



# EFFECTIVENESS IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Dr. Şükrü ÖZCAN



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**Dr. Şükrü ÖZCAN**



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This work was produced from the dissertation prepared by the author that had aimed to examine the key factors that influence effectiveness of a crisis management process in public sector.

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## PREFACE

This study aims to examine the key factors that influence effectiveness of a crisis management process in public sector. To achieve this aim, the researcher formulated two research questions: Firstly, *‘what are the key tasks that influence the effectiveness of a crisis management process in public sector?’* Secondly, *‘from the public sector perspective, what are the main barriers to an effective crisis management process? In other words, why do crises challenge public institutions?’*

In order to deal with the first research question, the researcher has initially developed a synthesis of the key tasks that influence the success of a crisis management process through some crisis management models. The synthesis was based on three stages and included a number of tasks for each phase: planning for possible crises and detecting an upcoming crisis in preparation phase; organising, leading, decision-making, managing the public’s perception, managing emotions and managing the agenda in management phase; managing the blame and learning from crisis in evaluation phase.

After developing the synthesis, the researcher has focused on questioning why and / or to what extent these tasks have the potential to influence the effectiveness of a crisis management process, and examining the main obstacles that hamper performing these tasks in order to address the second research question about the main barriers to an effective crisis management process. To achieve this, following a thorough literature review, on the one hand, the crisis management

process experienced after the Van Earthquake that occurred in 2011 in Turkey was studied as a case. On the other hand, a series of interviews with some Turkish policy makers were conducted.

In this study, the researcher has found that all the tasks in the synthesis are essential to effectively deal with crises but there are various barriers that hamper carrying out these tasks in the public sector. Unless these barriers are removed, crises are likely to continue to challenge public authorities in future.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Crises occur at any place and at any time. There are two main factors causing crises; namely nature and human. Nature sometimes causes crises while showing his power – those are called natural disasters – and sometimes it causes crises as a result of the deterioration of its relationship with human beings. And human being brings about crises while performing social, economic, political and technological activities in order to maintain its presence and to dominate the nature. Whatever the reasons of crises are, crises put individuals under huge pressure and provoke their emotional reactions (Reynolds & Seeger, 2012). Like individuals, organizations are vulnerable to crises. Crises disrupt the stability, function, and goals of organizations (Klann, 2003). Crises have a potential to impose severe strain on an organization's financial, physical, and emotional structures, and might even jeopardise the survival of the whole organization (Jaques, 2010).

Even though crises are traumatic and threatening, they also provide some opportunities for organisations - particularly - for public ones. Crises offer a lot of potential lessons for preparation for future crises (Boin et al, 2005). They are opportunities to study the performance of public institutions under extreme pressure (Boin & 't Hart, 2003). In their enormity, uncertainty, and sensitivity, crises have a potential to threaten the status quo and delegitimize the policies and institutions underpinning the status quo (Cortell & Peterson, 1999). More importantly, from a political perspective, political learning and change processes which take place at a slower rate under normal

circumstances may be drastically accelerated under crisis conditions because the normal inertia and resistance to change is often overcome by societal and political dynamics (Boin et al, 2005). It is, however, clear that turning crises into opportunities for public institutions depends on managing them effectively and properly.

### **1.1. Aim and research questions**

As mentioned above, although crises are traumatic and threatening, they also represent some opportunities for public organisations. However, turning crises into opportunities for public institutions depends on managing them effectively and properly. Therefore, the research aims to examine the key factors that influence effectiveness of a crisis management process in public sector. To achieve this aim, I pose the following research questions:

1. What are the key tasks that influence the effectiveness of a crisis management process in public sector?
2. From the public sector perspective, what are the main barriers to an effective crisis management process? In other words, why do crises challenge public institutions?

### **1.2. Research strategy and preferred methodology**

In order to deal with the first research question, the researcher has initially focused on a number of major models that handled crisis management as a process. This focusing has revealed that even though a crisis management process was divided into various stages and these

stages were identified in different ways in these models, it was possible to symbolize a crisis management process by the major three phases; namely preparation, management, and evaluation phase. Studying various crisis management models has also revealed that while preparation phase was often related to dealing with issues such as planning, training, mitigation, avoiding the crisis, and recognising a crisis (sense making), and so on; management phase was generally associated with dealing with issues such as coordination of crisis response, damage containment, containing the crisis, deciding critical response choices and their implementation, leading, and communicating with the stakeholders (meaning making) etc. Similarly, evaluation phase was mostly related to the accountability process which includes managing the accusations, and evaluating the crisis management process for lessons. Hence, the researcher developed a synthesis of the key tasks that influence the effectiveness of a crisis management process based *mainly* on these models (*see* 3.4). The synthesis was based on three stages and included a number of tasks for each phase: planning for possible crises and detecting an upcoming crisis in preparation phase; organising, leading, decision-making, managing the public's perception, managing emotions (included by the researcher), and managing the agenda (included by the researcher) in management phase; managing the blame and learning from crisis in evaluation phase.

After developing the synthesis, the researcher focused on exploring potentials and limitations of the tasks in the synthesis. In other words,

he focused on questioning why and / or to what extent these tasks have the potential to influence the effectiveness of a crisis management process, and examining the main obstacles that hamper performing these tasks in order to address the second research question about the main barriers to an effective crisis management process. To achieve this, following a thorough literature review, on the one hand, the crisis management process experienced after the Van Earthquake that occurred in 2011 in Turkey was studied as a case. The researcher preferred a natural disaster to study as a case because natural disasters have common characteristics of crises such as uncertainty, unexpected threats, high level of anxiety on the side of policy-makers, the probability of violence, the assumption that crucial and immediate decisions need to be taken under the pressure and existence of incomplete information, a stressful environment, and time limitation. On the other hand, a series of interviews with some Turkish policy makers such as undersecretaries, chairmen of some boards and departments, and civil inspectors, governors, deputy governors, and district governors etc. were conducted. Indeed, after testing how the synthesis worked in an actual crisis management process and searching the main barriers in a real process; the researcher re-tested the synthesis and examined the main challenges to crisis management practices through the findings getting from the interviews with a number of public figures that make the crisis management policies in Turkey.

### **1.3. Plan of study**

The study is composed of eight chapters. Following this introductory chapter is the literature review (Chapter 2). Here the term of ‘crisis’ is handled before the concept of ‘crisis management.’ The chapter is composed of four basic parts. The first part of the chapter provides a comprehensive knowledge about the concept of crisis. This part starts with several definitions of the term crisis and follows on the different approaches to its characteristics, types, and advantages. Here the impact of crisis on both individuals and organisations is also explored. In particular, why crises challenge both public institutions and their administrators is examined in here. The second part is about the defining the concept of crisis management. As for the third part, it provides an overview of the growth of scholarly knowledge within the cross-disciplinary field of crisis management studies. Here I describe the major strands of the scholarly field referred to as crisis management studies. Further, a number of contemporary crisis management studies from the Turkish literature are summarised in this section. The literature review chapter ends with the fourth part discussing effectiveness in crisis management processes in the light of the previous academic studies. In this sub-section of the review, I also turn the spotlight to the main obstacles to evaluating the success or failure in crisis response practices.

In the third chapter, in order to deal with the first research question about the key tasks that influence effectiveness of a crisis management process, the researcher focuses on a number of major models that handled the term ‘crisis management’ as a process. After reviewing the core models, at the end of the chapter, the researcher develops a synthesis of the key tasks that affect the success of crisis management process based mainly on these models.

Chapter 4 broadly studies the tasks in the synthesis presented at the end of the third chapter. The chapter is established on the debate about the potentials and limitations of the tasks composing the synthesis. In other words, it questions why and / or to what extent these tasks have the potential to influence the success of crisis management process, and it examines the main obstacles to these tasks in order to address the second research question concerning the main barriers to effective crisis management process. The chapter is composed of three main sections. The first section focuses on the preparation phase tasks; namely planning for possible crises and detecting an approaching crisis. Indeed, it studies the potentials and limitations of these two tasks. Likewise, the second section studies the potentials and limitations of the management phase tasks such as organising, leading, decision-making, managing the public perception, feelings management, and managing the agenda. As for the third section, it focuses on managing the blame and learning from crisis as two critical tasks related to the evaluation phase.

Chapter 5 discusses the methodology used in this research, and outlines the approach adopted. The chapter considers the research design and methodology available to the researcher. Notably, it examines not only the advantages and disadvantages of particular research methods, but also the data gathering procedures to be used. After the two main research strategies (namely; case study and qualitative interviews) to be used by the researcher in the thesis are evaluated, the triangulation of these methods is discussed. Finally, the chapter reflects on the ethical issues raised by the research.

Chapter 6 aims to demonstrate how the tasks in the synthesis worked in a real crisis management process, and to find out what the main barriers to these tasks in a real process were. In other words, the synthesis is tested, and the main obstacles to effective crisis management are examined through an actual case in here. The chapter starts with the discussion about the crisis management systems in the Turkish public administration. Then, it studies the crisis management process experienced following the Van Earthquake that occurred in 2011 in Turkey as a case.

As for the seventh chapter, it discusses the importance of the tasks in the synthesis and tries to find out the main obstacles that hamper to perform these tasks in the public sector through the views of various Turkish policy makers. In other words, here the synthesis is re-tested, and the main challenges to crisis management practices in the public sector are explored through the findings getting from the interviews with a number of Turkish policy makers at national level such as

undersecretaries, chairmen of some boards and departments, and civil inspectors, governors, deputy governors, and district governors, and so on. Chapter 7 is composed of two main sections. In the first section, both the significance of the tasks in the synthesis and the main barriers to these tasks are discussed through the views of various policy makers. As for the second section, it draws attention to the lessons I have learnt from the policy makers in relation to both my framework and the main challenges to crisis management practices in the public sector.

The study ends with Chapter 8 which presents conclusions and the new directions for future research.

## **2. LITERATURE REVIEW: CRISIS AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT**

### **2.1. Introduction**

Crises are often linked to social, economic and political conditions and tensions, and therefore, a full understanding of these factors is essential to understanding crisis management ('t Hart, 1993: 40). Therefore, here the term of crisis will be handled before the concept of crisis management. The chapter is composed of four basic parts. The first part of the chapter provides a comprehensive knowledge about the concept of crisis. This part starts with several definitions of the term crisis and follows on the different approaches to its characteristics, types, and advantages. Here the impact of crisis on both individuals and organisations is also explored. In particular, why crises challenge both public institutions and their administrators is examined in here. The second part is about the defining the concept of crisis management. As for the third part, it provides an overview of the growth of scholarly knowledge within the cross-disciplinary field of crisis management studies. Here I describe the major strands of the scholarly field referred to as crisis management studies. Further, a number of contemporary crisis management studies from the Turkish literature are summarised in this section. The literature review chapter ends with the fourth part discussing effectiveness in crisis management processes in the light of the previous academic studies. In this sub-section of the review, I also turn the spotlight to the main

obstacles to evaluating the success or failure in crisis response practices.

## **2.2. Concept of Crisis**

Here the term ‘crisis’ with its several definitions, features, types, and impact is handled in a broad perspective. Crisis as a term derived from the Greek word “krino” which means decision and to decide (Şahin: 2003:337). However, there are different approaches to the term of crisis because - as Lebow (1981:7) stated - similar to most of the significant concepts of disputed in both natural and social science, researchers usually describe the term in line with their methodological perspectives or the focus of concern in their studies.

### **2.2.1. Defining Crisis**

Before discussing about crisis management practices throughout the study, the definition of a crisis should be established. Scholars have defined the concept of crisis in a number of ways because - as Drennan and McConnell (2007) point out - individuals view crises in different ways based on their own beliefs, understandings, and responsibilities, and so on. There are, therefore, perhaps roughly as many definitions of crisis as there are crisis management researchers. Here a number of definitions will be given in chronological order starting from 1970s to show how the content of the term crisis has changed according to the various researchers’ perspectives over time.

Bell (1971) handles the term of crisis in the framework of governmental actions and he emphasises that crisis is a turning point when decisions are made by governments. On the other hand, Fink (1986) emphasises both its negative and positive effects in his definition: “crisis is an unstable time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending- either one with the distinct possibility of a highly undesirable outcome or one with the distinct possibility of a highly desirable and extremely positive outcome” (p.15). Another definition points out the main characteristics of a crisis which will be dealt in the next section. According to the definition, crisis is a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a social system which – under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances – requires making critical decisions (Rosenthal, Charles, & ‘t Hart, 1989:10). Pauchant and Mitroff (1992: 15) define the term as “a disruption that physically affects a system as a whole and threatens its fundamental assumptions, its subjective sense of self, and its existential core.” It is clear that the last definition contains non-organization crises (such as natural disasters) that have an impact, not only on individual organizations, also on a community system as a whole.

There is not a commonly accepted perspective on the term of crisis as - first of all - the researchers usually describe the term in accordance with their methodological perspectives. Second, as Rosenthal and Kouzmin (1997) point out, a crisis is not simply a black and white situation that everybody can agree on and there can be a great variety

of potential crises triggered from many circumstances. To exemplify, as an authority in crisis management studies, `t Hart (1993) approaches to the concept as a threat to the core values of the affected system and stresses that it must quickly be dealt with at times of deep uncertainty (p.9). Similarly, Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997) define crisis as a threat to one or more basic values of a state, along with an awareness of finite time for response to the value threat (p. 3). Furthermore, in the description of Birkland (1997:3) crises are “focusing events”, which are rare, harmful, unexpected event(s) that become known to the mass public and policy elites virtually simultaneously. According to Heath (1998), a crisis represents a serious event affecting human safety, the environment and which has either received or been threatened by adverse publicity. While Seeger et al (1998: 233) see a crisis as an unexpected and non-routine event; Pearson and Clair (1998) define the concept in the organisational framework as follows:

Crisis is a low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of the organisation and is characterised by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly (p.60).

As stated before, it is often hard to narrow down one specific perspective on what a crisis is or an exact definition of crisis, because there is the matter of personal perspective (Mitroff, 2001). Though the depths of definitions vary, they each employ the same principles. First, a crisis is a high-impact event that can drastically affect the

ability of both individuals and organizations to sustain themselves. Second, a crisis can damage or be a threat to quality of the relationship between an organization and its stakeholders (Coombs and Holladay, 2001: 324) because it generally emerges “with little or no warning” (Youngson, 2001: 52). Furthermore, as Fearn-Banks (2002: 2) stated, a crisis can be regarded as a major incidence with a potentially negative outcome affecting an organization, company or industry, as well as its publics, goods, and services.

As stated earlier, what constitutes a crisis is a matter of personal judgment, not a matter of fact. To expand, it depends on individuals’ perceptions of the scale and importance of the issue they experienced, the degree to which they are influenced, and the extent to which it may give an opportunity for them to benefit. As McConnell (2003: 393) stated, ‘crisis’ is simply a word, attached by individuals to a particular set of social circumstances, trying to draw attention to the fact that something out of the ordinary is happening, taking us away from a desirable state of affairs. On the other hand, a crisis is “an event, revelation, allegation or set of circumstances which threatens the integrity, reputation, or survival of an individual (Sapriel, 2003: 348). Crisis is a key moment or critical period that brings both surprise and dramatic change into individuals’ lives (Gene Klann, 2003: 4).

As for the definitions given in more recent studies, crisis is a sudden or evolving change- that results in an urgent problem that may be dealt with immediately (Luecke, 2004: xvi). A crisis may also be defined by

feelings of panic, fear, danger or shock, and the commensurate inter-organizational effect those feelings have (Darling et al, 2005: 347). Finally, in a broad definition by Adkins (2010: 97), crisis is an unexpected and unpredictable incident which threatens both high-priority organisational targets and expectations of an organisation's stakeholders, places non-routine demands on the organisation by producing both potentially negative outcomes and accusations. All the definitions of the term 'crisis' given so far can be summarised in a Table 2-1 as follows:

**Table 2-1** Summary of Various Crisis Definitions

<b>Definition</b>	<b>Author</b>
A turning point when decisions are made by governments	Bell (1971)
An unstable time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending	Fink (1986)
A serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values of a social system which requires making crucial decisions	Rosenthal, Charles & 't Hart (1989)
A disruption that physically affects a system as a whole and threatens its fundamental assumptions and existential core	Mitroff (1992)
A threat to the core values of the affected system and thus must quickly be dealt with at times of deep uncertainty	't Hart (1993)
A threat to one or more basic values of a state	Brecher & Wilkenfeld (1997)
A rare, harmful, sudden event that become known to the mass public and policy makers simultaneously	Birkland (1997)
A serious incident affecting human safety	Heath (1998)
Unexpected and non-routine event	Seeger et al (1998)

A low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of the organisation	Pearson & Clair (1998)
A threat that can damage the quality of the relationship between and organisation and its stakeholders	Coombs & Holladay (2001)
A situation that generally emerges with little or no warning	Youngson (2002)
A major occurrence with a potentially negative outcome affecting an organisation or a company, as well as its reputation	Fearn-Banks (2002)
Something out of ordinary	McConnell (2003)
An event that threatens the integrity or survival of an individual	Sapriel (2003)
A key moment that brings dramatic change into people's lives	Gene Klann (2003)
A sudden change causes an urgent problem that may be coped with immediately	Luecke (2004)
Feelings of panic, fear, danger or shock	Darling et al (2005)
An unexpected and unpredictable event that threatens high-priority organisational goals and places non-routine demands on the organisation by producing negative outcomes and accusations	Adkins (2010)

It is obvious that there are more definitions in the literature than ones exemplified in the Table 2-1. Even though there are some differences between the definitions, crisis is commonly seen as a serious threat to the core values of a system and as an unexpected event that places non-routine demands on both organisations and individuals. Researchers also commonly see the term crisis as an urgent and unpredictable problem which must be dealt with immediately and as a high-impact event that requires making critical decisions under uncertainty. It must also be noted that only the last two definitions

highlight the emotions and accusations produced by crises. As a result, it is possible to make a comprehensive definition of the term through combining the definitions studied so far as follows:

A crisis is a situation which emerges with little warning, results in an urgent problem with a high level of uncertainty that must be handled immediately, which provokes individual emotions (such as perception, panic, fear, stress etc.) by putting people under immense pressure, requires vital decisions to be made, sets a new agenda for both individuals and organisations to manage, which has the potential to produce negative outcomes and accusations if managed ineffectively, and which has the potential to generate a great variety of invaluable lessons for both organisations and individuals to learn.

Now, the following sections dealing with the main features, types, and impacts of crisis will be established on the definition given above. Indeed, the following sections will expand the definition.

### **2.2.2. Characteristics of Crisis**

Every crisis is unique. Each has its own causal factors, ramifications, period, rhythm, and unknowns (Boin *et al.*, 2005). In many definitions, there are some common characteristics such as uncertainty, unexpected threats, high level of anxiety on the side of policy-makers, the probability of violence, the assumption that crucial and immediate decisions need to be taken under the pressure and existence of incomplete information, a stressful environment, and time limitation (Boin *et al.*, 2005; McConell and Drennan, 2006; Rollo & Zdziarski, 2007). Since a crisis occurs abruptly, it threatens the interests and gives birth to many uncertainties, and it is sometimes

regarded as a frightening issue to deal with (Gilbert & Lauren, 1980: 642). Crisis also threatens to the basic structure (physical and non-physical) and to basic human needs (such as security, wellbeing, or health) of a community (Mitroff, 2001; Boin et al, 2005: 3).

Both inconceivability and unexpected nature of a crisis situation generate extreme psychological stress (Schneider, 1995). Indeed, the nature of modern crises has been becoming increasingly inconceivable in a world of globalisation, deregulation, information and communication technology, hyperterrorism, mutating viruses and so on (Lagadec and Carli, 2005). The modern crisis is increasingly complex as the nature of threats has now taken on more of a transnational character (Rosenthal et al. 2001). It is no longer confined to its site of origin because any crisis in one country can rapidly spill over to others (Boin, & 't Hart, 2003: 545).

A crisis situation can be characterised as an unstable time in which a decisive change is approaching. According to Fink (2002: 15), a crisis can be characterised in four phases which are prodromal, acute, and chronic and crisis resolution respectively. The first phase is the warning stage. If a crisis is an evolving change, it is predicted before and thus, it is much easier to deal with. On the contrary, if a crisis emerges suddenly it cannot be recognised in advance, and therefore it is hard to cope with. The second phase is the point of no return and even if the crisis cannot be controlled, it may be possible to exert some influence over it. The key features of the crisis at this stage are speed and intensity. The third one is the clean-up stage, a period of

recovery and self-analysis. Further crisis management planning often occurs in this period of the crisis. Finally, the last phase gives the chance to turn the crisis into an opportunity.

As Rosenthal (1998) stated, we should abandon the notion that crises are events that are neatly delineated in time and space. Instead, we need to treat crises as extended periods of high threat, high uncertainty, and high politics that disrupt a wide range of social, political, and institutional processes (Rosenthal, 1998). Crises also cause the context of fear and disruption to everyday activities and normal positive administrative functions of governmental bodies (Laufer, 2007). A crisis situation relates to a specific situation when government capacity is inadequate to control a situation using its own resources (Ozerdem & Jacoby, 2006). In other words, a crisis situation has the potential to create great complexity, and consequently can be managed by adaptive or second order expertise and methods, not routine or structured responses (Turner, 1994).

According to Stern (2000), there are five types of complexity associated with crises: political, institutional, temporal, informational, and problem complexity. To expand political complexity, crises in particular natural disasters generally become political depending on their impact on both political system and its actors (Olson, 2000: 265). Crises are of high salience not only to governments, but also to political oppositions and a variety of societal actors including mass media as crises have a potential to affect the key interests of several actors and stakeholders (Stern, 2000: 14). Thus the political

complexity associated with crisis situations is significant. On the other hand, various decision makers and agencies are drawn into a crisis at different moments, from different points of view, and with different purposes because of the fact that they hold different perceptions stemming from differences in tasks, jurisdictions, education, locality, level of preparedness, and other political and administrative considerations. This is called institutional complexity (Stern, 2000: 15). Temporal complexity has diachronic and synchronic dimensions. From a diachronic perspective, crisis perception and behaviour are affected by prior experience of key figures and stakeholders. According to synchronic perspective, crisis perception and behaviour is profoundly affected both by what has happened in the past, also by the present. In other words, the nature of the current political context is highly salient (Stern, 2000: 16).

As for the informational complexity, it is related to decision-making process in crisis. Paradoxically, problems of information shortage and overload challenge crisis managers. Crises can be described as information-poor situations (Coombs 2007: 113). Crucial information can be required to make crucial decisions within a crisis but there is not always perfect and complete knowledge (March, 1994: 15). Ironically, an equally debilitating problem can be informational overload (info pollution). Without mechanisms for coping with the flow of information, decision-makers may become paralyzed or indiscriminatingly attentive to idiosyncratic nuggets of information which may excessively affect their judgements (Stern, 2000: 17).

Finally, according to the author, problem complexity refers to the fact that not only is the notion of a unitary state actor an analytical fiction, but so is the notion of a unitary or even dominant crisis problem.

In conclusion, as Boin and 't Hart (2003) stated, crises are dynamic and chaotic processes, not discrete events sequenced neatly on a linear time scale. A crisis may smolder, flare up, wind down, flare up again, depending as much on the pattern of physical events as on the framing and interpretation of these events by the mass media, politics, and the public (Boin, & 't Hart, 2003: 546). From a more sociological perspective, a working notion of crisis might start with the idea that it highlights discontinuities and disruptions of dominant conceptions of social and political order (Rosenthal, 1978). Crises, whatever their origins are, therefore always contain multiple levels of individual and organisational conflict ('t Hart, 1993: 42). The main features of crises can be summarised in a Table 2-2 as follows:

**Table 2-2** Characteristics of Crisis

<b>CHARACTERISTICS OF CRISIS</b>
<b>Uniqueness:</b> Each crisis has its own causal factors, effects, period, and rhythm
<b>Uncertainty:</b> Each crisis has some unknowns, produce unforeseen results
<b>Unexpectedness:</b> emerges with little or no warning
<b>An unstable time:</b> a decisive change is impending
<b>Threatening:</b> threatens to the basic human needs such as security, wellbeing, or health
<b>Time limitation:</b> Each crisis requires immediate decisions under time pressure
<b>High level of anxiety:</b> Crises generate extreme psychological stress, fear, panic etc.

