distributed to non-profit boards of CSOs, CSO managers and workers (Ortmann and Schlesinger, 1997: 102-103). However, workers of CSOs have “more altruistic motivations, and in any case, are united by their belief in some common good”

(Ortmann and Schlesinger, 1997: 103), and “trust is the essential lifeblood of the nonprofit sector” (Jeavons, 1994: 186). Therefore, profit-making activities of CSOs will be motivated by “cross subsidization” to compensate activities which operate at a loss (Garton, 2009: 53; James, 1983: 352).

(c) *Adulteration*: Ortmann and Schlesinger (1997: 103) state that CSOs experience “ossification” and “bureaucratization” through their life-cycles like profit-making organizations. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between **new CSOs** and **old CSOs** in terms of age of the organization, because workers of older CSOs will be replaced by new people with different abilities and motivations. However, it is also possible that some workers can seek to exploit advantages of CSOs that are trustable due to their organizational age and longer duration in the provision of public goods and services. Trust is very essential for the presence of CSOs, but “the greater the initial trust is the more likely it is that the trust will be eroded by subsequent violations of trust” (Ortmann and Schlesinger, 1997: 103).

### **3.1.3. The Interdependence and Resource Dependence Theories**

**Interdependence theory** is different from theories that explain the presence of CSOs as a response to market and government failures in the provision of goods and services for people. This theory, on the other hand, refuses the idea that CSOs are gap-fillers in the case of market and government failures (Gronbjerg, 2001; Hansmann, 1987;

Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Weisbrod, 1975), on the contrary, they are rather **third-party governments** (Salamon, 1987).

Government failure theory is misleading, because it ignores “contract culture”, and it focuses on provision of public goods and services by CSOs only for minority groups not for majority of people on behalf of the state (Garton, 2009: 55). Similarly, Salamon (1987: 35) explains that market and state failure theories consider the contract between state and CSOs in the provision of public goods and services for majority as the violation of “their theoretical “raison d’être”. This is because these theories argue that there is little theoretical rationale behind the state support to CSOs, so cooperation between CSOs and state is unlikely to occur. However, as Garton (2009) questions that “What does happen if CSOs make contract with the state to provide public goods or services for majorities?”. Therefore, there is still need for explanation of **contract between CSOs and state**. In this sense, the interdependence theory objects to market and state failure theories which focus on the provision of public goods and services by CSOs rather than the state or private sector organizations. The theory suggests that CSOs are not alternative for the state; they are rather **partners** for the state, because state’s strengths can compensate the weaknesses of CSOs, and vice versa (Önder, 2006: 38). The strengths and weaknesses of state are already argued in public good theories. Therefore, there is a need to point out weaknesses and strengths of CSOs in order to introduce rationale behind the **interdependence**

**between public institutions and CSOs** in the provision of public goods and services.

Salamon (1987) develops a theory of **voluntary failure** in order to point out weaknesses of CSOs through **philanthropic insufficiency**, **philanthropic particularism**, **philanthropic amateurism**, and **philanthropic paternalism** that are already evaluated above (please see *1.5. Voluntary Failure*). In these conditions, CSOs can fail to provide necessary public goods and services alone, so compensation tools by state is necessary in the provision of these goods and services. On the other hand, CSOs can also compensate weaknesses of public institutions through their strengths: “organizational efficiency”, “higher expertise” and “insulation from political distractions” (Salamon, 1987: 39-44).

**(a) Organizational Efficiency:** Salamon (1987: 39) states that organizational size of CSOs is smaller than public institutions, so “transaction costs involved in mobilizing governmental responses to shortages of collective goods tend to be much higher than the cost of mobilizing voluntary action”. He claims that some conditions are necessary for government to provide goods and services: “substantial segments of the public must be aroused, public officials must be informed, laws must be written, majorities must be assembled, and programs must be put into operation”, while it is enough for CSOs to have “individuals acting on their own or with outside support” (Salamon, 1987: 39).

In addition, traditional microeconomics also states that new activities are less costly for **small-size organizations** than organizations which are large in size (Olson, 1971). However, Garton (2009: 57) objects to simplistic idea of Salamon (1987) that CSOs have higher organizational performance because they are smaller in size than public institutions. He gives the example of National Trust organization in the UK, which employs about 4000 regular workers and 49.000 volunteers in 2007, while Charity Commission in the UK, as a public institution, employs only 525 in the same year. Moreover, Kendall (2003: 169) empirically found that CSOs are relatively larger compared to private sector organizations in the provision of “residential care”, although private sector organizations have a larger share than CSOs in the provision of public goods and services in the UK. Moreover, CSOs have **higher organizational performance** than state and market in the context of **relational goods**, which provides utility through interpersonal relationships and which “can be enjoyed only by participating in a social process” (Ben-Ner and Gui, 2003: 14). Because CSOs provide atmosphere for their members in which they can express their interests and opinions. However, this becomes more difficult when the number of members is greater within CSOs that are large in size, so these members might get less utility.

(b) *Expertise*: It was already discussed above that state cannot provide different levels of public goods for numerous minority groups; because its actions are mainly driven by the **majority will** (Levitt, 1973). Therefore, it is more beneficial for small group of people to

form CSOs, or associate with one of the existing CSOs in order to provide necessary public goods and services for their members (Weisbrod, 1975). Similarly, Salamon (1987: 44) discusses that CSOs are small in size, and this type of structure encourages expertise. He suggests that activities of these CSOs are mainly driven by the needs and preferences of their members, because members might have more chances to influence decision-making preferences than in CSOs that are large in size and have greater number of members. These characteristics of CSOs with smaller organizational structure make it easier to expertise in specific areas, and this fosters a diversity of service for every citizen in the society.

There are also other reasons why CSOs have more expertise in the provision of public goods and services: the structure of CSOs encourages entrepreneurship due to **innovative** and **trustworthy characteristics**, and their intangible notion known as “ethos” (**non-profit distribution of sources**) (Garton, 2009: 83-87). In this sense, more members will be motivated to utilize their demand for prestige and altruistic purposes by supporting CSO activities, so this will result in developing their skills and knowledge.

(c) *Insulation from Political Distractions*: CSOs are insulated from political distractions, because they do not worry about being elected in the next elections (Salamon, 1987: 41), therefore, they can create **long-term goals** in the provision of public goods and services. However, CSOs are not fully insulated from political distractions due to some reasons. For instance, **government funding** is one of the

financial sources for CSOs, so they should consider the political interests of the government to increase their chances to secure its **future income** (Garton, 2009: 61). Moreover, it was also discussed earlier that some CSOs like trade unions and professional bodies have their **bargaining power** (e.g., reduction of transaction costs), and engage in other forms of co-operative activities with the state, so they consider micro and macro level of politics.

Finally, interdependence theory suggests that CSOs and public institutions are mainly partners rather than opponents in the provision of public goods and services due to their weaknesses, and it is evident that CSOs “receive more of their income from government than from any other single source” (Salamon, 1987: 29). Therefore, the more this partnership is developed through income support, the larger size that CSOs have.

**Resource Dependence theory** also focuses on partnership between different types of organizations, therefore it can also be applied to the relationships between CSOs and public institutions through investigation of dependence between these two actors. The theory assumes that organizations have open and adaptive systems that interact with other external actors, and they cannot always internally generate their functions and resources themselves (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976). Therefore, they need to generate their sources from their external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), because they are able to influence their environment (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976).

Moreover, these organizations are fighting mainly for sustainability and growth (Froelich, 1999; Hillman et al., 2009).

The theory argues that too much dependence on the resources of a provider can result in dependence of the receiver, and this can cause adaptation of the receiver according to interests and requirements of the providers (Malatesta and Smith, 2014). In other words, organizations are not fully autonomous from their environments, because there are factors that determine the degree of dependence from different actors: the significance of resources for the organization, availability and sustainability of resources, and power of the provider in deciding allocation and use of resources (Cho and Gillespie, 2006). For instance, Lu (2009) argues that CSOs in China gained substantial autonomy from the government, but CSOs still depend on government support. Therefore, resource dependence of CSOs on single resources from a particular supplier can damage the **autonomy of CSOs**, and result in **revenue concentration**. Moreover, **concentration on limited number of revenue streams** can cause **uncertainty for CSOs** (Despard et al., 2017; Hudock, 1995; Watkins et al., 2012), threatens **their autonomy** (Banks and Hulme, 2012; Elbers and Schulpen, 2013; Wallace et al., 2006), and results in **financial vulnerability** (Tuckman and Chang, 1991).

In summary, interdependence and resource dependence theories focus on the partnership between CSOs and public institutions. However, the former theory suggests that the higher level of income from public institutions is more likely to increase size of CSOs, while the latter

theory claims exactly an opposite opinion because the higher level of resource dependence on a single source causes lower levels of autonomy. The empirical findings of this book support the theoretical assumption of resource dependence theory, because a negative relationship was found between level of income from public institutions and size of CSOs. In other words, the size of CSOs increase when the level of income from public institutions decreases, and vice versa. Hence:

**Hypothesis 4:** The level of income from public institutions and size of CSOs have negative relationship.

#### **3.1.4. The Entrepreneurship Theories**

These theories explain the presence of CSOs with a **supply-side perspective**, whereas market and state failure theories are mainly concentrated on the demand-side explanations. Therefore, it is necessary to conceptualize reconcile of demand and supply side theories with one another (Young, 2003: 163). Badelt (1997) argues that entrepreneurial theories use the concepts of **institutional choice** or **organizational choice** to explain rationale for the presence of CSOs from a supply-side perspective. However, the findings of these theories are in line with demand-side explanations. For instance, James (1989: 6) empirically found that **religious or ideological CSOs** are formed to meet **heterogeneous demand** for the provision of goods and services. In other words, supplies of CSOs are still depended on the heterogeneous demand from consumers.

Demand-side theories are important for the explanation of the presence of CSOs, but they still need a **specific supply behavior**, which is carried out by “special types of human beings, with special personalities” (Badelt, 1997: 172-173). In this sense, **social entrepreneurs** strategically form a new CSO or change an existing CSO in the direction of heterogeneous demand. Therefore, entrepreneurship theories consider supply behavior of CSOs as “entrepreneurial”, which refers to “a specific attitude towards change” (Badelt, 1997: 163). Schumpeter (1983: 101) claims that entrepreneurs are “carrying out new combinations” to develop the process of production, and he tells that there are cases for these combinations (Schumpeter, 1983: 98):

(a) *The introduction of a new good:* It is one with which consumers are not yet familiar, or of a new quality of a good.

(b) *The introduction of a new method of production:* It is one not yet tested by experience in the branch of manufacture concerned, which needs by no means be founded upon a discovery scientifically new, and can also exist in a new way of handling a commodity commercially.

(c) *The opening of a new market:* It is a market into which the particular branch of manufacture of the country in question has not previously entered, whether or not this market has existed before.

(d) *The conquest of a new source of supply of raw materials or half-manufactured goods:* Again, irrespective of whether this source already exists or whether it has first to be created.

(e) *The carrying out of the new organization of any industry:* It is like the creation of a monopoly position, or the breaking up of a monopoly position.

Anheier (2005: 126) claims that **entrepreneurs** are **driving force of capitalism**, because they “innovate by introducing new ways of seeing and doing things, and thereby displace old ones”. Therefore, entrepreneur behavior of CSOs has potential to **innovate new goods and services** in the market economy, and this can cause a competition between CSOs for the provision of public goods and services. However, it is important to note that social entrepreneurs are seeking to create **social value** for their CSOs, because they have social mission in their mind, whereas business entrepreneurs seek to create **profit** for organizations (Anheier, 2005: 127, Dees et al., 2001: 4). Moreover, Dees et al. (2001: 5) claim that there are five ways that social entrepreneurs create social value:

- Adopting a mission to create and sustain social value,
- Recognizing and relentlessly pursuing new opportunities to serve that mission,
- Engaging in a process of continuous innovation, adaptation, and learning,

- Acting boldly without being limited to resources currently in hand,
- Exhibiting a heightened sense of accountability to the constituencies served and for the outcomes created.

As argued above, the common point for entrepreneurship theorists is that CSOs try to maximize non-monetary returns such as “social value” (Dees et al., 2001), “faith or adherents” (James, 1989), and “value bases and ideologies” (Anheier, 2005). And motives of these entrepreneurs drive the mission, development, goals and outputs of CSOs. Therefore, their actions are very important for the **organizational behavior** and **institutional change of CSOs** from an **institutionalist perspective**. James (1987a: 404) argues that the influence of social entrepreneurs on CSOs is the highest in the field of religion:

“Universally, **religious groups** are the major founders of nonprofit service institutions. We see this in the origins of many private schools and voluntary hospitals in the USA and England, Catholic schools in France and Austria, missionary activities in developing countries, services provided by Muslim **waqfs** [religious trusts] and so on.”

Similarly, Anheier (2005) claims that people are more engaged in **religion** under “critical life situations” and “situations of special need” than they would be under “normal” circumstances, in the eyes of entrepreneurship theorists. In this sense, social entrepreneurs of CSOs

are motivated to benefit from these situations, and provide goods and services related to **religion** or **ideology** (e.g., giving messages like “salvation” and “equality”) to gain more believers, donors, workers and members. And this motivation increases size of CSOs, because CSOs strong ideological and religious motivations are driven by the “value rationality” rather than “means rationality”, in Weber’s term, which dominates the private sector organizations, public institutions, and non-religious CSOs (DiMaggio and Anheier, 1990: 145-146).

Rose-Ackerman (1996: 724) empirically found that **ideological character of a CSOs** can attract **money** and **customers**, which is very essential for the survival of an organization in the USA. On the other hand, she points out that religious organizations received the highest percent of (60%) household giving in her research (Rose-Ackerman, 1996: 703). In addition, Salamon and Anheier (1998: 221) discuss that the size of civil society sector is larger because of religious competition, where one or more religious bodies compete to attract more adherents by providing goods and services in areas of healthcare and education. Finally, religious people are generally motivated to give their time and money to the people in need, because they believe that they are obliged to do this by the rules of the Creator.

The theoretical and empirical findings above show that CSOs that operate with ideological or religious motivation are expected to have larger size, because they receive more revenues especially voluntary donations. Hence:

**Hypothesis 5:** CSOs that operate with ideological or religious motivations are more likely to have larger size.

### 3.1.5. The Stakeholder Theory

The Stakeholder theory was mainly developed by Avner Ben-Ner through organizational economics and economic theories of institutions. This theory is a **combination of trust-related theories** (market failure) and **public goods theories** (government failure) that have **demand side explanations** on the one side, and **entrepreneurship theory** that have **supply-side explanations** on the other side. Therefore, the stakeholder theory has **both supply and demand side explanations** for the presence of CSOs. In this sense, Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen (2007) assert that their stakeholder theory is stronger than trust-related theories in explaining the trustworthiness of CSOs. They also claim that their theory provides better **combination of information asymmetry, non-rivalry and stakeholder control**. In addition, they give us a more comprehensive perspective from both demand and supply side conditions to explain why CSOs exist (Anheier, 2005: 129).

Firstly, as explained in trust-related theories, stakeholder theory argues that **information asymmetry** between consumers (demand-side stakeholders) and private sector organizations (suppliers) can result in contract failure due to increase of prices and decline in quality (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 2007; Hansmann, 1987). Demand-side stakeholders mainly seek **lower price and higher**

**quality** to increase their **utility**, while suppliers demand **highest price** and **lowest quality** to increase their **profit**. However, demand-side stakeholders cannot control or influence the price and quality of products by normal contractual or market mechanism due to lack of information flow (information asymmetry problem), therefore this situation causes contract, or market failure (Anheier, 2005: 128). In this sense, demand of these consumers for quasi-public goods and services cannot be met by private sector organizations. CSOs are more trustworthy form of institutions for demand-side stakeholders in the provision of these goods, because they focus on quality rather than profit due to their non-distribution feature (Hansmann, 1987).

Secondly, as in public goods theories, stakeholder theory suggests that diversity (e.g. income and its distribution, education, demand heterogeneity, and social cohesion) cause **government failure** in which public institutions fail to meet diverse preferences of demand-side stakeholders, because the provision of quasi-public goods and services by public institutions is mainly driven by the **preferences of average stakeholders** (median voters), who compose the majority of the society (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 2007; Weisbrod, 1975). Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen (2007) found that stakeholders with good income and education are capable of choosing better goods and services in quality and quantity, while this situation is the other way around for poorer stakeholders with less level of income and education. On the other hand, **demand heterogeneity** also has positive influence on the demand for CSOs, because the existence of

more heterogeneous stakeholders will lead to more dissatisfaction with the provision of goods and services by the state and private sector organizations. And this will result in more demand for CSOs which are capable of meeting **diverse preferences and demand of these heterogeneous stakeholders**. Similarly, social cohesion, which depends on the degree of shared backgrounds (e.g., social, economic, religious and ethnic), have also positive effect on the demand for CSOs in diverse societies where internally cohesive groups exist (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 2007; Galaskiewicz, 1985; James, 1987b).

Thirdly, market failure hypothesis of trust-related theories, and government failure hypothesis of public goods are important demand side explanations for the existence of CSOs as an alternative form of institution. However, it is also necessary to evaluate the **entrepreneurship feature of supply-side stakeholders** (e.g. social entrepreneurs, religious leaders and other actors), whose preferences are not driven by profit-making in the formation and operation of CSOs to satisfy existing demand for quasi-public goods and services. Therefore, CSOs are a better option for demand-side stakeholders in the provision of goods and services.

The stakeholder theory suggests that it is very essential to have **stakeholder control** in CSOs, because **CSOs can also fail** like private sector organizations and public institutions in the provision of quasi-public goods and services for demand-side stakeholders. For instance, some CSO managers might seek to exploit the opportunities

of these organizations (e.g., increasing their salaries or pursuing their individual preferences). Therefore, supply side stakeholders should **guarantee stakeholder control to sustain trustworthy, and entrepreneurship features of their CSOs** in the provision of quasi-public goods and services (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 2007: 527-528).

Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen (2007: 532-533) argue that there are seven ways to establish stakeholder control for the formation and operation of CSOs by supply-side stakeholders:

- *identifying and assembling a group of stakeholders willing to participate in forming and controlling an organization without receiving any direct monetary gain for that activity;*
- *determining that there is sufficient demand to allow for the provision of the good at a price and quantity that makes the operation of the organization worthwhile to the founding body;*
- *assembling inputs to produce the good;*
- *developing and maintaining a control mechanism to ensure that stakeholder interests are pursued by the organization;*
- *recruiting managers whose values and personal objectives are expected to cause only limited agency problems;*
- *identifying and convincing high-demanders (of collective goods) that it is to their benefit to reveal their demands and provide financial support; and*
- *designing mechanisms to discourage some stakeholders from free-riding on the control activities of others.*

**Stakeholder control** can overcome the problem of **information asymmetry** and **exploitation between the consumers and CSOs**. It is necessary to include demand-side stakeholders into the supply processes of CSOs, because they are the ones who pay for, or sponsor the provision of goods and services by CSOs (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 2007: 520). Anheier (2005: 129) notes that **demand-side stakeholders can also be supply-side stakeholder** because they “feel so strongly about the quality of the service provided and protection from moral hazard that they decide to exercise control over the delivery of service themselves”. In other words, some demand-side stakeholder can attend the decision-making process of CSOs to control whether profits and provision of goods and services are distributed efficiently and adequately. The theory also assumes that good relations with demand-side stakeholders are beneficial for CSOs in overcoming the problems of information asymmetry, non-rivalry and organizational control.

CSO activities without a form of control (internal or external) can increase the level of **information deficit**, while decrease **reputation**, **trustworthiness** and **accountability** of CSOs. Therefore, it is firstly necessary to inform demand-side stakeholders about activities of CSOs, who often have “no meaningful opportunity to learn about fund-raising costs” (Espinoza, 1991: 605). Secondly, as Jeavons (1994: 186) argues that **trust** is the essential lifeblood of the nonprofit sector”, **information flow** is very essential for the **reputation** and **trustworthiness** of CSOs, which can result in better quality of quasi-

public goods and services (Ortmann and Schlesinger, 1997: 102-103). Thirdly, information flow also provides **internal** and **external control on profit-making** and **voluntary activities** of CSOs, and this situation increases their accountability, and transparency. Hence:

**Hypothesis 6:** CSOs that provide information flow for stakeholders are more likely to have larger size.

### 3.1.6. The Social Origins Theory

The social origins theory, which was developed by Salamon and Anheier (1998), was built upon the interdependence theory, which suggests that **CSOs** are not alternative for the state; they are rather **partners for the state**. Because, Salamon and Anheier (1998) claim that it is necessary to evaluate **broader social, political, and economic conditions** under which CSOs and the state cooperate. They argue that these conditions can not only be explained by few historical factors (e.g., industrialization, diversity or education), it is also necessary to evaluate a **complex relation among social classes** and **social institutions** in different countries, because these classes and institutions are essential in explaining the relationships between the state and CSOs. In this sense, Salamon and Anheier (1998) made a **cross-national analysis** to find out differentiation in size and compositions of CSOs in different countries by a comparative-historical perspective (Anheier, 2005: 135).

The social origins theory can also be regarded as the **extension of institutional choice theory** of Moore (1966), and Esping-Andersen's (1990) **welfare state theory**. For instance, Moore (1966) divides a group of countries (England, France, Germany, Japan, China, and India) into three distinct categories by a historical perspective on the relations between landowners, peasants, middle class and state: democratic, fascist, and communist. On the other hand, Esping-Andersen (1990) also divides different **welfare regimes** into three distinct categories **by a comparative-historical perspective**: liberal (mostly Anglo-Saxon states), corporatist (European states with welfare assistance), and social democratic (Nordic states). Esping-Andersen also focusses on the **relations** between different actors such as **bourgeoisie, church, aristocracy, working class and the state**.

**Table 12:** Models of Non-Profit Regimes

	Non-Profit Size	
Government Social Welfare Spending	Low	High
Low	Statist (e.g., Japan, most developing countries)	Liberal (e.g., the USA and the UK)
High	Social-Democratic (e.g., Denmark, Norway and Finland)	Corporatist (e.g., Germany and France)

**Source:** (Salamon and Anheier, 1998: 228)

In their cross-national analysis, Salamon and Anheier (1998) use a similar categorization of Esping-Andersen (1990) in order to identify **four models of nonprofit regimes**: (i) liberal model, (ii) social democratic model, (iii) corporatist model, and (iv) statist model. Salamon and Anheier (1998: 228) divide these four models of

nonprofit regimes in terms of the **extent of government social welfare spending** (high or low) and the **size of nonprofit sector** (high or low), as shown in **Table 12**. In addition, they claim that **social forces** are also important in this categorization, because CSOs are not independent from **social space**, in contrast, they are “an integral part of a social system whose role and size are a byproduct of a complex set of historical forces” (Salamon and Anheier, 1998: 245). Finally, social origins theory suggests that there is “relative correspondence in size and revenue structure for countries that fall within the same regime type” (Anheier, 2003: 260).

#### **(i) Liberal Model of Non-Profit Regime**

- Government social welfare spending is low, while non-profit size is high.
- Middle-class is stronger, while opposition from landed elites or working-class is weaker.
- State and civil society sector are considered as alternatives.
- Charitable contributions for CSOs as financial source are high.
- There is ideological and political objection to the extension of government social welfare spending, so this leads to a limited level of social spending.

#### **(ii) Social Democratic Model of Non-Profit Regime**

- Government social welfare spending is high, while non-profit size is low.

- There is still room left for CSOs, not necessarily in the provision goods and services but especially in social, ideological or political expressions to facilitate individual and group expressions.
- Charitable contributions (especially voluntary donations) for CSOs as financial source are high.
- State and civil society sector are considered as alternatives.
- Working-class is politically strong in alliance with other social classes.

### **(iii) Corporatist Model of Non-Profit Regime**

- State is strong as in the social democratic model, but non-profit size is also high.
- The relationship between the state and CSOs is more curvilinear than linear.
- State and civil society sector are considered as partners.
- Landed elements and middle and working classes are strong, so they cooperate.
- State's contribution for CSOs as financial source is high.
- CSOs have been increasing parallel to increase of government social welfare spending.

### **(iv) Statist Model of Non-Profit Regime**

- The extent of government social welfare spending and the size of civil society is low.
- Conservative elements are strong in the control of state.

- “The state exercises power on its own behalf, or on behalf of business and economic elites, but with a fair degree of autonomy sustained by long traditions of deference and a much more pliant religious order”.
- Low level of government social welfare spending does not result in high level of non-profit size in the statist model, as it is in the liberal model.

It is hard to apply social origins theory in the **categorization of each country** due to its complexity. Moreover, some countries might have **hybrid characteristics** that include features from more than one model of non-profit regime. Therefore, it is not very easy to test implications of social origins theory (Anheier, 2005), because empirical analysis might only reveal **propensities** and **likelihoods** rather than concrete results (Young and Steinberg, 1995). However, empirical findings of Anheier (2003: 260), for instance, show that corporatist regimes (e.g., France and Germany) are similar in both size, proportion and revenue structure in terms of non-profit size. Therefore, the social origins theory is still worth to apply in order to understand relations between state and CSOs, and size, proportion and revenue structure of these CSOs.