<b>Transnational:</b> Any crisis in one country can rapidly spill over to others
<b>High politics:</b> crises disrupts a wide range of social, political, and institutional processes
<b>Political Complexity:</b> crises affects political order and its actors
<b>Institutional complexity:</b> various decision makers and agencies are drawn into a crisis at different moments, from different points of view
<b>Temporal complexity:</b> Crisis perception and behaviour are affected by prior experience of key actors and stakeholders
<b>Informational complexity:</b> Information shortage and overload challenge
<b>Dynamic and chaotic processes:</b> multiple levels of individual and organisational conflict
<b>Difficult to manage:</b> crises cannot be managed by routine and structured structures

### 2.2.3. Crisis Types

There seem to be as many possible forms of crisis as there are different crisis definitions (Kent, 2010; Massey & Larson, 2006). Crisis management scholars have developed various perspectives on crisis types. Distinguishing between various crises and disasters is important because the requirements for effective crisis management depend on the type of event.

According to Booth (1993), there are three main types of crisis. These will tend to alter the crisis response in different ways. The first type is a sudden or immediate crisis which is the conventional view of a crisis situation, occurring in the form of a swift, unanticipated event (such as an earthquake). In most cases, when an unexpected crisis leads to confusion both on the ground and in the crisis centre, it produces a

large measure of improvisation in the response (Boin et al, 2005: 54). The second type is a creeping crisis which does not have the characteristics of condensed dramatic events to focus our attention. Rather, vulnerable conditions and pressures build up gradually, often over many years. Global warming can be given as an example of this kind of crisis. More usually, creeping crises arrive on an agenda by stealth and often unrecognised or dismissed in their early stages, and therefore they will tend to generate a ‘business as usual’ response. The third one is chronic crisis that can last for weeks, months, or even years (Parsons, 1996). Whilst there may be ‘creeping’ aspects to them and the occasional sudden beginning of extraordinary circumstances, they are chronic because they are ongoing crises with no obvious solution. As a consequence of learning from continual problems, responses to chronic crises will tend to have usual measures ‘on the shelf’, waiting to be used when necessary.

Crises also take many forms. These different contexts of crisis are crucial in shaping and evaluating government response. Several crisis classifications have been developed in the literature. The first form of crises is *natural disasters* which differ in complexity, i.e., in the number of various physical forces operative at a certain time, and in violence, or the degree of cultural destruction wrought (Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1997; Seeger et al, 2003; Mitroff, 2004; Schoff, 2004; Cavanaugh, 2006; Laufer, 2007; Griffin, 2007; Ulmer et al., 2007; Gilpin & Murphey, 2008). According to Olson (2000), phases for

rapid-onset disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes can be described as follow:

(1) *Pre-Impact*, a period of indefinite length preceding the event; (2) *Impact*, those moments or hours in which the community sustains its direct physical losses; (3) *Response*, the period in which rescue and the saving of lives from impact effects are the paramount activities, usually lasting a maximum of a month; (4) *Recovery*, when the basic life support systems (water, power, sanitation, food and energy supply lines, medical facilities, etc.) of the affected community are repaired at least temporarily; and (5) *Reconstruction*, another period of indefinite length when the community rebuilds for the long-term (p.267).

Natural disasters are accidental and unforeseeable events (Schoff, 2004; Ulmer et al, 2007). Natural disasters can also be called as *victim crises*, which attributes minimal organisational crisis responsibility (Coombs, 2007; Holladay, 2010). The victims of natural disasters often suffer from psychological effects and withdrawal due to the overwhelming nature of the experience. Disasters are focusing events that include alteration and learning processes in policies (Birkland, 2006, p.5; Boin & 't Hart, 2006, p. 52) because natural events certainly disrupt institutions, and overload political structures, and they can even bring down regimes (Olson, 2000: 268; Smith et al., 2003).

The second form is *accidents* including spills, explosions, technical error accidents, and product defects (Olson, 2000; Seeger et al, 2003; Mitroff, 2004; Schoff, 2004; Coombs, 2007; Holladay, 2010). Quarantelli (1987: 25) describes an *accident* as an event that requires established response organizations. Accidents assign low

organisational crisis responsibility (Coombs, 2007; Holladay, 2010). Therefore, as Olson (2000: 268) claimed, accidents do not really overload political systems. Third one is *intentional crises* such as workplace violence, product tampering, sabotage, hostile takeovers, dishonest and unethical leadership, terrorism, and war, and so on (Seeger et al, 2003; Mitroff, 2004; Schoff, 2004; Ulmer et al, 2007). Intentional crises can be prevented before, and therefore they attribute strong organisational crisis responsibility (Coombs, 2007a; Holladay, 2010).

On the other hand, according to Gundel (2005: 110) there are four different types of crises: conventional, unexpected, intractable and fundamental. *Conventional* crises can be foreseen in advance and have known influences on other factors, hence their probability and prevention actions are well known. *Unexpected* crises are uncommon, and thus preparation for them may be limited. *Intractable* crises can be predictable but the response may be in conflict with other interests and some damage may be irreversible. Here, organisations should focus on exploring the affected system and on anticipating such an incident. *Fundamental* crises are the most hazardous; they are unpredictable and preparedness for them does not exist: 9/11 can be given as an example of this sort of crises.

Finally, crises can be divided into seven major groups (Mitroff 2004): First, economic, such as labour problems, stock market falls, and economic downturns; second, informational, such as loss of data and false information; third, physical, such as loss of key equipment,

plants, material supplies, and product failures; fourth, human resources, such as death of key staff, corruption, and workplace violence; fifth, reputational crises including defamation, gossip, rumours, and damage to reputation; sixth, psychopathic acts, such as product tampering, terrorism, criminal acts, and hostage taking; and last, natural disasters, such as earthquakes, fires, floods, and hurricanes etc.

#### **2.2.4. Impact of Crisis**

Within the definition, a crisis is an unusual situation or unpredictable event that can affect individuals or organisations, may cause financial and reputational damage, or can threaten stakeholder relations (Coombs, 2009; Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2007). Crises can disrupt people's perceptions of themselves and their world and impact organizational structure, mission and values (Rollo and Zdziarski, 2007). In other words, the perception of an unpredictable event threatens important expectancies of stakeholders and seriously impacts an institution's performance (Boin & 't Hart, 2006: 42; Coombs, 2007a: 2-3) as crises produce a disruption to the routine of an individual or organization; cause a sense of lack of control. Natural disasters - particularly catastrophic ones such as earthquakes - may cause extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions.

#### **2.2.4.1. Individuals and Crisis**

A crisis is often relative to the point of view of the person who is affected by the crisis (Coombs, 2007a). It should be kept in mind that even though a crisis strikes at the heart of an organization, at the centre of a crisis are those individuals most directly affected; they are also the first and most important responders (Reynolds & Seeger, 2012: 8).

Each crisis will carry its own psychological consequences due to the fact that - as mentioned before - crises put people under immense pressure and provoke emotional reactions. As Reynolds and Seegers (2012) described, when confronted with a crisis, people may go into shock and become paralyzed to the point of helplessness. Perceived helplessness is one of the most devastating psychological impacts of a crisis on individuals (Reynolds & Seeger, 2012: 21). Fear, worry, and stress are also major psychological considerations in the response to a crisis. More importantly, a crisis situation can have a long term impact on a person`s life, often becoming a memorable event that a person may feel emotionally attached to for months to years after it happens (Cavanaugh, 2006). Apart from the citizens, key figures that have the responsibility to manage a crisis situation are also negatively affected by its negative consequences. It can even be claimed that crises have a potential to remove some key figures from public if not managed properly.

#### **2.2.4.2. Organisations and Crisis**

Organizations are designed in many different forms and include various amounts of people, goals, systems, technology, and organizational plans (Smits & Ezzat, 2003). Like individuals, organizations are vulnerable to crises; crises have the potential to disrupt the continuity, operation, and goals of organizations (Klann, 2003; Ulmer et al., 2007). Crises impose severe strain on the organization's financial, physical, and emotional structures, and may even put the survival of the whole organization in danger due to the stresses placed on the organization through the disruption, lack of communication, and information in crisis situations (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993: 49; Klann, 2003; Smits & Ezzat, 2003; Ergünay, 2005: 9; Jaques, 2010).

Crisis is an unexpected, dramatic, and often exceptional event that forces an organization into chaos and may destroy the organization without urgent and decisive action (Victor et al, 2005: 1). Crises threaten the culture, aims, and existence of the organization by eliminating its resistance and adaptation mechanisms (Tağraf & Arslan, 2003:150). Therefore, an organisation cannot, on its own, put an immediate end to a crisis. A crisis is challenge for organisations in particular when it escalates. As a crisis escalates, organizational structures are systematically updated to reflect the changes in the nature of the crisis and the number of parties involved. A crisis threatens to damage organisational reputation because a crisis gives people reasons to think badly of the organization (Coombs 2007a:

164). Threats to reputation, whether real or perceived, can destroy, literally in hours or days (Regester and Larkin 2005: 2). As Jaques (2010: 9) stated, virtually nothing can damage organisational reputation more rapidly and more deeply than the consequences of a major crisis. Therefore, the actual potential damage to the organisation is considerable.

Specifically, natural disasters have a number of effects on organisations (Heide, 1989: 36). Disasters may -first of all- put demands on organizations, requiring them to make internal changes in structure and delegation of responsibilities. Second, disasters can generate the need for different organizations to share resources (personnel, vehicles, equipment, supplies, and facilities) because they produce demands that exceed the capacities of single organizations. Third, disasters may cross jurisdictional boundaries, resulting in many organizations being faced with overlapping responsibilities. Fourth, disasters may produce new tasks for which no organization has traditional responsibility. Furthermore, they can result in the unplanned formation of new organizations that did not exist before. Finally, disasters may attract the participation of organizations who usually do not respond to emergencies.

#### **2.2.4.3. Governments and Crises: Why are crises challenging for governments?**

Like many other environments, the public organization environment is organic and changeable. Public organizations are established due to

political decisions taken to deal with various social issues. Their activity continues as long as there is political support because they are dependent on government policies, external resources, and multiple stakeholders (Moore, 1995). Public organizations are also dependent on public legitimacy and accountability because public figures are financially, legally and politically accountable to collective values such as democracy and justice (Moore, 1995; Joldersma & Winter, 2002). Further, public managers need to produce public value, which is far more ambiguous in terms of achievement and estimation (Moore, 1995). Hence, public managers need to deal with vague public goals and various stakeholders' interests and needs (Joldersma & Winter, 2002: 88; Boin et al, 2008: 292). In sum, the public organization's environment is permeated by an indefinite potential for ambiguity, dilemmas and value conflicts. Crises are big challenges for governmental bodies as they have to deal with crises in such a complex environment.

The most crucial challenge is to recognise the crisis (Shekhar, 2009: 359). It is hard to detect crises particularly natural disasters because - as Şahin (2009) stated - their exact timing is often unknown before the incidents. Boin et al (2005) also point out some different reasons why public authorities are not successful in detecting crises. First of all, the driving mechanisms of a crisis are often concealed behind the complexities of our modern systems. Second, most public organisations are ill-equipped to detect impending crisis and unwilling to spend a great deal of resources on the detection of future crises.

Third, public authorities cannot put together the pieces of the crisis puzzle before it happens because the signals come into very different corners of the organisation that speak different languages. More importantly, crises have the capacity to challenge public organizations' every day life and the internal logic between strategy and operational components. This means that a perfect organizational culture for routine might be a burden when a sudden change emerges. In other words, governmental agencies generally seek to achieve certain politically articulated goals such as making the trains run on time, providing housing for poor, bringing literacy up to higher levels etc. Therefore, this preoccupation with achievement rather than avoidance has implications for the capacity to recognise crises.

Another challenge is that citizens in the risk society anticipate high-standard government care in the event of a crisis (Boin & 't Hart, 2003). To expand, the victims and stakeholders want governmental bodies to meet their short-term physical and financial needs. They also expect assistance in the years following a crisis; they wait for help with material disruptions, health problems, and psychosocial trauma (Boin & 't Hart, 2003). Moreover, it is often necessary that various organisations take part in managing a crisis. However, each organization in the disaster area is connected to a different organizational entity, which produces a complex relationship web (Sahin, 2009). For example, some local crisis management organizations, including first responders such as police and fire brigades are connected to local municipalities, and some international

disaster relief organizations are connected to international institutions (Sahin, 2009)

In a crisis situation, the media can determine the effects of government actions, generate the post-event perception, publicize ideas of what actually happened, assess the authority performance, and promote or squash rumours (Rosenthal et al, 2001). Therefore, governmental bodies need to provide very good and proper information to the media. However, as Liu and Horsley (2007: 379) pointed out, legal constraints often limit the ability of public institutions to communicate fully and honestly. In addition, Putra (2009) draws attention to another crucial challenge. According to the writer, public sector organisations have to face a higher degree of media interest, as every step and decision is analysed and scrutinised. Yet, the media are usually more interested in getting the information from victims or their families or friends as sources rather than government officials. Victims and people around them are naturally absorbed with their problem, sadness, and suffering. Then, they usually demand more from the government than it offers. This kind of phenomenon is usually picked up by journalists. On some level, when journalists write this story, they will make the officers work under pressure.

More importantly, Heide (1989) points out *fluidity* as another important factor that makes crises especially natural disasters difficult to cope with. To Heide, natural disasters are characterized by great uncertainty, and thus initial actions are undertaken based on vague and

inaccurate information. Disasters are also very "fluid" in nature with needs changing minute-to-minute. In other words, the character and extent of damage and the secondary threats (leaking chemicals, downed power lines, weakened dams) are not immediately apparent and therefore the necessary countermeasures not undertaken. This fluidity necessitates a procedure for determining and updating what the overall disaster situation is and what problems need to be tackled. Typically, it is unclear to the responders who have the responsibility for this task, and in many disasters the process is neglected. Furthermore, disasters as non-routine events disrupt societies and their larger subsystems such as regions, communities – invariably increase the number of demands on a public institution as well as the novelty and complexity of those demands while at the same time wreaking havoc on system response capabilities (Kreps, 1989: 219). Disasters therefore become political crises quite easily.

#### **2.2.4.4. Advantages of Crisis**

Although crises are often traumatic and threatening, they provide some opportunities as well. They offer lots of potential lessons for planning and preparation for potential crises (Kolb, 1984; Carley & Harald, 1997: 310; Fink, 2002: 43; Boin et al, 2005: 15; Boin et al, 2005; Boin et al, 2008). They are opportunities to study the performance of political systems under pressure (Keeler, 1993; Stern, 1997; Stern, 2000; Boin & 't Hart, 2003; Boin et al, 2005; Boin et al, 2008). They are also opportunities to determine priorities for reform (Keeler, 1993; Boin & 't Hart 2003; Dekker & Hansen, 2004; Boin et

al, 2005; Birkland, 2006; Lalonde, 2007; Boin et al, 2008). Furthermore, from a political perspective, political learning and change processes which take place at a slower rate under normal circumstances may be drastically accelerated under crisis circumstances because the normal inertia and resistance to change is often overcome by societal and political dynamics (Stern, 1997; Stern, 2000; Boin et al, 2005; Birkland, 2006; Lalonde, 2007; Boin et al, 2008; Doğan, 2010).

While crises are often only discussed in the negative aspects, there are also positive outcomes such as creation of heroes, opportunities for change in institutions, facing hidden problems, formation of new strategies, improvement of warning systems, and obtaining a competitive edge (Meyers & Holusha, 1986). Crises experiences are often inclined to re-order the political agenda, stimulate an appetite for change and reform on the part of the electorate and the mass media and, thus, create moments of political possibility, policy windows, which create opportunities for agile reformers before they close (Kingdon, 1984). There can often be a positive opportunity side to a crisis. The Chinese have embraced this idea. The symbol of their word for crisis, called *weiji*, is actually a combination of two words: “danger” and “opportunity” (Darling et al, 2005: 345). Organizations have many opportunities for learning from a crisis, such as the ability to learn from other failures, adjust old-fashioned practices, and so on (Ulmer et al., 2007). Thus, a crisis can also be conceived as a political, social or organizational dynamic that brings about opportunity and

institutional change (Rosenthal et al., 2001: 21; Boin & 't Hart, 2003: 544). Olsen (1992: 16) links crisis experience with institutional change, by submitting that radical and swift transformations are likely to be consequences of comprehensive external shocks and performance crises.

As mentioned before, one of the main characteristic of a crisis is that an organization or a community is triggered to act as a response to external shocks or changes. As Lalonde (2004) stated, these response efforts can bring people together and foster new solidarity and cooperation within an institution (Lalonde, 2004). Therefore, crises provide opportunities for mass mobilization and crisis management is always available as a way to activate public support ('t Hart, 1993: 43). Damgaard et al (1989: 186) point out a sense of urgency as another crucial advantage of crises. A crisis can produce a sense of urgency predicated on the assumption that already severe problems will be exacerbated by inaction. A sense of urgency may serve to override the concern for procedure manifested by officials of both the executive and the legislature during normal times and allows for unusually rapid and uncritical acceptance of reform proposals intended to resolve the crisis. Crises can also cause a sense of genuine fear predicated on the assumption that inaction may endanger lives and property (Keeler, 1993: 439). Furthermore, in their size, uncertainty, and sensitivity, crises threaten the status quo and delegitimize the policies and institutions underpinning the status quo (Cortell & Peterson, 1999).

It is clear that turning crises into advantages for both organisations and individuals depends on managing it effectively and properly. Now, the concept of crisis management will be explored in the light of several studies.

### **2.3. Defining Crisis Management**

To manage a crisis is to control it rather than eliminate it (Schulman, 1993: 369). The objective of crisis management is to make timely decisions based on best reality and clear thinking when operating under pressure (Pearson, 2002: 70). Crisis management is about improving an organization's capability to react flexibly and thus be able to make the prompt and necessary decisions once a crisis occurs (Lockwood, 2005: 2). However, it is crucial to understand that managing any crisis is not only a technical matter of making decisions and implementing them. It is also about politics because crisis management provides an ultimate test for the resilience of governmental bodies, political systems, and their actors (McConnell & Stark, 2002: 664; Boin et al, 2005: 2).

While some (Lockwood, 2005; Waugh & Streib, 2006) describe crisis management as an organization's pre-established activities and guidelines for preparing and responding to significant catastrophic events or incidents such as earthquakes, fires etc. in a safe and effective manner; some (Boin et al, 2005; Smith, 2006) describe it as the rescue, preparedness, and mitigation efforts accomplished by public agencies at national or local level, volunteer and private

organizations before, during, and after an unanticipated, uncontrolled public damage that disrupts or impedes normal operations, draws public and media attention, threaten public trust. Crisis management requires coordination between public and private organisations, efficient internal and external communication, effective collective decision making, and control responsibility (Valackiene, 2011: 78). Similarly, public sector crisis management requires the implementation of management principles (such as planning, organizing, decision making, coordinating, and learning etc.) in a crisis situation (Samal et al, 2005).

Similar to any management, crisis management is a process, and this process is identified in different ways by the scholars in the literature. Petak (1985) divides a crisis management process into four stages; mitigation, preparedness, recovery, and response. While first two phases aim to diminish the destructive effects of an emergency or catastrophic event, the recovery stage aims to return the society to normal conditions. As for the final phase, it aims to minimise the possibility of secondary damage, and to reduce problems for recovery operations. Fink (1986) identifies the process in four main stages such as prodromal stage, the acute stage, the chronic stage, and the resolution stage. While the first stage is related to detecting an approaching crisis through internal and external audits, the second phase is characterized by the crisis event and resulting damage. The chronic phase refers to the lasting effects of a crisis whilst the resolution stage identifies a clear end to the crisis. To Augustine

(1995), a crisis management process is composed of six stages; namely avoiding the crisis, preparing to manage the crisis, recognising the crisis, containing the crisis, resolving the crisis, and profiting from the crisis.

On the other hand, Burnett (1998) handles crisis management process in the framework of four main factors that inhibit crisis management. These are time pressure, control issues, threat level concerns, and response option constraints. According to the author, crisis management can be described as the activities that aim to remove these barriers. Furthermore, Boin, 't Hart, Stern and Sundelius (2005) define the process through five critical leadership tasks: sense-making, decision making, meaning making, terminating, and learning. Coombs (2007a) divide crisis management process into three major stages such as pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis stages. The pre-crisis stage entails actions that organizations perform before a crisis strikes and involves three sub-stages such as signal detection, prevention, and crisis preparation. The second phase refers to the actions (such as crisis recognition, crisis containment, information distribution, communication with stakeholders, message development, reputation management, and evolving developments) taken to cope with and respond to the crisis event. As for the post-crisis period, it begins when the crisis is resolved and it is equally important even though the crisis is officially over. Post-crisis stage mainly refers to evaluating crisis response efforts and to crisis -induced learning. All these

approaches and more will be broadly studied in the next chapter (Chapter 3) about the crisis management models.

Now, a great variety of crisis management studies will be given in the next section of the review chapter. The next part provides an overview of the growth of scholarly knowledge within the cross-disciplinary field of crisis management studies. It also turns the spotlight to a number of key factors affecting the success in crisis management processes in the light of the previous academic researches.

#### **2.4. History of Crisis Management Studies**

In the 1940s, early studies were often made on natural disasters with a focus on management of collective stress (Quarantelli and Dynes, 1977). Much of the early theory on crisis management was developed from studies of highly devastating natural disasters (Britton, 1988; Rodriguez, Quarantelli and Dynes, 2006) or from large-scale industrial accidents (Perrow, 1984). These studies focused on natural disaster response and identifying typologies of organizations and groups in disaster management and on how pre-existing behaviour, values and social problems impact on disaster response (Rodriguez et al, 2006). Noteworthy empirical researches used to theorize on crisis management often derived from major industrial accidents such as the Three Mile Island Incident, the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, and so on (Roux-Dufort, 2007). Nevertheless, as the author stated, crisis management theories based on empirical data from industrial accidents and natural disasters have been strong and this has led crisis

management research to build knowledge on industrial accidents rather than on organizational crises.

Since the 1980s, crisis management studies have focused on planning and preparation for possible crises and the analysis of organizational contingencies during a crisis (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). The literature on crisis management planning consists of a number of normative pronouncements aimed at improving the effectiveness of crisis responses (Lalonde, 2007). Their authors drew attention to the need for emergency planning, defining actions in relation to the different stages of the evolution of a crisis starting with the detection of warning signs up to post-crisis activities, stressing the development of a culture of security, both within organizations and in the population at large, and the training and sensitization of leaders to their roles in times of crisis (Perry & Nigg, 1985; Drabek & Hoetmer, 1991; Bugge, 1993; Kuban, 1995). The literature relating to analysing organizational contingencies features the complex and often disorganized dynamic amongst actors themselves, as well as the role and behaviour of ordinary people within crisis situations (Lalonde, 2004). From this perspective, as the author emphasised, crisis management should consider the nature of the social fabric, the level of resources, in addition to the characteristics of individuals and organizations having to intervene in times of crisis.

Similar to many other cross-disciplinary academic fields, crisis management studies are scattered over many disciplines (Boin, 2004: 167). There are mainly three domains in which crisis management is

systematically analysed by scholars: business, international politics, and public administration. Business is a discipline in which crisis management is a major subject of discussion. In this area, crisis management relates to how to make the firm survive after a crisis hits, meaning how to avoid suffering financial losses in the wake of a crisis (Laye, 2002). In international relations, researchers generally focused on brinkmanship, potential conflict and war between countries (Rosenthal, 't Hart and Charles, 1989; Schoff, 2004). The main aim of crisis management is to ensure that the tensions between countries do not turn into war, and that good diplomacy will be the most important rule of crisis management in this sense. As for the other discipline, it is public administration. In this field, crisis management relates to how public institutions can prevent, react to, and rehabilitate once a crisis occurred. The first wave of modern crisis management studies related to the public sector was based on executive decision making as part of US management of foreign policy crises, often with a focus on the president and his closest aides, bureaucracies and intra- and interagency interaction (Hermann, 1972; George, 1980). As the authors point out, these studies provided many insights on the role of leadership, political structures, presidential personality and high politics within crises.

There is an increasing need to improve our understanding of crisis management processes; how to effectively prepare for potential crises, respond them, and learn from them. Therefore, systematic research of crisis management is increasing within other academic disciplines.