Similar to social origins theory, Anheier (2005: 123) claims that the size of CSO activities will be influenced by the increase of state’s provision of public goods and services for small-group of people, whose demand was not previously supplied by the state. Because **CSOs** provide public goods and services mainly by **voluntary**

**donations** as financial source compared to **state's provision of goods and services** through **involuntary taxation** (Weisbrod, 1975). These donations can “crowd out”, if state begins to supply public goods and services itself to meet demand from minority groups, or to fund CSOs on condition that they provide public goods and services. Salamon and Anheier (1998: 221) also argue that if the state increases its social welfare spending, demand for CSOs in the provision of these public goods and services would decline. Therefore, a negative relationship between the extent of government social spending and size of CSOs can be considered. Hence:

**Hypothesis 7:** The extent of government social welfare spending and size of CSOs have negative relationship.

### **3.2. Organizational Theories: The Influence of Organizational Capacity on Organizational Performance of CSOs**

The organizational capacity of CSOs determines their impacts on the community that they serve (Despard, 2016: 2). For instance, CSOs with insufficient financial capacity can hardly perform their activities and carry out new programs (Besel et al., 2011; Calabrese, 2013; Salamon and Geller, 2007; Sontag-Padilla et al., 2012; Weerawardena et al., 2010). As a result, these CSOs cannot serve their target communities efficiently and effectively (Carman, 2007; Carman and Fredericks, 2008; Hofer, 2000; Innovation Network, 2012). **Increasing CSO capacity is closely and directly related with their performance** (Despard, 2016: 2, De Vita and Fleming, 2001; Light,

2004). Therefore, there are many studies that try to determine which capacity factors have influence on organizational performance (Christensen and Gazley, 2008; Eisinger, 2002; Honadle, 1981).

In the literature, there are some standardized indicators developed for measuring leadership capacity (Avolio et al., 1999; Posner and Kouzes, 1993), organizational culture and environment (Aarons and Sommerfeld, 2012; Anderson and West, 1998; Cooke and Rousseau, 1988; Glisson et al., 2008), and organizational readiness for change (Lehman et al., 2002). However, as Wing (2004) and Despard (2016) argues, there are still no standardized indicators to measure capacity of CSOs in general, because it might change in different communities and regions.

The capacity of a CSO is mainly considered as **financial resources**, **personnel skills** and **organizational functions** that ensure achievement of its mission and effective service by its organizational units (Doherty et al., 2013; Eisinger, 2002; Millesen et al., 2010). For instance, **strategic management theory** is based on the assumption that organizations need to determine **strategic responses to changes** from their internal and external environments (Barney and Hesterly, 2012; Hill and Jones, 2008; Oster, 1995). Therefore, organizations have the main objective to build and strengthen their capacity. On the other hand, **resource dependence theory** describes organizations as fighting mainly for sustainability and growth (Froelich, 1999; Hillman et al., 2009; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and this is another reason why organizations should build and strengthen their administrative

capacity, project management capacity, personnel training and fund-raising activities.

**Table 13:** Major Topics and Key Indicators of Organizational Capacity in the Literature

	<b>MAJOR TOPICS</b>	<b>KEY INDICATORS</b>
Bikmen, F. and Meydanoğlu, Z. (Eds.) (2006)  Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TUSEV)	1.Prevalence and Depth of Civil Participation	(e.g., CSO membership, voluntary action, donation)
	2.Diversity of Civil Society Participants	(e.g., CSO representation, gender, rural area, religious minorities)
	3.Organizational Level	(e.g., umbrella organizations, internal regulations, supporting infrastructure)
	5.Political Environment	(e.g., political rights, the rule of law, corruption)
	6.Socio-Economic and Socio-Cultural Context	(e.g., poverty, ethnic and religious tensions, economic crisis, trust, tolerance)
	7.Resources	(e.g., financial resources, human resources, infrastructures)
	8.Legal Environment	(e.g., CSO establishment, prohibited activities, tax laws)
	9.External Relations	(e.g., State-CSO, Private Sector-CSO and CSO-CSO relations)
	Compassion Capital Fund (CCF) (Minzner et al., 2014: 552).	1.Leadership Development
2.Organizational Development		(e.g., board governance and nonprofit incorporation)
3.Program Development		(e.g., enhancement of program and service delivery, monitoring)
4.Revenue Development		(e.g., diversified funding resources and financial sustainability)
5.Community Engagement		(e.g., community needs assessment and community participation)
Doherty et al. (2013:7)	1.Human Resources	(e.g., human capital, main focus area, volunteering)
	2.Financing	(e.g., constant revenue and costs, revenue diversification/concentration, financial discipline)
	3.Infrastructure	(e.g., facilities, technological infrastructure)
	4.Planning&Development	(e.g., strategic planning)
	5.External Relations	(e.g., relations with stakeholders, bureaucratic partners)
De Vita and Fleming (2001: 17)	1.Vision and Mission	(e.g., vision and mission of the organization)
	2.Leadership	(e.g., executive board, personnel and volunteers)
	3.Revenues	(e.g., financial, technological and human resources)
	4.Outreach	(e.g., public education, advocacy, cooperation)
	5.Goods and Services	(e.g., output, results, performance)
Mc Kinsey and Company (2001: 33-34)	1.Aspirations	(e.g., mission, vision and overarching goals)
	2.Strategy	(e.g., set of actions and programs)
	3.Organizational Skills	(e.g., capabilities, performance measures and planning)
	4.Human Resources	(e.g., experiences, management team and volunteers)
	5.Systems and Infrastructure	(e.g., decision making, administrative systems, technological assets)
	6.Organizational Structure	(e.g., governance, coordination and job descriptions)
	7.Culture	(e.g., shared values, practices and behavior norms)
The Marguerite Casey Foundation (2012)	1.Leadership Capacity	(e.g., skills of organizational leaders),
	2.Adaptive Capacity	(e.g., adaptation to internal and external changes)
	3.Management Capacity	(e.g., knowledge management, coordination/communication)
	4.Operational Capacity	(e.g., physical and technical infrastructure of organization)
TCC Group (2010: 28)	1.Adaptive Capacity	(e.g., environmental and programmatic learning)
	2.Leadership Capacity	(e.g., leader influence and leadership sustainability)
	3.Management Capacity	(e.g., financial management and problem solving)
	4.Technical Capacity	(e.g., facilities and fund-raising skills)

In the literature, there are some indicators of organizational capacity that influence organizational performance of CSOs as displayed in **Table 13**. For instance, McKinsey and Company (2001: 33-34)

determined seven indicators in order to measure the capacity of CSOs: **aspirations** (e.g., mission, vision and overarching goals), **strategy** (e.g., set of actions and programs), **organizational skills** (e.g., capabilities, performance measures and planning), **human resources** (e.g., experiences, management team and volunteers), **systems and infrastructure** (e.g., decision making, administrative systems, technological assets), **organizational structure** (e.g., governance, coordination and job descriptions), and **culture** (e.g., shared values, practices and behavior norms). Marguerite Casey Foundation (2017), on the other hand, used four capacity indicators: **leadership capacity** (e.g., skills of organizational leaders), **adaptive capacity** (e.g., adaptation to internal and external changes), **management capacity** (e.g., knowledge management, coordination and communication), and **operational capacity** (e.g., physical and technical infrastructure of the organization). Similarly, the TCC Group (2010:28) has four capacity elements: **adaptive capacity** (e.g., environmental and programmatic learning), **leadership capacity** (e.g., leader influence and leadership sustainability), **management capacity** (e.g., financial management and problem solving), and **technical capacity** (e.g., facilities and fund-raising skills). Based on the Compassion Capital Fund (CCF) Demonstration Program, Minzner et al. (2010) identified five capacity elements: **leadership development** (e.g., volunteer training, leadership professional and career development), **organizational development** (e.g., board governance and nonprofit incorporation), **program development** (e.g., enhancement of program and service delivery, program monitoring), **revenue development** (e.g.,

diversified funding resources and financial sustainability), and **community engagement** (e.g., community needs assessment and community participation). CCF demonstration has created a survey with binary (yes/no) and ordinal (self-assessed progress) questions based on these five capacity elements, and the survey was used in many studies organized by CCF demonstration (Abt Associates and Branch Associates, 2010; Francis et al., 2011; Minzner et al., 2010).

There are **no commonly accepted standardized organizational variables** to understand **capacity of CSOs** in general. Consequently, “Which organizational capacity indicators influence the organizational performance of CSOs?” is an open question that needs further inquiry. This might be due to difficulty of identifying universal performance standards for CSOs (Herman and Renz, 2008), complexity of the concept of organizational capacity (Wing, 2004), and lack of comprehensive studies including both internal and external factors (Despard, 2016: 4). In this book, the influences of the following organizational capacity indicators on organizational performance of CSOs are evaluated:

- Financial Capacity: Revenue Concentration and Annual Budget
  - Organizational Age (Tenure)
  - Physical and Technical Infrastructure
  - Cooperation with External Actors
- \**CSOs*
- \**Public Institutions*
- \**Private Sector Organizations*

- Managerial Competence of Human Resources
  - \**Professional Management of Voluntary Workers*
  - \**Experience of Organizational Leaders*

### **3.2.1. Financial Capacity: Revenue Concentration and Annual Budget**

CSOs play an essential role in the provision of quasi-public goods and services in areas where private and public sectors fail to provide for the people in need due to government and market failures throughout the world. In the case of private sector organizations, for example, there is an aim to increase profit and market share, while CSOs seek to achieve social mission and organizational goals to provide public goods and services for people in need (Fowler, 2000; Gronbjerg, 1993; Hackler and Saxton, 2007; Mitchell, 2014). Although CSOs do not seek profit, they also need financial sources to pursue their mission and achieve organizational goals. Therefore, their **social mission and organizational goals are directly related to their financial capacity** (Sontag-Padilla, 2012: 2). Tuckman and Chang (1991: 446) explain why financial capacity of CSOs is essential:

- Nonprofit sector has been growing rapidly over time, and it influences many people.
- Nonprofit sector has a substantial impact on employment.
- Nonprofits reduce cost of service offering, so a demand arises for government to fill the gap by nonprofits to avoid from financial pressures.

- Nonprofit sector is an essential source of diverse ideas and alternative delivery modes for public services.
- Nonprofit sector is a vehicle through which minority demands for public goods can be satisfied.

**Annual budget**, as an important indicator of the financial capacity, provides ability to increase their **performance**, pursue their **mission**, and react to **opportunities**, **crises** and **threats**. Therefore, CSO managers consider fund-raising activities to increase their annual budget, and they seek to reallocate financial resources to sustain their organizational mission (Sontag-Padilla, 2012: 2). These managers are not the only ones that consider about financial capacity of CSOs, because public institutions and non-public organizations like foundations supporting other CSOs have also interest on building and strengthening the financial capacity of CSOs that fill the gap in the provision of quasi-public goods and services for people in need. Financial capacity of CSOs needs to be dynamic against sudden shocks, crises and threats in order to continue providing services. Bowman (2011: 94) argues that:

“...an organization sustainable in the long run but unsustainable in the short term will be chronically short of cash. Conversely, an organization sustainable in the short term but not in the long term may have adequate cash but inflation will cause the value of its assets to erode over time. This, in turn, will cause the quantity and quality of services to diminish unless capital campaigns periodically bring infusion of new assets”.

Therefore, **sustainable revenue streams** are very essential for the financial capacity of CSOs in the short and long run. CSOs use several revenue streams (e.g., membership fees, voluntary donations, revenues from public institutions, revenues from income-generating activities) to pursue their social mission and organizational goals. However, some CSOs are not able to ensure **sustainability** and **diversity** of their revenue streams, which are vulnerable to external and internal challenges. For instance, Watkins et al. (2012: 288) argue that CSOs operate with “ambitious goals, uncertain technologies, and unpredictable environments”, so it is questionable whether financial capacities of CSOs are sufficient to resist internal and external challenges in the provision of public goods and services.

There are **different types and number of revenue streams of CSOs** in the literature. For instance, Gronbjerg (1993) determines six types of revenue streams that CSOs receive: donor funding from international agencies, funding from a government ministry(s), individual donors (including members), corporations, foundations, and income-generating activities. In addition, Chikoto et al. (2015: 10) use thirteen types of revenue streams (direct public support, indirect public support, government grants, membership dues, program service revenue, interest and savings, dividends, other investment income, net rental income, net gain on sale, net income from special events, net profit from selling inventory, and other revenue) to measure financial capacity and financial volatility of CSOs. Moreover, Önder (2006: 55) uses eight types of revenue streams, by adding three revenue streams

to five revenue streams of Tuckman and Chang (1991): revenue from contracts, gifts, and grants; program service revenue; membership fees; sales of unrelated service or goods; investment income; rental income; sales of inventory; and special events and other income. Finally, Salamon and Anheier (1998: 219) use three revenue streams of CSOs in order to find out revenue structure of the civil society sector in eight countries (Hungary, Italy, Sweden, Japan, Germany, the UK, France and the USA): private fees and payments, public sector payments, and private donations.

Scholars argue that **concentration on limited number of revenue streams** can cause **uncertainty for CSOs** (Despard et al., 2017; Hudock, 1995; Watkins et al., 2012), threatens **their autonomy** (Banks and Hulme, 2012; Elbers and Schulpen, 2013; Wallace et al., 2006), and results **in financial vulnerability** (Tuckman and Chang, 1991). For instance, Tuckman and Chang (1991: 445) claim that there are some factors that influence financial capacity of CSOs such as “the adequacy, stability, and diversity of its revenues; the quality of its management; its capacity to withstand revenue fluctuations; and the size of its capital”. These factors play essential roles during **financial shocks**. That means some CSOs withstand these shocks while some become financially vulnerable. Therefore, CSOs that are financially more vulnerable are likely to cut back their service offerings during financial shocks (Tuckman and Chang, 1991: 445).

Tevel et al. (2015: 2502) explain financial vulnerability as the “organization’s susceptibility to financial problems” which in turn prevent CSOs from pursuing their social mission and organizational goals. Zakrevska and Kotov (2009: 10-14) claim that there are four elements of financial vulnerability: “ability to cover operating expenditures, ability to cover future expenditures with future revenues, ability to cover incidental expenditures and ability to buy fixed assets”. Therefore, if financial vulnerability of CSOs is high, they cannot cover their operating expenditures, future expenditures, incidental expenditures, and they cannot buy fixed assets. To sum up, many scholars argue that **revenue concentration** might result in the **failure of social mission and organizational activities** (Gronbjerg, 1993; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman et al., 2009; Froelich, 1999). In order to sustain social mission and organizational activities, CSOs should aim to expand financial capacity by diversifying their revenue streams in order to pursue their mission and goals (Fowler, 2000; Mitchell, 2014), and avoid the revenue concentration (Frumkin and Keating, 2011; Keating et al., 2005).

In contrast, there are few studies arguing that concentration on few revenue streams does not necessarily increase financial vulnerability. In other words, these studies claim that revenue concentration does not have significant influence on financial vulnerability or it has a small negative effect on financial capacity. For instance, Lu et. al. (2019) systematically reviewed 258 effect sizes from a total of 23 existing studies through their bibliometric analysis and meta-analysis

to find out whether revenue concentration impacts financial vulnerability or financial capacity. They found that influence of revenue concentration on financial health is inconsistent (Lu et al., 2019: 604). They argue that “if nonprofits attempt to both reduce financial vulnerability and enhance financial capacity, some sort of concentration might turn out to be a more appropriate revenue strategy” (Lu et al., 2019: 605). In other words, financial diversification does not necessarily decrease financial vulnerability, and in some cases revenue concentration can be beneficial to decrease financial vulnerability. Although majority of the theoretical and empirical studies show that revenue concentration has a significant impact on the financial vulnerability and financial capacity of CSOs, it is still possible that revenue concentration has no relationship with financial vulnerability, or financial capacity. Therefore, it also does not have any relationship with organizational performance. Hence:

**Hypothesis 8:** Revenue concentration has no relationship with organizational performance of CSOs

On the other hand, **annual budget** is an important indicator of financial capacity. Therefore, the size of CSOs can increase if their annual budget also increases. Hence:

**Hypothesis 9:** CSOs that have larger annual budget are more likely to have higher organizational performance.

### 3.2.2. Organizational Age (Tenure)

Ortmann and Schlesinger (1997: 103) state that **adulteration** within CSOs is an important challenge to prove that they are less opportunistic and more trustworthy than private sector organizations. CSOs experience “ossification” and “bureaucratization” through their life-cycles like profit-making organizations. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between CSOs: in the early stages of their evolutions that are **newly-established organizations**, or in their later stages that are **long-established organizations**. Because, some workers in older CSOs might be replaced by new people with different abilities and motivations, and these new workers might try to get individual benefit by exploiting trustworthiness feature of CSOs. **Trust** is very essential for the presence of CSOs, but “the greater the initial trust is the more likely it is that the trust will be eroded by subsequent violations of trust” (Ortmann and Schlesinger, 1997: 103). Therefore, older CSOs should monitor adulteration challenge in order to sustain trustworthiness of their organizations. Similarly, Chikoto-Schultz and Neely (2016), for instance, found that organizational age of CSOs influences their ability to diversify revenue sources and decrease financial vulnerability, because older CSOs are likely to have more sources of revenue. In addition, Burde et al. (2016) argue that both organizational age and size are closely related with funding instability and organizational survival of CSOs in the case of Israel. To sum up, many scholars argue that **organizational age** is very related with

**organizational performance** in achieving organizational goals, because younger CSOs have more tendency to face “liability of newness” (Stinchcombe, 1965), “organizational failure rate” (death risk) (Halliday et al., 1987; Le Mens et al., 2011), or “absolute hazard risk” (Singh et al: 1986). Hence:

**Hypothesis 10:** Older CSOs are more likely to have higher organizational performance.

### 3.2.3. Physical and Technological Infrastructure

Many studies consider physical and technological infrastructure as an important organizational capacity indicator that influence organizational performance. For instance, Bryan (2018: 3) states that **organizational infrastructure** is essential for organizational capacity, because it provides basic **administrative** and **operational abilities** to achieve organizational missions. On the other hand, Boyne (2003: 219) calls organizational infrastructure as “potential antecedents” which means that it is a precondition in order to meet organizational goals. Bikmen and Meydanoğlu (2006) evaluates technological infrastructure as an important resource that impacts organizational capacity of CSOs in Turkey. Similarly, there are many other studies that consider **systems** (Mc Kinsey and Company, 2001), **operational capacity** (The Marguerite Casey Foundation, 2012), **technical capacity** (TCC Group, 2010), **facilities** and **technological infrastructure** (Doherty et al., 2013; De Vita and Fleming, 2001) as important organizational capacity indicators of CSOs. Hence:

**Hypothesis 11:** CSOs that have more physical and technological infrastructure are more likely to have higher organizational performance.

#### **3.2.4. Cooperation with External Actors**

Cooperation with external actors is considered as an important organizational capacity indicator by many studies (Bikmen and Meydanoğlu, 2006; Doherty et al. 2013; The Marguerite Casey Foundation, 2012). Therefore, this part evaluates external relations of CSOs with public institutions, private sector organizations, and other CSOs.

**(i) Cooperation with CSOs:** Salamon (1987) claims that CSOs have “a greater capacity to avoid fragmented approaches and to concentrate on the full range of needs that families or individuals face”, however, he does not clearly explain how so many CSOs will be able to coordinate to satisfy **diversified needs** of families and individuals, because CSOs have different size, target audience, organizational goals and missions (Salamon, 1987: 44). In its empirical research, Charity Commission (2003: 2) in England found out that there is a **collaboration** between 22% of charities currently, and 5% charities were established as a result of merging between different charities due to some main reasons such as “sharing knowledge”, “joint service delivery”, and “sharing resources to increase efficiency”. That means CSOs should generate **new resources from their external partners** if they are not able to generate them internally. Moreover, especially

worker's trade unions in Turkey have recently become very influential after the unification of trade unions from different ideologies under federations or confederations, because the unification of these unions increased the cooperation and acting together (İçduygu et al., 2011: 64). In this sense, it can be claimed that there is a **strong need for cooperation among CSOs** in order to overcome problems of **irregularity of production, fund-raising and lack of resources**, because this kind of cooperation can increase the organizational capacity which might positively influence organizational performance of CSOs in reaching their organizational goals. Hence:

**Hypothesis 12:** CSOs that cooperate with other CSOs are more likely to have higher organizational performance.

**(ii) Cooperation with Public Institutions:** Activities of organizations in a specific sector can influence other organizations in different sectors, because these sectors are not fully isolated from each other. For instance, innovative characteristics of some CSOs like research institutions and consumer organizations provide market support, while CSOs like trade unions and professional bodies can reduce transaction costs by their bargaining power and other forms of co-operative activities with the state. These functions of CSOs provide better conditions for private sector organizations.

The interdependence theory suggests that CSOs are **not alternative** for the state, they are rather **partners** for the state. Although CSOs have some strengths compared to state in the provision of public

goods and services, they also have **weaknesses**, which are explained under the “voluntary failure” theory of Salamon (1987). For instance, **philanthropic insufficiency** arises when CSOs cannot attract sufficient resources to provide public goods and services due to “free-rider problem” (Olson, 1971: 14-16; Weisbrod, 1975), “twists and turns of economic fortune” and “serious gaps in geographical coverage” (Salamon, 1987: 39-40). State can overcome these difficulties in the provision of sufficient and consistent goods and services by involuntary action through **taxation**, or by **direct** and **indirect support** to CSOs. Similarly, Anheier (2005: 131) suggests that “the voluntary sector’s weaknesses correspond well with the government’s strengths, and vice versa”, so the relations between state and CSOs is “a less competitive light”. In other words, CSOs and public institutions are mainly partners rather than opponents in the provision of public goods and services, since CSOs “receive more of their income from government than from any other single source” (Salamon, 1987: 29). Moreover, he proposes the concept of “third party government” for CSOs to emphasize partnership between the state and CSOs.

The discussions above show that cooperation with public institutions has a positive influence on the organizational performance of CSOs in reaching their organizational goals. Hence:

**Hypothesis 13:** CSOs that cooperate with public institutions are more likely to have higher organizational performance.

**(iii) Cooperation with Private Sector Organizations:** Bikmen and Meydanoğlu (2006) evaluate relations between CSOs and private sector organizations in Turkey as organizational capacity indicators. Similarly, Doherty et al. (2013) also argue that external relations with stakeholders are important to measure organizational capacity of CSOs. On the other hand, The Marguerite Casey Foundation (2012) sees external relations of CSOs with private sector organizations as **adaptive capacity** that means adaptation to internal and external changes. It is also important to note that donations of private sector organizations are essential **revenue sources** for CSOs. On the other hand, CSOs need to have **partnerships** or **commercial relations** to use facilities of private sector organizations such as conference hall, technological tools, or consultation. For instance, a CSO might get consultation from private consultation company to prepare project proposal, or project management, because some specific areas necessitate **expertise** and **professionalism**. Cooperation between CSOs and private sector organizations can overcome these problems. Hence:

**Hypothesis 14:** CSOs that cooperate with private sector organizations are more likely to have higher organizational performance.

### **3.2.5. Managerial Competence of Human Resources**

There are many studies that evaluate the relations between managerial competence and organizational capacity (Tuckman and Chang, 1991; Sontag-Padilla, 2012), because **experienced** and **qualified managers**

can: reallocate financial resources efficiently; pursue organization's mission and goals; react to opportunities, crises and threats effectively; and increase fund-raising activities (Önder and Köylü, 2018). Managerial competence indicates the total years of experience (e.g., director, manager, youth leaders, voluntary and paid workers), and professional management of voluntary workers.

### (i) Professional Management of Voluntary Workers

**Voluntary failure theory** is the opposite of market failure theory, which explains the presence of CSOs in the case of **government failure**, because CSOs exist due to voluntary action that arise from people's natural tendencies for collective action and sense of social obligation (Anheier, 2005: 130). In the theory, **philanthropic amateurism** is considered as a result of "amateur approaches to coping with human problems" (Salamon, 1987: 42), because the activities are mainly carried out by voluntary workers who are managing CSOs in voluntary basis. This **amateurism** in CSOs based on voluntary action has positive and negative consequences. For example, amateurism encourages **entrepreneurship** and **civic participation**. However, CSO are not always able to attract qualified and experienced personnel due to **limited amount of resources** to provide sufficient wages (Salamon, 1987: 42). Therefore, amateurism can cause poor quality of public goods and services. In this sense, there is a need for professional trainings of their voluntary workers and counsellors in CSOs, because these CSOs cannot provide adequate wages to attract professional and paid personnel. In this

sense, professional management of voluntary workers by organizational trainings (e.g., project management, fund-raising, capacity development, and performance management) can influence the contributions of these workers in organizational performance of CSOs in achieving major activities. Hence:

**Hypothesis 15:** CSOs that manage their voluntary workers professionally are more likely to have higher organizational performance.

### (ii) Experience of Organizational Leaders

Like organizational age, experience of organizational leaders is also much related with organizational performance in achieving organizational goals. **Organizational tenure** is used as synonym for **experience** of organizational leaders, and it refers to the time that workers spent in their organization. It is regarded as an essential **indicator of human capital**, because it increases **workers' value** and their **performance** (Judge et al., 1995; Nafukho et al., 2004). For instance, McDaniel et al. (1988) argue that organizational leaders display higher levels of performance as they gain more experience in their organization. In contrast, Schwenk (1993) argues that executives of CSOs (e.g., chief executive officers and top management team) with more extensive experience and longer tenure in their organizations have tendency to attribute negative outcomes to external causes. Therefore, this behavior of executives can decrease effectiveness of decision-making, and lead to poorer organizational

performance in the future. However, there are many scholars who evaluate the positive relationships between experience of employees, or organizational team and performance (Chi et al., 2009; Goll and Rasheed, 2005; Joshi et al., 2011), because **human capital theory** states that human capital is developed as workers gain **job knowledge, skills, experiences, and abilities** (Myers et al., 2004; Wayne et al., 1999). Therefore, organizational leaders with higher human capital are considered to perform better in their organizational roles and responsibilities (Humphrey et al., 2009; Steffens et al., 2014), so this can increase organizational performance in turn. Hence:

**Hypothesis 16:** CSOs that have experienced organizational leaders are more likely to have higher organizational performance.