One of them is cognitive psychology. According to Svedin (2009), most of the researches in this discipline were generated as a reaction against the classic model of decision making, which precluded that decision makers had access to appropriate information and that decisions were taken according to the most rational choice and the best choice. To the author, cognitive psychology put the microscope on subjectivity in crisis decision making and how personal constraints (such as beliefs, expectations, mental shortcuts and analogies) impose themselves on crisis decision making. Cognitive processes are used to critique the story for incompleteness, conflict, and unreliability; and attempt to improve the story by collecting new information and revising assumptions (Schraagen & Josine, 2008). Cognitive psychology perspectives on crisis management also draw attention to the relationship between the crisis characteristics of threat, urgency and uncertainty and psychological reactions such as stress, denial and paralysis (Svedin, 2009).

Studies that do take a process approach to crisis management by looking into more than causes and consequences tend to examine the management of crises according to a chronologic rationale of the three stages of incubation, beginning and aftermath (Boin et al, 2005: 10). Basic chronological process models of crisis management consider stages before during and after the actual trigger event (Smith and Elliott, 2007: 519). Although several chronological process models developed by scholars are broadly handled in the next chapter (Chapter 3), here the some of them are briefly given. Comfort (1988)

divided the crisis management process into phases of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery; while Mitroff (1994) developed a model that divides crisis management into five stages: signal detection, probing and prevention, damage containment, recovery, and learning. Further, Coombs (1999) describes the three stages of the model – pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis – as macro-stages that can be applied to many models of crisis management. Boin, 't Hart, Stern, and Sundelius (2005) developed another chronological process model of crisis management. They based their model on five critical challenges that face managers in the actual crisis management process – sense-making, decision making, meaning making, terminating, and learning.

Now, a number of major studies related to crisis management in Turkish literature will be given in the next sub-section.

#### **2.4.1. Crisis Management Studies in Turkish Literature**

Before summarising the Turkish studies about crisis management, it should be stated that most of them are related to the private sector. In other words, compared to ones concerning corporations, fewer studies have examined crises within Turkish governmental bodies. There may be several reasons behind this fact but discussing them is beyond the scope of the research. It should also be underlined that here the more recent researches are reviewed in order to reflect the contemporary approaches to crisis management.

Following four studies are related with the leadership under crisis conditions. To begin, Keles (2002) discusses crisis management

process and efficient crisis solving strategies used by executives in businesses. This research particularly emphasizes the importance of roles of executives for efficiency in crisis management and suggests that executives should control their own emotions under pressure and psychologically prepare for potential crises. Similarly, Yılmaz (2010) focuses on the role of executives in managing economic crises through leadership theories. Leadership is regarded as the most important factor to be successful in crisis management practices in another research conducted by Akgöl on the pharmaceutical firms in 2010. In addition, İlgün conducts a fieldwork over the executives in 2011 and concludes that their personalities have an impact on the way they handle a crisis situation.

On the other hand, Aslyüce (2010) discusses the importance of using information systems and technologies for decision-making during a crisis situation in her research. She also develops a crisis management model supported by information systems in air transportation sector. The study concludes that data is the most important element for success of crisis management as it is indispensable to make a decision in a crisis. Another study conducted by Onar in 2011 reveals that the biggest danger at the time of crisis is to keep inertia, not to give reaction and not to develop alternative against congestions. The research also examines the effects of the 2008 Global Economic Crisis on the Turkish banking sector. Apart from these, Tüfekçi (2010) draws attention to the difficulties of decision-making under uncertainty and time pressure in her study. The research concludes

that the lack of information challenges the main responsible figures for managing crises in private sector.

Further, Doğan (2010) points out the relationship between organisational learning and crisis management and claims that learning corporations can be more successful in coping with crisis situations. Eryıldız (2010) claims that success in crisis response depends on both decision-making and managing emotions in particular fear, worry, and stress. Different from the studies mentioned above, following two studies are related to public sector. The first research, conducted by Cetinkaya in 2010, draws attention to the importance of communication between the public officials and victims in a natural disaster through studying The 1999 Marmara Earthquake as a case. It also emphasises that information overload has got some negative effects on a crisis management process and the trust of public to governmental bodies is crucial for minimizing them. As for the second study by Erten (2011), it examines the approach of Turkish public administration to the concept of crisis management in the historical and legal framework. In addition, here the existing problems faced in the implementation of the Turkish law about the disaster and crisis management are discussed.

To conclude, it should be stated that all studies that have been mentioned so far examine how to more effectively cope with crises. It is clear that effectiveness in crisis response efforts minimises the losses and saves more lives. The following part discusses

effectiveness in crisis management practices in the light of various studies.

## **2.5. Effectiveness in Crisis Management**

There are various perspectives on the effectiveness of crisis management in the literature. To exemplify, according to Putra (2009: 158), the main idea of effective crisis management is not to stop the occurrence of calamities, but the most important aim is “to contain damages as much as possible and prevent the loss of life and property.” To Regester and Larkin (2005: 163), effective management of a crisis situation is about recognizing you have one, taking the necessary actions to remedy the situation, being seen to take them and being heard to say the right things. Further, remaining open to new information, perspectives, contingencies, interpretations, and alternatives are very essential for managing crises effectively (Seeger et al., 2001: 159). For Pearson and Mitroff (1993: 59), the success of crisis management depends on preparing an organization to think creatively about the extraordinary so that the best possible decisions can be made in time of crisis. However, as the authors stated, the types of problems that need decisions in a crisis especially within a natural disaster are not daily, routine problems, but the problems and issues are unique and important. These problems are ill-defined, “distinguished by interconnections to other problems, and have uncertainties in a dynamic environment” (Lyles & Thomas, 1988: 131). To Olson (2000), success of crisis management practices depends on producing a set of plans.

Planning has a great impact on the success of crisis management (Heide, 1989; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993; Olson, 2000: 268; Mitroff & Anagnos 2001; Boin & Hart, 2003: 546; Lockwood, 2005: 4; Alexander, 2005; McConnell & Drennan, 2006: 64). A well-thought out and tested contingency plan noticeably increases the chance of an effective response (Augustine, 1995; Carley, & Harrald, 1997; Kash & Darling, 1998; Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001; McConnell, 2003; Darling et al, 2005: 345; Regester, & Larkin, 2005: 206; Birkland, 2006; Sahin *et al*, 2008: 18). Therefore, many scholars commonly state that crisis planning for possible crises should be high on institutional and policy agendas (Nudell & Antokol, 1988; Seymour & Moore, 2000; Boin et al. 2005). Even though crisis management logic suggests that planning for crisis in pre-crisis period should be a vital part of institutional and policy toolkits, it is very difficult to translate this ideal into practice because - first of all - crises are considered to be very sudden, severe, and associated with uncertainty (Coombs, 2007a; Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1997; and Ulmer et al., 2007). Secondly, planning for possible crises place large demands on resources and has to compete against front-line service provision (Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1997; Coombs, 1999). In addition, robust contingency planning requires active preparation through training and exercises, but such costly actions often produce a level of symbolic readiness which does not reflect operational realities (McConnell & Drennan, 2006: 59).

On the other hand, many crises can be prevented – or at least dealt with more effectively – through early detection (González-Herrero &

Pratt, 1996: 82; Goodman, 2001: 117; Darling et al, 2005; Boin et al, 2005; Boin et al, 2008) unless it is followed by a period of limited action and an underestimation of the problem, leading to a “we are in control” approach (McConnell & Stark, 2002: 664). Therefore, recognizing crises with a will to address the issues they represent is more important (Barnes, 2001: 13; Mahoney, 2010: 22). On the other hand, it is hard to detect an upcoming crisis because - first of all - most organisations particularly public ones are ill equipped to detect an approaching crisis and they lack a common frame that specifies weaknesses and prescribes a way of recognising their development (Boin et al, 2005: 21). Second, bad news faces formidable obstacles on its way to the top of the organization, especially in public institutions (Boin & ‘t Hart, 2003: 548). More importantly, the inclination to discount the future often prevents public leaders from listening to persons warning about an imminent crisis (Victor et al, 2005: 10).

Coordination is studied as another crucial function that enables public organisations to effectively respond unexpected events. Crises require public agencies to interact with other organizations of non-professional emergency responders, volunteer groups, NGOs, government agencies, and the media, and so on (Heide, 1989: 48; Kroon & Overdijk, 1993; McConnel & Stark, 2002: 672; Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003; Tierney & Trainor, 2004: 164; Boin et al, 2005; Moynihan, 2009: 896; Gonzalez, 2010: 26; Reynolds & Seeger, 2012: 8). Coordination is compulsory for resolving or managing

dependencies between these organisations (Quarantelli, 1997; Boin & Hart 2003; Gonzalez, 2008: 4). Lack of cooperation can have negative consequences ranging from wasted resources to missed opportunities (Gonzalez, 2008). Coordination problems also lead to no efforts, double efforts or conflicting efforts (Heide, 1989: 48; Gonzalez, 2010). The most important factors that lead to coordination issues are heterogeneity in the nature of responders, language, working environments, and rules, and so on (Garaventa Myers, 1989; Heide, 1989; Gonzalez, 2008: 1; Gonzalez, 2010: 26). As a result, it is essential that participating organizations be made familiar with each other as much as possible.

Moreover, leadership competencies and styles have an influence on the success of crisis management practices (Boin & Hart, 2003; Klan, 2003; Smits & Ezzat, 2003; Pinsdorf, 2004: 227; Darling et al, 2005; Boin et al, 2005; Tüfekçi, 2010; Yılmaz, 2010). Crisis leadership requires a number of emotional intelligence competencies such as empathy, self-awareness, persuasion, courage, reliability, teamwork skills and the ability to manage relationships (Schoenberg, 2005; Darling et al, 2005: 346; Victor et al, 2005: 24; Vogelaar, 2007; Kauzya, 2007: 8; Ulmer et al., 2007; Yılmaz, 2010). There are two main leadership styles that emerge in crisis situations: democratic and authoritarian. Democratic style is generally preferred by the team members. However, it may slow down decision making in a crisis because democratic leaders encourage employee participation in decision-making processes (Regester & Larkin, 2005; Ulmer et al,

2007; Boin et al, 2010). As for the authoritarian style, contrary to the former, it is less preferred by the staff. However, it has a potential to shorten decision-making process in a crisis situation because authoritarian leaders make most of the decisions themselves with little input from their followers (Regester & Larkin, 2005; Ulmer et al, 2007; Boin et al, 2010). Leaders need to utilize the style that will allow them to have the best options to choose from when making decisions (Regester & Larkin, 2005: 205; Coombs, 2007; Yılmaz, 2010; Eryıldız, 2010).

In addition, there is a strong relationship between the effectiveness of a crisis management process and decision-making (Green & Shapiro, 1994: 209; Quarantelli, 1997; Stern, 2000; Boin et al, 2005; Flin, Youngson, & Yule, 2007; Lunenburg, 2010) because management is nothing more than decision-making. Decision-making is a dynamic process of searching for past experiences and information to connect to the current situation (Nutt, 2002; Ergünay, 2005; Eryıldız, 2010), and thus, crisis managers usually make a decision by means of interpreting the current situation in line with the previous experiences and information (Sahin, 2003; Forsberg & Pursiainen, 2006: 252; Aslıyüce, 2010). Therefore, lack of experience is generally accepted as a crucial barrier to decision-making in crisis situations (Simon, 1990; Akgöl, 2010; Erten, 2011; İlgün, 2011; Onar, 2011). Apart from lack of experience; information overload and shortage, uncertain and dynamic environments, competing goals, time pressure, mental

fatigue, high stakes, and high workload can be regarded as other important obstacles to crisis decision-making (McCan et al., 2000).

Another crucial factor that affects the success of crisis management process is communicating with the media and public (crisis communication). The term crisis communication is more typically related with public relations and the need for organizations to repair damaged images after a crisis or disaster (Coombs, 1999; Fearn-Banks, 2002; Hale et al, 2005; Boin et al, 2005: 69; Seeger et al, 2003; Seeger, 2006: 234; Smith 2006; Coombs, 2007a). Crisis communication is essential because if information about a crisis is not shared openly by the public authorities engaged in the crisis, the public and mass media are likely to obtain the information from other sources. In so doing, public organizations can lose the ability to manage the crisis message, and thus they can lose the chance to restore their own images (Rosenthal et al, 2001; McConnel, 2003; Tağraf & Aslan, 2003; Boin et al, 2005; Seeger, 2006: 239; Yan et al, 2006; Holladay, 2010; Cetinkaya, 2010). Crisis communication is more critical in this age of instant communication and rapid information flow (Quarantelli, 1997; Lundgren & McMakin, 2004; Jaeger et al, 2007; Ulmer et al, 2007; Liu & Horsley, 2007; Boin et al, 2008; Matteo, 2008: 6; Putra, 2009; Reynolds & Seeger, 2012). Hence, open and accurate communication to the public and the media must be begun immediately once a crisis emerges (Seeger et al. 2001: 163). Otherwise, the vacuum caused by a failure to communicate is soon filled with gossips, rumours, misrepresentation, drivel and

poison (Keles, 2002; Regester & Larkin, 2005: 169; Heath, 2010; Reynolds & Seeger, 2012).

Moreover, crisis-induced learning contributes to success of crisis management practices as it makes public organizations more prepared for future incidents and affects the structures and processes in an evolutionary way (Carley and Harrald, 1997). Therefore, crisis induced learning has been increasingly central to crisis management researchers' concerns (Kauffman, 1993; Toft & Reynolds, 1994; Stern, 1997; Stern, 2000; Roux-Dufort, 2000; Simon & Pauchant, 2000; Bourrier, 2002; Boin, 2004; Boin et al, 2005; Victor et al, 2005). Further, effectiveness of crisis management practices is influenced by a number of factors such as machinery of government structures and processes; degrees of contingency planning; the availability of sufficient resources; the role of a variety of elected and non-elected bodies throughout the country; political debates, powerful interest groups, the media and public opinion; the wider political and economic contexts (McConnell, 2003). In the meantime, multiplicity of the factors affecting crisis management performance shows that it is not easy to assess success or failure a crisis management process.

Assessing crisis management effectiveness is challenging because of the presence of complicated results, chaotic environments, incomparable or non-standardizable inputs and outputs, and a variety of figures and stakeholders (Sahin, 2009: 23). There are also certain factors which make evaluating crisis management initiatives particularly difficult (McConnel, 2003: 405-406). To begin, there is

the matter of personal perspective. Deciding what event or course of events constitutes a crisis is not an exact science, and the same applies to assessment of its handling. A crucial factor is how we perceive the situation. This is influenced by how we are affected by the crisis and by the political values we hold. Second, crisis management initiatives can also have unintended consequences which may be complicated to quantify and balance against unintended outcomes. Third, difficulty in assessing success is compounded by the fact that our assessment may differ over the period of the crisis and beyond. Fourth, in crisis or emergency decision-making, however, there is often a lack of clear written objectives, apart from attempting to stabilise the situation and return to normal. Indeed, we often struggle to work out vague governmental objectives that emerge during a crisis. Fifth, objectives may also conflict, so that it is not possible to state definitively whether handling a particular crisis has been successful. Another difficulty is that a government may clearly breach an original objective, yet its actions could be construed as a success. The other complication of judging the failures of government is to decide if government actions are too slow or if public demand is far away from being rational (Putra, 2009: 158). Therefore, we need to be careful when judging a government's success or failure in terms of crisis management.

## **2.6. Summary**

The aim of this chapter was, primarily, to visit the definitions of crisis and to discuss the main characteristics and types of crisis in some detail to provide a better understanding of the concept. Secondly, this

chapter aimed to explore impacts of crisis on both individuals and organisations. In particular, here the reasons why a crisis challenges governmental bodies were discussed. The chapter also turned the spotlight to a number of opportunities crises represent. Further, after the concept of crisis management was defined, cross- disciplinary crisis management studies were given. Here the researcher aimed to describe the major strands of the scholarly field referred to as crisis management studies. Specifically, several contemporary crisis management studies from the Turkish literature were summarised. More importantly, the chapter aimed to visit both different perspectives on the concept of effective crisis management and the main obstacles to evaluating the success or failure in crisis response practices.

As for the next chapter, it will discuss the process of a managing a crisis in the framework of various models. It will also present a synthesis of the key factors affecting the success of a crisis management process.

### **3. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS: THE PROCESS OF MANAGING A CRISIS**

#### **3.1. Introduction**

A useful way of understanding the term crisis management is to place the concept in the framework of a model. Researchers have developed various crisis management models. These models have developed to identify different key factors affecting the success of a crisis management process. Therefore, in this chapter, in order to deal with the first research question about the key tasks that influence effectiveness of a crisis management process, the researcher will focus on a number of major models that handled the term ‘crisis management’ as a process. After reviewing the core models, at the end of the chapter, the researcher will develop a synthesis of the key tasks that affect the success of crisis management process based mainly on these models.

#### **3.2. Crisis Management Models**

Crisis management literature is rich with models that attempt to identify the main characteristics of an effective crisis management process. However, the core models will be handled in a chronological order and then they will be compared and contrasted.

### **3.2.1. Petak's Model**

Petak (1985) divides crisis management process into the four stages, namely mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery: Petak considers the first stage as a “risk reduction program” that targets an area known to be cause of a public danger. In other words, mitigation activities aim to reduce the harm of a disaster. Investing on warning systems and the utilization of advanced technology to predict future hazards can be given as examples of mitigation efforts. As for the second stage, namely preparedness, it is a narrower term for a more specific risk area, which includes planning an emergency management policy, training first responders and volunteers, and developing fundamental agreements among public, local, and non-profit organizations that are supposed to cooperate in a crisis situation. First two phases aim to diminish the destructive effects of an emergency or catastrophic event. The third phase, which is called response stage, is composed of the immediate search and rescue operations. In other words, response activities include all the actions that aim to meet immediate needs in the wake of a disaster. Professional and volunteer first responders provide emergency aid to the victims is provided by the first responders during this phase. The response phase also aims to minimise the possibility of secondary damage, and to reduce problems for recovery operations. As for the last stage (recovery stage), it includes the processes that return the society to a normal condition. Temporary housing and debris clearance are some tasks performed within the phase. Recovery phase also includes the activities that aim

to evaluate the disaster response efforts. As seen, Petak's model is mostly associated with natural disasters. In other words, it is based mainly on how to manage a natural disaster.

### **3.2.2. Fink's Model**

Fink's (1986) four-stage model examines a crisis as an extended event with sufficient warning signs that precede the event. Fink uses a medical illness metaphor to identify four stages in the crisis life cycle: (1) prodromal: clues or hints of a potential crisis begin to emerge, (2) crisis breakout or acute: a triggering event occurs along with the attendant damage, (3) chronic: the effects of the crisis linger as efforts to clean up the crisis progress, and (4) resolution: there is some clear signal that the crisis is no longer a concern to stakeholders - it is over (Coombs, 2015). To Fink, crisis managers should have a proactive approach rather than reactive in the prodromal phase, and they attempt to identify an approaching crisis through internal and external audits in this stage. In other words, a well-prepared crisis manager does not just perform the crisis management policies when a crisis emerges (being reactive); they are also involved in identifying and resolving situations that could turn into or cause a crisis (being proactive) (Coombs, 2015). In the model, the acute phase is characterized by the crisis event and resulting damage. The severity of the crisis and damage are influenced by the success of the first phase. As Coombs (2015) points out, recognising an imminent crisis in the prodromal stage can reduce the impact of the crisis in the acute stage. As for the chronic phase, it includes the crisis management and communication

strategies, selection of response approaches (Coombs, 2015). As for the final stage in this model, it is the resolution stage that identifies a clear end to the crisis. According to the model, the resolution phase potentially can last for a long time. As seen, Fink's model does not include steps for evaluation or feedback on crisis management efforts. Fink does not approach to crisis management as a cyclic process and this remains as an important oversight of the model (Coombs, 2015).

### **3.2.3. Mitroff's Model**

Mitroff (1994) developed a model that divides crisis management into five stages: the first phase, which is very similar to prodromal stage of Fink's model, is *signal detection* in which warning signals are identified. If management can recognise and act upon these signals, then many crises can be prevented before they occur, which is the best possible kind of crisis management. The second stage is *probing and prevention* which frequently takes place at the same time with signal detection. The aim is to do as much as possible to prevent crises from occurring in the first place and to manage effectively those, which still occur in spite of all the efforts. This phase features members of an organization who seek known crises and determine ways to prevent them. These first two stages cover the proactive steps an organization can take before a crisis emerges. The third phase is *damage containment*. As Coombs (2015) pointed out, similar to Fink's chronic stage, damage containment focuses on the steps taken following the crisis event. The purpose is to contain the effects of a crisis from spreading further and, hence, from infecting other uncontaminated

parts of an organization or the environment. As for the fourth stage, it is recovery that primarily aims to recover normal business operations as soon as possible. Learning, as the last phase of crisis management cycle, refers to the process of reflecting upon what was done well and what was done poorly so that the organization can more effectively deal with future crises. As Coombs (2015) points out, the last three stages of the model feature minor differences from Fink's acute, chronic, and resolution stages.

Coombs (2015) also draws attention to a few essential differences between the Fink (1986) and Mitroff (1994) models. Fink's (1986) one simply notes that the resolution stage occurs when a crisis is no longer a concern. For Fink, termination points out the end of the crisis management process. On the contrary, Mitroff's model is cyclical because the end also represents a new start. The crisis management effort is reviewed and critiqued in order to find ways to develop the system. The learning stage of the Mitroff's model enables an organization to integrate what it has learned from the crisis into its organizational philosophy. Hence, the learning phase can feed back to either the signal detection phase or the probing and prevention stage. As for another essential difference, it is revealed by comparing the last stages. While Mitroff's model is active and draws attention to what crisis managers should do at each phase, Fink's one is more descriptive and emphasises the characteristics of each phase. This is not to say that Fink is not presenting recommendations to crisis managers. Rather, the Mitroff model is more prescriptive than Fink's.

Actually, Fink is concerned with mapping how crises progress while Mitroff is concerned with how crisis management efforts progress. As Coombs (2015) stated, early models tended to be descriptive, so this crucial difference is not surprising.

#### **3.2.4. Augustine's Model**

Norm Augustine (1995) developed a six staged crisis management model. These phases are avoiding the crisis, preparing to manage the crisis, recognising the crisis, containing the crisis, resolving the crisis, and profiting from the crisis:

##### ***Avoiding the crisis***

In the model the first thing managers should do is to detect an imminent crisis before it strikes and then to avoid it. According to Augustine, this stage is, however, often missed by manager in spite of the fact that it is the cheapest and easiest way for managing a crisis. He also claims that managers have a natural tendency to ignore this stage because they believe that crises are inevitable.

##### ***Preparing to manage the crisis***

There are a number of essential tasks to be done at the second stage such as establishing a crisis team, a crisis centre, making contingency plans, providing ready and redundant communications, and testing, and so on.

### ***Recognising the crisis***

To Augustine, recognising an approaching crisis is the most challenging as a problem is miscategorised. In the model, it is also stated that managing both expectations and perceptions is very crucial at the third phase because they often cause crises.

### ***Containing the Crisis***

The model says that following the crisis it is essential to contain it and then to inform stakeholders. To achieve this, establishing a crisis management team is a must. Otherwise, information pollution is likely to be unavoidable.

### ***Resolving the crisis***

According to Augustine, once a crisis is contained it should be resolved as soon as possible. Otherwise, the crisis is likely to deepen. Hence speed is of the essence in resolution.

### ***Profiting from the crisis***

In this model the final stage is profiting from the crisis. In this stage individuals and organisations have a chance to retrieve their some losses to restore the damage.


## **3.2.5. González-Herrero and Pratt's Model**

To González-Herrero and Pratt (1996), a crisis follows a sequential path through four phases, namely, birth, growth, maturity and decline. This model illustrates how a crisis develops rather than how crisis

management efforts progress. According to the authors, a crisis changes over time in a cycle, and the cycle does not end. This model claims that effects of a crisis stay behind the decline and its death. In other words, the model presents a crisis lifecycle.

### **3.2.6. Burnet's Model**

The model developed by Burnett (1998) points out four main factors that hamper crisis management. These are time pressure, control issues, threat level concerns, and response option constraints. The author draws attention to the fact that these factors are the main obstacles to focus on and control a crisis situation. According to the model, there are three steps so called identification, confrontation, and reconfiguration, and there are some crucial tasks to be performed in each phase (*see* Figure 1). Goal formation and environmental analysis for preparing the crisis are the tasks to be done in the first step. Once a crisis strikes, an organisation should formulate a strategy and then evaluate it (confrontation). As for the reconfiguration phase, it includes two critical tasks: strategy implementation and strategic control. It is obvious that these tasks are more related to crisis intervention.



**Figure 3-1** Crisis Management: Strategic Considerations; Adopted from Burnett (1998)

### 3.2.7. Moore's Model

Moore's model, published in Lakha & Moore (2002), includes six tasks (or steps) such as situation monitoring, crisis detection, containment, crisis response, de-escalation, and recovery. At the first step, the organisation keeps an eye on the picture to find out if everything is as it must be. This activity should continue throughout the year for the organisation. At the second step, techniques and methods are used to check routine situational monitoring from the

activity one. The aim is to identify events and trends that suggest something is problematic. As for the task of containment, it will occur when a threat to high priority goals or values has been identified. At this stage, the acquisition of information should be the focus to understand the causes of the crisis. Alternative options should be determined and a plan should then be put into practice. During the response, the identified strategy must be employed in accordance with the plan developed in the previous phase. At this step, it is also essential to evaluate the consequences of the action taken and if necessary, managers should revise the options. Another step is de-escalation in which a timetable is established to return to normality. Then, the situation returns to an acceptable level which may be higher than prior to the events (recovery phase).

### **3.2.8. The Model Developed by Boin, 't Hart, Stern, and Sundelius**

Boin, 't Hart, Stern and Sundelius offer another process model of crisis management based on five critical challenges that public leaders face in an actual crisis management process: sense-making, decision making, meaning making, terminating, and learning. The scholars focus on crisis management processes in public sector. According to Boin, 't Hart, Stern and Sundelius (2005), crisis is divided into three phases (such as the incubation, the onset, and the aftermath) and there are five critical crisis management tasks to be performed by public leaders in these stages:

### *Sense-making*

Detecting a crisis through some signals is a critical task for public authorities to perform in the incubation stage. However, crises are very difficult for public authorities to detect in their early phases because ‘most crises do not materialize with a big bang’; ‘they are the product of escalation’. Public leaders must recognise from unclear, ambivalent, and contradictory signals that ‘something out of the routine’ is developing. Leaders must evaluate the threat and what the crisis is about. Leaders should also find out how the situation will develop in future.

### *Decision-making*

Both successes and failures of crisis management are often related to decisions taken during the crisis. On the other hand, crises force policy makers to confront issues they do not face on a daily basis. In other words, public institutions have been designed to conduct routine business that answers to values such as fairness, lawfulness, and efficiency. Nevertheless, decision-making in crises needs flexibility, improvisation, redundancy, and the breaking the rules. That is why; decision-making under crisis conditions is an intimidating task in itself. Even when public leaders make well-informed decisions that define a clear course of action, they still face the challenge of seeing their decisions materialise. Leaders depend on organisations to implement their decisions. Therefore, public authorities need to coordinate various organisations’ crisis response efforts. It is,

however, not easy task because different organisations have different hierarchical structure, different coordination styles. Organising various agencies' crisis response efforts is not easy task because some of them may refuse to share information; some of them may be unwillingness to cooperate with others. In relation to crisis decision-making, the scholars specifically point out various forms of non-decision-making: 'decisions that are not taken', 'decisions not to decide', 'decisions not to act', and 'strategic evasion of choice opportunities'. They also draw attention to the fact that crisis experience tends to favour decentralisation of crisis decision-making.

### *Meaning-making*

Meaning-making is a crucial task to be performed in the onset stage. Meaning-making in a crisis refers to attempts to reduce the public and political uncertainty caused by the crisis. Crises produce a strong demand from citizens especially from stakeholders to learn what is going on and to ascertain what they can do to protect their own interests. Public authorities fight with a variety of raw data (reports, rumours, stories, pictures etc.) that quickly amass when something extraordinary occurs. Turning these data into a coherent picture of the situation is, however, a challenging task.

The model focuses on a triangular relationship between 'political actors' (governmental and non-governmental), 'the mass media', and 'the citizenry'. The model also draws attention to three main factors that are particularly crucial in determining the effectiveness of crisis communication efforts: 'degree of preparedness', 'degree of

coordination of outgoing information’, and ‘degree of professionalization’. Moreover, ‘framing’, ‘rituals, and ‘masking’ are studied as meaning-making strategies in the model.

### *Terminating*

Crisis termination is another critical leadership task handled in the framework of the model. The model points out two aspects of crisis termination. First, it is about ‘shifting back from emergency to routine’. This requires some form of downsizing crisis operations. It also requires rendering account for what has happened and gaining acceptance for this account. It is essential for public leaders to manage all the accusations in crisis-induced accountability processes. Otherwise, they are likely to face a new crisis after the crisis. Crisis termination depends on the way leaders deal with this accountability process following the operational phase of crisis management. Even though these two aspects of crisis termination are distinct; they are often closely related to each other in practice.

The authors underlines two major timing deficit related to crisis termination. First, public leaders may terminate the crisis regime prematurely when they miscalculate the complexity of the problems at hand, or misinterpret the lasting stress level existing in the affected people. However, premature closure is likely to invite disappointment and intense criticism. Particularly, in a society that is still experiencing immediate needs and stress, premature closure exposes public authorities to charges of being insensitive and opportunistic (“they forgot their promises as soon as the cameras were gone”). Second,

public leaders may overextend the crisis because they sometimes become so focused on the operational aspect of the crisis that they cannot see the big picture. Leaders also delay the termination for purely political reasons such as consolidating their positions.

### *Learning from Crisis*

A final strategic leadership task in crisis management is political and institutional lesson drawing. The crisis experience offers a reservoir of potential lessons for planning and preparation for future crises. In the model, three main types of learning are handled. These are ‘experience based learning’, ‘explanation based learning’, and ‘competence based learning’. In addition, the authors emphasise that the lessons learning from crisis must become part of a shared and institutionalised memory bank, maintained by organisational units close to ‘the heart of the decision-making machinery’ to be related.

### **3.2.9. Coombs’s Three Staged Model**

Coombs (2007a) identifies three macro stages in his model: pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis: The pre-crisis stage includes all aspects of crisis prevention – issues management, collecting information about risks, developing a crisis management plan, selecting and training the crisis management team, and testing contingency plans, and so on. In other words, the pre-crisis stage involves actions before a crisis is encountered and consists of the three sub-stages such as signal detection, prevention, and crisis preparation. Once potential crises are detected, actions must be taken to prevent them from happening. In

this stage, organizations should particularly put emphasis on the training of the spokesperson. In fact, crisis spokespersons should be trained in the pre-crisis phase.

The second stage (crisis phase) refers to the actions (such as crisis recognition, crisis containment, information distribution, communication with stakeholders, message development, reputation management, and evolving developments) taken to cope with and respond to the crisis event. Indeed, the crisis period focuses on how to communicate with the stakeholders, how to manage the organisational reputation during a crisis response. The crisis phase begins with a trigger event that marks the beginning of the crisis and ends when the crisis is considered resolved. As for the final phase, which is called post-crisis stage, it begins when the organization returns to business as usual and looks for ways to better prepare for the next crisis and fulfils commitments made during the crisis phase. There are three key tasks to be performed by an organisation in the post-crisis phase such as delivering all information promised to stakeholders as soon as the information is publicized, keeping stakeholders informed about the development of recovery efforts including corrective measures and investigations, and evaluating the crisis management process for lessons learned and to integrate them into its own crisis management system. As a result, Coombs' model focuses on some essential tasks to be performed by an organisation in order to communicate with the stakeholders before, during, and after a crisis situation because - according to the Coombs - crisis communication is a crucial element

in effective crisis management. This three-staged model, therefore, has been more often used in the studies on crisis communication.

### 3.3. Evaluation of the Models

**Table 3-1** Crisis Management Models

<b>Model</b>	<b>Characteristics of Model</b>
Petak (1985)	established on four stages: mitigation, preparedness, recovery, and response
Fink (1986)	founded on four stages: prodromal stage, the acute stage, the chronic stage, and the resolution stage.
Mitroff (1994)	includes five stages: signal detection, probing and prevention, damage containment, recovery, and learning
Norm Augustine (1995)	divides the process into six phases: avoiding the crisis, preparing to manage the crisis, recognising the crisis, containing the crisis, resolving the crisis, and profiting from the crisis.
González-Herrero and Pratt (1996)	illustrates how a crisis changes over time through four phases; namely, birth, growth, maturity and decline.
Burnet (1998)	focuses on four main factors that inhibit crisis management: time pressure, control issues, threat level concerns, and response option constraints.
Moore (2002)	comprises six broad activities: situation monitoring, crisis detection support, containment, response, de-escalation, and recovery
Boin, 't Hart, Stern, and	based on five critical challenges that

Sundelius (2005)	public leaders in the actual crisis management process: sense-making, decision making, meaning making, terminating, and learning from crisis.
Coombs (2007)	composed of the three stages: pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis

As can be seen from the Table 3-1, crisis management process is divided into several phases within various models. To exemplify, while Petak's model divides crisis management process into four stages (mitigation, preparedness, recovery, and response), Mitroff's model divides the process into five stages such as signal detection, probing and prevention, damage containment, recovery, and learning. Similarly, whilst Coombs' model is composed of three macro stages (pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis), Augustine's methodology is established on six phases such as avoiding the crisis, preparing to manage the crisis, recognising the crisis, containing the crisis, resolving the crisis, and profiting from the crisis. Also, Moore identifies the process within six broad activities (situation monitoring, crisis detection support, containment, response, de-escalation, and recovery), while Boin et al characterize the crisis management process through five leadership challenges; namely sense-making, decision making, meaning making, terminating, and learning from crisis.

Even though a crisis management process is divided into various phases and these phases are defined in different ways throughout the models, there are no considerable differences between them. It can even be claimed that what the researchers did is just using synonyms

or similar terms in order to identify the phases of crisis management process. To illustrate, in order to define the first stage of crisis management process, Mitroff uses the term “signal detection” instead of the term “prodromal stage” in the Fink’s model. Similarly, in order to identify the third phase of crisis management process, while Mitroff prefers using the term “damage containment”, Fink utilises the phrase “chronic stage”. However, both of them mean the steps taken following the crisis event. To give more examples, actions taken during the prodromal stage in Fink’s model can easily be placed into the pre-crisis stage of Coomb’s model as they address crisis prevention. The last stage of Fink’s model (the resolution phase) parallels the post-crisis stage of Coombs’s model as it ensures the crisis has ended and distributes that message. It can be better to show all the comparisons of the three different models (Fink, Mitroff, and Coombs’ models) in a table (Table 3-2) as follows:

**Table 3-2** Similarities and differences between three different models

<b>Fink’s Model</b>	<b>Mitroff’s model</b>	<b>Coombs’ model</b>
Prodromal stage	Signal Detection	Pre-crisis
	Probing and Prevention	
Acute stage	Damage Containment	Crisis
Chronic stage	Recovery	
Resolution stage	Learning	Post-crisis

Likewise, there are no significant differences between the three phrases “recognising the crisis”, “crisis detection support”, and “sense-making” used in the models presented by Augustine, Moore, and Boin et al, respectively. Moreover, the phrase “profiting from the crisis” used in the Augustine’s model is not that different from the term “learning from crisis” used in the model developed by Boin, Hart, Stern, and Sundelius. As a result, even though a crisis management process is divided into various phases and these phases are defined in different ways by the scholars, it can be characterised by the major three tasks (or phases); namely preparation, management / recovery operations, and evaluation. According to the scholars, while preparation phase often refers to dealing with issues such as planning, training, mitigation, avoiding the crisis, and recognising a crisis (sense making), and so on; management phase is generally associated with dealing with issues such as relief, recovery, damage containment, containing the crisis, deciding critical response choices and their implementation, leading, coordination of crisis response, and communicating with the stakeholders (meaning making) etc. As for the phase of evaluation, it begins when the organization returns to normal, and then continues with the accountability process which encompasses managing the blame. More importantly, it includes looking for ways to better prepare for the next crisis. In fact, it is mostly related to evaluating the crisis management process for lessons, profiting from the crisis, and improving future crisis response practices.

### 3.4. Key Tasks: A Synthesis

As discussed both in previous section and in previous chapter (Chapter 2), although a crisis management process is divided into various stages and these stages are identified in different ways by various researchers, it can be symbolized by the major three phases such as preparation, management / recovery operations, and evaluation. According to the scholars, while preparation phase often refers to dealing with issues such as planning, training, mitigation, avoiding the crisis, and recognising a crisis (sense making), and so on; management phase is generally associated with dealing with issues such as relief, recovery, coordinating crisis response efforts, damage containment, containing the crisis, deciding critical response choices and their implementation, leading, and communicating with the stakeholders (meaning making) etc. As for the phase of evaluation, it begins when the organization returns to normal, and then continues with the accountability process which includes managing the accusations. More importantly, it includes searching for ways to better prepare for future crises. In reality it is mostly related to evaluating the crisis management process for lessons, profiting from the crisis, and improving future crisis management practices. As a result, it is possible to make a synthesis of the key tasks affecting the success of crisis management process based mainly on these models as shown in a table (Table 3-3):

**Table 3-3** A synthesis of the key tasks affecting the success of crisis management process

<b>Phases</b>	<b>Tasks</b>
Preparation	Planning for possible crises
	Detecting an upcoming crisis
Management	Organising
	Leading
	Decision-making
	Managing the public's perception (Crisis Communication)
	Managing emotions*
	Managing the agenda*
Evaluation	Managing the blame
	Learning from crisis

\*The researcher integrates these two tasks into the synthesis.

Although why and / or to what extent the tasks in the synthesis influence crisis management effectiveness will be broadly examined in the following chapter, it can be useful to draw attention to the main reasons why these tasks were chosen by the researcher in here. Apart from various crisis management models' emphasis on these tasks (*see* also 2.5), there are also a number of reasons that force the researcher to prefer these tasks. To begin, *planning for possible crises* was integrated into the synthesis of the key tasks affecting the success of crisis management process because planning is the first management function which maps out exactly how to achieve a particular goal

within any management process. In addition, planning defines the roles of both individuals and organisations that will take part in crisis response, and thus increases the opportunity to save lives and minimize negative outcomes in the wake of a crisis. *Detecting an upcoming crisis* was included in the synthesis of the key tasks because it is clear that a well established planning requires recognising a crisis before it strikes. More importantly, as discussed before (*see* Chapter 2), an ultimate objective of crisis management is to prevent a crisis; or - at least - to reduce its negative results, and early detection may enable organisations to achieve this goal.

*Organising* was chosen by the researcher because it is a management function which involves designating duties to the staff with the specific ability sets needed to complete the tasks within a management process. Organising was preferred because - as Gonzalez (2008) stated - it enables public administrators to determine the internal organizational structure; establish and maintain relationships, as well as allocate necessary resources to effectively respond a crisis situation. The researcher preferred *leading* because - first of all - it is one of the most significant functions of management which is the set of processes used to get individuals to work together for a common goal. Second, as Boin et al (2005) pointed out, crisis and leadership are closely related terms. It is a natural inclination in a crisis situation to look to leaders to do something (Boin et al, 2005). In other words, once a crisis occurs, people look for a leader who will end the crisis; or at least, who will minimise the negative consequences of the

situation. Moreover, all management functions are shaped in the hands of a leader. *Decision-making* was integrated into the synthesis of the key tasks affecting the success of crisis management process because it is the basic requirement of management. If truth be told, management is nothing more than decision making. Both successes and failures of crisis management are directly associated with decision-making because all the tasks to be performed in a crisis management process require decision-making (i.e., deciding how to make a contingency plan, deciding how to organise crisis response efforts, deciding how to communicate with the stakeholders etc.).

*Managing the public's perception* (crisis communication) was included in the synthesis of the key tasks because - first of all - how people perceive the crisis response is more important than crisis response itself. Secondly, crisis communication has a potential to reduce the public and political uncertainty resulted from the crisis. More importantly, as Boin et al (2005) emphasised, crisis communication enables crisis managers to turn rumours, misrepresentations, and drivels produced in the crisis situation into the form of accurate and clear information and thus to obstruct a chain reaction of new crises that make the situation more challenging. The researcher integrated the task of *managing emotions* into the synthesis since crisis management is a human-intensive practice and human is beset by a great variety of feelings which motivate him to act. The researcher sees managing emotional reactions as a key task because crises have a potential to make people lose their sense of safety and

then to trigger various feelings (such as fear, stress, worry, anxiety, and panic etc.) that may lead to new crises. The researcher incorporated the task of *managing the agenda* into the synthesis because - by the definition given in previous chapter - crisis is a situation which sets a new agenda for both individuals and organisations to manage. To make clear, crises in particular natural disasters have a potential to put new issues on agendas (such as search and rescue, shelter, and mass medical attention etc.) to be dealt with. Managing a crisis requires dealing with all the issues. In fact, crisis management is nothing more than managing the issues occupying the crisis agenda.

It is commonly accepted that - once a crisis emerged - public leaders are generally accused for causing the crisis, failing to prevent it, or inefficiently responding to it. Unless public authorities manage these accusations well, it is hard for them to maintain their legitimacy. Unless these accusations are managed effectively, they may bring about a chain of new crises that make the situation more complicated. *Managing the blame* is, therefore, an essential task to be performed in a crisis management process. Finally, *learning from crisis* was chosen as a key task because it enables both individuals and organisations to learn what went wrong and then put in place measures to prevent or to reduce the risk of future crises. Crisis-induced learning is a key asset for building crisis management capacities due to the fact that - as Carley and Harrald (1997) stated - it makes both individuals and organizations more prepared for future incidents and affects the

structures and processes in an evolutionary way. More importantly, the harm caused by crises can be minimized with the help of a successful learning and adaptation of effective crisis management practices.

### **3.5. Summary**

The aim of this chapter was, mainly, to visit the crisis management models and to discuss their both phases and the most important ingredients. Secondly, the chapter discussed the differences and similarities between the models. More importantly, the chapter turned the spotlight to a synthesis of the major tasks affecting the success of crisis management practices.

As for the next chapter, it will broadly investigate why and / or to what extent the tasks in the synthesis influence crisis management performance. It will also examine the main barriers to these tasks in order to find out the major obstacles to the success of crisis management practices.

## **4. EXPLORING THE SYNTHESIS**

### **4.1. Introduction**

This chapter will broadly study the tasks in the synthesis presented at the end of previous chapter (Chapter 3). Indeed, the chapter will be established on the debate about the potentials and limitations of the tasks composing the synthesis. In other words, it will question why and / or to what extent these tasks have the potential to influence the success of crisis management process, and it will examine the main obstacles to these tasks in order to address the second research question concerning the main barriers to effective crisis management process. Apart from this introductory part, the chapter is composed of three main sections. The first section will focus on the preparation phase tasks; namely planning for possible crises and detecting an approaching crisis. It will discuss the potentials and limitations of these two tasks. The second section will study the tasks (such as organising, leading, decision-making, managing the public perception, feelings management, and managing the agenda) associated with the management phase. As for the third section, it will discuss managing the blame and learning from crisis as two critical tasks related to the evaluation stage.

### **4.2. Preparation Phase Tasks**

This section will question why and / or to what extent the tasks of planning for possible crises and detecting an approaching crisis have

the potential to influence the success of crisis management process. It will also examine the main limitations to these tasks.

#### **4.2.1. PLANNING FOR POSSIBLE CRISES**

##### **4.2.1.1. Potential of Planning for Possible Crises**

Planning can be described as preparing plans of actions that combine unity, permanence, flexibility and precision given the organisation's resources, type and significance of work and future trends. Planning involves mapping out exactly how to reach a particular target and defines the responsibilities and the line of command guidance within a real situation. Planning requires organizing and making as many decisions as possible before a crisis actually occurs, and thus forces organisations to predict potential crises. However, it is hard to completely predict all the types of crises an institution may face as crises come in a variety of guises such as chemical explosions, earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, and terrorist attacks, and so on (see Chapter 2). Therefore, rather than trying to make a specific plan for each type of crisis, it may be more practical to make instead a more generic plan that could be adapted to all crisis types.

Many researchers (*see* Chapter 2 & 3) commonly state that planning has a considerable impact on the effectiveness of crisis management process. Planning is expected to increase the chance of an effective crisis response because - first of all – planning may seriously reduce the negative effects of a crisis. In other words, by planning ahead for a crisis, there is the opportunity to save lives and minimize negative

outcomes. Secondly, it is likely to provide practice or training, which will admit higher performance during the actual situation. Thirdly, planning defines the roles of both individuals and organisations that will take part in crisis response, and also identifies the communication and resource channels which will be used for managing the crisis situation (Carley & Harrald, 1997). Fourthly, having a plan defines roles and so allows more rapid response because these roles do not have to be negotiated once a crisis strikes. Fifthly, planning provides an organized command structure to coordinate and deal with the situation (Putra, 2009). Furthermore, as Drennan and McConnell (2007: 128) pointed out, crisis planning often aims to identify lines of authority, roles and responsibilities and means of coordination, leaving key identified individuals with a significant amount of autonomy to act as appropriate to the circumstances.

On the other hand, the quality of a crisis management planning highly affects the success rate of the rescue and preparedness efforts (McConnell, 2003; Darling et al, 2005: 345; Regester, & Larkin, 2005: 206; Birkland, 2006; Sahin *et al*, 2008: 18). As for the main characteristics of a high quality crisis management plan (partly discussed above), it is - first of all - periodically updated and tested. It should be kept in mind that contingency plans are an illusion of preparation unless accompanied by training and testing and Heide (1989) calls this '*Paper Plan Syndrome*'. To expand, the existence of written crisis management plan documents is, of course, important, but the documents alone are not sufficient to guarantee the success. To

Heide (1989), the written plans are likely to fail under the pressure of vast and complex crisis or disaster situations, and hence they might readily degenerate into little more than window-dressing, creating a false sense of preparedness, unless they are connected with regular training and exercise programs. In other words, crisis plans need to be supported by training exercises from all the organisations concerned, and therefore, crisis simulations are now considered as an integral part of the emergency planning process.

Secondly, a well prepared plan indicates how quickly each function will be performed in the first crucial hours after a crisis occur. Thirdly, a high quality plan contains information and guidance that will help decision makers to consider not only the short-term consequences, but the long-term effects of each decision made during the response. Fourthly, a well-established contingency plan enables public organisations to improve their communications channels, and thus enables them to minimize losses and damage in case of an emergency. Fifthly, a well prepared contingency plan is neither too long nor rigid. In other words, it provides the flexibility and framework which acknowledges the unpredictable aspects of any crisis situation. Sixthly, a high quality crisis management plan is designed in collaboration with many departments, personnel from different levels of the hierarchy, and other organisations. Further, a well-prepared contingency plan is based on what people are "likely" to do, rather than what they should do (Heide, 1989). Moreover, modern crisis management planning is generic, written in general terms with

specific chapters covering the most likely threats, hence economies of scale can more easily be achieved and multiple impacts can be addressed through the one plan (Fink, 2002). More importantly, a well prepared crisis plan is based on valid assumptions about human behaviour, incorporates an inter-organizational perspective, is tied to resources, and is known and accepted by the participants. Alternatively, Perry and Lindell (2003: 340-347) identify the main features of a high quality crisis plan as follows:

- ✓ It is established on true knowledge of threats
- ✓ It encourages proper action by crisis managers.
- ✓ It increases the flexibility in disaster response.
- ✓ It facilitates inter-organisational coordination.
- ✓ It integrates into an all-hazard approach.
- ✓ It provides for testing through emergency exercises.
- ✓ It is an on-going and dynamic process, accommodating changes of the environment.
- ✓ It takes into account conflict and resistance on the allocation of resources such as personnel and budget.