## **CHAPTER IV**

### **AN EMPIRICAL STUDY FOR THE ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF CSOs IN TURKEY**



## 1. METHODOLOGY

This part of the book covers methodology of the empirical analysis for the organizational development of CSOs in Turkey by 2 variables: size and organizational performance of CSOs.

### 1.1. Research Question

Major theories in the literature show that there are different factors that cause differentiation in the size and organizational performance of CSOs in different communities, societies, cultures and countries throughout the world, because the degree of size and organizational performance influences the quality, quantity, sustainability, accessibility and efficiency of public goods and services provided by CSOs for the people in need. Therefore, this differentiation was analyzed in this chapter, because it is still debatable whether size and organizational performance of CSOs are sufficient to provide social, economic and political benefits for the society, or not. Hence, the main research question is: *“What accounts for the size and organizational performance of CSOs?”*

### 3.3. Hypotheses

As stated before, hypotheses for the book were derived from major theories of CSOs after the 1970s in the literature (please see *Chapter III*). These hypotheses of different theories are listed in **Table 14**.

**Table 14: Hypotheses Derived from Major theories of CSOs**

Size of CSOs	<i>Public Goods Theories</i>	<p><b>Hypothesis 1:</b> Social diversity is more likely to increase size of CSOs.</p> <p><b>Hypothesis 2:</b> Per capita income is more likely to increase size of CSOs.</p>
	<i>Trust-Related Theories</i>	<b>Hypothesis 3:</b> The lower the level of trust in private sector organizations is more likely to increase size of CSOs.
	<i>The Interdependence &amp; Resource Dependence Theories</i>	<b>Hypothesis 4:</b> The level of income from public institutions and size of CSOs have negative relationship.
	<i>The Entrepreneurship Theory</i>	<b>Hypothesis 5:</b> CSOs that operate with ideological and religious motivations are more likely to have larger size.
	<i>The Stakeholder Theory</i>	<b>Hypothesis 6:</b> CSOs that provide information flow for stakeholders are more likely to have larger size.
	<i>Social Origins Theory</i>	<b>Hypothesis 7:</b> The extent of government social welfare spending and size of CSOs have negative relationship.
Organizational Performance of CSOs	<i>Financial Capacity</i>	<p><b>Hypothesis 8:</b> Revenue concentration has no relationship with organizational performance of CSOs.</p> <p><b>Hypothesis 9:</b> CSOs that have larger annual budget are more likely to have higher organizational performance.</p>
	<i>Organizational Age</i>	<b>Hypothesis 10:</b> Older CSOs are more likely to have higher organizational performance.
	<i>Physical&amp;Technological Infrastructure</i>	<b>Hypothesis 11:</b> CSOs that have more physical and technological infrastructure are more likely to have higher organizational performance.
	<i>Cooperation with CSOs</i>	<b>Hypothesis 12:</b> CSOs that cooperate with other CSOs are more likely to have higher organizational performance.
	<i>Cooperation with Public Institutions</i>	<b>Hypothesis 13:</b> CSOs that cooperate with public institutions are more likely to have higher organizational performance.
	<i>Cooperation with Private Sector Organizations</i>	<b>Hypothesis 14:</b> CSOs that cooperate with private sector organizations are more likely to have higher organizational performance.
	<i>Professional Management of Voluntary Workers</i>	<b>Hypothesis 15:</b> CSOs that manage their voluntary workers professionally are more likely to have higher organizational performance.
	<i>Experience of Organizational Leaders</i>	<b>Hypothesis 16:</b> CSOs that have experienced organizational leaders are more likely to have higher organizational performance.

### 3.4. Unit of Analysis

The hypotheses derived from major theories of CSOs can be tested in different levels: cross-national, national, regional (across the same country), sectoral, or organizational. In this book, cross-national and sectoral levels of analyses are excluded, because the focus is mainly on two levels of analysis: (i) **geographic unit of analysis** that is 81 NUTS-3 regions of Turkey (N=81), and (ii) **organizational unit of analysis** that is 975 Youth CSOs in Turkey (N=975). These units of analyses necessitate two different models.

**Table 15:** NUTS-1, NUTS-2 and NUTS-3 Statistical Regions of Turkey

NUTS-1 (12 Regions)	NUTS-2 (26 Sub-Regions)	NUTS-3 (81 Provinces)
Istanbul Region (TR1)	Istanbul Subregion (TR10)	İstanbul
West Marmara Region (TR2)	Tekirdağ Subregion (TR21)	Tekirdağ, Edirne, Kırklareli
	Balıkesir Subregion (TR22)	Balıkesir, Çanakkale
Aegean Region (TR3)	Izmir Subregion (TR31)	İzmir
	Aydın Subregion (TR32)	Aydın, Denizli, Muğla
	Manisa Subregion (TR33)	Manisa, Afyonkarahisar, Kütahya, Uşak
East Marmara Region (TR4)	Bursa Subregion (TR41)	Bursa, Eskişehir, Bilecik
	Kocaeli Subregion (TR42)	Kocaeli, Sakarya, Düzce, Bolu, Yalova
West Anatolia Region (TR5)	Ankara Subregion (TR51)	Ankara
	Konya Subregion (TR52)	Konya, Karaman

Mediterranean Region (TR6)	Antalya (TR61)	Subregion	Antalya, Isparta, Burdur
	Adana (TR62)	Subregion	Adana, Mersin
	Hatay (TR63)	Subregion	Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye
Central Anatolia Region (TR7)	Kırıkkale (TR71)	Subregion	Kırıkkale, Aksaray, Niğde, Nevşehir, Kırşehir
	Kayseri (TR72)	Subregion	Kayseri, Sivas, Yozgat
West Black Sea Region (TR8)	Zonguldak (TR81)	Subregion	Zonguldak, Karabük, Bartın
	Kastamonu (TR82)	Subregion	Kastamonu, Çankırı, Sinop
	Samsun (TR83)	Subregion	Samsun, Tokat, Çorum, Amasya
East Black Sea Region (TR9)	Trabzon (TR90)	Subregion	Trabzon, Giresun, Ordu, Rize, Artvin, Gümüşhane
Northeast Anatolia Region (TRA)	Erzurum (TRA1)	Subregion	Erzurum, Erzincan, Bayburt
	Ağrı (TRA2)	Subregion	Ağrı, Kars, Iğdır, Ardahan
Central East Anatolia Region (TRB)	Malatya (TRB1)	Subregion	Malatya, Elazığ, Bingöl, Tunceli
	Van (TRB2)	Subregion	Van, Muş, Bitlis, Hakkâri
Southeast Anatolia Region (TRC)	Gaziantep (TRC1)	Subregion	Gaziantep, Adıyaman, Kilis
	Şanlıurfa (TRC2)	Subregion	Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır
	Mardin (TRC3)	Subregion	Mardin, Batman, Şırnak, Siirt

**Table 15** shows NUTS-1, NUTS-2, and NUTS-3 statistical regions of Turkey in detail. In order to adapt the EU classifications, Turkey is

included in the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). In this sense, there are 12 regions under NUTS-1 level which is also divided into 26 Subregions under NUTS-2 level, and NUTS-2 level is divided into 81 provinces of Turkey under NUTS-3 level. Therefore, data of CSOs was classified and grouped under 81 NUTS-3 statistical regions, and then analyzed to test hypotheses of major theories on size of CSOs in the literature.

**In the first model, size of CSOs** is evaluated by the data of **81 NUTS-3 statistical regions of Turkey** (81 provinces), as shown in **Table 15**. Doing research at province level provides information about how local conditions influence size of CSOs in different regions of Turkey.

There are three reasons why NUTS-3 level of analysis was chosen in this book. Firstly, NUTS was created by the European Union, because it was too complex to understand full picture of member states in detail. In this sense, “statistical information at a subnational level is an important tool for highlighting specific regional and territorial aspects”.<sup>56</sup> Therefore, Eurostat has established different classifications and typologies (e.g., regions, cities, metropolitan regions and rural areas) to create sub-national data. Similarly, this book applies provincial level of analysis in terms of NUTS-3 statistical regions of Turkey to highlight specific regional and territorial aspects in terms of size of CSOs. Secondly, it is statistically more meaningful to include a

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<sup>56</sup>Eurostat official website, “Regions and cities – Overview”, Retrieved March 27, 2019, from <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/regions-and-cities>

great number of units of analysis. The number of 12 NUTS-1, or 26 NUTS-2 statistical regions would not show a meaningful differentiation in the statistical calculations due to less number of unit of analysis. In this sense, this book analyzes data through the number of 81 NUTS-3 statistical regions. In this way, possible effects of measurement errors can be avoided in the statistical analysis. Thirdly, total populations of NUTS-3 regions were used as control variable, because some provinces like Istanbul has about 15,06 million people while Kilis has only about 136.319 people. As an indicator of size of CSOs, for instance, the number of CSOs in each province was calculated by CSOs per 1000 people in each NUTS-3 region of Turkey.

**In the second model, organizational performance of CSOs** in their major activities is evaluated by the **data of 975 surveys** that were applied to full sample of 1550 official Youth CSO representatives (e.g., director, member, manager, and youth leaders) from 81 cities in Turkey. These CSOs were randomly selected from the database of T.R. Ministry of Youth and Sports according to the following criteria: being active in the field by providing goods and service for youth, education and sport. The reason of choosing **organization (N=975) as unit of analysis** is to make in depth analysis by focusing on a specific area of activity, because these CSOs mainly operate in the area of youth. In addition, it is easier to make statistical explanations with higher number of unit of analysis.

There are several reasons for conducting a survey of 975 Youth CSOs. Firstly, majority of CSOs have units for the youth in general. The second reason is that these CSOs are younger in terms of organizational age and more dynamic, because they produce goods and services for young people. In other words, a continuous transformation and development is needed to provide goods and services that can attract the attention of young people, and meet their needs. In addition, these CSOs are actively in the field, and provide these goods and services for young people. Thirdly, T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society, which is affiliated to the T.R. Ministry of Interior, contains information only for associations in their official database. In contrast, in the database of T.R. Directorate General of Youth Services affiliated to the T.R. Ministry of Youth and Sports, there are various types of CSOs such as associations, foundations, trade unions and platforms that are operating in the field of youth. Therefore, Youth CSOs from 81 provinces of Turkey as sample of this book were randomly selected from the lists of T.R. Ministry of Youth and Sports. Finally, since young people are the future of a country, it is important to understand the current situation, needs, size and performance of CSOs that are active in the field of youth.

#### **1.4. Data**

In order to test hypotheses, **multiple source of data** for NUTS-3 regions (N=81) and organizations (N=975) was used. Some of the data exist at the national level, some exist at sub-national, or provincial

level, and some data do not exist at all. In statistical calculations, the **primary** and **secondary data** are used in two models.

It is important to note that the number of studies on CSOs is limited, and available data on CSOs (e.g., revenue sources, number of voluntary and paid workers, and the number of members) and socio-economic factors (e.g., education, ethnic and religious fractionalization, and trust) by public institutions is not accessible in Turkey. For instance, there is limited data on CSOs associations and foundations after the 2000s, because statistical records have just started to be collected and published after that period of time in Turkey. However, this information is mainly at the national level, so it is hard to make a comparative analysis of different cities, or regions within the country. On the other hand, CSOs are not willing to provide information about their activities, financial resources, number of members, and number of voluntary and paid workers. In this sense, existing data is not sufficient to make in-depth analysis on the factors that influence size and organizational performance of CSOs. Therefore, this book uses primary data, collected from survey research, and related secondary data to test hypotheses that are developed from major theories on size and organizational performance of CSOs.

Primary data was created by a **semi-structured** and **detailed survey** to test hypotheses that require more detailed information in terms of NUTS-3 regions and 975 Youth CSOs. This survey was applied to a total number of 1.550 CSO representatives by face-to-face (80%) and

e-mail (20%) between November 2017 and November 2018. These organizations mainly act in the area of youth (e.g., education, research, and accommodation) in 81 cities of Turkey. They were **randomly selected** from the **database of Turkish Ministry of Youth and Sports**, because the ministry has a list of CSOs that operate **in the areas of youth, education, research and sport**. Then they were invited to fill surveys. In the selection process of these CSOs, the following criterion was determined: being active in the field by providing goods and service for youth, education and sport. Only 1.034 of these representatives filled the surveys, and returned them. However, majority of questions in 59 surveys were not properly completed, therefore, these surveys were excluded from the data.

The reason of choosing the area of youth is simple. CSOs operate in many areas or segments of society from education, humanitarian aid and immigration to protection of local identities, poverty and animal rights. Moreover, general assumptions for all CSOs can be misleading, because these CSOs are different in terms of their area of activity, financial capacity, organizational size, and type of fund-raising activities (Chang and Tuckman, 1996: 33). As a result, the type of CSOs is limited to area of youth (e.g., education, research, accommodation and sport). The survey data was operationalized to make dependent (organizational performance of CSOs) and independent variables (organizational factors such as cooperation with other CSOs, professional management of volunteers, and revenue concentration) measurable for the statistical calculations.

The survey sample of 975 CSOs consists of 61,8% Associations, 23,3% Foundations, 7,0% Unions, 2,8% Others (e.g., professional organizations, federations and confederations). Moreover, 11,8% of respondents are female while 88,2% are male. On the other hand, 68,2% of respondents hold bachelor degree, 14,6% master degree, 2,3% Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) degree, 0,2% Post-Doctoral degree, and the rest of the respondents (14,7%) hold primary, secondary, or high school degree. About 80% of CSOs, in which these respondents work, were established after the year 2000, while the rest of the CSOs were established before 2000.

**Secondary data** on CSOs in Turkey was collected from the online databases and publications of T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society ([www.siviltoplum.gov.tr](http://www.siviltoplum.gov.tr)), T.R. Directorate General of Foundations ([www.vgm.gov.tr](http://www.vgm.gov.tr)), Ministry of Trade ([www.koop.gtb.gov.tr](http://www.koop.gtb.gov.tr)), Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) (<https://www.tobb.org.tr>). In addition, there are also empirical studies and official statistics, which are used to operationalize dependent and independent variables, such as TURKSTAT Statistics - Turkish Statistical Institute ([www.tuik.gov.tr](http://www.tuik.gov.tr)), KONDA Research and Consultancy (2006, 2011 and 2018 reports), DHS Survey - Demographic and Health in 2013, WVS -World Values Survey in 2012 in Turkey, OECD Database - Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and other related publications.

**Table 16** illustrates two dependent variables, their indicators, CSO types included in the data and sources of data. The size of CSOs was operationalized through four main indicators by using **secondary data**: number of paid and voluntary workers, CSO revenue per person, proportion of CSO members within total population, and CSO density per 100.000 people in each NUTS-3 regions of Turkey. On the other hand, organizational performance of CSOs was operationalized through the performance of CSOs within six major activities by using **primary data** (survey research): marketing, internet and technology, administrative techniques, income generating activities, volunteering, and reported. The answers from 1 (worst) to 5 (best) for each CSO within the sample of 975 Youth CSOs were coded for empirical analysis.

**Table 16:** Dependent Variables, Indicators, CSO Types Included in Data, and Source of Data

	Indicators	Control Variable	CSO Types Included in Data	Source of Data
The Size of CSOs	Number of paid and voluntary workers in CSOs	-	Associations	-Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society (2017)
	CSO revenue per person	Total population	Associations	-TURKSTAT - Turkish Statistical Institute, Population Statistics (2017) -Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society (2017)
	Proportions of CSO members within the population	Total population	Associations Workers Unions Cooperatives	-TURKSTAT - Turkish Statistical Institute, Population Statistics (2017) -Ministry of Trade (2018) -Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society (2017) -Ministry of Labour, and Social Services (2016)
	CSO density (per 100.000 people)	Total population	Associations Foundations Unions Professional Organizations Cooperatives	-TURKSTAT - Turkish Statistical Institute, Population Statistics (2017) -Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society (2017) -Directorate General of Foundations (2018) -Ministry of Trade, Department of Cooperatives (2018) -The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) (2018)
Organizational performance of CSOs	<u>Organizational performance in Major Organizational Activities</u> Marketing Internet and Technology Administrative Techniques Income Generating Activities Volunteering Reporting	-	Associations Foundations Unions Others (e.g., professional organizations, federations and confederations)	-Data was collected from the surveys with the number of 975 CSO representatives in all 81 cities of Turkey (2018)

**Table 17: Independent Variables, Indicators, Control Variable, and Source of Data**

Variable	Control Variable	CSO Types	Source of Data
social diversity	Total Population	-	TURKSTAT. Indicator Values of Well-Being Index (2015)
	Surface Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	-	TURKSTAT. Population Statistics (2018) & T.R. Directorate General of Map (2018)
	-	-	2018 Turkish General Elections
per capita income	Total Population	-	TURKSTAT. Education Statistics & Population Statistics (2017)
	Total Population	-	TURKSTAT. Population and GDP Statistics (2017)
trust in private sector org.	Per 1000 People	-	T.R. Ministry of Trade, 2018 data
level of income from public inst.	Total Revenue	Associations	Data was collected from the surveys with the number of 975 CSO representatives in all 81 cities of Turkey (2018)
ideological & religious motivation	Total Number of Associations	Associations	T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society (2017)
government social welfare spending	Total Population & No. of Students	-	OECD, Social Spending Statistics (2018), TURKSTAT, Statistics for spendings on education, health and social protection (2017), MEB (2018)
information flow for stakeholders	-	Assoc. Found. Unions, Others	Data was collected from the surveys with the number of 975 CSO representatives in all 81 cities of Turkey (2018)
revenue concentration & annual budget	-		
organizational age	-		
physical & technological infrastructure	-	Associations	
cooperation with CSOs	-	Foundations	
cooperation with public institutions	-	Unions	Data was collected from the surveys with the number of 975 CSO representatives in all 81 cities of Turkey (2018)
cooperation with private sector org.	-	Others	
prof. management of volunteers	-	(e.g., profes. org., federations and confed.)	
experience of org. leaders	-		

**Table 17** illustrates indicators of independent variables, control variables (if exists), and sources of primary and secondary data. **Primary data** was used for the following variables: information flow for the stakeholders, revenue concentration, annual budget, organizational age, physical and technological infrastructure, cooperation with CSOs, cooperation with public institutions, cooperation with private sector organizations, professional management of voluntary workers, and experience of organizational leaders. On the other hand, **secondary data** was used for the following variables: social diversity, per capita income, trust in private sector organizations, income from public institution, ideological and religious motivation, and government social welfare spending.

### 1.5. Analysis Methods

The variables were operationalized by different methods such as HHI (Hirschman-Herfindahl Index), z-score, and revenue concentration index in order to convert raw data into testable and measurable values. The relationships between dependent and independent variables were estimated by multiple regression analysis, namely **Hierarchical OLS Regression Analysis**, that reveal whether these variables have statistically significant relationships, or not.

**OLS method** was selected for two reasons (Farah et al., 2018; Önder, 2006). First, it is a widely accepted statistical procedure for exploring and predicting the relationships between a criterion variable and two or more predictor variables. Second, the results of regression are easy

to interpret. Regression runs with variables against each criterion variable and the results are reported in the findings in a subsequent title. On the other hand, **Hierarchical regression** is very useful for specific theoretically based hypotheses by adding each independent variable into the model in multiple regression procedures one by one (Aron and Aron, 1999). In comprehensive studies that combine different theoretical assumptions including partial, overlapping or parallel hypotheses, it is important to judge how much an independent variable of a theoretical hypothesis increases the prediction power of the statistical model. Many scholars suggest that this method is very useful such specific and theory-based hypotheses (Cohen, 2001: 523-524; Wampold and Freund, 1987: 377). Therefore, this method has recently been used more frequently in explaining relationship between dependent and independent variables. For instance, 48,57% of the 70 articles that were published in Journal of Counseling and Development used hierarchical multiple regression method (Petrocelli, 2003).

## **1.6. Models**

There are two models to test different hypotheses, because there are two dependent variables in this book. After operationalization of variables, the influence of independent variables on dependent variables were estimated by **Hierarchical OLS Regression Analysis**.

**(i) First model to test hypotheses that focus on the size of CSOs:**

Dependent Variable: *size of CSOs*

Independent Variables:

- *social diversity*
- *per capita income*
- *trust on private sector organizations*
- *income from public institutions*
- *ideological and religious motivation*
- *information flow for stakeholders*
- *government social welfare spending*

The following formula is used in this Hierarchical OLS Regression Analysis:

$$A = a + b_{1...n}X_{1...n} + e$$

**Formula 1:** First Regression Model for Size of CSOs

Where;

$A$  = The size of CSOs,

$X_{1...n}$  = social diversity, per capita income, trust in private sector organizations, income from public institutions, ideological and religious motivation, information flow for stakeholders, and government social welfare spending.

$e$  = Error term

**(ii) Second model to test hypotheses that focus on the organizational performance of CSOs in their major activities:**

Dependent Variable: *organizational performance of CSOs*

Independent Variables:

- *revenue concentration*
- *annual budget*
- *organizational age*
- *physical and technological infrastructure*
- *cooperation with other CSOs*
- *cooperation with public institutions*
- *cooperation with private sector organizations*
- *professional management of voluntary workers*
- *experience of organizational leaders*

The following formula is used in this Hierarchical OLS Regression Analysis:

$$B = a + b_{1..n}X_{1..n} + e$$

**Formula 2:** Second Regression Model for Organizational Performance of CSOs

Where;

$B$  = The Organizational performance in major activities

$X_{1..n}$  = revenue concentration, annual budget, organizational age, physical and technological infrastructure, cooperation with other CSOs, cooperation with public institutions, cooperation with private

sector organizations, professional management of voluntary workers, and experience of organizational leaders.

$e$  = Error term

## **2. OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES**

This part of book includes operationalization of dependent and independent variables, because it is important to transform these variables into measurable data for empirical analysis. Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables are presented in **Table 18**. As expected, distribution of dependent and independent variables within two models of the book indicates substantial variations.

**Table 18:** Descriptive Statistics for the Variables of NUTS-3 Regions and 975 Youth CSOs

<b>1<sup>st</sup> Model for 81 NUTS-3 Regions of Turkey (N=81)</b>					
<b>Type</b>	<b>Variable</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Deviation</b>
Dependent	<i>size</i>	-,91	,63	-,1279	,37751
Independent	<i>social diversity</i>	-,98	,79	-,0565	,40845
Independent	<i>per capita income</i>	12729,00	64659,00	27994,5454	8791,45960
Independent	<i>trust in private sector org.</i>	1,60	12,25	5,7490	2,17241
Independent	<i>income from public institutions</i>	,00	42,50	12,2009	8,79831
Independent	<i>ideological &amp; religious motivation</i>	9,11	36,19	23,4977	6,49027
Independent	<i>information flow for stakeholders</i>	1,88	3,71	2,7639	,33721
Independent	<i>government social spending</i>	280126695,00	1,06E+10	2934046059	2460550854
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Model for 975 Youth CSOs (N=975)</b>					
<b>Type</b>	<b>Variable</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
Dependent	<i>organizational performance</i>	1,00	5,00	3,0805	,75609
Independent	<i>revenue concentration</i>	,00	1,00	,6218	,23508
Independent	<i>annual budget</i>	10000,00	5000000,00	175934,8739	285515,3511
Independent	<i>organizational age</i>	,00	67,00	12,5231	12,93824
Independent	<i>physical and technological infrastructure</i>	,00	13,00	5,4107	2,82553
Independent	<i>cooperation with CSOs</i>	,00	6,00	3,4181	2,05385
Independent	<i>cooperation with public institutions</i>	,00	3,00	2,0473	1,13859
Independent	<i>cooperation with private sector organizations</i>	,00	1,00	,2668	,44252
Independent	<i>professional management of voluntary workers</i>	1,00	5,00	3,5735	1,10769
Independent	<i>experience of org. leaders</i>	1,00	40,00	12,6450	8,99819

## 2.1. Dependent Variables

There are two dependent variables to measure organizational development of CSOs: **(i)** size of CSOs, and **(ii)** organizational performance of CSOs. After operationalization of these variables, possible interactions and relations with independent variables were tested by multiple regression, specifically Hierarchical OLS Regression Analysis. These variables were used to test existing hypothesis in the major theories that explain organizational performance, and size of CSOs. It is important to note that data on CSOs in Turkey was not available to test all hypotheses since there is a limited source of data. However, analysis of the primary and secondary data is a good start for the future research on civil society in Turkey. The findings of this book show us what factors influence the size and organizational performance of CSOs in Turkey.

The primary and secondary data was used to convert theoretical foundations and variables into testable and measurable variables by different methods (e.g., HHI, z-score, and revenue concentration index). It is important to note that data on CSOs is mainly from 2017, because 2018 data was not completed due to collection of associations' proclamations until May 2019. That means, there might be new data entries in the upcoming months of 2019, so the 2018 data might change until the end of 2019.

### 2.1.1. The Size of CSOs

There are different indicators that constitute the size of CSOs in the literature. For instance, Önder (2006) used four indicators to measure size of CSOs in a specific region: CSO density, CSO Revenue, CSO capacity, belonging CSO activities. On the other hand, Salamon and Anheier (1998) used three indicators: employment, volunteer time, and operating expenditures. In this book, the dependent variable of “size of CSOs” in each NUTS-3 regions of Turkey was operationalized by summing up the standardized values of (i) the numbers of paid and voluntary workers in CSOs, (ii) CSO revenue per person in the population, (iii) proportions of CSO members within the population, and (iv) CSO density (per 100.000 people) in each NUTS-3 region. After these indicators of size of CSOs were operationalized, their standardized values were coded as variables for Hierarchical OLS Regression Analysis. Then, the mean of these four variables was coded to get one single variable for each NUTS-3 region of Turkey in order to use in Hierarchical OLS Regression Analysis.