In the meantime, it must specifically be stated that planning, though valuable, cannot guarantee the success of crisis management practices because - first of all –effective crisis management requires coping with lots of uncertainties and complexities (see chapter 2) but during the planning it is hard to foresee the all unknowns and difficulties that will emerge within an actual situation. Second, even if a plan is well-established, the pressure that a crisis situation brings about may

hamper the proper implementation of the plan. More importantly, as Heide (1989) points out, plans are often laid aside and are not followed within an actual situation because the planners are not the practitioners. To make this point clear, as the practitioners have no ownership of the plans and often have not read them, the benefits of the planning process do not occur. However, it is a reality that even though a crisis plan cannot guarantee the effective crisis management; it enables public organisations to restore the chaotic situation back to normal, to minimize the crisis damage, and extremely shorten the time to recover from the crisis.

To conclude, although planning does not guarantee the effectiveness of a crisis management process, it can be said that it has a considerable impact on the success of the process. Therefore, all the factors that impede the function of planning can be considered as the barriers to effectiveness of a crisis management process. Now, the next subsection will take a look at the key obstacles to the function of planning.

#### **4.2.1.2. Limitations to Effective Planning**

Although crisis management logic suggests that planning and preparing for possible crises should be a vital part of institutional and policy toolkits, it is hard to translate this ideal into practice because of a number of reasons. First, crisis planning involves decision-making with regard to uncertainties and complexities that will emerge within an actual situation, and thus forces planners to predict all of them.

However, it is very difficult for both organisations and individuals to predict the all uncertainties and complexities (see 2.2.1. & 2.2.2) they are likely to face within a crisis situation because of its inconceivable and unexpected nature. Second, planning and preparation for possible crises place large demands on resources and thus, have to compete for taking a share from limited resources. To expand this point, owing to the improbability of disaster impact, the expense and effort put out to prepare for it is perceived as an 'investment with little certainty of return' (McConnell and Drennan, 2006: 62). In other words, people are unlikely to give priority of attention to an unlikely future disaster when there are fifteen tasks that have to be accomplished by Friday (Tierney, 1985: 77). This factor is particularly salient in contemporary government where there are so many programs competing for scarce resources (Drabek, 1985: i). Third, robust contingency planning requires active preparation through training and exercises, but such costly activities often produce a level of symbolic readiness which does not reflect operational realities (McConnell & Drennan, 2006: 59).

Fourth, contingency planning requires ordering and coherence of possible threats but - as Heide (1989) stated - it is not yet possible to package crisis in such a predictable way. Fifth, planning for crisis requires integration and synergy across institutional networks, yet the modern world is characterised by fragmentation across public, private and voluntary sectors (McConnel & Drennan, 2006). More importantly, crises in particular natural disasters tend to cross

jurisdictional and functional boundaries involving city, county, state, federal, and special district (e.g., flood control or fire districts) governments as well as private spheres of responsibility. This often results in a situation where no *single* institution, person, or level of government is perceived as responsible for contingency planning (Heide, 1989). Accordingly, disaster preparedness goals and policies of various jurisdictions and agencies are often contradictory, and motivation to get things done is hampered by a lack of accountability (Cigler, 1986: 6). Finally, one of the most important barriers to effective planning is not being able to detect the signals of an imminent crisis. In other words, a well established planning requires recognising a crisis before it strikes. Therefore, now the task of detecting an approaching crisis will be studied in the following part.

## **4.2.2.DETECTING AN APPROACHING CRISIS**

### **4.2.2.1. Potential of Detecting an Approaching Crisis**

In order to prepare an effective contingency plan, public institutions need to assess the threat and decide what the crisis is about. However, as Boin et al (2005) emphasise, most crises do not materialize with an explosion, and they surprise both public organisations and policy makers. To understand why crises continue to surprise us - as Boin et al (2005) point out - it is essential for us to think of them in terms of a disease: A disease starts with a weak state of the body, which may be induced by genetic factors or the result of unhealthy behaviour. The incubation phase sets in when pathogens proliferate and make

themselves at home. When they reach a certain threshold, the pathogens overtake the body's defence system and make the patient feel sick. The disease is now manifested and the fight for recovery, or survival, can begin. A crisis follows a similar pattern of development, and therefore, it is essential for public organisations to recognize an imminent crisis in a timely fashion, in particular before it has passed through the threshold of prodromal (preliminary) recognition and action (Barnes, 2001). Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that it is very difficult for public organisations to predict with any sort of precision when and where a crisis will emerge because the driving mechanisms of crisis are often concealed behind the complexities of our modern systems which were discussed in the second chapter (for details of complexities *see* 2.2.2).

As discussed in previous chapters (Chapter 2 and 3), an ultimate objective of crisis management is to forestall a crisis; or - at least - to lessen its negative outcomes, and early detection may enable organisations to prevent most crises or - at least - to cope with them more effectively. Therefore, it can be claimed that recognising a crisis in advance has a considerable impact on the success of crisis management practices. As Goodman (2001: 117) underlines, nothing prepares public institutions for change better than the awareness of what they can do, and what they cannot do about it. Therefore, it can be claimed that the earlier an organization is aware of a threat, the better it can prepare for the threat and the more effective it can cope with it.

On the other hand, it is essential for a crisis manager to recognize an approaching crisis in a timely fashion and with a will to address the issues they represent because once a crisis has passed through the threshold of prodromal (preliminary) recognition and action it is much more difficult to seize and effectively respond (Barnes, 2001: 13; Mahoney, 2010: 22). More importantly, if diagnosis phase is followed by a period of limited action and an underestimation of the problem, leading to a ‘we are in control’ mentality (McConnell & Stark, 2002: 664), it is obvious that crisis recognition will make no sense. Hence, it can be concluded that detecting an upcoming crisis cannot guarantee the effective crisis management even though it has a considerable impact on the success of the process.

As a result, although crisis recognition does not guarantee the effectiveness of a crisis management process, it can be said that it has a considerable impact on the success of the process. Thus, all the factors that obstruct to detect an imminent crisis can be considered as the obstacles to effective crisis management efforts. Now, the next subsection will look into the key barriers to detecting an imminent crisis.

#### **4.2.2.2. Limitations to Detecting an Approaching Crisis**

Even though crisis management authorities suggest that recognising an imminent crisis through some signals should be an essential part of crisis management process, it is not easy task for public institutions to

turn this ideal into practice due to a number of reasons (Boin et al, 2005). To begin, most public organisations are ill equipped to detect an approaching crisis and they lack a common frame that specifies vulnerabilities and prescribes a way of recognising their development. Secondly, most public authorities are either unable or unwilling to pay the costs of systematic check-ups that have a potential to spot emerging vulnerabilities before it is too late. Thirdly, public authorities often fail to generate and interpret information that is crucial for effective crisis detection as long as the signals come into very different corners of the organisations that do not share information or, when they do, use different languages. Fourthly, many issues including warnings of impending crises never make it to the decision-making agenda of public authorities because the policy agenda is overcrowded with issues such as deficiencies with regard to roads, schools, hospitals etc. that await decision-making. All of these issues have fought a hard battle to make it to the top of the agenda; they have all acquired the status of urgency. Fifthly, it is obvious that public leaders need to be informed about the bad news to detect an upcoming crisis but bad news may face formidable obstacles on its way to the top of the organization, in particular in bureaucratic organizations because - as Burnett (1998) - states, nobody wants to alarm his boss unnecessarily and nobody wants to acquire the reputation of a troublemaker. Further, crises are not normally caused by a single factor but emerge from combination and interaction of various factors, and it is very difficult for these organisations to detect all of these factors. Last but not least, as Victor et al (2005) point out,

positive illusions, self-serving biases, and the tendency to discount the future often prevent leaders from listening to persons warning about an approaching crisis.

Consequently, even though planning and early detection do not guarantee the effective crisis management; with proper advanced contingency planning and preparation, and appropriate recognition, there can often be a positive opportunity side to a crisis. It can also be concluded that the success of crisis management process depends on the removal of all the obstacles to these functions discussed above.

### **4.3. Management Phase Tasks**

This section will discuss the tasks such as organising, leading, decision-making, managing the public perception, feelings management, and managing the agenda. This section will examine why and / or to what extent these factors have the potential to affect crisis management success, and will study the main limitations to them.

#### **4.3.1. ORGANISING**

##### **4.3.1.1. Potential of Organising**

Organising is a function in which the synchronization and combination of human, physical and financial resources take place. Organising refers to the integration and harmonious adjustment of individual activities towards the accomplishment of a larger goal (Singh, 1992). Coordination is about resolving or managing

dependencies between different activities. There are a number of dependencies to be managed by crisis managers during a crisis response (Gonzalez, 2008; Gonzalez, 2010). One of them is flow dependency that occurs when a resource flows from one action to another. During crisis response, there are both information and tasks flows among responders as well as between responders and the emergency operations centre. The second one is fit dependency which occurs when multiple agents make a single decision. During a crisis, decisions need to be made quickly under pressure and with incomplete and limited information. Often, they must be made between more than one agent, since actions will affect the response network and the incident itself. Even though the final word with regards to decisions is typically the responsibility of a single agent, it involves joint discussion or consultation. There is also sharing dependency because during a crisis response the same resource may have to be used in different locations or by different organisations. In other words, this dependency occurs when two or more agencies use the same resource.

Whether a disaster is of natural or man-made origin, major incidents can quickly overwhelm the capacity of any single jurisdiction and require support from many organizations, various levels of government and multiple sectors. In general, no single public agency can possess all the skills and resources necessary to respond the disaster. In other words, a large-scale crisis or emergency can exceed governmental bodies' regular administrative abilities, requiring exceptional measures in a short period of time. This can create a power

vacuum and ambiguity as to who owns the crisis and who must deal with it, leading to tensions and undermining the legitimacy base of governance structures and processes (Boin et al, 2005). Therefore, it can be claimed that the success of crisis management process is centred on organising the efforts of these several governmental agencies, and identified coordination is hallmark of expert crisis management teams.

Organising is a crucial function within the crisis management process because - first of all - through the process of organizing, public administrators determine the internal organizational structure; establish and maintain relationships, as well as allocate necessary resources to effectively respond an unexpected event. Secondly, in the event of a crisis, such as a large-scale emergency or a natural disaster, a network of response agencies (police, fire, medical services, and others) are often deployed to deal with the situation. Hence, as Gonzalez (2010) underlines, the speed and accuracy with which the agencies become aware and take action is critical for the crisis to be contained or controlled, and both speed and accuracy depend on effective coordination. Thirdly, lack of cooperation can have negative consequences ranging from wasted resources to missed opportunities (Gonzalez, 2008).

Furthermore, in disasters, the alterations of traditional divisions of labour and resources increase the need for multi-organizational and multi-disciplinary coordination of the various responding participants (Gonzalez, 2010). Without this coordination, resources may not be

shared or distributed according to need. More importantly, through organising, public organisations can avoid double efforts or conflicting efforts. If disaster-related tasks - such as search and rescue, traffic control, medical care, and transportation of casualties - are performed in a loosely structured, spontaneous manner, with insufficient communication and control, the result can be duplication of effort, omission of essential tasks, and even counterproductive activity (Heide, 1989). Finally, in the event of a crisis, coordination enables to resolve or manage dependencies (discussed above) between the various public response agencies such as police, fire and medical service.

Consequently, since the function of organising plays a major role within the crisis management process, it is obvious that all the factors that impede performing the function will negatively affect the success of the process. Hence, the next section will have a look at the major barriers to the function of organising.

#### **4.3.1.2. Challenges to Organising**

One of the most important challenges for crisis coordination is of course *network diversity*. To expand this issue, as crises increase in size and complexity, they require greater capacities, which imply a larger and more diverse network of responders, and this network diversity makes crisis coordination harder because of a number of reasons. To begin, as response agencies change during a crisis response, coordinating resource distribution between various agencies

becomes more difficult. Secondly, the inclusion of multiple agencies with distinct backgrounds, interests, and cultures can cause uncertainty about how members will behave and interact with one another (Provan and Milward, 2001: 418). Thirdly, different agencies are likely to have different coordination styles and they do not want to depart from their own styles during a crisis response. Fourthly, diversity of network may foster delay and confusion. In addition, network diversity may foster solo actions (the greatest enemy of coordination), and thus even within well-established networks, boundaries are difficult to define, as is determining who is “in” and who is “out” (Moynihan, 2007; Moynihan, 2009). This lack of clarity about who is in charge can give rise to responders freelancing, and then - as stated in the previous section - duplication of effort, omission of essential tasks, and even counterproductive activity.

*Voluntary actors* such as non-governmental and private actors that take part in crisis response are another significant challenge for crisis coordination due to a number of reasons (Moynihan, 2009). To begin, they are largely unknown to planners ahead of time or not considered important enough to include in crisis response plans. Secondly, as the volunteers hover on the edge of the network and can form their own ad hoc network, public agencies that are the main responsible for organising crisis response frequently have difficulty coordinating the efforts of volunteer groups with their own efforts. Thirdly, volunteers may have varying skill levels and lack familiarity with organizational routines or operating procedures. Moreover, volunteers are not always

familiar with the standard terms or routes used in communications. They do not know who to ask for what, or under what conditions (and to whom) to report difficulties. This is especially true when these actors have never worked together before. More importantly, since crisis managers cannot always be sure whether the required task is properly completed by the volunteer actors, they may need to re-perform the task. This situation may diminish the speed and efficiency of crisis response efforts because it leads to waste of time and resources.

Thirdly, in crises especially in natural or man-made disasters, coordination difficulties are often hard to separate from *inter-organisational communication difficulties*. Most coordination issues are resulted from the unwillingness of some agencies to communicate and share information with others even in the wake of a disaster. A substantial portion of disaster communications problems are resulted from lack of trust or familiarity, or political, jurisdictional, and personal disputes among these agencies (Heide, 1989: 52). Fourthly, as mentioned in section 4.2.1.1, limited adequacy of the planned response may undermine any attempt to organise crisis management efforts. Fifthly, in natural disasters an organisation that is responsible for coordinating the first response may find itself victimised. It is obvious that when headquarters, essential equipment, or communication systems are ruined, mobilization of organisational members will be hindered. Sixthly, during a crisis response, the necessity of the ad hoc formulation of function is an important barrier

to coordination because public organisations are traditionally designed to perform a specific function and they perform their function in a given geographic area, under specified conditions (Boin et al, 2005).

Moreover, during a crisis many people especially bystanders try to make their way to the scene. These people may have different motives for doing so but the effects are the same: roads clog up, communication and physical interaction between responders is hindered (Boin et al, 2005). Last but not least, there are also a number of barriers to crisis coordination such as the complexity and unpredictable nature of a large-scale crisis, high uncertainty, the critical requirements of speed and accuracy (for saving lives, protection the environment or restoring normalcy), heterogeneity in the nature of responders and the data, language, working environments, rules and regulations, response under temporal and resource constraints, and the difficulty in agreeing upon and combining the individual actions of response units and agencies to achieve a globally effective and efficient response (Gonzalez, 2008; Gonzalez, 2010).

In conclusion, the effectiveness of crisis management process is centred on organising the efforts of several governmental agencies because a failure to coordinating of crisis response efforts can lead to responders freelancing, and then duplication of effort, conflicting efforts, waste of time and resources, omission of essential tasks, and even counterproductive activity. It is therefore clear that the success of

crisis management process depends on the removal of all the barriers to the functions of organising discussed.

### **4.3.2.LEADING**

Leading is one of the most important functions of management. Leading refers to the set of processes used to get individuals to work together, and all management functions are shaped in the hands of a leader. Leading also refers to authorising the action of others, providing focus and overview (Drennan and McConnell, 2007; Ulmer et al., 2007). Crisis and leadership are closely related terms. It is a natural inclination in a crisis situation to look to leaders to do something (Boin et al, 2005). Therefore, during a crisis, it is essential that the leader - at least - be visible, poised, courageous, committed, and attentive. It is also necessary that the leader provide stability and security as well as reduce anxiety by consistently returning to the organization's values and vision. Meanwhile, it must be underlined that successful crisis management leaders often come from the organizations that have clear vision and values because these organisations have both the opportunities and structures for leaders to gain knowledge, strategies, skills, and abilities to handle the crisis situations (Mitroff, 2001; Smits & Ezzat, 2003).

On the other hand, whether public authorities like it or not, crisis management has become a leadership issue because the increased scope, complexity, and political salience of crises raise the stakes for public authorities (Boin et al, 2005). To illustrate, when leaders

become successful in coping with the crisis, they will be heralded by the public; but once the leaders fail to control the situation they are likely to be held responsible for this failure. Leadership has become a significant aspect of crisis management process because - as Klann (2003) points out - all leaders are likely to face a crisis at some point, and many leaders feel how they deal with the crisis will be the benchmark for the rest of their careers. Therefore, during a crisis, it is essential that leaders take on a more important and critical role, remain calm in the face of strong emotions, reduce turmoil, and make sense out of ambiguous circumstances, and work well with stakeholders (Adubato, 2008). It is also necessary that leaders have some crucial competencies as well as choose right leadership style. Hence, the following sections will focus on what makes a good leader in a crisis situation.

#### **4.3.2.1. Leadership Competencies**

It is important for crisis leaders to have many different competencies to cope with uncertain, unexpected, and complex nature of a crisis. Crisis leadership needs to have different skills as a crisis emerges with little warning, provokes individual emotions (such as perception, panic, fear, stress etc.) by putting people under immense pressure, requires vital decisions to be made under pressure, and sets a new agenda. Therefore, researchers list a great variety of competencies leaders will need to lead during a crisis as: being able to react under pressure, comprehensive planners, decisive, willing to make hard decisions, knowledgeable, personable, versatile, communicator,

negotiator, delegator, empowered, self-actualized, tough, compassionate, fully engaged, understands culture, flexible, involves stakeholders, technically capable for their position, motivational, judicious, credible, clear vision and value system (Adubato, 2008; Cavanaugh, 2006; Klann, 2003; Lalonde, 2004). In addition, the contemporary-based quantum skills of seeing intentionally, thinking paradoxically, feeling vitally alive and involved, knowing intuitively, acting responsibly, and trusting life's processes can be of enormous value in effective crisis management (Darling et al, 2005).

Emotional intelligence competencies of a leader such as empathy, self-awareness, persuasion, courage, reliability, teamwork skills and the ability to manage relationships would be important for success in crisis management processes (Schoenberg, 2005). Crisis leadership also requires giving account, being respectful for different cultures, serving to the public, giving up personal interests and concerns, and being professional, and so on. When such values are lacking there is no push for creating and sharing knowledge that is essential for crisis response. Crisis leadership particularly needs to have a capacity to analyse both local and global trends as modern crises tend to cross the boundaries. The following leadership abilities are also considered very critical (Kauzya, 2007: 13-15).

- **Entrepreneurial ability** is required for visioning and strategizing including analysis of the past, current and future environment and situation in order to map out paths as well as viable and feasible policy alternatives for development.

- **Administrative ability** is necessary for following and respecting laws, rules, regulations, procedures, due process and prudent utilization of scarce resources especially for accountability purposes as well as orderly productivity.
- **Operative ability** is critical for action. Development is not a result of only policy and strategy. It is also a consequence of action or production.

To conclude, as stated above, all of these skills, traits, and competencies are tools to help during a crisis. More importantly, many of these competencies can be learned through training, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

#### **4.3.2.2. Leadership Styles in Crises**

When leaders interact with followers they employ combination of traits, skills and behaviours that is called leadership style. Leadership style consists of a leader's general personality, behaviours, and communication patterns in guiding others toward reaching organizational or personal goals. More importantly, leadership style determines at what level of the organization decisions are made, how much participation and power subordinates have in the process (Regester & Larkin, 2005). The style which leaders adopt is commonly based on combination of their beliefs, ideas, norms, and values (Ulmer et al., 2007). Different theories and assumptions lead to a number of different leadership styles including authoritarian and democratic styles that are often displayed in crisis situations.

As Boin et al (2010) underline, authoritarian leaders employ coercive tactics to enforce rules, use Machiavellian cunning to manipulate people and decision making, reward loyalty over merit, believe in a top-down organizational chart with clear levels of authority and reporting processes, employ control as the primary management strategy, insist on direct involvement and control over decision-making processes, actively put forward their own policy views, seek to set the agenda for their followers, centralize decision making within their inner circle of advisers. The most distinguishing features of authoritarian leaders is placing themselves at the heart of all key processes and decisions, and making most of the decisions themselves with little input from followers. Therefore, authoritarian leaders can be expected to react much quicker to a crisis and to more rapidly develop a frame of the scale and significance of the crisis (as well as the type of response that is needed). As the authors point out, this can be interpreted as the peak of crisis leadership – the true decider – but it may also be perceived, with or without the benefit of hindsight, as ‘shooting from the hip’ or even as reckless carelessness.

Authoritarian style emphasizes objectivity in the workplace, tends to be impervious to human problems, is insensitive to people’s feelings, and displays little emotion or affection towards employees (Boin et al, 2010). Therefore, even though authoritarian style can be viewed as successful in a few crisis situations allowing for the extremes of consideration and ruthlessness, it is unlikely to work properly in most crisis situations which provoke individual emotions such as

perception, panic, fear, stress etc. by putting people under immense pressure. Indeed, once the response comes to be perceived as a failure, they will be held responsible by the public, and thus it will be more difficult for them to avoid the blame. Hence, as Boin et al (2010) claimed, these leaders walk a fine line between heroism and scorn (This topic will be discussed later when studying blame management). More importantly, authoritarian leadership will not be able to guarantee the success in crisis management practices because it is widely understood that no leader is smart enough to single handily cope with all the issues an organization or community encounters within a crisis.

Democratic leadership, however, leads to delegation and communication about goals, processes of goal accomplishment, respect for diversity in team members, and a collective effort to seek quality in each task and final product (Ulmer et al, 2007). This collaborative process brings a trust atmosphere to the workplace and creates respect for the contributions by team members. Contrary to authoritarian leaders, democratic leaders rarely make decisions without input from their followers. In other words, democratic leaders encourage others to participate in decision-making processes. Therefore, compared to authoritarian style, democratic leadership is more likely to provide success in crisis management. On the other hand, as Boin et al (2010) point out, during and after a crisis democratic leaders are more exposed to blame from a public and media who expect rapid, decisive interventions. Particularly, in the

case of disasters and catastrophes, high societal costs such as death, injury, disease and critical infrastructure breakdowns provide political opponents with the ammunition to attack 'ineffective' leadership (Boin et al, 2010). Yet, in crisis management, democratic leaders are closer to success because they take into account individual emotions provoked by crisis itself and tend to display more emotion or affection toward both team members and stakeholders.

### **4.3.3.DECISION-MAKING**

#### **4.3.3.1. Potential of Decision-making**

Decision-making is related with management and leadership. In other words, decisions lay fully in the domain of managers and leaders. To Eisenfuhr (2011), decision making is a process of making a choice from various alternatives to achieve a desired result. This definition has three key elements (Eisenfuhr, 2011). First, decision making involves making a choice from a number of options. Second, decision making is a process that involves more than simply a final choice from among alternatives. Finally, the "desired result" mentioned in the definition involves a purpose or target resulting from the mental activity that the decision maker engages in to reach a final decision. In other words, when solving a problem or working toward a goal, we anticipate that if we take a certain action another situation will result that represents our desired objective.

Historically scientists have emphasized two basic models of decision making; namely, the *rational* model and the *bounded rationality*

model. To rational model, individuals decide under certainty. They know their alternatives; they know the decision-making criterion that will be employed; they know the outcomes of the decision that will be made; and they have the ability to make the optimum choice and then to implement it. According to the model, the decision making process is broken down into six steps (March, 2010): Once a problem is identified, alternative solutions to the problem are generated. These alternatives are carefully assessed, and the best alternative is chosen for implementation. The implemented alternative is then evaluated over time to assure its immediate and continued effectiveness. If difficulties arise at any stage in the process, recycling may be effected.

On the other hand, the bounded rationality model has different assumptions (March, 2010): First of all, decisions will always be based on an incomplete and, to some degree, inadequate comprehension of the true nature of the problem being faced. Secondly, decision makers will never succeed in generating all possible alternative solutions for consideration. Thirdly, alternatives are always evaluated incompletely because it is impossible to predict accurately all consequences associated with each alternative. Furthermore, the ultimate decision regarding which alternative to choose must be based on some criterion other than maximization or optimization because it is impossible to ever determine which alternative is optimal. In other words, this approach to decision making involves choosing the first alternative that satisfies minimal standards of acceptability without exploring all possibilities.

It is hard to claim only the rationale model or merely the bounded rationality model is more fitted to crisis decision-making. Different models of decision-making can be applied to different types of crises. In other words, decision-making styles may change according to type of crisis. To illustrate, the rationale model can be more suitable for conventional crises (i.e. global warming) because - as mentioned in Chapter 2 - this type of crises can be predicted in advance and have known influences on other factors. More importantly, their probability and prevention actions are well known. On the other hand, the bounded rationality decision-making model can be more fitted to fundamental crises such as 9/11 because during this sort of crises the problem or situation requiring a decision is very dynamic, exceptional, and difficult to define. Decisions are, therefore, likely to be established on an inadequate comprehension. The bounded rationality model is better to explain decision-making in fundamental crises because during this type of crisis situations - as Bennet & Bennet (2008) state – decision makers are unlikely to succeed in generating all possible alternative solutions for consideration due to time pressure and multiple actors that interact in shaping, implementing, and reacting to the decisions.

It is hard to define crisis decision-making with only the rationale model or the bounded rationality model because decision making styles may differ depending on the stages of a crisis. Indeed, different models of decision-making can be applied to the different phases of a crisis. As the conditions in preparation (pre-crisis) stage are different

from the ones in management (acute or crisis) phase, decision-making styles are likely to differ in these two stages. To be more specific, while crisis managers have plenty of time to decide in pre-crisis period, they are likely to be under time pressure in the acute phase. Whilst decision-makers, thus, have a chance to consider almost all possible alternative solutions in the preparation phase, they will probably make decisions without considering all alternatives in the acute stage of the crisis. Therefore, it can be said that while the rationale model is more suitable for decision-making in pre-crisis period, the bounded rationality model is more fitted to decision-making in acute (management or crisis) phase.

On the other hand, it is clear that both successes and failures of crisis management are often related with great decisions. To make effective and accurate decisions in a crisis, the situation should be carefully analysed, available cues should be assembled (Flin, Youngson, and Yule, 2007). More importantly, the most appropriate decision-making strategies should be chosen. To achieve this, crisis managers should take the type of crisis into consideration (Putra, 2009). For example, if the type of crisis is “fast burning,” crisis leaders might choose recognition-primed/intuitive because this method is good for quick action to prevent a rapid cascade to a catastrophic adverse outcome. On the contrary, if the type of crisis is “slow burning,” a crisis leader could use an innovative strategy because there is plenty of time for him/her to try any innovative solutions to solve the problem.

Experience is another essential factor that affects the quality of decisions made under crisis conditions. Experience has a great impact on the success of crisis management process because of a number of reasons (Forsberg & Pursiainen, 2006). First of all, while managing crises, decision makers often tend to base their decisions on previous experiences and memories in order to determine their actions. Secondly, during a crisis, both information deficiency and pollution cannot be overcome easily and solely through the advice of experts or gathering intelligence. In addition, decision-making is a dynamic process of searching for past experiences and information to connect to the current situation. More importantly, at crisis times, the information at the hand of public institutions is usually interpreted in line with the previous experiences whether they are rational or irrational, since there is a time limitation and stress which may avoid the flow of sufficient and relevant information.

There is also another crucial factor that has a considerable impact on the decision-making process in a crisis situation: centralization or decentralisation level of decision-making process. Centralization can be described as a process where the decisions are made by a few key persons. In other words, the important and key decisions are taken by the top management. It is a common belief that the decision-making process guiding crisis-response efforts should be centralized. This so-called ‘centralization study’ underpins the public want of a figurehead who is “in charge” during times of crisis (‘t Hart, Rosenthal, and Kouzmin, 1993). The crisis-centralization study proposes that a crisis

will cause centralization of authority because increased time pressure during crisis times creates an urge for rapid response and shorter lines of communication enabled by escalation of more direct control to higher managerial levels (Billings et al, 1980; 't Hart et al, 1993 ).

There are a number of crucial factors that affect the centralisation level of crisis response. One of them is the *nature and extent of the threat* ('t Hart et al, 1993): A tendency is that the greater the threat, the more centralised will be the response. The reason is that no government can afford to ignore crucial issues which threaten its legitimacy, security and capacity to govern. Economic threats are subject to similar centralising tendencies. Military threats and challenges to security also involve strong centralisation, simply because state security is a function of the centre. Another factor is *the degree of secrecy* required (McConnell, 2003). The higher the level of secrecy, the greater the likelihood that formation of the response will be confined to the central government.

On the other hand, as 't Hart et al (1993) define, decentralization is a systematic delegation of authority at all levels of management and in all of the organization. In a decentralization concern, authority is retained by the top management for taking major decisions and framing policies concerning the whole concern ('t Hart et al, 1993). Rest of the authority may be delegated to the middle level and /or lower level of management. According to the 'decentralization study', most crises or emergencies require those individuals close to the impact of the crises to take 'local' decisions because in emergency

situations such as train crashes or floods, loss of life could result if the emergency services waited for authority to act from central agencies (Waugh and Streib, 2006). The decentralisation study also claims that centralization may lead to rigidity and inefficiency, and may be unrelated or even destructive toward actual response capacity in particular when driven by a desire for political control (Waugh and Streib, 2006). It can be concluded that while almost all crises or emergencies include an element of central decision-making and authoritative choices, a large element of decentralisation is more or less unavoidable because many dynamic and urgent problems arise simultaneously at different places.

Consequently, because the success of crisis management process is very connected to monumental decisions, all the factors that hinder decision-making process will of course negatively affect the crisis management performance. Hence, the next section will look into the major barriers to decision-making.

#### **4.3.3.2. Limitations to Decision-making**

It is hard to make decision under crisis circumstances because of the twin limitations of information overload and deficiency (Stern, 2000). On the one hand, individuals are constantly bombarded with stimuli to such an extent that the stream threatens to overwhelm the human capacity to absorb and make use of the incoming information. On the other hand, decision-makers may lack crucial information regarding a decision. There are two main reasons behind information shortage

faced in crisis situations (Schraagen & Josine, 2008). First, crisis decision-making is often characterized by multiple organizations coming from widely different backgrounds, with different cultures and different information systems, and thus they are not willing to share information with each other. The second reason why decision-makers may lack crucial information is that decision-makers are inclined to focus on information that confirms their initial explanation of events (confirmation bias), and thus easily discard and forget information that contradicts this.

Apart from information overload and shortage, there are also a number of factors that have a potential to affect decision-making under crisis conditions negatively such as uncertain, dynamic environments (not static, simulated situations), shifting, ill-defined, competing goals (not clear and stable goals), time stress, mental fatigue, high stakes, and high workload may also undermine decision-making process (McCan et al., 2000). Further, domestic political vulnerabilities or perceptions of high levels of political accountability on particularly volatile issues often force public institutions to act independently, and thus make collective decision-making more difficult (Stern, 2000). More importantly, crisis managers are preoccupied with successive emergencies, fighting fires rather than thinking about preventing them. Instead of dealing with a single broadly defined problem, they commonly experience a series of tactical sub-problems of varying degrees of urgency, and thus they may lose the ability to think analytically (Stern, 2000). Finally, lack of

experience, inflexibility in considering different options for mitigation, attenuation and filtering of information to key decision makers can be regarded as other crucial barriers to decision-making (Barnes, 2001).

As a result, it is essential for public leaders to remove all these barriers as there is a close connection between the effectiveness of the crisis management process and decision-making. Now, the following section will discuss another crucial task; namely managing the public perception.

#### **4.3.4. MANAGING THE PUBLIC'S PERCEPTION**

##### **4.3.4.1. Potential of Managing the Public's Perception**

Beliefs, expectations, and agenda shape people's perception. Therefore, during a crisis, managing the public's perception *refers* to attempts to direct people's beliefs and expectations about the situation, attempts to shape the agenda within the situation, attempts to influence the public's understanding of the crisis, and to reduce the public and political uncertainty the situation itself caused. As Boin et al (2005) claim, leaders can do this solely by means of communicating a persuasive story line that explains what happened, why it had to be that way, and how it can be resolved. Hence, it can be said that managing the public's perception refers to communicating with the public (or shortly, *crisis communication*). Crisis communication is – as Hale et al (2005) defined - a process of information collection, information processing, decision making, and information distribution

of data necessary to address a crisis situation to internal and external stakeholders. Crisis communication is more typically related with public relations because it is largely informative and responsive to publics' inquiries during and after the crisis. Crisis communication occurs during all phases of crisis management process but crisis response is the most critical and important phase because - compared to preparation and evaluation phase - it is more visible to stakeholders and significantly influences both public opinion and what stakeholders think about how and to what extent the organisation is coping with the situation.

Crisis communication has a considerable impact on the effectiveness of crisis management process because of a number of reasons (Boin et al, 2005). To begin, it aims to establish general and broad-based understanding of the crisis circumstances, consequences, and anticipated outcomes based on available information. Second, crisis communication aims to reduce crisis-related uncertainty as much as possible. Third, crisis communication enables a crisis manager to empathise with those affected by the crisis, and demonstrate the will to mitigate the impact of the crisis. Fourth, crisis communication has a potential to foster a positive image of crisis response. This contribution cannot be underestimated due to the fact that how people perceive the crisis response is more important than crisis response itself. Fifth, it has a potential to reduce emotional turmoil caused by panic, fear, worry, stress. (The importance of managing these emotions will be studied as another leadership task in the next sub-

section.) Furthermore, crisis communication makes a significant difference between obtaining and losing the permissive consensus public authorities need to effectuate their policies and bolster their reputation. More importantly, crisis communication enables public authorities to turn rumours, misrepresentations, and drivels produced in the crisis situation into the form of accurate, clear, and actionable information, and thus to impede a chain reaction of other crises that makes dealing with the situation more complex. Last but not least, as Reynolds and Seeger (2012) point out, crisis communication helps the public understand the responsibilities of the various organizations (public or private) involved in the response.

It is obvious that the most important tool used for crisis communication is the media. The media have been playing a very significant role, especially in providing information to the public during a crisis. In other words, the media serve as an important emergency information system during a crisis. The media are especially important during the first hours or days of an emergency. They also play a critical role in setting agendas and in determining outcomes. However, there are a few negative aspects of the media in a crisis situation. During a crisis the media can consume public authorities' time and attention because it has a potential to produce lots of trouble. More importantly, the media generally have an agenda that emphasizes the more sensational aspects of a crisis. In other words, they often emphasize wrongdoing, blame, and danger during a crisis. Also, they often seek a scape goat for the mistakes made during

the response. Therefore, with respect to media relationships, it is essential for the public authorities to take a proactive stance through open and honest communication. If information about a crisis is not shared openly and honestly by the main authority that manages the situation, both the media and the public are likely to obtain information from other sources. This may cause the public authority to lose the ability to manage the crisis message, and then the situation.

As Putra (2009) emphasised, honesty is really the best policy in crisis communication. Public authorities do not have to tell the media everything they know, but everything they say should be accurate. Such honesty, in the long run, fosters credibility with both the media and the public (Seeger, 2006; Matteo, 2008). Credibility is essential for effective communication and political survival (Smith, 1989: 46) because government's ability to exploit "nodality", which refers to the communication abilities of government, is determined by its credibility, and messages that lack credibility are likely to be ignored (Baker & Stoker, 2012). Therefore, during the initial phase of an event, response organizations and spokespersons need to take steps to establish their credibility. The source of a public organization's perceived credibility comes from its ability to care, competent commitment to solve the crisis (Lundgren & McMakin, 2004). However, the credibility an organization develops prior to a crisis is more valuable during a crisis. Such credibility translates into believability and trust between the public and those seeking to manage the event. Conversely, organizations that fail to develop credible,

trusting relationships in advance will have an exceptionally difficult time doing so in the wake of a crisis.

Another important thing for properly managing the public perception is to speak with one voice. Public communication works best if it is jointly done. Although close coordination of public communication may be complicated, it ensures clear and consistent messages. Consistency of message is one of the most crucial prerequisites for effective crisis communication. Coordinating messages enhances the probability of consistent messages and may reduce the probability of confusion. Therefore, designating a spokesperson is essential for effective crisis communication. Organizational spokespersons have critical roles in crisis communication because they are the face of the organization and humanize the crisis message. Spokesperson may take the organization from an “it” to a “we” and may set up bridge between the response agencies and the public in particular stakeholders (Reynolds & Seeger, 2012). Hence, it is essential that public authorities designate find credible, empathetic, independent and trustworthy spokespeople.

As a result, ever since crisis communication contributes to the success of crisis management process, all the factors that impede crisis communication are likely to influence negatively the crisis management performance. Hence, the next section will investigate the major barriers to effective crisis communication.

#### **4.3.4.2. Barriers to Crisis Communication**

Crisis communication is a big challenge for public authorities because - first of all - the inherent features of crisis such as spectacles of dead bodies, mass destruction of properties, people in distress, widespread violence, uncertainties, and panics put pressure on a public authority's communication capacity (Boin et al, 2005). Secondly, many public institutions in particular in Turkish ones are ill-equipped for crisis communication, not just politically but even in the basic operational sense. To illustrate, many public agencies in Turkey do not have even a public relations unit. Therefore, as 't Hart (1993) points out, under crisis conditions, public institutions and their administrators are overtaken by events, as well as by the fact that in most cases the mass media's initial responses are much quicker and more powerful in terms of generating images of the situation for mass consumption. Then, as Boin et al (2005) draw attention, they easily fall into a reactive mode, which causes them to lose both track of the big picture and control over political communication.

Furthermore, in some crises, spokespersons need to use technocratic language that ordinary people generally do not understand, and this leads to false impression about the messages given (Cole & Fellows, 2008). More importantly, communication issues are often considered by public authorities after an event occurred but once a crisis emerged, public leaders often lack time to prepare for informing the public and the media, and thus lose speed and coherence in communication (Boin et al, 2005). The release of incoherent information has the potential to

increase levels of demoralisation, and can lead to confusion, misunderstanding, suspicion, and resistance to future warnings that ultimately inhibit relief efforts (Durodié & Wessely, 2002). Such communication failures also have the potential to worsen a crisis and to significantly deteriorate the public perception about how effective the crisis is being handled by the response agencies. Therefore, the impact of crisis communication on the effectiveness of crisis management process cannot be ignored.

It is obvious that perception and emotions are interrelated. In other words, perception activates people's feelings and feelings shape the way people perceive things. Therefore, it is essential that public authorities manage emotions during a crisis situation. Now, the following section, therefore, will discuss the task of managing feelings.

#### **4.3.5. MANAGING EMOTIONS**

As mentioned before (see 2.2.1), crises put people under immense pressure and provoke emotional reactions. The unexpected, uncontrollable, and destructive nature of a crisis makes people lose their sense of safety and then triggers various feelings such as fear, stress, worry, anxiety, and panic, and so on. Different emotional reactions to different crises depend on the stakeholder's perception about what caused the crisis, the degree of violence it produced, and the extent to which the victim was involved with its effects (Aptekar & Boore, 1990: 78). During a crisis, any failure in managing these

emotional reactions can cause a chain reaction of new crises. Hence, managing emotions is another crucial leadership task within crisis management process. Emotion management refers to the ways in which people influence their own feelings and expressions and the ways in which they influence other people's feelings. Emotion management helps people to raise their awareness of the potential impact of their emotional responses and by so doing helps them to control them more effectively (Carone & Bianchi, 2012: 1).

During a crisis, managing people's feelings is necessary because the most important factor motivating humans to act is their emotions. To make clear, as discussed in the previous section, people's feelings shape how they perceive and their perception determines what they will do and how they will act. In other words, emotions have the potential to influence what effort individuals exert and how they react to situations. During a crisis, public leaders should manage both their own and stakeholders' feelings because feelings have the potential to produce some negative consequences. To give a number of examples, fear that comes out during a crisis impairs people's ability to act decisively, if not managed. Similarly, as Paton and Flin (1999: 262) call attention, stress that often follows crises damages individuals' ability to make consistent decisions and adversely affects performance in circumstances that demand high levels of attention and creative solutions to emergency problems, if not controlled. In addition, panic that usually appears in the emergency phase of a disaster leads to more serious problems than disaster itself, if managed ineffectively. During

a crisis, controlling emotions is essential as it increases individuals' understanding of the possible consequences of their emotional reactions, and thus enables them to control these responses.

To conclude, it is obvious that crisis management is a human-intensive practice and human is beset by a great variety of feelings. Therefore, crisis managers who ignore or underestimate humans' feelings are likely to fail in the implementation of crisis management strategies.

Now, the following section will discuss managing the agenda as another crucial factor for crisis management performance.

#### **4.3.6.MANAGING THE AGENDA**

As discussed in previous sections, managing the public's perception has a considerable impact on the success of crisis management process. It is clear that one of the most important factors shaping people's perception about a crisis situation is the issues on its agenda. Therefore, during a crisis situation, managing the agenda is very important. However, in crisis situations, controlling the agenda is a big challenge for public authorities because crises, particularly catastrophic ones such as natural disasters take, or at least threaten to take, agenda control from the hands of public leaders (Olson et al. 1998; Olson, 2000). To make clear, natural disasters place a large number of new and complex issues (such as rescue, shelter, drinkable water, relief supplies, mass medical attention, and so on affecting hundreds to many thousands of people) on the public authorities'

agendas simultaneously even though they can deal with only a limited number of items at once.

During a crisis situation, the most effective method public authorities can utilise for managing the agenda is to set a new agenda (Tanner, 2002: 179). To make clear, as given in the literature review chapter (*see* 2.2.4.4), crises experiences tend to re-order the political agenda, stimulate an appetite for change and reform on the part of the electorate and the mass media. If a governmental body regards this situation as potentially damaging, it should take a proactive approach towards the situation by establishing a new agenda. The most efficient method public authorities can use for setting a new agenda is to quickly and effectively disseminate crucial information to key target publics and mass media because this enables the public authorities to frame the issue that will determine the agenda. As a result, it can be said that if public authorities do not control the agenda, the public and mass media are likely to do this.

More importantly, it is known that one of the most important issues occupying the crisis agenda is the accusations against public authorities themselves. Therefore, public leaders who desire to effectively manage the agenda should manage the blame.

#### **4.4. Evaluation Phase Tasks**

This section will be established on the debate about the two crucial tasks; namely managing the blame and learning from crisis. It will

particularly point out the blame management strategies with their risks, and the most important obstacles to learning from crisis.

#### **4.4.1. MANAGING THE BLAME**

##### **4.4.1.1. Potential of Managing the Blame**

Conventionally, blame is taken to mean the act of attributing something considered to be bad or wrong to some person or entity (Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Hood, 2005: 3). A crisis situation often provides an attack on credibility of public authorities for public and the media, and thus blame is central to politics (Boin et al, 2005). In the wake of a crisis, the public opinion, the mass media, and political opponents tend to examine the crisis management performance of incumbents; they want to know what went wrong, what was (not) done to prevent and contain the crisis, and who should be held responsible (Boin et al, 2005). Actually, following a crisis, the mass media and public often accuse public authorities for their bad performance in crisis response and even for causing the crisis. In particular, disasters can evoke the worst in persons – a relentless search for scapegoats to blame for destruction and loss of life (Boin et al, 2005). If these accusations are not handled effectively, they give rise to a chain of new crises, and thus the situation may be more complicated for public authorities to cope with. If the blame is not managed properly, public institutions are unlikely to maintain their legitimacy. Legitimacy is important to public organizations because it

represents a type of social contract that enables an organization to continue to operate (Ferraris & Backus, 2008).

On the other hand, it is hard for public leaders to avoid some accusations against themselves whatever leadership types they display during crisis management process. Boin, 't Hart, Mcconnell, and Preston (2010) make this point clear through comparing and contrasting authoritarian and democratic leaders' decision-making styles: On the one hand, authoritarian leaders are likely to place themselves at the heart of all key processes and decisions, and make most of the decisions themselves with 'little input from followers.' Authoritarian leaders may benefit from a public perception of hands-on leadership style, that is, if the public perceives the crisis response to be effective and successful. However, if the response comes to be perceived as a failure, they will be held responsible by the public, and thus it will be more difficult for them to avoid the blame. On the other hand, democratic leaders encourage employee participation in decision-making processes, and thus, under normal decision-making circumstances, they may produce high quality decisions. Under pressure, democratic style may not, however, operate well, and therefore, democratic leaders may become 'politically vulnerable to blame from the public and media' who anticipate rapid, decisive interventions. In particular, in the case of natural disasters, the public and media may hold responsible them for high societal costs such as death, injury, disease and critical infrastructure breakdowns, and so on.

#### **4.4.1.2. Blame Management Strategies**

There are a number of strategies public authorities can exploit for managing the blame. One of them is denial. Denial includes simple denial with the argument that ‘nothing was wrong’ and shifting the blame with the argument that ‘another party is actually responsible for the undesirable act’ (Ferraris & Backus, 2008). It must be underlined that shifting the blame requires public authorities to make the public believe that the situation is under the control of someone outside their organisations. Denial can be effective when the party have no responsibility but when a responsible party denies its own responsibility the strategy will probably backfire. As (Ferraris & Backus, 2008) point out, denial is very risky for a public manager that is in the wrong to deny its responsibility because once the truth comes out, he or she is likely to be accused for not only performing an offensive act but also misleading the public.

The second strategy that public authorities can use is to set up an inquiry. Such a move is practical because good practice in crisis management requires investigation into what went wrong and then a process of learning and reform to reduce vulnerabilities in the future (McConnell, 2003). The strategy can, however, backfire, as well. A fully independent and thorough inquiry that exposes and condemns government failures puts leaders’ careers on the line (Boin et al, 2010). In addition, apology can be used as an effective instrument of blame management. A timely and sincere admission of responsibility by a governmental body with a willingness to undertake corrective

action can expedite the organization's effort to rebuild its legitimacy (Hood, 2002). However, it must not be forgotten that there is a problem with the ethical stand that in our modern culture of 'suing' any ethical correct apology may be used in court against the apologist (Hearit, 2006).

Consequently, managing the blame is a crucial task because if the blame is not handled effectively, it may lead to a chain of new crises, and then the situation may be more complicated for public authorities to cope with. More importantly, if the blame is not managed properly, it can be hard for public authorities to maintain their legitimacy that enables them to rule, and stands for a right to issue commands.

Now, the following section will study the task of learning from crisis.

## **4.4.2. LEARNING FROM CRISIS**

### **4.4.2.1. Potential of Learning from Crisis**

Learning refers to the process of transforming experience into knowledge (Kolb, 1984). Learning involves purposeful efforts to record, recollect, and retrieve of past events (Boin et al, 2005). Learning is a dynamic and interactive process, which takes place at both individual and organisational level. As individuals develop their personalities, personal habits, and beliefs over times, organizations develop their world views and ideologies. Organizational learning is, however, set apart from individual learning by the process of institutionalizing knowledge, which occurs when lessons become

disseminated and institutionalized within the structures of the organization (Dekker and Hansén, 2004: 219). Organizations can learn as lessons are shared throughout the organization and stored in some sort of organizational memory. As Olivera (2000) underlines, this memory can be some kind of explicit forms, such as formal rules and structures, policy documents, manuals, standard operating procedures, and computer-based information systems, and so on; or implicit forms, such as organizational routines, codes, norms, and beliefs.

As for crisis-induced learning, it focuses on both prevention and response (Boin et al, 2005). The former is related to finding the cause of the crisis, and making sure that it does not happen again. This is learning how to avoid being subjected to the same or similar crisis in the future. As for the the latter, it is more associated with minimizing consequences of the same or similar event by enhancing crisis management capacities. This is learning how to respond to the crisis events at hand or in the future. Therefore, it can be concluded here that basic to all crisis-induced learning is nothing more than sharing some kind of active experience.

Learning plays a major role for the success of crisis management because learning enables organisations to learn what went wrong and then take some necessary steps to prevent or to mitigate the risk and damage of potential crises. Learning from crises is a key asset for building crisis management capacities due to the fact that it enables organizations (public or private) to prepare for future incidents and improve their own structures and procedures. Crisis-induced learning

contributes to success of crisis management practices because - as Carley and Harrald (1997) draw attention - it enables organisations to improve their problem solving capacities. In short, the harm caused by crises can be minimized through learning and adaptation of effective crisis management practices.

As learning from crisis contributes to success of crisis management practices, all the factors that obstruct learning will negatively affect the success of the process. Hence, the next section will look into the major obstacles to the crisis-induced learning.