**(i) The Numbers of Paid and Voluntary Workers in CSOs:** The 2017 data for the number of paid and voluntary workers in **associations** was collected from Database of T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society ([www.siviltoplum.gov.tr](http://www.siviltoplum.gov.tr)). In the calculations, data for the number of 110.787 Associations in 2017 was used. It is very significant because total number of CSOs in 2018 was about 120.000 that are officially registered in Turkey (please see **Table 3**). With the inclusion of the number of cooperatives under

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, the total number of CSOs increased to 203.709 CSOs. Therefore, our sample still composes more than half of the total number of CSOs in Turkey. On the other hand, there was not available data on paid and voluntary workers within other types of CSOs (foundations, unions, professional organizations and cooperatives) at NUTS-3 level. Therefore, it was not possible to add data for these CSOs in the calculations under NUTS-3 regions. Data of T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society illustrates that there were 40.493 paid workers while 41.287 voluntary workers were in associations in Turkey, in 2019. When we sum up paid and voluntary workers, it makes 81.780 workers in total. However, this data seems invalid or missing, because there were about 118.299 associations in Turkey, in 2019. Even if we imagine that each association has one worker, the number of 81.780 workers does not correspond the number of 118.299 associations. In addition, the number of voluntary workers is only about 1000 people more than paid workers. However, CSOs are expected to have higher number of voluntary workers than paid worker, because they mainly operate on the voluntary basis. In this sense, T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society should monitor collection process of associations' proclamations in order to get more concrete data of these CSOs. Since the number of voluntary and paid workers are very low, total population or total employment was not used as control variable in the operationalization of voluntary and paid workers. The numbers

are just added to the table without any change for the future calculations.

**(ii) CSO Revenue per person:** CSO revenue per capita in each NUTS-3 region was operationalized by 2017 data of TURKSTAT - Turkish Statistical Institute population statistics ([www.tuik.gov.tr](http://www.tuik.gov.tr)), and T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society ([www.siviltoplum.gov.tr](http://www.siviltoplum.gov.tr)). The data only includes associations, because there was no available data of revenues for other types of CSOs in terms of NUTS-3 regions. In order to use **population of each NUTS-3 region as control variable**, we operationalized the CSO revenue per capita for each NUTS-3 region by the following formula:

$$= \frac{\text{Total Revenue of Associations in each NUTS}_3 \text{ Region}}{\text{Population of each NUTS}_3 \text{ Region}}$$

**Formula 3:** CSO Revenue per person for each NUTS-3 Region

The **CSO revenue per capita is the highest** in Ankara by 870,00 TL, Karabük by 637,66 TL, Gaziantep by 409,50 TL, and Istanbul by 386,62 TL. On the other hand, **the lowest level of CSO per capita** is in Hakkari by 18,81 TL, Bitlis by 18,09 TL, Siirt by 17,57 TL, and Ağrı by 14,20 TL. There is a variance in terms of CSO per revenue between different provinces of Turkey that hold different populations and socio-economic conditions. For instance, Kilis province has less population than many big cities, but this province has higher CSO revenue per capita than all these cities, because it takes the fifth place

after Istanbul in the table. The reason of this variance necessitates an extra evaluation that can be problem statement of a future research.

**(iii) Proportions of CSO Members within the Populations of NUTS-3 Regions:** The data for **the number of CSO members** in each NUTS-3 region was collected from 2017 data of Associations within the database of Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society ([www.siviltoplum.gov.tr](http://www.siviltoplum.gov.tr)), 2016 data of Workers' Trade Unions in the publication of Ministry of Labour, and Social Services (2016), and 2018 data of cooperatives in the publication of Ministry of Trade (2018). In order to use **population** of each NUTS-3 region as **control variable, the percentage of CSO members** for each NUTS-3 region was operationalized by the following formula:

$$= 100 * \frac{\text{The number of members in CSOs in each NUTS\_3 Region}}{\text{Total population in each NUTS\_3 Region}}$$

**Formula 4:** The Percentage of CSO Members within the population for each NUTS-3 Region

The calculations illustrate that the **highest percentages of CSO members** within the population of each NUTS-3 region are in the following NUTS-3 regions: Ankara by 56,37%, Karabük by 30,90%, Düzce by 25,91%, Zonguldak by 25,90%, Rize by 22,35%, and Istanbul by 22,24%. It seems that the rate of membership in the Black Sea Region is very high compared to other regions of Turkey. On the

other hand, the **lowest percentages of CSO members** are in the following NUTS-3 regions: Diyarbakır by 3,69%, Siirt by 3,19%, Ağrı by 2,59%, and Şırnak by 1,95%. The rate of membership in the South-East Anatolia region is the lowest compared to other regions of Turkey.

**(iv) CSO Density (per 100.000 People):** The CSO density per 100.000 people helps us to include data of CSOs that are not only big in size but also small in size, so we can demonstrate differentiated demands in each NUTS-3 region. 2018 data on the number of CSOs were obtained from databases of T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society ([www.siviltoplum.gov.tr](http://www.siviltoplum.gov.tr)), T.R. Directorate General of Foundations ([www.vgm.gov.tr](http://www.vgm.gov.tr)), T.R. Ministry of Trade, Department of Cooperatives ([www.koop.gtb.gov.tr](http://www.koop.gtb.gov.tr)), The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) ([www.tobb.org.tr](http://www.tobb.org.tr)). On the other hand, 2018 data on populations in NUTS-3 regions were collected from the database of TURKSTAT - Turkish Statistical Institute population statistics ([www.tuik.gov.tr](http://www.tuik.gov.tr)). Therefore, the data for other types of CSOs was included in the calculations in addition to data for associations. The CSO density per 100.000 people was calculated by the following formula:

$$= 100.000 * \frac{\text{The Total Number of CSOs in each NUTS\_3 Region}}{\text{Population of each NUTS\_3 Statistical Region}}$$

**Formula 5:** The CSO Density (per 100.000 people) in each NUTS-3 Region of Turkey

The calculations show that the **highest number of CSOs per 1000 people** within NUTS-3 regions are in Karabük 300 CSOs, Artvin by 280 CSOs, Düzce by 257 CSOs, and Rize by 255 CSOs. On the other hand, the **number of CSOs per 1000 people** within NUTS-3 regions are in Diyarbakır 67 CSOs, Ağrı by 62 CSOs, Şanlıurfa by 58 CSOs, and Şırnak by 50 CSOs. Data illustrates that the highest rate of CSO density is in the Black Sea region, while the lowest rate of CSO density is in the South-East Anatolia region of Turkey.

### **2.1.2. The Organizational Performance of CSOs**

The organizational performance of CSOs in achieving their organizational goals was operationalized through the survey answers of 975 Youth CSO representatives for organizational performance in major activities. The following question was asked to these representatives: “Could you please evaluate organizational performance of your organization in the following major activities from 1 (very poor) to 5 (excellent)?” (Likert-Scale). Although answers for this question were based on personal evaluations, the data was tested by the objective organizational capacity indicators of these CSOs such as revenue concentration index, annual budget, the number of physical and technological facilities (e.g., student dorm, computer, website, and clubhouse), and total years of experience of organizational leaders as voluntary and paid worker. Furthermore, these respondents are official organizational leaders of CSOs (e.g., director, member, manager, and youth leaders) who have wide knowledge of their organizational activities, so their opinions have

strong assessment power. Therefore, analyses of organizational performance by these indicators still provide empirical and objective results to test hypotheses. The major activities are listed below:

- Marketing
- Internet and Technology
- Administrative Techniques
- Income Generating Activities
- Volunteering
- Reporting

In the Likert Scale of the survey, organizational performance of these activities were coded as; 1=“Very Poor”, 2=“Poor”, 3=“Fair”, 4=“Good”, 5=“Excellent”. In this sense, the mean of answers for major activities was calculated. The variables for each CSO were coded for Hierarchical OLS Regression Analysis, because the unit of analysis is the organization.

## **2.2. Independent Variables**

There are various independent variables to test hypothesis of major theories on CSOs in the literature. To operationalize these variables that influence size and organizational performance of CSOs, different measures and calculations were applied.

### **2.2.1. Social Diversity**

According to theory of Weisbrod (1975), the greater the diversity in society (e.g., religion, language, culture and ethnicity), the larger the size of civil society sector and voluntary donations for CSOs. In addition, demand heterogeneity, which depends on income distribution and differences caused by social, cultural and religious factors, also has positive influence on the demand for CSOs, because the existence of more heterogeneous stakeholders will lead to more dissatisfaction with the provision of goods and services by the state and private sector organizations. And this will result in more demand for CSOs which are capable of meeting diverse preferences and demand of these heterogeneous stakeholders (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 2007).

Social diversity should not only be considered as ethnicity, religion or language, but also “age, lifestyle preferences, occupational and professional background and income” (Anheier, 2005: 121). Therefore, it was necessary to operationalize some major indicators showing the social diversity across the NUTS-3 statistical regions of Turkey. These indicators are (i) income and wealth index, (ii) population density, (iii) ethno-linguistic and religious fractionalizations, and (iv) education. Different measures and calculations were used to convert these variables into testable ones. After converting these variables, their standardized values were coded as variables, and then the mean of these four variables was coded to

get one single variable for social diversity in each NUTS-3 regions of Turkey.

**(i) Income and Wealth Index:** TÜİK published a report on rankings and index values of well-being index for provinces in 2015. “Income and wealth index” for each NUTS-3 region was used as an indicator of social diversity. The **highest income and wealth index** within NUTS-3 regions are in Istanbul by 0,8788 index, Ankara by 0,7972 index, Izmir by 0,6553 index, Kocaeli by 0,6291 index, Tekirdağ by 0,5993 index, and Zonguldak by 0,5987 index. These provinces are mainly metropolitan cities. On the other hand, **lowest income and wealth index** within NUTS-3 regions are Batman by 0,1161 index, Muş by 0,0970 index, Şanlıurfa by 0,0938 index, Ardahan by 0,0740 index, Ağrı by 0,0646 index, and Adıyaman by 0,0191 index. These provinces are mainly located in South-East and East Anatolia regions.

**(ii) Population Density:** It is the total population of a NUTS-3 statistical region, in thousands of people, per square km of land area. This indicator can be considered as a proxy which can increase the demand for the provision of goods and services by CSOs. In other words, the higher population density, the more demand for the provision of goods and services by CSOs. However, there might be more “substitutes” for the provision of goods and services by CSOs in some NUTS-3 regions with high population density, so population density might have negative influence on the demand for CSOs (Chang and Tuckman, 1996: 31). This is mainly because of the competition between both private sector organizations and CSOs to

produce substitutes for goods and services. Population density for each NUTS-3 region was calculated by the simple formula: *Total Population of Province / Land area of Province (km<sup>2</sup>)*. The **highest population density** within NUTS-3 regions are in Istanbul by 2.759 people per km<sup>2</sup>, Kocaeli by 554 people per km<sup>2</sup>, Izmir by 560 people per km<sup>2</sup>, and Yalova by 315 people per km<sup>2</sup>. On the other hand, **lowest population density** within NUTS-3 regions are in Bayburt by 21 people per km<sup>2</sup>, Ardahan by 20 people per km<sup>2</sup>, Erzincan by 19 people per km<sup>2</sup>, and Tunceli by 11 people per km<sup>2</sup>.

**(iii) Ethno-Linguistic and Religious Fractionalizations:** It is important to note that there are no official records of people in terms of ethno-linguistic or religious differences in Turkey. The ethno-linguistic fractionalization depends on different ethno-linguistic groups, which also speak another language, such as Turkish, Kurdish/Zaza, Arab, or other, while religious fractionalization depends on different religious denominations such as Sunni-Hanafi Muslims, Sunni-Shafi'i Muslims, Alawite, Nusairis, Christian (Orthodox, Catholic, Protestants and others), or others. Therefore, there are only descriptive data that was collected from survey-based studies like by KONDA Research and Consultancy (2006, 2011 and 2018 reports), DHS Survey (2013), WVS (2012), and Livny (2015) in Turkey. Moreover, the data is mainly at the national level rather than provincial level, so it was not possible to group data under NUTS-3 regions of Turkey. There are some major studies that shed light on the ethno-linguistic and religious fractionalizations in Turkey. **None of**

**these studies is useful** for this book. In order to measure ethno-linguistic and religious fractionalization in 81 NUTS-3 regions of Turkey, data from 2018 Turkish general election results was used.

In the literature, there are scholars who argue that ethnicity and religion are important dynamics that influence the formation of political parties and voting behavior of citizens in multi-party democratic systems. For instance, Çarkoğlu and Hinich (2006), and Başlevant et al. (2009) assert that religion and ethnicity are essential indicators of voting behavior in Turkey, while Esmer (2002), Lipset and Rokkan (1967), and Sarıgil (2010) assume that socioeconomic and ideological factors are more significant in general. In this sense, voting rate of political parties in each NUTS-3 region is considered as an important indicator of ethno-linguistic and religious fractionalization. Therefore, the voting rates were calculated by ELF index, and values were coded for Hierarchical OLS Regression Analysis.

Ethno-linguistic and religious fractionalization can be measured by “ethno-linguistic fractionalization index” (ELF). For instance, Alesina et al. (2003: 158) assert that ethno-linguistic data was frequently used in the Soviet Union during the 1960s, and this data was firstly published in Atlas Narodav Mira in 1964. ELF index for each is calculated as “one (1) minus the Herfindahl index of ethnolinguistic group shares, and reflected the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belonged to different groups” (Alesina et al., 2003: 158). The **Formula 6** for ELF index is below:

$$1 - \sum_{i=1}^N S_{ir}^2$$

**Formula 6:** Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF)

In this formula, where  $S_{ir}$  is the percentage share of ethno-linguistic or religious group  $i$  in total population  $r$ , and  $N$  is the number of ethno-linguistic or religious groups. In this sense, one (1.00) indicates that the population of the region falls into different ethno-linguistic or religious groups, zero (0.00) indicates that majority of people in a region belong to the same ethno-linguistic or religious group (Salamon and Anheier, 1998: 233). The extended version of the formula can also be shown as:

$$1 - \sum [(G_1/100)^2 + (G_2/100)^2 + \dots + (G_N/100)^2]$$

**Formula 7:** The extended version of Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF)

For instance, the symbol of “G” can be considered as an ethnic or religious group. It can be assumed that **Region A** is composed of four ethno-linguistic groups with different share in the total population of that region;  $G_1=10\%$ ,  $G_2=40\%$ ,  $G_3=20\%$ ,  $G_4=30\%$ , and Total population=100%. ELF Index for this region is calculated as:

$$\text{ELF Index} = 1 - [(10/100)^2 + (40/100)^2 + (20/100)^2 + (30/100)^2] = \mathbf{0.7}$$

Similarly, **Region B** is composed of two ethno-linguistic groups;  $G_1=10\%$ ,  $G_2=90\%$ , and Total population=100%. If we use the same

method, we would have  $\text{ELF Index} = 1 - [(10/100)^2 + (90/100)^2] =$   
**0.18**

Ethno-linguistic and religious fractionalizations can be calculated easily by this formula. For instance, the results of the calculations above show that ethno-linguistic fractionalization of Region A (ELF Index=0.7) is higher than ethno-linguistic fractionalizations of Region B (ELF Index=0.18). In other words, there are more number of ethno-linguistic groups in Region A, and the percentage share of these groups to total population are similar, while there are less number of ethno-linguistic groups in Region B, and there is disproportion of these groups to total population. Therefore, social diversity in Region A is greater than social diversity in Region B.

**(iv) Education:** In the literature, the education level is mainly used as an important indicator to point out socio-economic differences in different communities. In addition, it is an important element of social capital that can promote the necessary human resources for CSOs. Moreover, voluntary and paid workers with higher level of education can increase the size of CSOs (Önder, 2006). The Education level is mainly operationalized as the percentage of high school graduates in the population. Therefore, in this book, the education level in each NUTS-3 region of Turkey was also operationalized by the calculation of the percentage of high school graduates within the total population, because regions with higher level of education are considered to have larger size of civil society sector. There is no available data on education in 2018, therefore calculations are made according to 2017

data that is available for education and population statistics. Calculations illustrate that the **highest percentages of high school graduates** are in Tunceli by 23,41%, Kırıkkale by 23,38%, Eskişehir by 23,15%, Karabük by 22,63%, Artvin by 22,19%, and Bayburt by 21,81%. On the other hand, the **lowest percentages of high school graduates** are in Mardin by 11,21%, Van by 10,02%, Şırnak by 10,01%, Muş by 9,55%, Ağrı by 8,28%, and Şanlıurfa by 7,79%. These regions are mainly located in Southeast and East Anatolia regions that are mainly less developed compared to Western regions of Turkey.<sup>57</sup>

### 2.2.2. Per Capita Income

It is the annual income per person of a NUTS-3 statistical region in Turkish Lira (TL). In empirical studies, it is argued that income has an essential influence on the demand for the provision of goods and services by CSOs (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 2007: 542-543, Chang and Tuckman, 1996: 31). Many scholars argue that regions with wealthier communities have more number of CSOs, because there might be more donations and service fees available to CSOs (Corbin, 1999; Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 2007; Önder, 2006). Therefore, higher level of income would result in higher demand for CSOs (Chang and Tuckman, 1996: 31), which will increase the size of civil CSOs and voluntary donations (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 2007; Weisbrod, 1975).

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<sup>57</sup> TÜİK, Education Statistics Population Statistics in 2017. Retrieved May 21, 2019, from <https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/medas/?kn=130&locale=tr> and <https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/bolgeselistatistik/sorguGiris.do>

According to TÜİK statistics,<sup>58</sup> the **highest amounts of per capita income** within NUTS-3 regions are in Istanbul by 65.041,00 TL, Kocaeli by 64.659,00 TL, Ankara by 52.000,00 TL, Tekirdağ by 47.479,00 TL, İzmir by 45.034,00 TL, and Bursa by 43.707,00 TL. Per capita income in these regions are higher than the Turkey's average that is 38.681,00 TL in 2017. All these NUTS-3 regions are metropolitan provinces in Turkey. On the other hand, **lowest amounts of per capita income** within NUTS-3 regions are in Siirt by 16.607,00 TL, Muş by 16.131,00 TL, Bitlis by 15.536,00 TL, Şanlıurfa by 14.185,00 TL, Van by 14.080,00 TL, and Ağrı by 12.729,00 TL. These NUTS-3 regions are mainly located in South-East and East Anatolia regions in Turkey.

### 2.2.3. Trust in Private Sector Organizations

Trust-related theories suggest that CSOs are more trustworthy for consumers compared to private sector organizations, because they mainly focus on quality rather than profit-making, so CSOs are “second best” to the market (Hansmann, 1987: 62). Similarly, Anheier (2005: 124-125) asserts that “non-distribution constraint”, which refers to “the prohibition of distributing profits to owners and equivalents”, makes CSOs more trustworthy than private sector organizations. In other words, non-distribution constraint prohibits owners and equivalents of CSOs from distributing the financial resources of CSOs for their personal benefit (Önder, 2006: 26).

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<sup>58</sup> TÜİK - Turkish Statistical Institute, GDP Statistics (2017). Retrieved June 21, 2019, from <https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/medas/?kn=116&locale=tr>

Therefore, it is important to find out the level of trust for private sector organizations in order to understand how the level of trust for private sector organizations influence the size of civil society sector as proposed by trust-related hypothesis.

The data on the level of trust in private sector organizations in Turkey was obtained from **the number of complaints to the consumer arbitration committee** in 81 NUTS-3 regions of Turkey from the T.R. Ministry of Trade. In order to use **total population** as **control variable**, the number of complaints to the consumer arbitration committee **per 1000 people** in 2018 was calculated. It is assumed that the higher number of complaints, the lower level of trust in private sector organizations. In this sense, the number of complaints in each NUTS-3 region was coded for Hierarchical OLS Regression Analysis. The **highest level of trust in private sector organizations per 1000 people** within NUTS-3 regions is in Bolu by 12,21 complaints, Eskişehir by 11,85 complaints, Rize by 11,11 complaints, Ankara by 10,31 complaints, Malatya by 9,85 complaints, Trabzon by 9,41 complaints, and Istanbul by 9,07 complaints. On the other hand, the **lowest level of trust in private sector organizations per 1000 people** within NUTS-3 regions is in Siirt by 2,81 complaints, Bitlis by 2,54 complaints, Van by 2,39 complaints, Muş by 2,37 complaints, Hakkari by 2,26 complaints, Şırnak by 1,81 complaints, and Ağrı by 1,60 complaints. These provinces are mainly located in East Anatolia Region.

#### 2.2.4. Income from Public Institution

Interdependence theory refuses the idea that CSOs are gap-fillers in the case of market and government failures (Gronbjerg, 2001; Hansmann, 1987; Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Weisbrod, 1975), on the contrary, they are rather **third-party governments** (Salamon, 1987). The theory suggests that CSOs and public institutions are mainly partners rather than opponents in the provision of public goods and services due to their weaknesses and strengths in different areas. Moreover, it is evident that CSOs “receive more of their income from government than from any other single source” (Salamon, 1987: 29). Therefore, the more this partnership is developed through income support, the larger size CSOs have.

Data was collected from our semi-structured and detailed survey, which was applied to the number of 975 Youth CSO representatives (N=975) from 81 provinces of Turkey between November 2017 and November 2018. The following questions were asked to the Youth CSO representatives: “Could you please indicate the percentage of your revenue from **local public institutions?**”, and “Could you please indicate the percentage of your revenue from **central public institutions?**”. The answers for both local and central public institutions were added up, and the mean of these results were grouped under 81 NUTS-3 regions. The **highest level of income from public institutions** within NUTS-3 regions is in Izmir by 46,67%, Aydın by 42,50%, Van by 30,59%, Mardin by 30,00%, Tunceli by 29,29%, Çorum by 28,57%, and Konya 27,86%. On the other hand, the **lowest**

**level of trust in major private sector companies** within NUTS-3 regions is in Çanakkale by 2,22%, Sivas by 1,43%, Isparta by 1,11%, Artvin, Balıkesir, Kırşehir, and Kütahya by 0,00%.

### **2.2.5. Ideological and Religious Motivation**

In the theoretical part of this book, it was argued that social entrepreneurs of CSOs are motivated to benefit from these situations, and provide goods and services related to religion or ideology (e.g., giving messages like “salvation” and “equality”) to gain more believers, donors, workers and members. And this motivation increases their organizational performance in reaching their organizational goals, because CSOs with strong ideological and religious motivations are driven by the “value rationality” rather than “means rationality”, to borrow Weber’s term, which dominates the private sector organizations, public institutions, and nonreligious CSOs (DiMaggio and Anheier, 1990: 145-146). It was also empirically and theoretically claimed that CSOs with religious and ideological motives are attracting more voluntary donations.

The independent variable of religious and ideological motivation was operationalized through the data that was taken from the database of T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society ([www.siviltoplum.gov.tr](http://www.siviltoplum.gov.tr)). In the calculations, data for the number of 114.251 associations in 2018 was used. It is very significant because total number of CSOs in 2018 was 131.050 that are officially registered in Turkey. The number of religious and ideological CSOs

includes the religious (e.g., Charities, and Associations for Mosque Building and Developing) and ideological (e.g., Associations of Kemalist Thought, and Associations for sustaining social values) associations in Turkey. Data was collected from databases of T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society, and T.R. Directorate General of Foundations. The **highest percentages of religious and ideological associations are** in NUTS-3 regions of Turkey are in Afyon by 36,19%, Sakarya by 35,51%, Bitlis by 35,31%, Karabük by 34,86%, Çankırı by 34,51%, Erzincan by 34,50%, and Van 33,46%. On the other hand, **lowest percentages of religious and ideological associations** are in Tekirdağ by 12,49%, Istanbul by 12,23%, Kilis by 11,60%, Antalya by 10,92%, Gaziantep by 10,69%, Hatay by 10,26%, and Muğla 9,11%.

### **2.2.6. Information Flow for Stakeholders**

CSOs also use financial source to carry out their activities like profit-making private sector organizations. These CSOs also perform some income-generating activities that provide profit. These profit-making activities without a form of control (internal or external) can increase the level of information deficit, while decrease reputation, trustworthiness and accountability of CSOs. Therefore, it is necessary to inform donors about financial resources and profit-making activities of CSOs, who often have “no meaningful opportunity to learn about fund-raising costs” (Espinoza, 1991: 605). Moreover, as Jeavons (1994: 186) argues that “trust is the essential lifeblood of the nonprofit sector”, information flow is very essential for the reputation and

trustworthiness of CSOs, which can result in better quality of goods and services (Ortmann and Schlesinger, 1997: 102-103). Finally, internal and external control on profit-making activities of CSOs can increase their accountability. As a result, information flow that reduces information asymmetry is an important control mechanism for CSOs in increasing their reputation, trustworthiness and accountability that influence the size and organizational performance of CSOs. The independent variable of **information flow for stakeholders** was operationalized by one question from the survey with the number of 975 CSO representatives in all 81 cities of Turkey. The answers in the survey were processed in statistical program, and then they were calculated to obtain measurable data for each NUTS-3 regions of Turkey. The question is “Please mark **frequency of your advertising** activities below from 1(worst) to 5(best)” (*Likert Scale*). The answers for these advertising activities were firstly calculated separately, then mean of these results were coded as one single variable.

- Cooperation with **media** (e.g., newspapers, TV and radio)
- Advertising by **website**
- Organizing a **professional contact list** for members and potential volunteers
- Sending **E-mail and SMS** to networks which might be **potential donors**
- Efficient use of **social media** (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and YouTube)
- **Spending money in advertising**

- Advertising in **the public domain**
- Preparing **different messages & communication tools for different audiences**

The **highest rates of information flow for stakeholders** are in the following NUTS-3 regions of Turkey: Ağrı (3,71), Yalova (3,45), Mersin (3,41), Muş (3,38), Bayburt (3,28), and Denizli (3,25). On the other hand, **the lowest rates of information flow for stakeholders** are in the following NUTS-3 regions of Turkey: Çorum (2,35), Bursa (2,28), Kars (2,24), Bartın (2,16), Ordu (2,02), and Kütahya (1,88).