#### **4.4.2.2. Barriers to Learning from Crisis**

Crises have great potential for learning from the successes and failures in addressing the crisis. However, there are several obstacles and hazards to learning from crisis as follows:

##### ***Individual and organizational defensiveness***

An individual or organisation may attempt to deny responsibility for negative outcomes or shift the blame to others (Stern, 1997). As Dekker and Hansen (2004: 211) point out, this tendency may even be exacerbated once external pressures on an individual or organisation are combined with severe criticism and condemnation regarding past and present performances. Such defensive behavioural tendencies have a potential to prevent learning from past practices because these tendencies prevent both individuals and organisations from facing and assessing the mistakes.

### ***Politics of accountability***

As Boin et al (2005) point out; another crucial barrier that hampers learning from crises is the politics of accountability. Individuals who realize that they may be subject to high levels of accountability after making decisions in a crisis and committing to courses of action, are likely to divert their valuable time and energy to seeking rationalizations and public defences for their decisions and actions instead of engaging in introspection and self-criticism, which make learning easier (Boin et al, 2005).

### ***Justification efforts for decisions made***

Likewise, as Boin et al (2005) emphasise, decision-makers may feel a great deal of pressure to find justifications for decisions made in a relatively casual manner or for previous prioritizations which favoured other issues or values than those highlighted by the crisis.

### ***Politicization***

Crisis-induced learning can get overtaken by political fighting between those looking for radical change following a crisis, and those desiring to broadly maintain the status quo (Boin et al, 2005).

### ***Unwillingness to Receive Feedback***

It is obvious that learning requires feedback. With feedback, both individuals and organizations can learn to increase the accuracy of their actions and improve their performance (Carley, 1992). However,

it is not appreciated after the initial response period is over and it is often not available to, or wanted by, disaster response organizations because in post-crisis period the environment is generally too sensitive for any discussions (Bourrier, 2002). Feedback is not welcomed since it is often viewed as criticism and so as a potential threat to organizational survival (Carley and Harrald, 1997). The capacity of an organization to learn from feedback is reduced when its personnel are unwilling to accept feedback, when some individual and organisational concerns prevent getting feedback.

### ***Subjective Feedback***

As discussed in the second chapter (see 2.5), evaluating performance of organizations in crisis response depends on the personal perspective, and thus may not be objective. As Carley and Harrald (1997) draw attention, the ability of the organization to learn from feedback is reduced when the feedback is not objective. Subjective performance judgments provided by the media have a potential to reduce the learning capacity of an organisation.

### ***Opportunism***

In post-crisis period, actors either may attempt to disassociate themselves from perceived failures or tend to exaggerate their role in bringing about, and the magnitude of success (Stern, 2000: 211). These opportunist tendencies may prevent individuals and then organisations from learning.

### *Not sharing of experiences*

Lessons can only have widespread and long-lasting effects if they are disseminated and embedded in the structures of the public institution (Bourrier, 2002). Hence, not sharing of lessons can be regarded as another important barrier to learning.

### *Lack of Institutional Memory*

A key pre-requisite for experience-based learning is the extent to which institutional memory is cultivated and accessible to participating actors. However, as Stern (1997) draws attention, valuable competence and stores of experience are routinely lost throughout staff attrition.

### *Changing priorities after crisis*

As Rosenthal and Kouzmin (1996) point out, once the immediate crisis response has ended, drawing lessons from crisis does not remain a priority because the pressure of managing day-to-day affairs resurfaces and tends to eclipse the period which could be devoted to post-crisis reflection.

## **4.5. Summary**

The aim of this chapter was to discuss the impacts of a number of factors on the effectiveness of crisis management process. Indeed, it aimed to study why and to what extent these factors contribute to the effectiveness of crisis management practices. More importantly, here

the major limitations of these factors were examined in order to find out the main barriers to effective crisis management practices. Following the introductory part, the second section focused on the preparation phase tasks; namely planning for possible crises and detecting an approaching crisis. It discussed the potentials and limitations of these two tasks. The third second section was established on the debate about the key tasks (such as organising, leading, decision-making, managing the public perception, feelings management, and managing the agenda) associated with the management phase. As for the fourth section, it studied the tasks of managing the blame and learning from crisis related to the evaluation stage. It particularly pointed out the blame management strategies with their risks, and the main barriers to learning from crisis.

The next chapter will discuss the methodology used in this research, and outlines the approach adopted. The chapter will consider the research design and methodology available to the researcher. Notably, it will take a look at not only the advantages and disadvantages of particular research methods, but also the data gathering procedures to be used. After the two main research strategies (namely; case study and qualitative interviews) to be used by the researcher in the study are evaluated, the triangulation of these methods will be discussed. Finally, the chapter will point out some ethical issues raised by the research.

## **5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

### **5.1. Introduction**

Research methodology in social sciences is completely related to methods of data collection as well as particular epistemological perspectives, both of which determine how data is analysed. Hence, selection of an appropriate research methodology is important and researchers must adopt the most suitable data gathering methods for addressing the research questions. It is also necessary to justify the choice of methods and their appropriateness to the research questions under study.

This chapter discusses the methodology used in this research, and outlines the approach adopted. The chapter considers the research design and methodology available to the researcher. Notably, it examines not only the advantages and disadvantages of particular research methods, but also the data gathering procedures to be used. After the two main research strategies (namely; case study and qualitative interviews) to be used by the researcher in the study are evaluated, the triangulation of these methods is discussed. Finally, the chapter reflects on the ethical issues raised by the research.

## 5.2. Research Design

Research design refers to the blueprint that enables the researcher to produce solutions to the research problems and guides him throughout the research (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996: 99). A research design provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data (Bryman, 2008: 31). Research design is related with developing research questions into projects and it deals with all of the issues involved in planning and conducting a research project from identifying the research problem through to publishing the results (Robson, 2002: 79; Punch, 2009). As Ragin (1994: 191) stated, the design of a study touches almost all aspects of the research, from the minute details of data collection to the selection of the data analysis techniques. Indeed, as Flick (2004) points out, research design primarily concerns how the data selection and analysis can be set up, and how the selection of empirical material is to be made so as to answer the research questions throughout the research.

This project aims to generate a qualified body of practical information in the area of crisis management because - as Corbin and Strauss (2008) emphasised - the most important aim of research projects is often to produce a professional body of empirical data. In order to engender well-founded and dependable information, it is essential that scholars carefully consider the research design and methodology that they prefer to collect, analyse and present the information. However, while conducting any research project - as Robson (2002) underlined - there is no general agreement on the subject of how to conceptualise

the doing of research. Thus, researchers may face some difficulties during the research design. Overall, whatever the purpose of a study, research design is mainly associated with turning research questions into projects.

One of the primary choices in designing a research approach is choosing between a quantitative and a qualitative research. Even though some research areas have strong traditions favouring either a quantitative or a qualitative study, the decision should be made in accordance with the area of research and on the research questions. As for the researcher, he decided to conduct a qualitative study. The next section will, therefore, focus on qualitative research and why the researcher preferred this approach.

### **5.3. Qualitative Research**

Qualitative research has become increasingly influential since the 1970s and it sees reality as a projection of human imagination, based on the assumption that social reality is within us; therefore the act of questioning reality has an effect on that reality (Collis & Hussey, 2003: 53). Qualitative research can be constructed as a research strategy that generally draws attention to words rather than quantification in the gathering and analysis of data (Bryman, 2008: 22). As Corbin and Strauss (2008) point out, qualitative research often incorporates an element of description as it is the origin for more abstract interpretations of data and theory development and, thus is basic to theorising. Qualitative research methods are concerned with

generating theories and use small samples to produce rich and subjective data, which allows generalisation from one setting to another (Bryman, 2008). At the centre of a qualitative approach are specific conceptions of data interpretation and analysis that entail the codification of transcripts, protocols, recordings, photographs and numerous other data-rich artefacts (Mitchell, 2008: 1). Qualitative study also aims to inform the reader what it is in this topic that is of particular interest to the researcher; this is often quite different from quantitative approach. The nature of the data gained by applying a qualitative approach is different from that obtained by using quantitative approach.

Qualitative study enables researchers to achieve an understanding a fact since - as Mitchell (2008: 1) states – it allows for a “deep exploration and explanation of a phenomenon”. Therefore, qualitative studies may function as introductions to new areas of interest. Indeed, as Hiillos (2004) points out - it is often suggested for researchers to conduct a qualitative study before undertaking a quantitative study, to capture what is relevant and interesting in the phenomenon to be researched. Qualitative research refers to a flexible design strategy because - as Corbin and Strauss (2008) state - it often starts with a broad question and no pre-identified concepts. The qualitative research process allows researchers to explore multileveled questions and allows the questions to be modified as the data is collected from different individuals (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Johnson & Christensen,

2008). More importantly, research questions in a qualitative study can focus beyond individuals to entire organisations, families or sectors.

Qualitative approach seems to be more appropriate to the current research because of a number of reasons. First of all, qualitative approach enables the researcher to explore the key factors affecting crisis management performance in details as this type of research helps the researcher to extract and understand the inner experiences of the participants. Indeed, the qualitative study allows access to the perspectives and standpoints of both the practitioners and policy makers working in the research area. Second, this kind of research provides a detailed evaluation for the researcher to be able to capture the multifaceted processes of crisis management and, provides an overview of the area as well as the analysis of specific issues. Third, qualitative approach provides the flexibility in questioning for the researcher. Fourth, qualitative study enables the participants to discuss the subject in details. Fifth, the focus of crisis management studies has significantly shifted away from quantitative-based studies towards more qualitative-based ones, incorporating a variety of viewpoints from business, international relations, cognitive psychology, anthropology, sociology, and economics (Royal Society, 1992). Further, qualitative approach provides flexibility in research design for the researcher. Finally, the results of a research like this, whose aim is to suggest new ways of looking at crisis management effectiveness, can be considered as alternative truths rather than as new ones.

After these two sections about the research design and paradigms, now the research methodology will be discussed in the next part of the chapter.

#### **5.4. Research Methodology**

In order to deal with the first research question, the researcher has initially developed a synthesis of the key tasks that influence the success of a crisis management process through a number of major crisis management models. After developing the synthesis, the researcher has focused on exploring potentials and limitations of the tasks in the synthesis. In other words, he has focused on questioning why and / or to what extent these tasks have the potential to influence the effectiveness of a crisis management process, and examining the main obstacles that hamper performing these tasks in order to address the second research question about the main barriers to an effective crisis management process. To achieve this, following a thorough literature review, on the one hand, the crisis management process experienced after the Van Earthquake that occurred in 2011 in Turkey was studied as a case. On the other hand, a series of interviews with some Turkish policy makers were conducted. Indeed, in order to address the research questions about the both key tasks and barriers that influence the effectiveness of a crisis management process, this project has been designed by means of two main research methods; namely, case study strategy and qualitative interviews. For that reason, the current study can be regarded as a mixed methods research.

According to Brannen (2005) mixed methods research means adopting a research strategy employing more than one type of research method. The methods may be a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods, a mix of quantitative methods or a mix of qualitative methods. As Brannen (2005) points out, adopting a mixed method strategy may constitute a strategy in its own right or it may be subsumed within another research strategy as in the case of adopting a case study design in which a number of different methods are embedded. Recently, mixed methods research strategies have been increasingly utilized by researchers because of a number of advantages they present (Brannen, 2005: 5-6). To begin, a mixed method strategy enables scholars to enhance for their own skills. The knowledge society is primarily achieved through an emphasis upon skill. In the social sciences, skills are increasingly obtained through training courses across a range of different research methods. Secondly, mixed method research training and experience provide an opportunity for lifelong learning. Third, a utilising a mixed method approach gives a chance to deflect attention away from theoretical work that is often specific to particular disciplines. Hence, it may encourage thinking ‘outside the box’. Fourth, developing a mixed method strategy is in harmony with the political currency accorded to ‘practical enquiry’ that speaks to policy and policymakers and that informs practice. Fifth, with the increase of strategic and practically oriented research which meets the needs of users, the need to dissemination is also increasing. Mixed method technique has a potential to meet this need because it allows researchers to speak - at least - two languages – the technical language

of research but also the language that makes research results simple to communicate and its messages easy to comprehend.

After this introductory section, now; case study and qualitative interview strategies will be discussed respectively.

#### **5.4.1. Case Study Strategy**

The researcher preferred to study a case because it was essential for him to demonstrate how the key tasks in the synthesis worked in a true crisis management process, and to find out what the main barriers to these tasks in a real process were. The case studied in the research is the crisis management process experienced after the Van Earthquake that occurred in 2011 in Turkey. The researcher preferred a case at local level because it is obvious that most crises occur in a locality; or - at least - start at local level. In fact, even a nation-wide crisis begins in a locality. Therefore, the researcher preferred to study a local level case in order to test his synthesis on the keys and barriers to effective crisis management. Another important reason why the researcher preferred a local level case is that all crisis management policies are applied at local level even though they are made by the central government in Turkey.

The researcher preferred a natural disaster to study as a case because natural disasters have common characteristics of crises such as uncertainty, unexpected threats, high level of anxiety on the side of policy-makers, the probability of violence, the assumption that crucial and immediate decisions need to be taken under the pressure and

existence of incomplete information, a stressful environment, and time limitation. In other words, in the framework of the definition of the term “crisis” put forward in the Chapter 2, natural disasters emerge with little warning, result in an urgent problem with a high level of uncertainty that must be handled immediately, provoke individual emotions (such as perception, panic, fear, stress etc.) by putting people under immense pressure, require vital decisions to be made, set a new agenda for both individuals and organisations to manage, have the potential to produce negative outcomes and accusations if managed ineffectively, and have the potential to generate a great variety of invaluable lessons for both organisations and individuals to learn.

A natural disaster was chosen as a case in the research because - as mentioned in literature review chapter (Chapter 2) - natural disasters have different types of complexity associated with crisis situations such as political, institutional, temporal, and informational complexity (*see* also Stern’s classification in 2.2.2). To expand, crises in particular natural disasters generally become political depending on their impact on both political order and its actors. Natural disasters are of high salience not only to governments, but also to political oppositions and a variety of societal actors including mass media because they tend to affect the key interests of multiple actors and stakeholders (*political complexity*). On the other hand, several decision makers and agencies are drawn into an emergency situation at different moments, from different points of view, and with different purposes because they hold different perceptions stemming from differences in tasks,

jurisdictions, education, geographical location, level of preparedness, and other political and administrative considerations (*institutional complexity*). Crisis perception and behaviour are affected by prior experience of key actors and stakeholders (*temporal complexity*). Crucial information can be required to make monumental decisions within an emergency situation but there is not always perfect and complete knowledge. Therefore, natural disasters can also be characterized as information-poor situations (*informational complexity*).

The researcher specifically prefers using the case study strategy because - first of all - the research is basically in favour of the assumptions of qualitative research, and - as Gerring (2004) points out - a case study strategy is considered as the most suitable method that can be employed in a qualitative research (see also Table 5.1).

**Table 5-1** Characteristics of qualitative and quantitative methods; Adopted from Bryman, 2008: 393)

<b>Qualitative method</b>	<b>Quantitative method</b>
Words	Numbers
Rich, deep data	Hard, reliable data
Soft	Hard
Flexible	Fixed
Subjective	Objective
Political	Value-free
Relativistic	Universalistic
<b>Case Study</b>	Survey

Second, case study enables the researcher to produce rich data and to develop detailed knowledge about the event. Third, case study enables the researcher to understand well how the synthesis of key tasks operated in a real process. Furthermore, as Yin (2003) points out, it enhances data credibility because a hallmark of case study research is the use of multiple data sources. Last but not least, case study method has been extensively preferred in crisis and crisis management studies. To illustrate, while McConnell and Stark studied the “Foot and Mouth Crisis” emerged in 2001 in Britain as a case in their research about the Politics of Crisis Management in 2002, Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003) studied the response to the World Trade Centre disaster in September 2001 (9/11) as a case in the research concerning the importance of organisational resilience for the effectiveness of a crisis management process. Likewise, ‘t Hart, Tindall, K. and Brown (2008) used the 9/11 and Katrina Crises in their research about success and failure in crisis leadership, while Paul Barnes (2001) handled the U.K. Government responses to Chernobyl Radiation Fallout as a case in his research about crisis management needs in the public sector. In addition, while Stern (2006) focused on The Chernobyl Fallout Crisis in his study on crisis decision-making, K.M. Carley and J.R. Harrald (1997) established their research about organisational learning under fire on the response to Hurricane Andrew in Miami.

Case studies can be based on any mix of quantitative and qualitative methods (Yin, 2003). However, the most commonly used methods are ‘*interviews*’, ‘*documentary research*’, and ‘*observation*’ (Stake, 1995;

Patton, 2002; Stark and Torrance, 2005). As for the case, it is largely based on both a documentary research and qualitative interviews. To expand, for the case I examined the official government documents produced by actors within, as well as outside of the crisis management system in Turkey. I collected various documents including post hoc accident investigation, organizational documents produced by local and central agencies as well as by international organisations. I also assembled articles from major periodicals, information from central government agencies and NGO's. The use of multiple data-gathering methods and sources, allowed the researcher to triangulate the resulting data. That is, the researcher was able to compare and contrast the data gathered from one source with other sources as a means to check for accuracy and validity of the data. For the case study, the researcher also made a variety of extensive semi-structured interviews with both key public officials taking part in coping with the event and the people affected by the disaster as one of the most important sources of information in the case study is the qualitative interviews.

#### **5.4.2. Qualitative Interviews**

The nature of the qualitative interview method is ideal for this type of study because qualitative interviews are viewed as a vital first-hand source of information about a given area, and allow people who are being interviewed to truly explain their story. Qualitative interviewing is ideal for this research due to the fact that it enables the researcher to obtain detailed data from the participants and to gain information about their opinions, feelings, values, attitudes, and beliefs. The

researcher preferred qualitative interview because - as Rubin & Rubin (2005) underline, it allows researchers to draw interpretations from respondent talk, and further understand the meanings of participants' worlds especially through "listening, hearing, and sharing social experiences." More importantly, qualitative interview provides active interaction between the interviewer and interviewees, and thus it is accepted as one of the most important instruments of gathering primary data (Fontana and Frey, 2000).

Qualitative interview method was chosen for this research because it has been widely used in crisis and crisis management studies. To give a number of examples, Carley and Harrald (1992) made a number of interviews with the response personnel at the site for their study called "Hurricane Andrew response: Comparing practice, plan, and theory". Likewise, G. L. Wamsley and A. D. Schroeder (1996) preferred using interview method in their research on "The Changing Dynamics of the Emergency Management Policy Subsystem". In addition, J.M. Kendra and T. Wachtendorf utilised interviewing strategy in their study called "Elements of Resilience after the World Trade Center Disaster: Reconstituting New York City's Emergency Operations Centre" in 2003. Moreover, R. Gonzalez (2008) conducted a research on "Coordination and its ICT support in Crisis Response" through observation of the crisis response exercises in the Port of Rotterdam, and made interviews with several responders, from police officers, to crisis managers for this study.

There are three main varieties of qualitative interview, which are determined by the extent of structure imposed on each design: structured interview, semi-structured interview, and unstructured interview (Fielding and Thomas, 2008). In a structured interview, the interviewer asks all respondents the same set of questions in the same order with a limited set of response categories. Therefore, throughout structured interviews it is hard for researchers to be flexible. In a semi-structured interview, participants are granted their freedom in expressing their views and feelings. In semi-structured interviews the interviewer uses a list of questions, but the interviewee has certain liberty in how to reply to them. As Bryman (2008) points out, in an investigation with clear focus and emphasis on specific issues, semi-structured interviews are most likely the method of choice. As for an unstructured interview, it is centred on a list of topics which the interviewer wants the interviewees to discuss. Interviewers can take the liberty of phrasing the wording of questions and asking them in any order as they wish in accordance with the interview guide. They can also take part in the conversation, if appropriate, by discussing what they think of the subject. Therefore, unstructured interviews are far more flexible compared to first two types.

As for the researcher, he conducted semi-structured interviews using a non-directive interviewing style that enables the participants to freely express their views and feelings. The researcher preferred a non directive interviewing style because he aimed to collect data as much as possible without guiding the participants in any particular direction.

It must be underlined that although the researcher used a list of questions, the participants were free to reply them. In the meantime, it must specifically be stated that the researcher tried to avoid asking leading questions which pointed out a particular answer he preferred. All these points will be explained in detail in the section about how the interviews were conducted. Prior to the section on how the researcher conducted the interviews, the next section will explain the ways of selecting and contacting the interviewees.

#### **5.4.2.1. Selecting and Contacting the Interviewees**

In order to deal with the research questions related to both the key tasks and main barriers that influence the effectiveness of a crisis management process in the public sector, it was crucial for the researcher to make interviews with the public figures in the field (**GROUP 1**) and to make interviews with the policy makers (**GROUP 2**). It was also essential for the researcher to test his synthesis of key tasks affecting crisis management performance through the views and experiences of the both practitioners (Group 1) and policy makers (Group 2).

#### **Group 1: Case study-related participants (People in the field)**

There were 20 people in this group the researcher interviewed. Group 1 was predominantly composed of the public figures and volunteers who took part in the crisis management process following the earthquake studied as the case. There were six (6) public administrators, three (4) public officials, three (3) emergency services

personnel, two (2) volunteers, four (4) ordinary people (stakeholders), and one (1) media representative the researcher interviewed in this group. Likewise, while ten (10) participants in the group were local actors, only five (5) participants were central actors (excluding stakeholders and media representative).

It was compulsory for the researcher to make interviews with the governors, deputy governors, and district governors who took part in crisis response efforts following the Van Earthquake because - as will be explained in the sixth chapter about crisis management in Turkish public sector – these figures are the main responsible figures in crisis management processes according to the Turkish laws. Apart from these public administrators, the researcher interviewed with some emergency service personnel and operational staff because it was crucial for him to find out some issues the people on the ground faced during the disaster response. The researcher also made interviews with a number of stakeholders, volunteers, and local media representatives because it was necessary to evaluate the governors' leadership competencies and styles, and how these authorities performed some crucial tasks during the event.

In the beginning, a purposeful sample was used in order to choose the best people to interview who have the richest stories to tell of the experience. Through the use of selecting the initial participants through a purposeful sample, the participants recommended additional people to interview creating a snowball or chain sample selection process for additional participants. Then, the potential interviewees

were informed about the study and appointments were made in advance through phone or emails. In addition, the participation information sheet and the consent form underlying that the participation was not compulsory were sent to the participants. Further, it was emphasised that there was no need for the participants to give their names so this would help the trust be set up between the interviewer and the interviewees. It was also stressed that the names of participants were not be used in any stage of the project if they did not consent.

### **Group 2: Policy makers**

There were 22 people in this group the researcher interviewed. Group 2 was mainly composed of the public figures that make crisis management policies in Turkey. The participants in this group were predominantly bureaucrat and central actors. There were eighteen (19) bureaucrats, two (2) politicians, and one (1) representative of NGO in the group. Also, while sixteen (17) participants were central actors, only five (5) participants were local actors in this group. To be more specific, there were three (3) undersecretaries, six (6) governors, three (3) deputy governors, three (3) provincial directors, two (2) civil inspectors, two (2) chairmen of department, one (1) mayor, one (1) deputy mayor, and one (1) representative of NGO in this group.

It was compulsory for the researcher to get the views of these policy makers about the key factors that influence the effectiveness of a crisis management process in the public sector because crisis management

policies have been made by these authorities in Turkey. More importantly, they were the persons that combined the theory and practice within their career. The researcher preferred to make interviews with the central authorities because he also aimed to test his synthesis at national level following testing it at local level through a case study. Testing the synthesis at national level was compulsory because it is obvious that testing the validity and reliability of a theory or a model at only local level will not make much sense for scholars and practitioners. The researcher preferred to interview with some public figures outside the case because he also aimed to find out their perspectives on the key tasks and barriers affecting crisis management effectiveness, and then to compare and contrast between their views and experiences of those who took part in the crisis management process after the Van quake. Indeed, the researcher aimed to enrich his analyses on the subject through discovering some crucial points that the national level policy makers and the local level practitioners agree and / or disagree.