### 2.2.7. Government Social Welfare Spending

In their cross-national analysis, Salamon and Anheier (1998) propose a similar categorization of Esping-Andersen (1990) in order to identify **four models of nonprofit regimes**: (i) liberal model, (ii) social democratic model, (iii) corporatist model, and (iv) statist model. Salamon and Anheier (1998) argue that **extent of government social welfare spending** (high or low) and the **size of nonprofit sector** (high or low) have significant relationship that changes in different nonprofit regimes.

Similar to social origins theory, Anheier (2005: 123) argues that increase of state's provision of public goods and services for small-group of people, whose demand was not previously supplied by the state, might have negative influence on the size of CSOs. Because **CSOs** provide public goods and services mainly by **voluntary donations** as financial source compared to **state's provision of goods**

**and services** through **involuntary taxation** (Weisbrod, 1975). These donations can “crowd out”, if state begins to supply public goods and services itself to meet demand from minority groups, or to fund CSOs on condition that they provide public goods and services. Salamon and Anheier (1998: 221) also argue that if the state increases its social welfare spending, demand for CSOs in the provision of these public goods and services would decline. Therefore, a negative relationship between the extent of government social spending and size of CSOs can be considered. Therefore, it is necessary to find out the relationship between extent of state social welfare spending and size of CSOs can be tested by the case of NUTS-3 regions in Turkey. In this way, the influence of different level of social welfare spending on the size of CSOs can be explained better.

The available official data on **social protection spending of public institutions** in Turkey is only given at national level. There is no specific data that show the number of people who receive different types of social protection pensions or income for each NUTS-3 region. Therefore, the data for social protection spending of public institutions at the NUTS-3 level could not be calculated. The national level of 2017 data on social protection spending of public spending are given in **Table 20**.

**Table 19:** Social Protection Spending of Public Institutions in Turkey (2017)

Area of Social Protection	Amount of Spending (TL)	Percentage in Total Spending (%)
Administrative Costs and Spending	7.108.000.000	1,9
Disease/Health Care	103.077.000.000	26,9
Disable/Invalidity Pensions	13.317.000.000	3,5
Retired/Old-Age Pensions	185.036.000.000	48,4
Widow/Orphan Pensions	44.684.000.000	11,7
Family/Children	14.891.000.000	3,9
Unemployment Pensions	8.672.000.000	2,3
Social Exclusion	5.853.000.000	1,5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>382.639.000.000</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** TURKSTAT - Turkish Statistical Institute, Retrieved May 21, 2019, from [http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTable.do?alt\\_id=1040](http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTable.do?alt_id=1040)

According to data, the highest percentage of social protection areas in total spending are retired/old-age pensions by 48,4%, and disease/health care spending by 26,9%. On the other hand, the percentages of spending for social exclusion and unemployment are very low. In order to calculate the values for **education spending**, the numbers of students (MEB, 2018) in each NUTS-3 regions was multiplied with the amount of education spending per student by 8.111,00 TL which was indicated by TÜİK data. On the other hand, the values for **health spending** were calculated by multiplying the number of population in each NUTS-3 regions with the amount of health spending per person by 1.751,00 TL which was indicated by TÜİK data. The **highest amount of social welfare spending** within NUTS-3 regions is in Istanbul by 57,6 billion TL, Ankara by 20,7 billion TL, Izmir by 15,3 billion TL, Bursa by 10,5 billion, and Konya

by 8,9 billion TL. On the other hand, the **lowest amount of social welfare spending** within NUTS-3 regions is in Gümüşhane by 618,8 million TL, Artvin by 600,5 million TL, Ardahan by 379,4 million TL, Bayburt by 355,4 million, and Tunceli by 280,1 million TL.

### **2.3. Organizational Variables**

In this part, the operationalization of organizational variables that influence the organizational performance of CSOs is evaluated.

#### **2.3.1. Financial Capacity: Revenue Concentration and Annual Budget**

Financial capacity is significant for CSOs because it gives them ability to increase their activities, pursue their mission, and react to opportunities, crises and threats. Financial capacities of CSOs need to be dynamic against sudden shocks, crises and threats in order to continue providing services. Therefore, CSO managers consider about fund-raising activities, and they seek to reallocate financial resources to sustain their organizational mission (Sontag-Padilla, 2012: 2).

CSOs use several revenue streams (e.g., membership fees, voluntary donations, revenues from public institutions, revenues from income-generating activities) to pursue their social mission and organizational goals. However, **concentration on limited number of revenue streams** can cause uncertainty for CSOs (Despard et al., 2017; Hudock, 1995; Watkins et al., 2012), threaten their autonomy (Banks and Hulme, 2012; Elbers and Schulpen, 2013; Wallace et al., 2006),

and result in financial vulnerability (Tuckman and Chang, 1991). Therefore, CSOs should expand financial capacity by diversifying their revenue streams in order to pursue their mission and goals (Fowler, 2000; Mitchell, 2014), and avoid the revenue concentration (Frumkin and Keating, 2011, Keating et al., 2005).

**Revenue concentration** of 975 Youth CSOs (n=975) was operationalized by **revenue concentration index** of Tuckman and Chang (1991) that is similar to Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI). In the literature, this index was used to find out how diverse the revenue streams of CSOs (Chikoto et al., 2015; Despard et al., 2017; Gronbjerg, 1993; Hodge and Piccolo, 2005; Macedo and Pinho, 2006; Önder, 2006; Salamon and Anheier, 1998; Silva and Burger, 2015) in NUTS-3 regions of Turkey. Tuckman and Chang (1991: 452) argue that a CSO is “more vulnerable to revenue downturns if its revenue sources are limited than if they are diverse... The larger the number of revenue sources a nonprofit has and the more equally divided its share of revenues from each source is, the less vulnerable it tends to be”.

$$\sum_{i=1}^N R_{ic}^2$$

**Formula 8:** Revenue Concentration Index of CSOs in each NUTS-3 Region

In this **Formula 8**, where  $R_{ic}$  is the percentage share of a revenue stream  $i$  in total revenue of each CSO  $c$ , and  $N$  is the number of revenue streams. CSOs with revenues from single sources are considered to have revenue concentration index of one (1.00), while

CSOs with equal revenues from many sources are considered to have revenue concentration index of zero (0.00). In other words, CSOs with lower level of concentration index (close to zero) are labeled as financially less vulnerable. The revenue concentration index for each CSO is calculated by summing the squares of the percentage share that each revenue stream represents to total revenue (Önder, 2006: 55; Tuckman and Chang, 1991: 453).

The extended version of the formula can also be shown as:

$$\sum [(R_1/100)^2+(R_2/100)^2+\dots+(R_7/100)^2]$$

**Formula 9:** The Extended Version of Revenue Concentration Index of CSOs in each NUTS-3 Region

For instances, CSO A has four revenue streams out of seven;  $R_1=10$  TL (Turkish Lira),  $R_2=40$  TL,  $R_3=20$  TL,  $R_4=30$  TL, and Total Revenue=100 TL. Revenue concentration of CSO A was calculated as:

$$\text{Revenue Concentration Index} = [(10/100)^2+(40/100)^2+(20/100)^2+(30/100)^2] = \mathbf{0,30}.$$

Similarly, CSO B has two revenue streams;  $R_1=40$  TL and  $R_2=60$  TL, and Total Revenue=100 TL. If we use the same method, we would have:

$$\text{Revenue Concentration Index} = [(40/100)^2+(60/100)^2] = \mathbf{0,52}.$$

Revenue concentration of different CSOs can be calculated easily by this formula, because the results of the calculations show that financial

sources of CSO A (revenue concentration=0.30) is more diversified than financial sources of CSO B (revenue concentration=0.52). In other words, financial sources of CSO A are equally divided into diverse revenue streams, while financial sources of CSO B is mainly concentrated on few revenue streams. Therefore, CSO B is financially more vulnerable than CSO A.

Data for annual budget was also collected from the survey that was applied to representatives of 975 Youth CSOs from 81 cities of Turkey. The following question was asked to these representatives “Could you please indicate the amount of annual budget that your organization needs to carry out its activities during last year?”. The answers for the annual budget (in Turkish Lira) in 2017 were coded for Hierarchical OLS Regression Analysis.

### **2.3.2. Tenure: Organizational Age**

Organizational age of CSOs influences their ability to diversify revenue sources and decrease financial vulnerability, because older CSOs are more likely to have more sources of revenue (Chikoto-Schultz and Neely, 2016). In addition, organizational age and size are closely related with funding instability and organizational survival of CSOs (Burde et al., 2016). Furthermore, organizational age is very related to **organizational performance** in achieving organizational goals, because younger CSOs have more tendency to face “liability of newness” (Stinchcombe, 1965), “organizational failure rate” (death

risk) (Halliday et al., 1987; Le Mens et al., 2011), or “absolute hazard risk” (Singh et al: 1986).

Organizational age (tenure) indicates how long a CSO has been operating since its establishment. It is calculated by subtracting establishment year of the 975 Youth CSOs from the year of 2018 (*Organizational Age = 2018 – Year of Establishment*).

### 2.3.3. Physical and Technological Infrastructure

Physical and technological infrastructure is an important organizational capacity indicator that influences organizational performance. **Organizational infrastructure** is essential for organizational capacity, because it provides basic **administrative** and **operational abilities** to achieve organizational missions (Bryan, 2018: 3). Moreover, organizational infrastructure is “potential antecedents”, because it is a precondition in order to meet organizational goals (Boyne, 2003: 219). **Technological infrastructure** is also an important resource that impact organizational capacity of CSOs (Bikmen and Meydanoğlu, 2006).

Physical and technological infrastructure of 975 Youth CSOs (n=975) was operationalized by the number of physical and technological facilities that are listed below. For instance, if CSO A has 3 numbers of physical facilities and 5 numbers of technological facilities, the value of 8 is coded for Hierarchical OLS Regression Analysis.

<b>Physical Facilities</b>	<b>Technological Facilities</b>
Sanctuary	Internet Connection
Exhibition Area	Computer
Cultural Center	Computer Network
Day Care Center	Cinevision/Projector
Clubhouse	Website
Classroom	Boardrooms
Conference Room	
Student Dorm	
Other Physical Facilities	

#### **2.3.4. Cooperation with External Actors**

In this part, cooperation of 975 Youth CSOs (n=975) with external actors was operationalized. These actors are other CSOs, public institutions, and private sector organizations. To measure how CSOs cooperate with external actors, data from the surveys was used. These three indicators were operationalized through three major “Yes/No” questions in the surveys that were applied to a sample of 975 CSO representatives (e.g., director, member, manager, and youth leaders), aged between 17 and 72, from 81 cities of Turkey between November 2017 and November 2018.

**(i) Cooperation with other CSOs:** There are three “Yes/No” questions that determine the level of cooperation of CSOs with other CSOs:

- “Do you cooperate with **local** CSOs?”

- “Do you cooperate with **national** CSOs?”
- “Do you cooperate with **international** CSOs?”

Based on the level of cooperation, cooperation with local CSOs was coded as “1”, cooperation with national CSOs was coded as “2”, and cooperation with international CSOs was coded as “3” for Hierarchical OLS Regression Analysis. It is easier to cooperate with local CSOs, while it is hard to cooperate with international CSOs, because larger organizational capacity is needed for higher level of cooperation.

**(ii) Cooperation with Public Institutions:** The following “Yes/No” questions were asked to the number of 975 Youth CSOs in order to measure their cooperation with local and central public institutions:

- “Do you cooperate with **local public institutions**?”
- “Do you cooperate with **central public institutions**?”.

Based on the level of cooperation, **cooperation with local public institutions** was coded as “1”, and **cooperation with central public institutions** was coded as “2” for Hierarchical OLS Regression Analysis. It is easier to cooperate with local public institutions than central public institutions, because larger organizational capacity is needed for higher level of cooperation.

**(iii) Cooperation with Private Sector Organizations:** Cooperation of CSOs with private sector organizations was measured by the following question:

- “Do you cooperate with **private sector organizations** by sponsorship agreements)”

The answer “Yes” was coded as “1”, while “No” was coded as “0” for Hierarchical OLS Regression Analysis.

### **2.3.5. Managerial Competence of Human Resources**

In this part, managerial competence of human resources of 975 Youth CSOs (n=975) was operationalized. In this sense, the following two indicators were used: professional management of voluntary workers, and experience of organizational leaders (e.g., director, manager, youth leaders, or voluntary workers).

**(i) Professional Management of Voluntary Workers:** Activities of CSOs are mainly carried by **voluntary workers** (Kendall and Knapp, 1996). In other words, CSOs are mostly operating with voluntary action, so the numbers of voluntary workers are expected to be higher than paid workers. This is an advantage because structure of CSOs encourages entrepreneurship and civic participation, but CSO cannot always attract qualified and experiences human resources so amateurism can cause poor quality of public goods and services (Garton, 2009: 62-63). Therefore, voluntary workers should be supported by full-time paid and professional workers, because there might be risk of **philanthropic amateurism** that is a result of “amateur approaches to coping with human problems” (Salamon, 1987: 42).

Some CSOs cannot support their voluntary workers with full-time paid and professional workers due to their financial capacity, so they need to carry out their activities by voluntary workers. Therefore, there is a need for professional trainings of their voluntary workers and counsellors in CSOs, because these CSOs cannot provide adequate wages to attract professional personnel (Salamon, 1987: 42). In this sense, professional management of voluntary workers by organizational trainings (e.g., project management, fund-raising, capacity development, and performance management) can influence the contributions of these workers in achieving organizational goals of CSOs.

The independent variable of **professional management of voluntary workers** was operationalized by one question from the survey with the number of 975 Youth CSO representatives: “Please grade your **organizational performance in voluntary-based activity** from 1(worst) to 5(best)” (*Likert Scale*). Each answer from 1 to 5 was coded as single value for Hierarchical Regression Analysis by OLS method.

**(ii) Experience of Organizational Leaders:** Finally, there are many studies evaluating the relations between **managerial competence** and financial vulnerability (Tuckman and Chang, 1991; Sontag-Padilla, 2012), because experienced and qualified managers can: reallocate financial resources efficiently; pursue organization’s mission and goals; react to opportunities, crises and threats effectively; and increase fund-raising activities (Önder and Köylü, 2018). Managerial

competence indicates the total years of experience of CSO manager (including both voluntary and paid). In order to calculate total years of experience, paid and voluntary experiences were standardized as variables, and then total experience was calculated by summing up these variables.

### 3. DATA ANALYSIS

Although the data on CSOs in Turkey is limited, existing primary and secondary data provide a sufficient analysis to test causative relationships between dependent and independent variables. The hypotheses on the size and organizational performance of CSOs can be tested in different levels: cross-national, national, regional (across the same country), sectoral, or organizational. Since the focus of this book is on civil society in Turkey, cross-comparison is mainly excluded in this book.

The data were analyzed by using statistical program. In the surveys with **Likert-Scale**, data is often normally distributed. However, it may not always be possible to maintain normality in data for socio-economic indicators. Compliance with **normal distribution** can be examined by **Kolmogorov Smirnov** and **Shapiro Wilk** normality tests, as well as by **Q-Q plot**, or **boxplot graph**. In addition, the normal distribution of the data depends on the **skewness** and **kurtosis values** that are between  $\pm 3$ . In this sense, data sets were evaluated by considering normality analysis.

As **outliers** increase the value of the **variance error**, they also have influence on the **power of statistical tests**. For this reason, it was examined whether the **outliers** were present in the data sets, or not, before statistical tests were made. In multivariable data, “**Mahalanobis Distance**” was used to determine outliers and extreme values based on the number of variables. During the analysis of data for 81 NUTS-3 Regions, data of **4 cities were excluded** (Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Karabük), because they were outside of the determined borders of Mahalanobis Distance. On the other hand, during the analysis of data for 975 Youth CSOs, **23 data were excluded** from the analysis, because they were also outside of the determined borders of Mahalanobis Distance. Therefore, we continued our analysis with data of 77 NUTS-3 Regions and 952 Youth CSOs. After exclusion of outliers by using Mahalanobis Distance, normality analyses for new data were performed again. The relationships between the variables were examined by **correlation analysis**. Significance of independent variables that were considered to affect the dependent variable was tested by **Hierarchical OLS Regression Analysis**.

### **3.1. Multiple Regression Results for the First Model: Size of CSOs in NUTS-3 Regions of Turkey**

Hierarchical OLS Regression Analysis results, Durbin Watson (DW) value, VIF values, correlation analysis, and heteroscedasticity test for size of CSOs in 77 NUTS-3 regions of Turkey are evaluated.

By examining statistical results of Durbin Watson, a widely used **test** for **autocorrelation** in the **residuals** within statistical regression analysis, it was found that there was no autocorrelation (DW=1,842), as displayed in **Table 21**.

**Table 20:** Durbin Watson Value for Hierarchical Regression Models (77 NUTS-3 Regions of Turkey)

<b>Model Summary<sup>b</sup></b>				
<b>R</b>	<b>R Square</b>	<b>Adjusted R Square</b>	<b>Std. Error of the Estimate</b>	<b>Durbin-Watson</b>
,783 <sup>a</sup>	,613	,574	,24637	1,842
<b>Note:</b>				
a. Predictors: (Constant), Per Capita Income, Social Diversity, Trust in Private Sector Organizations, Level of Income from Public Institutions, Ideological and Religious Motivation, Information Flow for Stakeholders, Government Social Welfare Spending				
b. Dependent Variable: Size of CSOs				

One of the most important assumptions of the regression is that there is **no multiple linear connection** between the variables. This assumption was examined with **VIF values** and it was found that there was **no problem of multicollinearity** (VIF<10), as shown in **Table 22**.


**Table 21:** VIF Values of Hierarchical Regression Models for Size of CSOs (77 NUTS-3 Regions of Turkey)

Coefficients <sup>a</sup>								
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Stand. Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	-,891	,112		-7,926	,000		
	Per Capita Income	2,725E-5	,000	,635	7,110	,000	1,000	<b>1,000</b>
2	(Constant)	-,498	,124		-4,016	,000		
	Per Capita Income	1,415E-5	,000	,330	3,375	,001	,626	<b>1,598</b>
	Social Diversity	,461	,090	,498	5,104	,000	,626	<b>1,598</b>
3	(Constant)	-,608	,131		-4,624	,000		
	Per Capita Income	1,079E-5	,000	,251	2,460	,016	,546	<b>1,832</b>
	Social Diversity	,410	,091	,444	4,500	,000	,585	<b>1,711</b>
	Trust in Private Sector Organizations	,035	,016	,201	2,146	,035	,647	<b>1,546</b>
4	(Constant)	-,533	,136		-3,918	,000		
	Per Capita Income	1,139E-5	,000	,265	2,630	,010	,543	<b>1,843</b>
	Social Diversity	,378	,092	,409	4,130	,000	,562	<b>1,778</b>
	Trust in Private Sector Organizations	,031	,016	,181	1,945	,056	,637	<b>1,569</b>
	Income from Public Institutions	-,006	,003	-,140	-1,808	,075	,917	<b>1,091</b>
5	(Constant)	-,709	,194		-3,663	,000		
	Per Capita Income	1,280E-5	,000	,298	2,875	,005	,509	<b>1,964</b>
	Social Diversity	,337	,097	,365	3,482	,001	,499	<b>2,003</b>
	Trust in Private Sector Organizations	,032	,016	,185	1,995	,050	,637	<b>1,571</b>
	Income from Public Institutions	-,007	,003	-,154	-1,978	,052	,899	<b>1,113</b>
	Ideological&Religious Motivation	,006	,005	,101	1,273	,207	,875	<b>1,143</b>

6	(Constant)	-,749	,348		-2,153	,035		
	Per Capita Income	1,275E-5	,000	,297	2,835	,006	,506	<b>1,976</b>
	Social Diversity	,338	,098	,366	3,452	,001	,493	<b>2,027</b>
	Trust in Private Sector Organizations	,032	,016	,187	1,980	,052	,623	<b>1,606</b>
	Income from Public Institutions	-,007	,003	-,156	-1,966	,053	,884	<b>1,131</b>
	Ideological&Religious Motivation	,006	,005	,104	1,247	,217	,794	<b>1,260</b>
	Information Flow for Stakeholders	,013	,092	,012	,140	,889	,815	<b>1,226</b>
7	(Constant)	-,759	,350		-2,167	,034		
	Per Capita Income	1,198E-5	,000	,279	2,543	,013	,466	<b>2,147</b>
	Social Diversity	,354	,102	,383	3,468	,001	,459	<b>2,177</b>
	Trust in Private Sector Organizations	,032	,017	,183	1,923	,059	,619	<b>1,615</b>
	Income from Public Institutions	-,007	,003	-,164	-2,027	,047	,859	<b>1,165</b>
	Ideological&Religious Motivation	,006	,005	,112	1,314	,193	,776	<b>1,289</b>
	Information Flow for Stakeholders	,016	,093	,014	,171	,865	,813	<b>1,230</b>
	Government Social Welfare Spending	7,404E-12	,000	,048	,580	,563	,811	<b>1,233</b>
<b>Note:</b> a. Dependent Variable: Size of CSOs								

In a regression analysis, it is an essential assumption that the **variance of error term must be constant** across observations. The errors are **homoscedastic** if the variance of the errors in the model for the analysis of variables is constant, otherwise the errors are **heteroscedastic**. Therefore, if there is no information about the **changing variance** beforehand, the figure of the **error prediction squares** can be examined to check whether it gives a systematic shape, or not. In other words, the existence of **systematic distribution**

can be controlled by checking error prediction squares on the vertical axis on the one hand, and **predictive values of the dependent variable** on the horizontal axis on the other hand. In this sense, **Figure 4** illustrates the **scatterplot for heteroscedasticity test** of the first model of book that is determined for the size of CSOs and independent variables. The figure indicates that there is **no changing variance problem**, while there is **systematic distribution**.



**Figure 4:** Scatterplot for Heteroscedasticity Test of the 1<sup>st</sup> Model for the Size of CSOs (77 NUTS-3 Regions of Turkey)

**The White Test** is an LM (Lagrange Multiplier) test like Breusch-Pagan (1980) LM test to detect **heteroscedasticity** in the regression analysis for variables. In the White test, the main equation requires an additional auxiliary equation estimate. The basic idea behind the test: if there is a **constant variance**, we get the formula of  $E(ui^2) = \sigma$ . In

this situation, X values or variables that function as X do not explain  $ui^2$  (error square). Therefore, an **auxiliary equation** is estimated where the left side variable is taken as  $ui^2$ , and the right-side variables are a function of X values. If we suspect from the **changing variance**, but have no idea about its form, the White test is an appropriate test. The results of the White test for our model were examined, and **it was found that there is no changing variance problem**.

**Table 22:** Hierarchical Regression Analysis Results for the Size of CSOs (77 NUTS-3 Regions of Turkey)

MODEL 1							
Independent Variables	Dependent Variable	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	F	p	$\beta$	t	p
C: Constant	Y: Size of CSOs	0,546	46,745	0,000*	-	-	0,000*
X <sub>1</sub> : per capita income					0,498	4,016	
X <sub>2</sub> : social diversity					1,415	3,375	0,001*
					0,461	5,104	0,000*
MODEL 2							
Independent Variables	Dependent Variable	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	F	p	$\beta$	t	p
C: Constant	Y: Size of CSOs	0,567	34,217	0,000*	-	-	0,000*
X <sub>1</sub> : per capita income					0,608	4,624	
X <sub>2</sub> : social diversity					1,079	2,460	0,016*
X <sub>3</sub> : trust in private sector organizations					0,410	4,500	0,000*
					0,035	2,146	0,035*
MODEL 3							
Independent Variables	Dependent Variable	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	F	p	$\beta$	t	p
C: Constant	Y: Size of CSOs	0,580	27,279	0,000*	-	-	0,000*
X <sub>1</sub> : per capita income					0,533	3,918	
X <sub>2</sub> : social diversity					1,139	2,630	0,010*
X <sub>3</sub> : trust in private sector organizations					0,378	4,130	0,000*
X <sub>4</sub> : level of income from public instit.					0,031	1,945	0,056
					-	-	0,075
					0,006	1,808	
MODEL 4							
Independent Variables	Dependent Variable	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	F	p	$\beta$	t	p
C: Constant					-	-	0,000*
					0,709	3,663	

X1: per capita income	Y: Size of CSOs	0,584	22,335	0,000*	1,280	2,875	0,005*
X2: social diversity					0,337	3,482	0,001*
X3: trust in private sector organizations					0,032	1,995	0,050*
X4: level of income from public instit.					-	-	0,052
X5: ideological and religious motivation					0,006	1,273	0,207
<b>MODEL 5</b>							
Independent Variables	Dependent Variable	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	F	p	$\beta$	t	p
C: Constant	Y: Size of CSOs	0,578	18,359	0,000*	-	-	0,035*
					0,749	2,153	
X1: per capita income					1,275	2,835	0,006*
X2: social diversity					0,338	3,452	0,001*
X3: trust in private sector organizations					0,032	1,980	0,052
X4: level of income from public instit.					-	-	0,053
X5: ideological and religious motivation					0,007	1,966	
X6: information flow for stakeholders	0,006	1,247	0,217				
	0,013	0,140	0,889				
<b>MODEL 6</b>							
Independent Variables	Dependent Variable	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	F	p	$\beta$	t	p
C: Constant	Y: Size of CSOs	0,574	15,635	0,000*	-	-	0,034*
					0,759	2,167	
X1: per capita income					1,198	2,543	0,013*
X2: social diversity					0,354	3,468	0,001*
X3: trust in private sector organizations					0,032	1,923	0,059
X4: level of income from public instit.					-	-	0,047*
X5: ideological and religious motivation					0,007	2,027	
X6: information flow for stakeholders					0,006	1,314	0,193
X7: government social welfare spending	0,016	0,171	0,865				
	7,404	0,580	0,563				
*p<0,05							

By evaluating multiple regression models that were hierarchically created to explain the influence of factors on the **size of CSOs**, **all regression models** were found to be **statistically significant** ( $p < 0.05$ ), as shown in **Table 23**. The  $\beta$  values are the regression

coefficients, and they represent the amount of change in the dependent variable versus the one-unit increase in the independent variable. If  $\beta$  is positive, it means that if the independent variable increases, the dependent variable will also increase. This is a positive linear relationship. Similarly, negative  $\beta$  indicates that the dependent variable decreases when the independent variable increases, and this is a negative linear relationship.

The first model explains 54,6% of the variance in **Adjusted R<sup>2</sup>** that measures the proportion of the differentiation (positive or negative) in **size of CSOs** (Y) explained by independent variables (X) for the linear regression models. Second model explains 56,7% of the variance when X<sub>3</sub> (trust in private sector organizations) variable is added to the model. Moreover, when X<sub>4</sub> (level of income from public institutions) variable is added to the model, 58% of the variance is explained. Finally, when X<sub>5</sub> (ideological and religious motivation) variable is added to the model, 58,4% of the variance is explained. Up to Model 5, each variable which was added to the model has slightly increased the **explanatory power of the model**. However, when X<sub>6</sub> (information flow for stakeholders) variable added in Model 5, and X<sub>7</sub> (government social welfare spending) variable added in Model 6 were added, the explanatory power has started to decrease. Although the first six models were statistically significant ( $p < 0,05$ ), coefficients in all models were not statistically significant. For instance, the **second model** is the model in which **all coefficients are significant**, because independent variables in the second model have significant

relationships with size of CSOs. That means size of CSOs increases when these independent variables increase. For instance, in NUTS-3 regions with higher per capita income, size of CSOs is also larger. On the other hand, the **fourth model** is the model with the **highest explanatory power**. In other words, although ideological and religious motivation does not have a significant relationship with size of CSOs, it increases the explanatory power in explaining differentiation in size of CSOs when it is added in the fourth model.

**Table 23:** Correlation Analysis Results for the Size of CSOs & Independent Variables (77 NUTS-3 Regions of Turkey)

Variables		Y	X <sub>1</sub>	X <sub>2</sub>	X <sub>3</sub>	X <sub>4</sub>	X <sub>5</sub>	X <sub>6</sub>	X <sub>7</sub>
Y: Size of CSOs	r	1,000							
	p								
X <sub>1</sub> : per capita income	r	0,665**	1,000						
	p	0,000							
X <sub>2</sub> : social diversity	r	0,721**	0,618**	1,000					
	p	0,000	0,000						
X <sub>3</sub> : trust in private sector organizations	r	0,491**	0,645**	0,477**	1,000				
	p	0,000	0,000	0,000					
X <sub>4</sub> : level of income from public instit.	r	-0,354**	-0,175	-0,292**	-0,185	1,000			
	p	0,002	0,127	0,010	0,108				
X <sub>5</sub> : ideological and religious motivation	r	0,133	-0,068	0,230*	-0,049	0,047	1,000		
	p	0,250	0,557	0,044	0,674	0,683			
X <sub>6</sub> : information flow for stakeholders	r	-0,153	-0,094	-0,262*	-0,224	0,191	-0,346**	1,000	
	p	0,185	0,414	0,021	0,050	0,097	0,002		
X <sub>7</sub> : government social welfare spending	r	-0,013	0,108	-0,173	0,127	0,168	-0,174	0,085	1,000
	p	0,910	0,349	0,132	0,273	0,143	0,130	0,461	
*p<0,05									
**p<0,01									

The **correlation analysis** results that were conducted to test the correlation between the dependent and independent variables are given in **Table 24**.

A statistically significant **linear, positive** and **high-level** relationship was found between the *size of CSOs* and **social diversity** ( $r=0,721$ ;  $p<0,01$ ). Hence, **Hypothesis 1** that assumes a positive relationship between these variables was **supported** (Public Goods Theories).

A statistically significant **linear, positive** and **moderate** relationship was found between the *size of CSOs* and **per capita income** ( $r= 0,665$ ;  $p<0,01$ ). Hence, **Hypothesis 2** that assumes a positive relationship between these variables was **supported** (Public Goods Theories).

A statistically significant **linear, positive** and **moderate** relationship was found between the *size of CSOs* and **trust in private sector organizations** ( $r=0,491$ ;  $p<0,01$ ). Hence, **Hypothesis 3** was **not supported**, because theoretically a **negative relationship** was expected between these variables. Therefore, the empirical results **contradict** with theory (Trust-Related Theories).

A statistically significant **linear, negative** and **weak** relationship was found between the *size of CSOs* and **income from public institutions** ( $r=-0,354$ ;  $p<0,01$ ). Hence, **Hypothesis 4** that assumes a negative relationship between these variables was **supported** (Resource Dependence Theory).

It was found that there is **no linear** and **statistically significant** relationship between the *size of CSOs*, and **religious and ideological motivation** ( $p>0,01$ ;  $p>0,05$ ). Hence, **Hypothesis 5** that assumes a positive relationship between these variables was **not supported** (The Entrepreneurship Theory).

It was found that there was **no linear** and **statistically significant** relationship between the *size of CSOs* and **information flow for stakeholders** ( $p>0,01$ ;  $p>0,05$ ). Hence, **Hypothesis 6** that assumes a positive relationship between these variables was **not supported** (The Stakeholder Theory).

It was found that there is **no linear** and **statistically significant** relationship between the *size of CSOs* and **government social welfare spending** ( $p>0,01$ ;  $p>0,05$ ). Hence, **Hypothesis 7** that assumes a negative relationship between these variables was **not supported** (The Social Origins Theory).

### 3.2. Multiple Regression Results for the Second Model: Organizational Performance of 952 Youth CSOs in Turkey

In this part; Hierarchical OLS Regression Analysis results, Durbin Watson (DW) value, VIF values, correlation analysis, and heteroscedasticity test for organizational performance of 952 CSOs in Turkey are evaluated.

**Table 24:** Durbin Watson Value for Hierarchical Regression for Organizational Performance of CSOs (952 Youth CSOs in Turkey)

Model Summary <sup>b</sup>				
R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
,644 <sup>a</sup>	,414	,409	,58136	1,892
a. Predictors: (Constant), Organizational Age, Professional Management of Voluntary Workers, Revenue Concentration Index, Cooperation with Private Sector Organizations, Experience of Organizational Leaders, Cooperation with CSOs, Cooperation with Public Institutions, Physical and Technological Infrastructure, Annual Budget				
b. Dependent Variable: Organizational Performance of CSOs				

By examining statistical results of Durbin Watson that is a widely used **test for autocorrelation** in the **residuals** within statistical regression analysis, it was found that there was **no autocorrelation** (DW=1,892), as displayed in **Table 25**.


**Table 25:** VIF Values of Hierarchical Regression Models for Organizational Performance of CSOs (952 Youth CSOs in Turkey)

Models		Coefficients <sup>a</sup>						
		Unstandardized Coefficients		Stand. Coeff.	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
<b>1</b>	(constant)	2,594	,059		43,883	,000		
	physical and technological infrastructure	,050	,008	,188	5,912	,000	,958	<b>1,044</b>
	cooperation with csos	,063	,012	,171	5,400	,000	,958	<b>1,044</b>
<b>2</b>	(constant)	2,514	,065		38,927	,000		
	physical and technological infrastructure	,047	,009	,175	5,486	,000	,941	<b>1,062</b>
	cooperation with csos	,052	,012	,143	4,332	,000	,879	<b>1,138</b>
	cooperation with public institutions	,065	,022	,099	2,997	,003	,885	<b>1,130</b>
<b>3</b>	(constant)	1,270	,075		16,846	,000		
	physical and technological infrastructure	,038	,007	,142	5,537	,000	,938	<b>1,066</b>
	cooperation with csos	,025	,010	,068	2,556	,011	,866	<b>1,155</b>
	cooperation with public institutions	,057	,018	,085	3,222	,001	,884	<b>1,131</b>
	professional management of voluntary workers	,393	,017	,575	22,805	,000	,974	<b>1,027</b>
<b>4</b>	(constant)	1,316	,079		16,740	,000		
	physical and technological infrastructure	,038	,007	,144	5,599	,000	,938	<b>1,067</b>
	cooperation with csos	,026	,010	,071	2,646	,008	,864	<b>1,157</b>
	cooperation with public institutions	,058	,018	,087	3,285	,001	,884	<b>1,132</b>
	professional management of voluntary workers	,392	,017	,575	22,815	,000	,974	<b>1,027</b>
	experience of organizational leaders	-,004	,002	-,051	-2,039	,042	,995	<b>1,006</b>
<b>5</b>	(constant)	1,257	,097		12,953	,000		
	physical and technological infrastructure	,039	,007	,147	5,688	,000	,921	<b>1,086</b>
	cooperation with csos	,026	,010	,070	2,625	,009	,864	<b>1,158</b>
	cooperation with public institutions	,058	,018	,088	3,318	,001	,883	<b>1,133</b>
	professional management of voluntary workers	,393	,017	,576	22,839	,000	,973	<b>1,028</b>
	experience of organizational leaders	-,004	,002	-,052	-2,089	,037	,992	<b>1,008</b>

	revenue concentration	,084	,081	,026	1,034	,302	,975	<b>1,026</b>
<b>6</b>	(constant)	1,256	,097		12,914	,000		
	physical and technological infrastructure	,039	,007	,147	5,650	,000	,917	<b>1,091</b>
	cooperation with csos	,026	,010	,070	2,629	,009	,864	<b>1,158</b>
	cooperation with public institutions	,057	,018	,087	3,249	,001	,870	<b>1,150</b>
	professional management of voluntary workers	,393	,017	,575	22,793	,000	,971	<b>1,030</b>
	experience of organizational leaders	-,004	,002	-,053	-2,107	,035	,988	<b>1,012</b>
	revenue concentration	,086	,081	,027	1,056	,291	,970	<b>1,031</b>
	cooperation with private sector organizations	,016	,043	,009	,361	,718	,963	<b>1,038</b>
<b>7</b>	(constant)	1,255	,097		12,881	,000		
	physical and technological infrastructure	,039	,007	,146	5,450	,000	,865	<b>1,156</b>
	cooperation with csos	,026	,010	,070	2,626	,009	,864	<b>1,158</b>
	cooperation with public institutions	,057	,018	,086	3,234	,001	,867	<b>1,153</b>
	professional management of voluntary workers	,393	,017	,575	22,781	,000	,971	<b>1,030</b>
	experience of organizational leaders	-,004	,002	-,053	-2,108	,035	,974	<b>1,026</b>
	revenue concentration	,086	,081	,027	1,055	,292	,970	<b>1,031</b>
	cooperation with private sector organizations	,016	,043	,009	,364	,716	,963	<b>1,039</b>
	organizational age	,000	,002	,004	,145	,885	,915	<b>1,092</b>
<b>8</b>	(Constant)	1,255	,097		12,881	,000		
	physical and technological infrastructure	,037	,007	,138	5,036	,000	,832	<b>1,202</b>
	cooperation with csos	,024	,010	,066	2,446	,015	,861	<b>1,162</b>
	cooperation with public institutions	,056	,018	,085	3,172	,002	,868	<b>1,152</b>
	professional management of voluntary workers	,396	,017	,580	22,820	,000	,962	<b>1,039</b>
	experience of organizational leaders	-,005	,002	-,058	-2,278	,023	,968	<b>1,033</b>
	revenue concentration	,091	,082	,028	1,116	,265	,968	<b>1,033</b>
	cooperation with private sector organizations	,014	,043	,008	,319	,750	,961	<b>1,040</b>
	organizational age	7,733 E-5	,002	,001	,050	,960	,903	<b>1,108</b>
	annual budget	1,162 E-7	,000	,044	1,685	,092	,915	<b>1,093</b>
a. Dependent Variable: Organizational Performance of CSOs								

In the second model that was created for **organizational performance of 952 Youth CSOs**, there was no information about the **changing variance** beforehand, so the figure of the **error prediction squares** was examined to check whether it gives a systematic shape, or not. In other words, the existence of **systematic**

**distribution** was controlled by checking error prediction squares on the vertical axis on the one hand, and predictive values of the dependent variable on the horizontal axis on the other hand. In this sense, **Figure 5** illustrates the scatterplot for heteroscedasticity test of the second model. The figure indicates that there is **no changing variance problem** and **systematic distribution**.



**Figure 5:** Scatterplot for Heteroscedasticity Test of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Model for the Organizational Performance of CSOs (952 Youth CSOs in Turkey)

In addition to scatterplot for heteroscedasticity test, the results of the **White Test** for our model were examined, and it was found that there is **no changing variance problem**.

**Table 26:** Hierarchical Regression Results for Organizational Performance of CSOs (952 CSOs in Turkey)

	Independent Variables	Dependent Variable	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	F	p	β	t	p
Model 1	C: Constant	Y: Organizational Performance of CSOs	0,075	39,644	0,000*	2,594	43,883	0,000*
	X <sub>1</sub> : physical and technological infrastructure					0,050	5,912	0,000*
	X <sub>2</sub> : cooperation with CSOs					0,063	5,400	0,000*
Model 2	C: Constant	Y: Organizational Performance of CSOs	0,083	29,598	0,000*	2,514	38,927	0,000*
	X <sub>1</sub> : physical and technological infrastructure					0,047	5,486	0,000*
	X <sub>2</sub> : cooperation with CSOs					0,052	4,332	0,000*
	X <sub>3</sub> : cooperation with public institutions					0,065	2,997	0,003*
Model 3	C: Constant	Y: Organizational Performance of CSOs	0,406	163,763	0,000*	1,270	16,846	0,000*
	X <sub>1</sub> : physical and technological infrastructure					0,038	5,537	0,000*
	X <sub>2</sub> : cooperation with CSOs					0,025	2,556	0,011*
	X <sub>3</sub> : cooperation with public institutions					0,057	3,222	0,001*
	X <sub>4</sub> : profess. management of volun. workers					0,393	22,805	0,000*
Model 4	C: Constant	Y: Organizational Performance of CSOs	0,409	132,459	0,000*	1,316	16,740	0,000*
	X <sub>1</sub> : physical and technological infrastructure					0,038	5,599	0,000*
	X <sub>2</sub> : cooperation with CSOs					0,026	2,646	0,008*
	X <sub>3</sub> : cooperation with public institutions					0,058	3,285	0,001*
	X <sub>4</sub> : profess. management of volun. workers					0,392	22,815	0,000*
	X <sub>5</sub> : experience of organizational leaders					-	-2,039	0,042*
						0,004		
Model 5	C: Constant	Y: Organizational Performance of CSOs	0,409	110,591	0,000*	1,257	12,953	0,000*
	X <sub>1</sub> : physical and technological infrastructure					0,039	5,688	0,000*
	X <sub>2</sub> : cooperation with CSOs					0,026	2,625	0,009*
	X <sub>3</sub> : cooperation with public institutions					0,058	3,318	0,001*
	X <sub>4</sub> : profess. management of volun. workers					0,393	22,839	0,000*
	X <sub>5</sub> : experience of organizational leaders					-	-2,089	0,037*
	X <sub>6</sub> : revenue concentration					0,084	1,034	0,302

	Independent Variables	Dependent Variable	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	F	p	β	t	p
Model 6	C: Constant	Y: Organizational Performance of CSOs	0,408	94,722	0,000*	1,256	12,914	0,000*
	X <sub>1</sub> : physical and technological infrastructure					0,039	5,650	0,000*
	X <sub>2</sub> : cooperation with CSOs					0,026	2,629	0,009*
	X <sub>3</sub> : cooperation with public institutions					0,057	3,249	0,001*
	X <sub>4</sub> : profess. management of volun. workers					0,393	22,793	0,000*
	X <sub>5</sub> : experience of organizational leaders					-	-2,107	0,035*
	X <sub>6</sub> : revenue concentration					0,004		
	X <sub>7</sub> : cooperation with private sector org.					0,086	1,056	0,291
						0,016	0,361	0,718
Model 7	C: Constant	Y: Organizational Performance of CSOs	0,408	82,803	0,000*	1,255	12,881	0,000*
	X <sub>1</sub> : physical and technological infrastructure					0,039	5,450	0,000*
	X <sub>2</sub> : cooperation with CSOs					0,026	2,626	0,009*
	X <sub>3</sub> : cooperation with public institutions					0,057	3,234	0,001*
	X <sub>4</sub> : profess. management of volun. workers					0,393	22,781	0,000*
	X <sub>5</sub> : experience of organizational leaders					-	-2,108	0,035*
	X <sub>6</sub> : revenue concentration					0,004		
	X <sub>7</sub> : cooperation with private sector org.					0,086	1,055	0,292
	X <sub>8</sub> : organizational age					0,016	0,364	0,716
Model 8	C: Constant	Y: Organizational Performance of CSOs	0,409	74,062	0,000*	1,248	12,743	0,000*
	X <sub>1</sub> : physical and technological infrastructure					0,037	5,036	0,000*
	X <sub>2</sub> : cooperation with CSOs					0,024	2,446	0,015*
	X <sub>3</sub> : cooperation with public institutions					0,056	3,172	0,002*
	X <sub>4</sub> : profess. management of volun. workers					0,396	22,820	0,000*
	X <sub>5</sub> : experience of organizational leaders					-	-2,278	0,023*
	X <sub>6</sub> : revenue concentration					0,005		
	X <sub>7</sub> : cooperation with private sector org.					0,091	1,116	0,265
	X <sub>8</sub> : organizational age					0,014	0,319	0,750
	X <sub>9</sub> : annual budget					7,733	0,50	0,950
	1,162	1,685	0,092					

\*p<0,05

By evaluating regression models that were hierarchically created to explain the influence of factors on the organizational performance of CSOs, all regression models were found to be **statistically significant** ( $p < 0.05$ ), as shown in **Table 27**.

The first model explains 7,5% of the variance in **Adjusted R<sup>2</sup>** that measures the proportion of the differentiation (positive or negative) in **organizational performance of CSOs (Y)** explained by independent variables (X) for the linear regression models. Second model explains 8,3% of the variance when X<sub>3</sub> (cooperation with public institutions) variable is added to the model. Moreover, when X<sub>4</sub> (professional management of voluntary workers) variable is added to the model, 40,6% of the variance is explained. Finally, when X<sub>5</sub> (experience of organizational leaders) variable is added to the model, 40,9% of the variance is explained. Up to Model 5, each variable which added to the model has slightly increased the explanatory power of the model. The variable X<sub>4</sub> (professional management of voluntary workers) was found to be the variable that most increased the explanatory power of the model. However, when X<sub>6</sub> (revenue concentration) variable was added in Model 5, the explanatory power of the model remained constant. On the other hand, the explanatory power of the model decreased when X<sub>7</sub> (cooperation with private sector organizations) variable was added in Model 6. The explanatory power of the model remained constant again when X<sub>8</sub> (organizational age) variable was added in Model 7. Finally, the explanatory power of the model has slightly increased when X<sub>9</sub> (annual budget) variable was added in

Model 8. Although eight regression models were statistically significant ( $p < 0,05$ ); coefficients in all models were not statistically significant. **The fourth model** is the one in which **coefficients are all significant**, because independent variables in this model have significant relationships with organizational performance of CSOs. That means organizational performance of CSOs increases when these independent variables increase. For instance, CSOs that manage their voluntary workers professionally have higher organizational performance. On the other hand, fourth model also has the highest **explanatory power**. In other words, this model is the best one if we use the following independent variables to explain differentiation of organizational performance of CSOs: physical and technological infrastructure, cooperation with CSOs, cooperation with public institutions, professional management of voluntary workers, and experience of organizational leaders.

The analysis results that was conducted to test the correlation between the dependent and independent variables are given in **Table 28**. It was found that there is **no linear** and **statistically significant** relationship between *organizational performance of CSOs*, and **revenue concentration** ( $p > 0,01$ ;  $p > 0,05$ ). Hence, **Hypothesis 8** that assumes no relationship between these variables was **supported**.

**Table 27:** Correlation Analysis for Organizational Performance of CSOs & Independent Variables (952 Youth CSOs in Turkey)

Variable		Y	X <sub>1</sub>	X <sub>2</sub>	X <sub>3</sub>	X <sub>4</sub>	X <sub>5</sub>	X <sub>6</sub>	X <sub>7</sub>	X <sub>8</sub>	X <sub>9</sub>
Y: organizational performance of CSOs	r	1,000									
	p										
X <sub>1</sub> : physical and technological infrastructure	r	0,221**	1,000								
	p	0,000									
X <sub>2</sub> : cooperation with CSOs	r	0,195**	0,196**	1,000							
	p	0,000	0,000								
X <sub>3</sub> : cooperation with public inst.	r	0,176**	0,192**	0,332**	1,000						
	p	0,000	0,000	0,000							
X <sub>4</sub> : professional management of voluntary workers	r	0,587**	0,070*	0,145**	0,063*	1,000					
	p	0,000	0,031	0,000	0,053						
X <sub>5</sub> : experience of organizational leaders	r	-0,035	0,050	0,078*	0,043	-0,013	1,000				
	p	0,282	0,126	0,017	0,183	0,689					
X <sub>6</sub> : revenue concentration	r	-0,038	-0,127**	-0,005	-0,049	-0,034	0,064*	1,000			
	p	0,239	0,000	0,880	0,129	0,300	0,048				
X <sub>7</sub> : cooperation with private sector organizations	r	0,065*	0,094**	0,05	0,149**	0,056	0,066*	-0,083*	1,000		
	p	0,044	0,004	0,108	0,000	0,081	0,042	0,011			
X <sub>8</sub> : organizational age	r	0,024	0,279**	0,085**	0,062	-0,016	0,215**	0,000	-0,001	1,000	
	p	0,462	0,000	0,008	0,056	0,623	0,000	0,999	0,973		
X <sub>9</sub> : annual budget	r	0,114**	0,330**	0,138**	0,091**	-0,002	0,134**	-0,088**	0,113**	0,205**	1,000
	p	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,005	0,958	0,000	0,007	0,000	0,000	

\*p<0,05

\*\*p<0,01

A statistically significant **linear, positive** and **too weak** relationship was found between *organizational performance of CSOs* and **annual budget** ( $r=0,195$ ;  $p<0,01$ ). Hence, **Hypothesis 9** that assumes a positive relationship between these variables was **supported**.

It was found that there is **no linear** and **statistically significant** relationship between *organizational performance of CSOs*, and **organizational age** ( $p>0,114$ ;  $p>0,01$ ). Hence, **Hypothesis 10** that assumes a positive relationship these variables was **not supported**.

A statistically significant **linear, positive** and **weak** relationship was found between *organizational performance of CSOs* and **physical and technological infrastructure** ( $r=0,221$ ;  $p<0,01$ ). Hence, **Hypothesis 11** that assumes a positive relationship between these variables was **supported**.

A statistically significant **linear, positive** and **too weak** relationship was found between *organizational performance of CSOs* and **cooperation with CSOs** ( $r=0,195$ ;  $p<0,01$ ). Hence, **Hypothesis 12** that assumes a positive relationship between these variables was **supported**.

A statistically significant **linear, positive** and **too weak** relationship was found between *organizational performance of CSOs* and **cooperation with public institutions** ( $r=0,176$ ;  $p<0,01$ ). Hence, **Hypothesis 13** that assumes a positive relationship between these variables was **supported**.

A statistically significant **linear, positive** and **too weak** relationship was found between *organizational performance of CSOs* and **cooperation with private sector organizations** ( $r=0,065$ ;  $p<0,05$ ). Hence, **Hypothesis 14** that assumes a positive relationship between these variables was **supported**.

A statistically significant **linear, positive** and **moderate** relationship was found between *organizational performance of CSOs* and **professional management of voluntary workers** ( $r=0,587$ ;  $p<0,01$ ).

Hence, **Hypothesis 15** that assumes a positive relationship between these variables was **supported**.

It was found that there is **no linear** and **statistically significant** relationship between *organizational performance of CSOs* and **experience of organizational leaders** ( $p>0,01$ ;  $p>0,05$ ). Hence, **Hypothesis 16** that assumes a positive relationship between these variables was **not supported**.

#### **4. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS**

The main aim of Chapter IV is to understand why CSOs differ in terms of size and organizational performance within different areas and segments of society. The assumptions of major theories provide explanations for differentiation in size and organizational performance of CSOs with different perspectives. Therefore, hypotheses that are developed from theories were tested to find out which factors cause differentiation in size and organizational performance of CSOs by the case of CSOs in Turkey.

There are **two models** that include two different units of analysis: model for size of CSOs in 77 NUTS-3 regions of Turkey ( $N=77$ ), and model for 952 Youth CSOs in Turkey ( $N=952$ ). The primary and secondary data was analyzed by **Hierarchical OLS Regression Analysis** that reveals whether dependent and independent variables have significant relationship or not. It was found that 10 out of 16 of hypotheses were statistically supported. That means that factors within these hypotheses have significant relationships with dependent

variables. The rest of hypotheses were not supported substantively, or statistically. One of the independent variable (trust in private sector organizations) had linear, positive and moderate relationship with dependent variable (size of CSOs), but this relationship contradicted the theoretical assumption because a negative relationship was expected between these variables, rather than positive.

#### **4.1. First Model: Size of CSOs in 77 NUTS-3 Regions of Turkey**

*Social Diversity:* Public Goods Theories have demand side explanations for the size of CSOs, and they suggest that CSOs occur to meet **heterogeneous demands** of different groups that cannot be sufficiently supplied by the private sector organizations and public institutions due to market and government failures (Gronbjerg, 2001; Hansmann, 1987; Levitt, 1973; Önder, 2006; Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Weisbrod, 1975). Therefore, they argue that the size of CSOs is larger in diverse/heterogenous communities. **Hypothesis 1** was **supported** by empirical findings in the case of NUTS-3 regions of Turkey, because a statistically significant **linear, positive** and **high-level** relationship was found between the size of CSOs and **social diversity** ( $r=0,721$ ;  $p<0,01$ ). It can be implicated that public institutions fail to meet diversified demand, because they mainly focus on the demands of **median voter**, who composes the majority of the society so influences political power during elections (Weisbrod, 1975). On the other hand, private sector organizations also fail, because they do not prefer to supply public goods and services due to the problem of **free-ride**, which refers to rational consumers preferring not to pay for these

goods and service to maximize their utility (Olson, 1971: 14-16). Therefore, CSOs appear to be a better alternative in the provision of public goods and services that are demanded from different social groups. In this sense, public institutions should increase cooperation with CSOs to meet diversified needs and interests of heterogeneous groups.

Although, Gronbjerg and Paalberg (2001) argue that there is not direct relation between the social diversity and the size of CSOs, the findings of this book in the case of NUTS-3 regions of Turkey is similar with empirical studies of scholars that support a strong relationship between social diversity and size of CSOs. For instance, Anheier (2005: 122-123) empirically proved that **religious heterogeneity** in different countries increases the size of civil society sector, despite some exceptions such as Ireland, Belgium, Israel and Czech Republic. Similarly, Feigenbaum (1980) found that the size of CSOs is higher in societies where heterogeneity in terms of income, education, and age is also higher. James (1987b) also found that diversity in terms of social, religious, and linguistic influences the size of CSOs. Similarly, Chang and Tuckman (1996) prove that countries with low Herfindahl value, which show higher racial diversity in terms of black and white population, have more number of CSOs.

***Per Capita Income:*** It also has a positive influence on the size of CSOs in different communities, because CSOs provide public goods and services mainly by **voluntary donations as financial source** compared to state's provision of goods and services through

involuntary taxation (Weisbrod, 1975). Therefore, CSOs have larger size in the communities where income level is high, because they receive more **financial resources** (e.g., membership fees, fund-raising activities, and individual donations) (Corbin, 1999; Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 1992). **Hypothesis 2** was also **supported** by empirical findings in the case of NUTS-3 regions of Turkey, because there is a statistically significant **linear, positive** and **moderate** relationship between the size of CSOs and **per capita income** ( $r= 0,665$ ;  $p<0,01$ ). This empirical finding is in line with the findings of Corbin (1999), Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen (1992), who proved that CSOs have larger size in communities where income level is high, because they receive more voluntary donations.

The theoretical and empirical findings reveal the implication that higher availability of financial resources in NUTS-3 regions of Turkey is positively related to the size of CSOs. For instance, financial resources such as membership fees, individual donations, and service fees are expected to be more available to CSOs in these regions. On the other hand, people in these regions have more time and money to spend for CSOs, so it can simply be argued that CSOs are larger in size in wealthier regions. However, **CSOs in poorer regions** need more technical and financial support.

***Trust in Private Sector Organizations:*** Trust-Related Theories provide demand side explanations for the size of CSOs, because they argue that consumers are “incapable of accurately evaluating” the quantity and quality of public goods and services, which are provided

by private sector organizations, due to **lack of product information** (Hansmann, 1987: 61). Therefore, it is hard for consumers to choose which private sector organization is more **trustworthy** due to **information asymmetry**. In this direction, it can be implied from these theories that lower level of trust in private sector organizations is likely to increase size of CSOs, because CSOs are more trustworthy than private sector organizations due to non-distribution constraint and focusing on quality rather than profit. Therefore, CSOs exist because **demand for trust goods and services** for people are not met by private sector organizations (Anheier, 2005: 129). However, **Hypothesis 3** was **not supported** by empirical findings in the case of NUTS-3 regions of Turkey, because a statistically significant **linear, positive** and **moderate** relationship was found between the size of CSOs and **trust in private sector organizations** ( $r=0,491$ ;  $p<0,01$ ). A negative relationship was expected by theoretical assumption, but there is an **opposite relationship**. It is necessary to make further analysis due to this contradicted empirical finding. For instance, not only trust in private sector organizations, but also **trust in others** (e.g., public institutions, CSOs, and people) can be evaluated to find out significant relationships between different types of trust and size of CSOs. For instance, Bülbül and Yashıkaya (2006) analyzed the level of trust in CSOs by political institutions, because they argue that trust among the members of the society, and trust in political institutions by the society is not sufficient. In this sense, they questioned how civil society is influenced by the level of trust in CSOs by political institutions, and found that civil society in Turkey is

less developed compared to civil society in Western countries because political institutions do not trust CSOs as it should be. As it is seen, trust is a multi-dimensional concept, so trust-related studies could not provide significant predictions in explaining differentiation in size of CSOs, because they only focus on trust in private sector organizations.

The findings, methods and models of this book can be used to evaluate relationship between trust and size of CSOs in a more comprehensive analysis with a **larger perspective** on trust in future research, because theoretical assumptions of trust-related theories failed to explain differentiation in size of CSOs in the case of NUTS-3 regions of Turkey. In other words, trust in private sector organizations is not sufficient to explain this differentiation in size of CSOs.

***Income from Public Institutions:*** The **Interdependence Theory** refuses the idea that CSOs are gap-fillers in the case of market and government failures (Gronbjerg, 2001; Hansmann, 1987; Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Weisbrod, 1975), on the contrary, CSOs are rather **third-party governments** (Salamon, 1987). Therefore, CSOs are not alternative for the state; they are rather **partners** for the state, because state's strengths can compensate the weaknesses of CSOs, and vice versa (Önder, 2006: 38). In this sense, the theory seeks rationale behind the **interdependence between public institutions and CSOs** in the provision of public goods and services. **Hypothesis 4** was also **supported** by empirical findings in the case of NUTS-3 regions of Turkey, because a statistically significant **linear** and **weak** relationship was found between the size of CSOs and **income from**

**public institutions** ( $r=-0,354$ ;  $p<0,01$ ), and this relationship is **negative** as resource dependence theory suggests. That means size of CSOs decreases when the level of income from public institutions increases. **Resource Dependence theory** also focuses on partnership between different types of organizations, so it can also be applied to the relationships between CSOs and public institutions through investigation of **dependence between these two actors**. The theory argues that **too much dependence on the resources of a provider can result in dependence on the receiver**, and this can cause adaptation of the receiver according to interests and requirements of the providers (Malatesta and Smith, 2014), because organizations **are not fully autonomous from their environments** (Cho and Gillespie, 2006).

Theoretical and empirical findings implicate that too much dependence on financial support from the public institutions decreases the size of CSOs in NUTS-3 regions of Turkey. The data for the level of income from public institutions was collected from the surveys that were applied 975 Youth CSOs that are grouped under 81 NUTS-3 regions of Turkey. The majority of these CSOs (about 80%) were established after the 2000s, therefore these CSOs are mainly new CSOs that need to grow. In this direction, support from the public institutions (e.g., project funding, permitting the use of public facilities like sport halls, student dormitories and conference rooms) has vital importance. However, they need to diversify their revenue streams in order to be more autonomous, financially less vulnerable,

and less insulated from political distractions. It seems that **dependence on resources from the public institutions** is an advantage but at the same time a disadvantage for newly-established CSOs that are small in size. If these CSOs depend on single providers for a long time without diversifying their resources, this can have a **negative influence** on their size, and it can threaten their sustainability and autonomy in the long run. The theoretical assumptions of interdependence and resource dependence theories, which provide supply side explanations, can be tested by a larger sample with more number of CSOs, which includes not only newly-established CSOs, but also long-established CSOs, in the **future research**. This can reveal more significant relationships between income from public institutions and the size of CSOs in different regions.

*Religious and Ideological Motivation: The Entrepreneurship Theories* explain the presence of CSOs with a **supply-side perspective**, whereas market and state failure theories are mainly concentrated on the demand-side explanations. They use the concepts of **institutional choice** or **organizational choice** to explain rationale for the presence of CSOs in different regions (Badelt, 1997). Demand-side theories are important, for instance, **religious or ideological CSOs** are formed to meet **heterogeneous demand** for the provision of goods and services (James, 1989). However, these explanations still need a **specific supply behavior**, which is carried out by “special types of human beings, with special personalities” (Badelt, 1997: 172-

173). The entrepreneurship theories suggest that **social entrepreneurs** strategically form a new CSO or change an existing CSO in the direction of heterogeneous demand. Therefore, supply behavior of CSOs is “entrepreneurial” that refers to “a specific attitude towards change” (Badelt, 1997: 163). In addition, Salamon and Anheier (1998: 221) state that the size of civil society sector is larger because of religious competition, where one or more religious bodies compete to attract more adherents by providing goods and services in areas of healthcare and education. However, **Hypothesis 5** was **not supported** by empirical findings in the case of NUTS-3 regions of Turkey, because **no linear** and **statistically significant** relationship between the size of CSOs, and **religious and ideological motivation** was found in the case of NUTS-3 regions of Turkey ( $p>0,01$ ;  $p>0,05$ ).

Therefore, empirical finding of this book contradicts with the previous studies arguing that CSOs that operate with ideological or religious motivation are expected to have larger size, because they receive more revenues especially voluntary donations, and gain more supporters (e.g., members and voluntary workers) (Anheier, 1998). For instance, Rose-Ackerman (1996: 724) empirically found that **ideological character of a CSOs** can attract **money** and **customers**, which is very essential for the survival of an organization. On the other hand, she points out that religious organizations received the highest percent of (60%) household giving in 1993 (Rose-Ackerman, 1996: 703). However, available data was not strong enough to support these theoretical and empirical assumptions in the case of Turkey. This

might be due to existing ambiguity within the official categorization of CSOs under the category of “associations for religion, ideology, or social values” by the responsible public institution, T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society for CSOs. It is not very explicit whether CSOs that operate in other areas like sport or occupation carry out their activities with religious and ideological motivation or not. For instance, a CSO can be categorized under “associations for sport, or occupation”, but it can still operate through religious or ideological motivation. Therefore, future research should focus not only on CSOs that are categorized under “associations for religion, ideology, or social values”, but also on other CSOs that are categorized under different categories. However, it is a hard duty to reveal whether CSOs under other categories operate with religious or ideological motivation or not. It necessitates a **further** and **deeper analysis** that requires more effort, because the availability of data is very limited.

***Information Flow for Stakeholders:*** The Stakeholder Theory firstly argues that **information asymmetry** between consumers (demand-side stakeholders) and private sector organizations (suppliers) can result in **contract failure** due to increase of prices and decline in quality (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 2007; Hansmann, 1987). Secondly, the theory suggests that diversity (e.g. income and its distribution, education, demand heterogeneity, and social cohesion) cause **government failure** in which public institutions fail to meet diverse preferences of demand-side stakeholders, because the

provision of quasi-public goods and services by public institutions is mainly driven by the **preferences of average stakeholders** (median voters), who compose the majority of the society (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 2007; Weisbrod, 1975). Thirdly, it is necessary to evaluate the **entrepreneurship feature of supply-side stakeholders** (e.g. social entrepreneurs, religious leaders and other actors), whose preferences are not driven by profit-making in the formation and operation of CSOs to satisfy existing demand for quasi-public goods and services. Finally, the theory suggests that it is very essential to have **stakeholder control** in CSOs, because **CSOs can also fail** like private sector organizations and public institutions.

**Stakeholder control** can overcome the problem of **information asymmetry** and **exploitation** between the consumers and CSOs. **Information flow** is very essential for stakeholder control, because it provides **internal** and **external control on profit-making** and **voluntary activities** of CSOs, and this situation increases their accountability and transparency. However, **Hypothesis 6** was **not supported** by empirical findings in the case of NUTS-3 regions of Turkey, because there is **no linear** and **statistically significant** relationship between the size of CSOs and **information flow for stakeholders** ( $p > 0,01$ ;  $p > 0,05$ ). Although, it is theoretically necessary to include demand-side stakeholders into the supply processes of CSOs (Anheier, 2005; Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 2007: 520), no significant relationship between information flow for stakeholders and size of CSOs was determined by the available data. Therefore, the

**stakeholder control** can be analyzed through other indicators like investigation of participation of demand-side and supply-side stakeholder in the decision-making processes within CSOs. The future research **by scholars** can reveal not only the influence of stakeholder control on size of CSOs, but also other factors such as democratization, strategic management, transparency and accountability in the case of CSOs.

***Government Social Welfare Spending:*** The Social Origins Theory, which was built upon the interdependence theory, suggests that **CSOs** are not alternative for the state; they are rather **partners for the state**. On the other hand, the social origins theory argues that it is also necessary to evaluate **broader social, political, and economic conditions** under which CSOs and the state cooperate (Salamon and Anheier, 1998). The theory provides a framework to make **cross-national analysis** to find out differentiation in size and compositions of CSOs in different countries by a comparative-historical perspective (Anheier, 2005: 135). In this direction, the theory identifies **four models of nonprofit regimes** in terms of the **extent of government social welfare spending** (high or low) and the **size of nonprofit sector** (high or low): (i) liberal model, (ii) social democratic model, (iii) corporatist model, and (iv) statist model. **Hypothesis 7** was **not supported** by empirical findings in the case of NUTS-3 regions of Turkey, because **no linear and statistically significant** relationship between the size of CSOs and **government social welfare spending** was found ( $p>0,01$ ;  $p>0,05$ ). Theoretical assumption requires

comparative analysis of different regions and countries, but available data for the case of NUTS-3 regions of Turkey was not sufficient to prove a significant relationship between these variables. Due to lack of data, only social spending in health and education was included in the statistical calculations. Data on other areas such as disable/invalidity pensions, unemployment pensions, social exclusion, and widow/orphan pensions does not exist at the 81 NUTS-3 level in Turkey. Only national data is given by official publication of TÜİK (Turkish Statistical Institute), therefore, data for NUTS-3 regions in other areas of social spending could not have been added to the empirical analysis. In the future, this hypothesis can be re-tested, when the data of 81 NUTS-3 regions is available for **scholars**.

#### **4.2. Second Model: Organizational Performance of Youth CSOs in Turkey**

**Revenue Concentration:** CSOs use several revenue streams (e.g., membership fees, voluntary donations, revenues from public institutions, revenues from income-generating activities) to pursue their social mission and organizational goals. Moreover, **sustainable revenue streams** are very essential for the financial capacity of CSOs in the short and long run. However, scholars argue that **concentration on limited number of revenue streams** can cause **uncertainty for CSOs** (Despard et al., 2017; Hudock, 1995; Watkins et al., 2012), threatens **their autonomy** (Banks and Hulme, 2012; Elbers and Schulpen, 2013; Wallace et al., 2006), and results in **financial vulnerability** (Tuckman and Chang, 1991). **Hypotheses 8** that

expected **no relationship between** revenue concentration and organizational performance of CSOs was **supported** in the case of 975 Youth CSOs in Turkey, because **no linear** and **statistically significant** relationship was found between the organizational performance of CSOs and **revenue concentration** in the empirical analysis ( $p > 0,01$ ;  $p > 0,05$ ). Lu et al. (2019) systematically reviewed 258 effect sizes from total of 23 existing studies through their bibliometric analysis and meta-analysis to find out whether revenue concentration has impact on financial vulnerability, or financial capacity. Lu et al. (2019) also found that influence of revenue concentration on organizational performance of CSOs is inconsistent. They argue that “if nonprofits attempt to both reduce financial vulnerability and enhance financial capacity, some sort of concentration might turn out to be a more appropriate revenue strategy”. Similarly, descriptive statistics that are collected from primary data illustrate that majority of the 975 Youth CSOs use voluntary donations and membership fees as main sources of income, so their revenues are concentrated on **limited number of revenue streams**. It is possible that these sources are sustainable and available for CSOs most of the time.

Theoretical and empirical implications prove that financial diversification does not necessarily decrease financial vulnerability, and in some cases revenue concentration can be beneficial to decrease financial vulnerability. In this sense, **CSO managers** can concentrate some revenue streams that are sustainable and available most of time.

However, these single resources should be able to generate necessary financial capacity to provide sufficient level of public goods and services that attract and provide benefits for more number of people.

**Annual Budget:** Social mission and organizational goals of CSOs are directly related to their **financial capacity** (Sontag-Padilla, 2012: 2). Therefore, **annual budget**, as an important indicator of the financial capacity, provides ability for CSOs to increase their **performance**, pursue their **mission**, and react to **opportunities, crises and threats**. CSO managers consider about fund-raising activities to increase their annual budget, and they seek to reallocate financial resources to sustain their organizational mission (Bowman, 2011). **Hypothesis 9** was **supported** by empirical findings in the case of 975 Youth CSOs in Turkey, because a statistically significant **linear, positive, but too weak** relationship was found between the organizational performance of CSOs and **annual budget** ( $r=0,195$ ;  $p<0,01$ ). As majority of organizational theories suggest (Bowman, 2011; Sontag-Padilla, 2012: 2), empirical finding shows that increasing **annual budget** is essential for the organizational performance of CSOs. Therefore, **CSO managers** should focus on creating more financial resources to carry out their mission and organizational goals.

**Organizational Age:** Organizational theories on tenure argue that it is necessary to distinguish between **newly-established CSOs** that are in the early stages of their evolutions and **long-established CSOs** that are in their later stages. For instance, Chikoto-Schultz and Neely

(2016) found that organizational age of CSOs influences their ability to diversify revenue sources and decrease financial vulnerability, because older CSOs are more likely to have more sources of revenue. Therefore, many scholars claim that **organizational age** is very related with **organizational performance** in achieving organizational goals, because younger CSOs have more tendency to face “liability of newness” (Stinchcombe, 1965), “organizational failure rate” (death risk) (Halliday et al., 1987; Le Mens et al., 2011), or “absolute hazard risk” (Singh et al., 1986). However, **Hypothesis 10** was **not supported** by empirical findings in the case of 975 Youth CSOs in Turkey, because it was found that there is **no linear** and **statistically significant** relationship between the organizational performance of CSOs and **organizational age** ( $p > 0,01$ ;  $p > 0,05$ ). Therefore, theoretical and empirical studies on the organizational age failed to explain differentiation in organizational performance of CSOs in the case of 975 Youth CSOs in Turkey. The main reason is that about 80% of these CSOs were established after the 2000s, and there was **no equal distribution of organizational age** of these CSOs for statistical calculations. Therefore, statistical results could not show a significant relationship between organizational age and organizational performance of these CSOs. In the future, **scholars** can re-test the relationship between organizational age and organizational performance of CSOs with a larger sample that includes equal distribution of newly-established and long-established CSOs. But still, it is obvious that majority of the sample of 975 Youth CSOs are **newly-established**, and these CSOs need **more support** in terms of

cooperation with external stakeholders, annual budget, training for voluntary and paid workers, and physical and technological infrastructure as other supported hypotheses indicates.

***Physical and Technological Infrastructure:*** Organizational theories suggest that **organizational infrastructure** is essential for organizational capacity, because it provides basic **administrative** and **operational abilities** to achieve organizational missions (Bryan, 2018). On the other hand, Boyne (2003: 219) calls organizational infrastructure as “potential antecedents” which means that it is a precondition in order to meet organizational goals. Bikmen and Meydanoğlu (2006) evaluate technological infrastructure as an important resource that impact organizational capacity of CSOs in Turkey. Therefore, physical and technological infrastructure is expected to have a significant relationship with the organizational performance of CSOs. Parallel to theoretical explanations, **Hypothesis 11** was **supported** by empirical findings in the case of 975 Youth CSOs in Turkey, because a statistically significant **linear, positive**, but **weak** relationship was found between the organizational performance of CSOs and **physical and technological infrastructure** ( $r=0,221$ ;  $p<0,01$ ). The empirical findings prove that organizational infrastructure of CSOs has a significant explanatory power for differentiation in organizational performance of Youth CSOs in Turkey. Therefore, it is necessary for individual contributors/donors, CSO managers, public institutions and non-public organizations to support physical and technological infrastructure of CSOs, because

CSOs with higher organizational performance can provide better public goods and services for diversified needs and interests of people.

*Cooperation with External Actors (CSOs, Public Institutions, and Private Sector Organizations)*: Organizations have open and adaptive systems that interact with other external actors, and they cannot internally generate their functions and resources (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976). Many scholars have argued that cooperation with external actors is an important organizational capacity indicator (Bikmen and Meydanoğlu, 2006; Doherty et. al. 2013; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; The Marguerite Casey Foundation, 2012). Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate whether cooperation with other CSOs, public institutions, and private sector organizations have a significant relationship with organizational performance of CSOs. In line with theoretical assumptions, **Hypothesis 12** was **supported** by empirical findings in the case of 975 Youth CSOs in Turkey, because a statistically significant **linear, positive**, but **too weak** relationship was found between the organizational performance of CSOs and **cooperation with CSOs** ( $r=0,195$ ;  $p<0,01$ ). The empirical finding proves that cooperation with other CSOs can increase the organizational performance of Youth CSOs in Turkey. Similarly, **Hypothesis 13** was also **supported**, because there is also statistically significant **linear, positive**, but **too weak** relationship was found between the organizational performance of CSOs and **cooperation with public institutions** ( $r=0,176$ ;  $p<0,01$ ). Hence, the theoretical assumption was statistically **supported**. The empirical findings prove that cooperation

with public institutions can increase the organizational performance of CSOs. Finally, **Hypothesis 14** was also **supported**, because a statistically significant **linear, positive** and **too weak** relationship was also found between the organizational performance of CSOs and **cooperation with private sector organizations** ( $r=0,065$ ;  $p<0,05$ ).

To sum up, theoretical and empirical explanations are consistent with the idea that cooperation of different actors in the provision of public goods and services can increase social benefit for the society. In this sense, people can take advantage of better quality, efficient and accessible public goods and services that are available for diverse needs and interests. Therefore, there is a need for more platforms and areas that encourage **cooperation between CSOs, public institutions, and private sector organizations**.

*Professional Management of Voluntary Workers:* Organizational theories also evaluate the relations between managerial competence and organizational capacity (Tuckman and Chang, 1991; Sontag-Padilla, 2012), because experienced and qualified managers can: reallocate financial resources efficiently; pursue organization's mission and goals; react to opportunities, crises and threats effectively; and increase fund-raising activities (Önder and Köylü, 2018). Activities of CSOs are mainly carried out by the voluntary workers who are mainly driven by the idea of collective action and sense of social obligation (Anheier, 2005: 130). These workers have "amateur approaches to cope with human problems" (Salamon, 1987: 42), so this situation can result in **philanthropic amateurism** that

causes voluntary failure, although **amateurism** can encourage **entrepreneurship** and **civic participation** in some cases. Therefore, professional management of these workers by increasing responsibility, personal skills and abilities can result in higher performance of CSOs. **Hypothesis 15** was also **supported** in the case of 975 Youth CSOs in Turkey, because a statistically significant **linear, positive** and **moderate** relationship was found between the organizational performance of CSOs and **professional management of voluntary workers** ( $r=0,587$ ;  $p<0,01$ ).

It is clear that CSOs cannot always attract qualified and experienced personnel due to **limited amount of resources** to provide sufficient wages (Salamon, 1987: 42). Therefore, voluntary workers in CSOs should professionally be managed to get maximum performance for the organizational mission and goals. Hence, the empirical findings prove that professional management of voluntary workers can increase the organizational performance of Youth CSOs in Turkey. In this sense, **CSO managers** should provide more **training** and **education** for their voluntary workers through **collaborations** with **individual experts, public institutions** and **non-public organizations** that are willing to support CSOs voluntarily. In this sense, voluntary workers can gain better qualifications, skills and talents, and this can increase their contribution to the organizational performance of CSOs.

***Experience of Organizational Leaders:*** Experience of organizational leaders refers to the time that workers spent in their organization. It is an essential **indicator of human capital**, because it increases

**workers' value** and their **performance** (Judge et al., 1995; Nafukho et al., 2004). Scholars argue that there is a positive relationship between experience of employees, or organizational team and organizational performance (Chi et al., 2009; Goll and Rasheed, 2005; Joshi et al., 2011), because **human capital theory** states that human capital is developed as workers gain **job knowledge, skills, experiences, and abilities** (Myers et al., 2004; Wayne et al., 1999). **Hypothesis 16** was **not supported** by empirical findings in the case of 975 Youth CSOs in Turkey, because it was found that there is **no linear** and **statistically significant** relationship between the organizational performance of CSOs, and **experience of organizational leaders** ( $p > 0,01$ ;  $p > 0,05$ ). The empirical finding could not detect a significant relationship between professional management of voluntary workers and organizational performance of Youth CSOs in Turkey. This can be due to the limited data about the experience of organizational leaders. The surveys were applied to only one of the organizational leaders of each CSO (e.g., director, member, manager, and youth leaders), but the statistical results might change when data on the experience of all organizational leaders in each CSO can result in another implication. **Scholars** can re-test this theoretical assumption with a larger empirical data that is collected from all organizational leaders of each CSO in the future.

**Table 29** displays whether hypotheses of major theories were statistically supported or not. A total of 16 theoretical assumptions were tested by two different models that were created to reveal

relationships between independent variables and two different dependent variables: size of CSOs and organizational performance of CSOs.

**Table 28:** Summary of Hypothesis Testing for Major theories

	<b>Theory</b>	<b>Hypothesis</b>	<b>Significance</b>	<b>Results</b>
<i>Major Theories on Size of CSOs</i>	<i>Public Goods Theories</i>	<b>H. 1: Social diversity</b> is more likely to increase <b>size</b> of CSOs.	Significant (+)	Supported
		<b>H. 2: Per capita income</b> is more likely to increase <b>size</b> of CSOs.	Significant (+)	Supported
	<i>Trust-Related Theories</i>	<b>H. 3: The lower the level of trust in private sector organizations</b> is more likely to increase <b>size</b> of CSOs.	Significant (+)	Not Supported
	<i>Interdependence and Resource Dependence Theories</i>	<b>H. 4: The level of income from public institutions and size</b> of CSOs have negative relationship.	Significant (-)	Supported
	<i>The Entrepreneurship Theory</i>	<b>H. 5: CSOs that operate with ideological and religious motivations</b> are more likely to have larger <b>size</b> .	Not Significant	Not Supported
	<i>The Stakeholder Theory</i>	<b>H. 6: CSOs that provide information flow for stakeholders</b> are more likely to have larger <b>size</b> .	Not Significant	Not Supported
	<i>The Social Origins Theory</i>	<b>H. 7: The extent of government social welfare spending and size</b> of CSOs have <b>negative relationship</b> .	Not Significant	Not Supported
<i>Organizational Theories on organizational Performance of CSOs</i>	<i>Financial Capacity</i>	<b>H. 8: Revenue concentration</b> has no relationship with <b>organizational performance</b> of CSOs.	Not Significant	Supported
		<b>H. 9: CSOs that have larger annual budget</b> are more likely to have higher <b>organizational performance</b> .	Significant (+)	Supported
	<i>Organizational Age (Tenure)</i>	<b>H. 10: Older CSOs</b> are more likely to have higher <b>organizational performance</b> .	Not Significant	Not Supported
	<i>Physical &amp; Technological Infrastructure</i>	<b>H. 11: CSOs that have more physical and technological infrastructure</b> are more likely to have higher <b>organizational performance</b> .	Significant (+)	Supported
	<i>Cooperation with CSOs</i>	<b>H. 12: CSOs that cooperate with other CSOs</b> are more likely to have higher <b>organizational performance</b> .	Significant (+)	Supported
	<i>Cooperation with Public Institutions</i>	<b>H. 13: CSOs that cooperate with public institutions</b> are more likely to have higher <b>organizational performance</b> .	Significant (+)	Supported
	<i>Cooperation with Private Sector Organizations</i>	<b>H. 14: CSOs that cooperate with private sector organizations</b> are more likely to have higher <b>organizational performance</b> .	Significant (+)	Supported
	<i>Professional Management of Voluntary Workers</i>	<b>H. 15: CSOs that manage their voluntary workers professionally</b> are more likely to have higher <b>organizational performance</b> .	Significant (+)	Supported
<i>Experience of Organizational Leaders</i>	<b>H. 16: CSOs that have experienced organizational leaders</b> are more likely to have higher <b>organizational performance</b> .	Not Significant	Not Supported	



## **CHAPTER V**

### **CONCLUSION**



## A SHORT SUMMARY OF BOOK

This book explains issues related to historical, conceptual, theoretical and organizational development of CSOs in **different social settings**. In this sense, it firstly explains conceptual development of civil society and CSOs. After that, it provides theories on civil society and CSOs in the literature. Finally, it makes an empirical research to understand organizational development of CSOs by seeking explanations **why CSOs differ greatly in terms of size and organizational performance** in different communities, societies, cultures and countries throughout the world. This is because the degree of size and organizational performance influences the quality, quantity, sustainability, accessibility and efficiency of public goods and services provided by CSOs.

In the first chapter of the book (Chapter I), it was argued that civil society followed **different paths in different social settings** in terms of historical, conceptual, theoretical and organizational development. On the other hand, **increasing role and importance of CSOs** was also discussed, because civil society has recently appeared as **a new sector**, namely “third sector”, which cooperates with public and private sectors. In addition, CSOs has started to provide public goods and services in areas where public and private sectors are unwilling to act or fail. Moreover, **theoretical explanations** on the presence and organizational development of CSOs were also shortly given. In practice, it is obvious that CSOs differ in terms of organizational development (size and organizational performance) in different

communities, and **this differentiation** influences the quality, quantity, sustainability, accessibility and efficiency of public goods and services provided by CSOs for the people in need. Therefore, it was pointed out that it is necessary to determine **which factors cause this differentiation**.

Chapter II evaluates **conceptualization of civil society** in Western and Turkish-Islamic political thoughts, **definitions of CSOs**. In this sense; **sectoral, legal, and economic definitions of CSOs**, and **common features of CSOs** were highlighted, because these features are used to determine organizations that are categorized as CSOs. In addition, historical evidences and development of CSOs in Turkey was also explained through the **unique culture and history of waqfs** during Great Seljuks Empire and Ottoman Empire until today by **five different timespans**: (a) 1923-1945, (b) 1945-1960, (c) 1960-1980, (d) 1980-2000, and (e) after the 2000s. The **types of CSOs** in Turkey were also explained shortly by giving legal definitions and descriptive statistics. These CSOs are associations, foundations, trade unions, cooperatives, and professional organizations. The recent literature was reviewed by summarizing some **major researches on civil society in Turkey** at the local, national and international levels.

In Chapter III covers **types of goods and services** provided by CSOs, public institutions, and private sector organizations, **the functions of CSOs**, and **main arguments of major theories** on conceptual, theoretical and organizational development of CSOs. Firstly, it was discussed that **pure private goods and services** (excludable and rival)

are best provided by **private sector organizations**, **pure public goods and services** (non-excludable and non-rival) are best provided by **public institutions**, and **quasi-public goods and services** (excludable) are best provided by **CSOs**. Secondly, **the functions of CSOs** such as activities that support markets, democratic consolidation, political transformation, gender and equality, provision of social and cultural services, increasing social entrepreneurship, and protection of political rights were explained. In the last part of the chapter, **key terms** and **main arguments of major theories** on conceptual, theoretical and organizational development of CSOs after the 1970s were discussed. In addition, their **main hypotheses** on size and organizational performance of CSOs are noted to be tested by empirical data in the next chapter.

The research question, hypotheses, unit of analysis, data collection, operationalization of variables, methods and models for the case study of CSOs in Turkey were explained in the fourth chapter of the book (Chapter IV). In this chapter, **data was empirically analyzed** to test main hypotheses from major theories that explain presence and organizational development of CSOs in the literature. Depending on the results of **multiple regression method**, it was explained whether these hypotheses were statistically supported by empirical data, or not. Finally, **findings and discussions** were presented depending on the analysis results.

In the last chapter of the book (Chapter V); general conclusions and **policy recommendations** for policy-makers, CSO managers, public institutions, and funders (e.g., individuals, private sector organizations, and other non-public organizations) were given. Moreover, **suggestions for scholars** were also explained, because the theoretical and empirical findings, discussions, limitations, methods and models in this book can be further developed for **future research**.

In addition to definitions, conceptual and theoretical developments of CSOs, it was also necessary to research empirical evidences for the questions “**What accounts for the size and organizational performance of CSOs?**”. This because there is a gap between theory and practice in the civil society literature. In addition, theoretical and empirical findings suggest that there are different factors causing differentiation on size and organizational performance of CSOs. Therefore, this book includes a particular analysis chapter to explain which factors are influential on size and organization performance of CSOs in the case of Turkey. The number of studies and accessible data are limited in Turkey, therefore, theoretical and empirical findings of this study contribute to the literature. Moreover, these findings are also beneficial for the policy-makers, scholars, public institutions, students, CSO managers, and funders of CSOs (e.g., individuals, private sector organizations, and other non-public organizations).

## 1. CONTRIBUTIONS

The contribution of this book to the literature can shortly be summarized:

- This book provides explanations for **historical, conceptual, theoretical and organizational development of civil society and CSOs** in Turkey as well as in the world.
- **The empirical analysis** in the book contributes to the existing literature by providing **a comprehensive approach** that combines different explanations of major theories on the **size and organizational performance of CSOs** in one single research.
- It also contributes to the existing literature by being the **first broad research** on the differentiation in terms of size and organizational performance of CSOs in Turkey by two different unit of analyses: 81 NUTS-3 regions of Turkey (N=81), and 975 Youth CSOs from 81 cities in Turkey (N=975).
- **It creates different models** to test different hypotheses by **multiple sources of data**: (i) **primary data** that was created by survey research that was applied randomly to selected sample of 975 Youth CSOs representatives from 81 cities of Turkey, and (ii) **secondary data** that is collected from existing scientific publications and official databases.

- **It introduces the influence of different socio-economic and organizational factors** (e.g., social diversity, per capita income, trust, revenue concentration, ideological and religious motivation, managerial competence) on the size and organizational performance of CSOs in Turkey.
- **It contributes to the studies about CSOs** in the areas of political science, public administration, management, and other related disciplines. Because, it uses theories of political science to explain what civil society and CSOs mean, explains civil society-state relations with the perspective of public administration, evaluates size and organizational performance of CSOs by using management techniques, and implements advanced statistical methods for social sciences that are mainly used in the areas of economics, business and statistics.
- **It creates public awareness** about social, economic and political benefits as well as functions of CSOs such as the provision of new employment (paid and voluntary), providing public goods and services, and protection of freedoms and rights.

## 2. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

*Cooperation between CSOs and public institutions can be increased, and new legislation can be created to meet heterogeneous demand in regions with higher social diversity.* Public institutions fail to meet **heterogeneous demand of minorities** for public goods and services

in NUTS-3 regions where social diversity is high due to government failure. Since **CSOs are better alternatives** in meeting this demand, **local and central public institutions** should increase their **cooperation and support** for CSOs in the provision of public goods and services for those minorities in these regions. Moreover, **policy-makers** can encourage cooperation between CSOs and private sector organizations by **creating new legislation** such as tax exemption for private sector organizations in the case of supporting a civil society projects.

*There is a more need of technical and financial support for CSOs in poorer communities.* NUTS-3 regions with **wealthier communities** have more number of CSOs, because higher per capita income might result in more donations, qualified human resources and service fees available to CSOs. People in these regions have more time and money to spend for CSOs. However, **CSOs in poorer regions** need more technical and financial support from **public institutions** and **non-public funders** (e.g., individuals, private sector organizations, and larger associations that provide assistance for smaller CSOs). For instance, the following trainings, and programs can be provided for CSOs: institutionalization, capacity-building, fund-raising, project writing, and project management.

*Although newly-established CSOs depend too much on revenues from public institutions in the short run, CSO managers might focus on diversifying their revenue sources to be financially less fragile, and more autonomous in the long run.* It was theoretically estimated that

majority of the **newly-established CSOs** are mainly depended on the income from public institutions, while **long-established CSOs** are depended on individual donations, membership fees, projects, and other fund-raising activities. However, dependence on single resource from public institutions influences the **autonomy**, **financial vulnerability**, and **size** of newly-established CSOs negatively, while long-established CSOs are **more autonomous**, and have **larger size** because they are **insulated from political distractions**, and they are depended on income from public institutions. Therefore, **CSO managers** should focus on **diversifying their resources in the long run** even though they receive revenue from public institutions during developmental stage of their organization.

*Public institutions can create objective criteria, which are insulated from personal approaches of public servants, or officials, in providing technical and financial support for CSOs.* Personal interviews with CSO representatives, and related questions in the survey research revealed that some public servants, or officials might have tendency to support long-established and well-known CSOs rather than newly established and small CSOs. However, **public institutions** should technically and financially support CSOs according to objective criteria, and they can have positive discrimination towards these newly-established and small CSOs. Furthermore, the **public personnel** who are responsible for the relations with CSOs should be more familiar with CSOs, and experienced in civil society. In addition to T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society under T.R.

Ministry of Interior, governorships in 81 provinces and some ministries (e.g., T.R. Ministry of Youth and Sports) also have similar institutional unit for the relations with CSOs. **These units should be more widespread** in the majority of the public institutions that cooperate with CSOs.

*Internal and external control over activities of CSOs is necessary for sustainability, accountability, trust and transparency.* Stakeholder theory suggests that it is very essential to have **stakeholder control** by demand-side and supply-side stakeholders in CSOs, because **CSOs can also fail** like private sector organizations and public institutions. For instance, some CSO managers might seek to exploit the opportunities of these organizations (e.g., increasing their salaries or pursuing their individual preferences). Therefore, **CSOs managers** should provide **information flow for external and internal stakeholders** through advertising in the public domain, preparing different messages and communication tools for different audiences, using social media and website efficiently, and cooperating with media. In addition, responsible **public institutions** should **monitor** activities, and financial spending of CSOs periodically and more frequently.

*Although revenue diversification is necessary in the long run, concentration in limited number of revenue streams can be better strategy in some cases (e.g., availability of specific type of revenue streams in the region, or economic, political and social crises).* Contrary to theoretical discussions, there is **no linear** and **statistically**

**significant** relationship between the organizational performance of CSOs, and **revenue concentration** in the case of 975 Youth CSOs in Turkey by empirical analysis. Like findings of Lu et al. (2019) who systematically reviewed 258 effect sizes from total of 23 existing studies, it was empirically found that influence of revenue concentration on organizational performance of CSOs is inconsistent. In addition, descriptive statistics that are collected from primary data illustrate that majority of the 975 Youth CSOs uses voluntary donations and membership fees as main sources of income, so their revenues are concentrated on **limited number of revenue streams**. It is possible that these sources are sustainable and available for CSOs most of the time, and this kind of concentration might turn out to be a more **appropriate revenue strategy** for **CSO managers** especially during by the economic, social and political crises. For instance, individual donations and membership fees are more sustainable in South-East Anatolia region of Turkey, therefore, CSOs in these regions are more concentration on these revenues than others such as project income, or financial revenues.

*CSO managers might focus on increasing annual budget by more effective fund-raising strategies to increase their size and organizational performance.* In line with theoretical discussions, it was found that there is a statistically significant **linear** and **positive** relationship between the organizational performance of CSOs and **annual budget** in the case of 975 Youth CSOs in Turkey. In other words, increasing **annual budget** is essential for the organizational

performance of CSOs. Moreover, annual budget is an essential indicator of financial capacity, so it has a positive influence on the size of CSOs. Therefore, **CSO managers** should focus on creating more financial resources to carry out their social missions and organizational goals, and to react strategically for **opportunities, crises** and **threats**. They can focus on project writing and management for project revenue, increase public awareness on their activities by advertising (e.g., media, internet, public area, and social media) to get more donations and financial support from individuals, public institutions, and other funders that support CSOs. **Policy-makers** can support CSOs by legislation on financial issues such as providing tax exemption, or eliminating withholding and value-added taxes for CSOs.

*Like in the case of annual budget, CSO managers and funders of CSOs may focus on increasing the number of physical and technological facilities by new strategies to increase quantity, quality, accessibility, and efficiency of public goods and services. It was theoretically and empirically proved in the case of 975 Youth CSOs in Turkey that there is a statistically significant **linear**, and **positive** relationship was found between the organizational performance of CSOs and **physical and technological infrastructure**. Therefore, it is necessary for **individual contributors/donors, CSO managers, public institutions** and **non-public organizations** to support physical and technological infrastructure of CSOs, because CSOs with higher organizational performance can provide better public goods and*

services for diversified needs and interests of people. For instance, **public institutions** can provide physical and technical support by allowing CSOs to use public facilities (e.g., sports hall, conference room, or transportation) for free, or at an appropriate and affordable fee.

*Cooperation between CSOs, public institutions and private sector organizations can be more encouraged by new strategies.* It was theoretically assumed that organizations have open and adaptive systems that interact with other external actors, and they cannot internally generate their functions and resources. Therefore, **cooperation with external actors** (CSOs, public institutions, and private sector organizations) has significant relationship with organizational performance of CSOs. It was empirically found in the case of 975 Youth CSOs in Turkey that there is a statistically significant **linear** and **positive** relationship between the organizational performance of CSOs and **cooperation with CSOs, public institutions, and private sector organizations**. People can take advantage of better quality, efficient and accessible public goods and services that are available for diverse needs and interests if cooperation between different actors is increased, so there is a need for **more platforms and areas** that encourage **cooperation between these actors**. In this direction, **policy-makers** should strengthen democracy, tolerance, and cooperation culture in the society. Moreover, they should decrease negative influences of social and political crises on civil society (e.g., failed coup attempt in 2016 and

political polarizations due to elections). **Public institutions** should be more open to cooperation with CSOs by non-discrimination approach. **Larger and long-established CSOs** should support newly-established and small CSOs by the exchange of knowledge, experience, physical and technological facilities. **Private sector organizations** can financially support CSOs by sponsorship, donations, or social and environmental projects of CSOs to show their awareness on social and environmental issues. In addition, **policy-makers** can encourage private sector organizations to support these projects by creating new legislation such as tax exemption, or other financial benefits.

*It might not be enough to manage voluntary workers professionally, so it is also necessary to support these workers by professional, paid and full-time workers.* Experienced and qualified workers can: reallocate financial resources efficiently; pursue organization's mission and goals; react to opportunities, crises and threats effectively; and increase fund-raising activities. On the other hand, activities of CSOs are mainly carried out by the voluntary workers that are mainly driven by the idea of collective action and sense of social obligation (Anheier, 2005: 130). In some cases, **amateurism** can encourage **entrepreneurship** and **civic participation**, but amateur approaches of these workers can also result in **philanthropic amateurism** that causes voluntary failure (Salamon, 1987). Furthermore, time spent for CSO activity is limited in the case of voluntary workers, because they mainly work somewhere else as paid-worker to make a living. Therefore, voluntary workers should be

supported by professional, paid and full-time workers. However, CSO cannot always attract qualified and experienced personnel due to **limited amount of financial resources** to provide sufficient wages. In this case, it is a better strategy to manage voluntary workers professionally by increasing responsibility, personal skills and abilities. It was found that there is a statistically significant **linear** and **positive** relationship between the organizational performance of CSOs and **professional management of voluntary workers**. Therefore, **CSO managers** should provide more **training** and **education** (e.g., performance management, fund-raising, public relations, and project management) for their voluntary workers through **collaborations** with **individual experts**, **public institutions** and **non-public organizations** that are willing to support CSOs voluntarily.

*It might be a good strategy to make career in civil society more attractive by increasing public awareness on the functions, opportunities and benefits of CSOs. **Lack of qualified human resources** is a chronic problem of CSOs, because CSOs cannot always attract professional, full-time and paid workers due to lack of financial resources. On the other hand, it is also hard to find voluntary workers in regions where public awareness, level of knowledge, and trust in CSOs are low. In this sense, **policy-makers** and **public institutions** can increase **public awareness** on the career opportunities, benefits, and functions of CSOs with new strategies such as encouraging opening new courses, bachelor and graduate programs on civil society at educational institutions. Moreover, they*

can increase **visibility of CSOs in public sphere** by cooperating with CSOs through social projects, or programs. Moreover, it might be obligatory for candidates to have experience in civil society for job applications in some specific public institutions or private sector organizations.

### **3. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH**

*Trust-Related Theories failed to explain differentiation in size of CSOs in terms of trust in private sector organizations, so it is also necessary to research trust in others (e.g., public institutions, CSOs, and people) in the future research.* The findings of book could not detect any relationship between **trust in private sector organizations** and size of CSOs by empirical analysis. This result requires further and more comprehensive analysis, because **trust in others** (e.g., public institutions, CSOs, and people) should also be evaluated to find out significant relationships between different types of trust and size of CSOs, because trust is a multi-dimensional concept that influence more than few sectors, or segments of society. Considering only one-dimension limits interdisciplinary and explanatory power of trust. For instance, trust in CSOs was increased because of the high performance of some CSOs (especially AKUT-Search and Rescue Association) in helping people in need right after the Marmara earthquake disaster on August 17, 1999 in Turkey. On the other hand, many CSOs were closed down, because their relations was found with FETÖ behind the failed coup attempt in 2016. Consequently, many volunteers of these CSOs were arrested, or suspended from public institutions, so trust in

CSOs was seriously damaged in the Turkish society. Therefore, **trust in CSOs** before and after social, political, and economic crises is a potential research topic **for scholars** in the future.

*Entrepreneurship Theory failed to explain differentiation in size of CSOs in terms of ideological and religious motivation due to lack of secondary data, therefore, a further analysis and data collection is necessary to test same hypothesis with a larger sample in the future research.* Theoretical and empirical studies argue that **ideological and religious motivation** increases resources of CSOs (e.g., members, voluntary workers, donations and public support) that increase their size. It is argued that **religious** or **ideological character of a CSOs** can attract **money** and **customers**, which is very essential for the survival of an organization. In addition, the size of civil society sector is larger because of religious competition, where one or more religious bodies compete to attract more adherents by providing goods and services in area of healthcare and education. However, no relationship between type of motivation and size of CSOs was found in the case of Turkish CSOs. This might be due to **problem of categorizing** CSOs under “associations for religion, ideology, or social values” by T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society for CSOs, because it is possible that CSOs under other categories (e.g., associations for sport, or occupation) can also have religious or ideological motivation. This requires a **further and more comprehensive analysis** of CSOs with ideological or religious motivation under different categories as a potential research topic **for scholars** in the future.

*The Social Origins Theory failed to explain differentiation in size of CSOs due to lack of secondary data, therefore, a further analysis is necessary to test same hypothesis with new data that might be available in the future research.* It was found that there is **no linear** and **statistically significant** relationship between the size of CSOs and **government social welfare spending**. However, data for the case of NUTS-3 regions of Turkey was not sufficient and available to prove a significant relationship between these variables. Due to lack of data, only social spending in health and education was included in the statistical calculations. Data on other areas such as disable/invalidity pensions, unemployment pensions, social exclusion, and widow/orphan pensions does not exist at the 81 NUTS-3 level in Turkey. Only national data is given by official publication of TÜİK (Turkish Statistical Institute). **Scholars** can re-test the relationship between government social welfare spending and size of CSOs when the data of 81 NUTS-3 regions is available. In this sense, data of **public institutions** should be more accessible for the researchers.

*Organizational Theories failed to explain differentiation in organizational performance of CSOs due to unequal distribution of the sample in terms of organizational age, therefore, a further analysis and data collection is necessary to test same hypothesis with a larger sample and with more equal distribution of organizational age in the future research.* Theoretical and empirical studies on the organizational age failed to explain differentiation in organizational performance of CSOs in the case of 975 Youth CSOs in Turkey.

These Youth CSOs are selected as a sample in this research because they are mainly dynamic, and open to change and innovation. However, records show that most of these Youth CSOs (80%) are also newly-established later than the 2000s which prevented us from observing variations in a longer period. In other words, there was **no equal distribution of organizational age** of these CSOs for statistical calculations. Therefore, statistical results could not show a significant relationship between organizational age and organizational performance of these CSOs. In the future, **scholars** can re-test the relationship between organizational age and organizational performance of CSOs with a larger sample that includes equal distribution of newly-established and long-established CSOs.

*Organizational Theories failed to explain differentiation in organizational performance of CSOs in terms of experience of organizational leaders due to lack of data, therefore, a further analysis is necessary with new data that include experience of all organizational leaders in each CSO.* Although, it was theoretically assumed that experience of organizational leaders in CSOs, as an essential indicator of human capital, increases **workers' value** and their **performance**, there was **no linear** and **statistically significant** relationship between the organizational performance of CSOs, and **experience of organizational leaders** in the case of 975 Youth CSOs in Turkey. The surveys were applied to only one of the organizational leaders of each CSO (e.g., director, member, manager, and youth leaders), but the statistical results might change when data on the

experience of all organizational leaders in each CSO can result in another implication. Therefore, **scholars** can re-test the relationship between experience of organizational leaders and organizational performance of CSOs with a larger empirical data that is collected from all organizational leaders of each CSO in the future. To do this, a qualitative research that enables in-depth analysis at the organizational level is recommended.

*To make in-depth analysis at the organizational level, scholars might not only focus on CSOs carrying out activities for youth, sport, and education, but also CSOs operating in other areas of activities throughout Turkey.* In Turkey, available data on different types of CSOs is limited. T.R. Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society under the Ministry of Interior has a list and categorization of about 104.000 associations in 2017. However, they do not have information about other types of CSOs on their database that is available: foundations, unions, cooperatives, and professional organizations. In this sense, we cooperated with the Office of Relations with Civil Society Organizations under T.R. Ministry of Youth and Sports. They have a full-list of CSOs (e.g., associations, foundations, unions and others) that operate mainly in the areas of youth, sport and education throughout Turkey. These CSOs are dynamic, and open to change and innovation, because these areas require new strategies and reactions based on the social and technological developments. However, as it is discussed above, most of these CSOs were newly-established after the 2000s, so unequal

distribution of organizational age throughout our sample resulted in failure for the hypothesis indicating a relationship between organizational age and organizational performance of CSOs. However, minimizing activity areas is actually one of the strengths of the book since there is not available data for all types of CSOs in different areas of activity. Moreover, the **unit of analysis is organization** (N=975), so it is easier to make statistical explanations with higher number of unit of analysis. In addition, these CSOs were **randomly selected**, and the sample of 975 CSOs include **different types of CSOs** such as associations, foundations, unions and others from 81 cities of Turkey. But still, **scholars** might focus on CSOs in other areas of activity with a larger sample that includes equal distribution of newly-established and long-established CSOs in **their future research**.

*There is a need to make specific analysis for the size of CSOs especially in big cities of Turkey such as Izmir, Ankara, and Istanbul.* In multivariable data, “**Mahalanobis Distance**” was used to determine outliers and extreme values based on the number of variables for the first model that is created to find out relationships between size of CSOs and independent variables. During the analysis of data for 81 NUTS-3 Regions, data of **four cities were excluded** (Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Karabük), because they were outside of the determined borders of Mahalanobis Distance. These cities mainly have higher populations, and numbers of CSOs that have larger size, revenues, members, and workers compared to CSOs in other cities.

Therefore, statistical calculations and multiple regression were made with the data of 77 NUTS-3 regions of Turkey. **Scholars** can make a specific research for these 4 NUTS-3 regions in **future analysis**.

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
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