In the beginning, a purposeful sample was used in order to choose the best people to interview. Through the use of selecting the initial interviewees through a purposeful sample, they recommended additional people to interview creating a snowball or chain sample selection process for additional participants. Then, the potential interviewees were informed about the study and appointments were made in advance through phone or emails. In addition, the participation information sheet and the consent form underlying that

the participation was not compulsory were sent to the participants. Further, it was emphasised that there was no need for the participants to give their names so this would help the trust be set up between the interviewer and the interviewees. It was also stressed that the names of participants were not be used in any stage of the project if they did not consent.

Consequently, the researcher interviewed forty (42) people in the data collection process and the following table (Table 5-2) describes the participants' responsibilities and positions:

**Table 5-2** List of Interviewees

<b>GROUP 1: Case study-related participants</b>			
<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>Position Description</b>
Atilla Uzun	Leader of Van Search and Rescue Team	Responsible for coordinating all rescue teams at operational level	Local actor / Emergency services
Münir Karaloğlu	Governor of Van Province	Provides coordination between all public institutions and responsible for providing public order and managing crises emerged within the province.	Representative of Central Government (Central actor) / Public administrator

Dr. Ali Çiçeksay	Chairman of Van Active Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association	Representative of an NGO taking part in crisis response efforts	Local actor / Volunteer
Aydoğan Kaya	Representative of National Medical Rescue Organisation	Coordinating first aid services	Local actor / Emergency services
Yalçın Özdemir	Head of Van Branch of Turkish Red Crescent	Responsible for distribution of tents and meeting the basic requirements (food, water, housing) of the victims	Local actor / Volunteer
Cafer Giyik	Provincial Director of Disaster and Emergency	Responsible for planning and preparation for possible crises in Van	Local actor / Emergency services
Fatih Sevinç	Chairman of Journalists of Van Lake Association	Representative of an NGO and owner a local newspaper	Local media representative
Selahaddin Akdaş	Personnel of Van Governorship	Prepares the governor's press release and organises the governor's press conference	Local actor / Public official
Ramazan Fani	District Governor of Erciş	Main Responsible authority to manage the event in the district (Erciş)	Representative of central government (central actor) / Public administrator

Barboros Baran	Deputy District Governor of Erciş	Performs the tasks given by district governor	Representative of central government (central actor) / Public administrator
Yusuf Yüksel	Head of Department	Coordinates Social Services under the Development Minister	Central actor / Public administrator
Mehmed Yüzer	Deputy Governor of Van	Performs the tasks given by the governor	Representative of central government (central actor) / Public administrator
Anonymity	Public Manager / Project Expert	Responsible for planning first crisis response	Local actor /public administrator
Anonymity	Ordinary person	Affected by the disaster	Stakeholder
Anonymity	Civil Servant	Coordinates health services	Local actor / public official
Anonymity	Ordinary person	Affected by the crisis	Stakeholder
Anonymity	Ordinary person	Stakeholder	Stakeholder
Anonymity	Public official	Responsible for social services for victims	Local actor/ public official
Anonymity	Ordinary person	Affected by the event	Stakeholder

<b>POLICY MAKERS</b>			
<b>GROUP 2:</b>			
<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>Position description</b>
Dr. Abdullah Abid Öztoprak	Deputy Governor of Malatya Province	Performs the tasks given the governor of Malatya	Central actor /Bureaucrat
Anonymity	District Governor in Malatya	Responsible for providing public order and managing crises emerged within the district	Central actor / Bureaucrat
Abdülmuttalip Aksoy	Civil Inspector / Civil Inspection Board of Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs	has a power to inspect all tasks performed by governors and mayors, police chiefs, provincial directors etc.	Central actor / Bureaucrat
Nesim Babahanoğlu	District Governor of Yesilyurt / Malatya	Responsible for providing public order and managing crises emerged within the district	Central actor / Bureaucrat
Mehmed Aktaş	District Governor of Darende / Malatya	same as above	Central actor / Bureaucrat
Nureddin Dayan	District Governor of Hekimhan / Malatya	same as above	Central actor / Bureaucrat
Bünyamin Kuş	District Governor of Doğanyol / Malatya	same as above	Central actor / Bureaucrat
Sezer Işıқтаş	Deputy Governor of Malatya	Performs the tasks given by the governor	Central actor / Bureaucrat
	Civil Inspector /	has power to inspect all tasks	Central actor /

Erdoğan Filiz	Civil Inspection Board of Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs	performed by governors and mayors, police chiefs, provincial directors etc.	Bureaucrat
Doç. Dr. Ulvi Saran	Current Under Secretary of Public Order and Security Institution (previous governor of Malatya)	Works under Prime Minister, has power and responsibility to make policies concerning all types of crises that threaten to public order	Central actor / Bureaucrat
M. Niyazi Tanılır	Former Under Secretary of Public Order and Security Institution - Current Ambassador of Turkey to Montenegro	same as above	Central actor / Bureaucrat
Seyfullah Hacımüftüoğlu	Under Secretary of Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs (previous governor of Rize)	has a power and responsibility to make policies regarding all governorships, municipalities, police provincial institutions	Central actor / Bureaucrat
Nebi Tepe	Provincial Director of Social Solidarity Foundation of Malatya	Responsible for determining the people in need and helping them	Local actor / Bureaucrat
Hamza Demiralp	Provincial Director of Disaster and	Responsible for planning and preparation for	Local actor / Bureaucrat

	Emergency in Malatya	possible crises in Malatya	
Memet Yücel Mete	Chairman of Malatya Branch of Disaster communication Association (NGO)	Voluntarily helps for providing and enhancing communication during disasters	Local actor / Representative of NGO
Latif Memiş	Deputy Governor of Malatya	Responsible for immigrants within the borders of Malatya	Central actor / Bureaucrat
Vasip Şahin	Former Governor of Malatya - Current Istanbul Governor	Provides coordination between all public institutions and responsible for providing public order and managing crises emerged within the province.	Central actor / Bureaucrat
Ahmed ÇAKIR	Mayor of Malatya	Elected Chairman of the local government	Local actor / Politician
Ertan MUMCU	Vice Mayor	Performs the tasks given by the Mayor	Local actor / Politician
Mustafa AYGÜN	Police Chief of Malatya	Works under the governor as the leader of the police forces	Central actor / Bureaucrat
Anonymity	Head of Department	Responsible for policy-making and planning in the Turkish Development Ministry	Central actor / Bureaucrat

Gökhan Güder	Head of Department	Responsible for policy-making and planning in the Turkish Development Ministry	Central actor / Bureaucrat
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#### 5.4.2.2. Conducting the Interviews

42 semi-structured in-depth-interviews with the public authorities and stakeholders in Turkey (listed in Table 5-2) were conducted individually over a period of approximately three and half months from the middle of the June to end of September in 2013. The shortest interview lasted approximately 30 minutes while the longest interview lasted around an hour. Prior to the starting interview, each interviewee was told to feel free to answer each question because the interview was not compulsory. At the end of each interview, each participant was told that they would get a chance to review and add additional information to the interview. The interviewees were free to make comments or changes where they thought it necessary.

There were some intervals between the interviews, which made it possible for the researcher to reflect on the previous interviews before engaging new ones. Each new interview contributed additional perspectives to previous ideas and patterns. Entirely new ideas and confusing or contradictory elements in relation to the research subject emerged as well. Interviewing was continued until the researcher sensed that it was unlikely that any new findings about the key factors affecting crisis management success would be discovered.

As mentioned before, the researcher conducted semi-structured interviews using a non-directive interviewing style that enables the participants to freely express their views and feelings. The researcher preferred a non directive interviewing style because he aimed to collect data as much as possible without guiding the participants in any particular direction. It must be underlined that although the researcher used a list of questions, the participants were free to reply them. In the meantime, it must specifically be stated that the researcher tried to avoid avoided asking leading questions which pointed out a particular answer he preferred.

### **About Interview Questions**

To increase the understanding of the key factors that influence effectiveness in crisis management processes, a guide sheet of questions was created beforehand and then modified throughout the interviews. The questions were generally broad and open ended because the researcher aimed to collect as much data as possible without guiding the interviewees in any particular direction. In the meantime, it must be specifically stated that while some of the questions were related to the crisis studied as a case (i.e. Questions 1,3,8,9 in Appendix C), some of them were related to crisis management in general (i.e. Questions 2, 4 in Appendix C). More importantly, some questions were related to the ingredients of the researcher's synthesis given in Table 3.3. To give a number of examples, while the fifth question (see Question 5 in Appendix C) was about the first task in the synthesis, namely planning for possible

crises (see Table 3.3.), the sixth question (see Question 6 in Appendix C) was related to another component of the synthesis, which is leadership (see Table 3.3.). Likewise, whilst the seventh question (see Question 7 in Appendix C) was related to decision-making, which is a management phase task in the synthesis (see Table 3.3.), another question (Question 12 in Appendix C) was about learning from crisis which is an evaluation phase task in the synthesis (see Table 3.3.).

### **Limitations**

Before ending this section about how the interviews were conducted, it can be better to mention some limitations the researcher faced during the interviews. First of all, some interviewees - especially some operational staff and emergency service personnel - avoided answering some questions. To make clear, although these participants were willing to answer factual and generic questions, they were reluctant to answer some specific questions. For example, they avoided answering the questions about the leadership styles and performance the governor displayed during the disaster response. Likewise, some participants were not open while answering some questions in particular the questions about the blame management strategies Turkish public authorities had used.

There were also some constraints on the researcher resulted from his position. The researcher could not ask some questions to the participants regarding the members of the central government who took part in the disaster response because he had been working as a

representative of the central government (deputy governor) in Turkey before he began the research. To be more specific, even though most of the members of the Turkish Government - including the Prime Minister and the vice Prime Minister - involved in disaster response efforts even within the first hours following the earthquake, the researcher could not question these central actors' leadership styles and performance during the crisis response. The researcher could not ask questions about the impact of these political leaders' involvement on effectiveness of the disaster management process. Likewise, as an appointed actor, the researcher could not make interviews with the local politicians such as the mayor and vice-mayors in Van because there have been a long-standing dispute and conflict between the appointed and elected actors in the provinces and districts in Turkey, which is beyond the scope of the research.

Furthermore, the researcher could not question the leadership role of elected actors during the crisis response because there was political divide between the governor and the mayor where the disaster occurred. Indeed, due to sensitivity of both the position of the researcher and the political conditions in the disaster region, he had to avoid questioning some issues during the interviews. Before ending this sub-section about the limitations, it must also be stated that one of the public officials who took part in the disaster response refused the offer to make interview with himself.

To summarise this section on the research methodology, in order to deal with the first research question, the researcher has initially

developed a synthesis of the key tasks that influence the success of a crisis management process through a number of major crisis management models. After developing the synthesis, the researcher has focused on exploring potentials and limitations of the tasks in the synthesis. Indeed, he has focused on questioning why and / or to what extent these tasks have the potential to influence the effectiveness of a crisis management process, and examining the main obstacles that hamper performing these tasks in order to address the second research question about the main barriers to an effective crisis management process. To achieve this, following a comprehensive literature review, on the one hand, the crisis management process experienced after the Van Earthquake that occurred in 2011 in Turkey was studied as a case. On the other hand, a series of interviews with some Turkish policy makers were conducted. In truth, in order to address the research questions about the both key tasks and barriers that influence the effectiveness of a crisis management process, this project has been designed by means of two main research methods such as case study strategy and qualitative interviews.

### **5.5. Validity and Reliability of the Data**

The interview data consist of descriptions of crisis tasks gathered in semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions. The interview data collected for the project can be said to have the character of narratives or stories because - as Coffey and Atkinson (1996) state - social actors often remember and order their memories or their careers as a series of narrative chronicles or stories marked by key events. The

data getting from semi-structured interviews were compared and contrasted with the data getting from the documents in order to discover similarities or differences. To increase data reliability, narratives from the different interviewees were compared and contrasted against each other, and against other sources such as official reports, organizational documentation and media sources. This is where the term triangulation enters.

### **5.5.1. Triangulation**

In social science research, the term triangulation is used to refer to the use of multiple sources to improve the validity of data and to enhance the rigour of research (Bryman, 2008). Triangulation enables researchers to check the reliability of the data using multiple data sources or methods. Triangulation is a valuable method to enhance the rigour of research and can be classified into four types (Robson, 2002: 174):

- ✓ Data triangulation: the use of more than one method of data collection;
- ✓ Observer triangulation: using more than one observer in the study;
- ✓ Methodological triangulation: combining quantitative and qualitative approaches;
- ✓ Theory triangulation: using multiple theories or perspectives.

The researcher employed data triangulation in the course of his research through documentary research and qualitative interviews. Particularly, the main sources for the case studied in the project were

official documents, articles, and semi-structured interviews. Multiple sources or individuals (at both local and national level; public officials and ordinary people etc.) were used to enhance the quality of the research and, this multi-source approach enabled triangulation in data collection which contributed to ensuring validity and reliability of the presented information.

### **5.6. Ethical Considerations**

Research ethics are related to the preservation of participants. In this research, participation was entirely voluntary. Each participant was given a participation information sheet that clarifies the research aims, procedure and techniques. Afterwards, each participant was respectfully asked to sign the consent form, when applicable. Moreover, the researcher guaranteed that personal details of the interviewees would not be released or publicised without their direct consent to the disclosure. Finally, the researcher was given ethical approval by the Ethics Committee of the University of Southampton.

### **5.7. Summary**

This chapter discussed the methodology used in this research, and outlines the approach adopted. The chapter considered the research design and methodology available to the researcher. Notably, it looked at not only the advantages and disadvantages of particular research methods, but also the data gathering procedures to be used. After the two main research strategies (namely; case study and qualitative interviews) to be used by the researcher in the study were analysed,

the triangulation of these methods was discussed. Finally, the chapter drew attention to the ethical issues raised by the research.

As for the next chapter, it will discuss how the tasks in the synthesis worked in an actual crisis management process, and try to find out what the main barriers to these tasks in a real process were. In fact, the synthesis will be tested, and the main obstacles to effective crisis management will be examined through a real event in the chapter. It will start with the discussion about the crisis management systems in the Turkish public administration. Then, it will focus on the crisis management process experienced after the Van Earthquake that occurred in 2011 in Turkey. The process will be studied in the framework of the synthesis of the key factors and / or tasks affecting the effectiveness of crisis management practices. The case study will be designed through a variety of sources including post hoc official disaster investigations, articles, organizational documents and extensive semi-structured interviews with key crisis managers and stakeholders.

## **6. CASE STUDY: 2011 VAN EARTHQUAKE**

### **6.1. Introduction**

After studying the potentials and limitations of the tasks composing the synthesis in the fourth chapter, it is essential for the researcher to demonstrate how they worked in an actual crisis management process, and to find out what the main barriers to them in a real process were. Therefore, this chapter will mainly focus on the crisis management process experienced after the Van Earthquake that occurred in 2011 in Turkey. The researcher preferred a natural disaster to study as a case in the project because natural disasters have common characteristics of crises such as uncertainty, unexpected threats, high level of anxiety on the side of policy-makers, the probability of violence, the assumption that crucial and immediate decisions need to be taken under the pressure and existence of incomplete information, a stressful environment, and time limitation. In other words, in the framework of the definition of the term “crisis” put forward in Chapter 2, natural disasters emerge with little warning, result in an urgent problem with a high level of uncertainty that must be handled immediately, provoke individual emotions (such as perception, panic, fear, stress etc.) by putting people under immense pressure, require vital decisions to be made, set a new agenda for both individuals and organisations to manage, have the potential to produce negative outcomes and accusations if managed ineffectively, and have the potential to generate a great variety of invaluable lessons for both organisations and individuals to learn. On the other hand, it is obvious that most

crises occur in a locality; or - at least - start at local level. In fact, even a nation-wide crisis typically begins in a locality. Therefore, the researcher preferred to study a local level case in order to test his synthesis on the key prerequisites and barriers to effective crisis management. Another important reason why the researcher preferred a local level case is that all crisis management policies are applied at local level even though they are made by the central governments in Turkey.

The case will be studied in the framework of the synthesis of the key factors and / or tasks affecting the effectiveness of crisis management practices. The case study will be developed through a variety of sources including post hoc official disaster investigations, articles, organizational documents and extensive semi-structured interviews with the key crisis managers and stakeholders. Prior to the case study, however, it is useful to discuss the crisis management systems that are in place in the Turkish public sector. These form the general context to the specific case of crisis management.

## **6.2. Crisis Management in Turkish Public Administration**

In Turkey, the central government has remained strong in even provinces and districts. To make this point clear, in spite of elected local authorities, the highest-level public administrators in the provinces and districts are governors, deputy governors and district governors that have been appointed by the central government. Governors and district governors are working as the representatives of

the central government and they are the main figures responsible for providing coordination between all public institutions including local ones in the locality. Governors and district governors are also the main figures responsible for managing a crisis (in Turkish legislations, the term “crisis” is often described as a threat to public order) because they have the responsibility to provide public order and security. As for the local governments, they are represented by municipalities, and elected mayors are working as the heads of municipalities. Municipalities are supposed to provide basic services such as water supply and garbage collection etc. Since the central government has remained dominant in Turkish public sector, crisis management systems have naturally developed in a centralist way. In fact, all crisis management policies have been made by the central governments, and - during a crisis situation - local authorities work under the representatives of the central governments; namely governors and district governors.

Following this introductory section, it can be useful to specifically discuss the Turkish disaster management systems in details because the chapter will focus on how a crisis (resulted from a natural disaster) was managed, and - more importantly - crisis management has been unfortunately confined to disaster management in Turkish public administration.

### **6.2.1. Disaster Management in Turkey**

Turkey has been exposed to natural disasters throughout its history. The main sources of these natural disasters have been earthquakes, floods, erosion and avalanches. Turkey tops the life-loss list of disasters of the last 60 years, along with China, Russia, Peru, and Iran (Sahin, 2009: 71). The latest major earthquakes to hit Turkey took place in Marmara on August 17 and November 12, 1999, leaving a total of 18,243 dead (Akdag, 2002), and occurred in Van on 23<sup>rd</sup> of October 2011, leaving 604 dead (Cilacı, Aksu & Saglam, 2012). Of course, apart from these catastrophic events, a series of earthquakes and other natural disasters continued to hit different Turkish regions and claim more lives in different periods. After each disaster, specific legislations and disaster declarations for the affected regions were passed by the Turkish Parliament. More importantly, a lot of reforms and amendments as regards disaster management policies and institutions were made following the natural disasters - in particular earthquakes - in different periods.

The disaster management history of Turkey can be classified into four periods (Akdag, 2002). The pre-1944 period consists of disaster management policies in the Ottoman Empire and early years of the Turkish Republic. Disaster response policies in the republican era started after the 1939 Erzincan Earthquake, the greatest earthquake to hit Turkey, and it claimed 32,962 lives. The earthquake was so strong that 116,720 buildings collapsed during the catastrophe and the city was relocated (Sahin, 2009). After the earthquake, a series of legal

arrangements giving authorization for coordination to the provincial and district governors in disaster areas were made. However, measures taken for disasters were limited to temporary shelter and reconstruction and recovery activities (Ozdemir, 2001). Natural disasters experienced in the following years (Niksar, Adapazari, Tosya, and Bolu Earthquakes between 1939 and 1944, resulting in over 43,000 deaths and 200,000 collapsed buildings) increased the need for emergency response (search, rescue, emergency aid) policies (Sahin, 2009).

As a result of this increasing demand for new disaster response policies, a mitigation law was enacted by the Parliament in 1944, and it started a new period in the area of disaster management in the Turkish public sector (Sahin, 2009): Partnerships with universities were set up, new set of laws were passed by the Parliament, and an earthquake risk map of whole the country was prepared in the next year. The 1944 legislation did not change the need for particular laws for other specific disasters. On the other hand, it put forward a strong basis for mitigation and preparation efforts, in particular against earthquakes. Building new structures was allowed only with supervision and permits after the 1944 legislation passed by the Turkish Parliament. These rules were applied mainly by the central organizations. Nevertheless, confusion reigned among administrative bodies because there was no primary agency to oversee those efforts. In 1958, The Ministry of Reconstruction and Settlement was set up in the Cabinet to pursue mitigation efforts in Turkey. Later, in 1983, the

ministry was merged with The Ministry of Public Works and turned into The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement.

The third stage of disaster management in Turkey (1958-1999) begins with establishment of this cabinet office. In this period, additional policies cancelled the maintenance of individual funds for each disaster; instead, a single fund, the Disasters Fund, was produced for all past and future disasters managed by the above ministry (Sahin, 2009). Specific legislations and disaster declarations for the affected parts of the country were made by the Turkish Parliament; earthquake funds were separated from other disaster funds (Sahin, 2009). Minor changes in disaster management policies were made with amendments, but the 1958 legislation remained largely the same until the 1999 Marmara Earthquakes, which started the most recent period of the Turkish crisis management system (Cilacı, Aksu & Saglam, 2012).

Turkish disaster management changed its course after the Marmara Earthquakes on August 17 and November 12, 1999, leaving a total of 18,243 dead, and more than 40000 injured (Cilacı, Aksu & Saglam, 2012). These earthquakes differed from others because they affected a large area of land containing the majority of Turkey's population (namely, Istanbul, Kocaeli). These provinces were also the most industrialized area of Turkey. The 1999 Marmara Earthquakes revealed that Turkish disaster management system needed a coordinating agency with both expertise and authority, and thus, the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs (GDDA) was established

(Cilacı, Aksu & Saglam, 2012). This agency coordinated crisis management efforts under the The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement between 1999 and 2009. In extreme events, crisis management practices were supervised by a committee called the Prime Minister Crisis Management Centre (PMCMC), headed by the Prime Minister (Sahin et al, 2008). The Secretariat in the PMCMC was the GDDA, providing coordination among central and local committees and subcommittees.

Following the 1999 earthquakes, a central disaster management office under the Prime Minister was also founded. The General Directorate of Turkey Emergency Management (GDTEM) was responsible for coordinating disaster management efforts when natural and manmade disasters threaten the nation (Türkdamar, 2011). The GDTEM was assigned to establish emergency management units in local and central public agencies, to supervise and provide essential communication among them, to prepare disaster plans for national threats, and to administer further arrangements in future emergency management (Celik, 2007). However, GDTEM could not solve Turkey's disaster management issue because it had a very limited number of qualified personnel and insufficient resources and expertise, posing another barrier to effective crisis management. Therefore, GDTEM was abolished and Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (DEMP) was established instead in 2009. At this point, it must be stated that - in spite of all these changes in legislations mentioned above - the role of governors and district governors has not changed.

They have been always main responsible authorities to manage all crises emerged in the provinces and districts they have governed. It can be even claimed that every new law enacted has increased their responsibilities in crisis situations.

As for the structure of crisis management centre at provincial and sub-provincial level, “Crisis desk,” the common expression adopted recently, defines the crisis management centre led by provincial and sub-provincial (district) governors. It is all responsible for managing and coordinating the disaster response efforts. Crisis desk comprises representatives of institutions contributing to emergency response activities (local governments, the Armed Forces, the Red Crescent, civil defence units, health directorate, etc.). The Secretariat in the crisis desk is the Provincial Disaster and Emergency Management Directorate (AFAD), and it is also responsible for providing coordination among central and local committees and subcommittees. Fire departments and the search and rescue teams of local administrations play an important role in the disaster management phase. Local authorities contribute to mitigation efforts through responsibility for developing settlement plans. Moreover, the principle of on-site disaster management under modern emergency management structures places additional responsibilities upon local administrations. The Turkish Armed Forces and police forces play an important role not only in search and rescue activities, but also in ensuring regional security. As for the Red Crescent, it is an important non-governmental organisation in disaster management; almost any kind of primitive

sheltering and food is provided by this agency. It is a non-profit agency just like the Red Cross, which also heavily depends on donations. Red Crescent's duties are not limited to disaster relief; they also include delivering incoming aid material to those who need it, providing immediate medical assistance to victims, coordinating aid efforts with international disaster relief organizations, and campaigning for blood donations (Cilacı, Aksu & Saglam, 2012). Of course, apart from these institutions, there are many governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) taking part in the disaster management processes, but discussing their structures and duties is beyond the scope of the research.

To sum up, it must be re-underlined that crisis management has been confined to just disaster management in Turkish public administration, and disaster management policies have been solely limited to temporary shelter and reconstruction and recovery activities. To make clear, there is no policy with regard to coping with other crisis types. There is no guideline for dealing with disaster-related psychological and social problems. In other words, psychological and social dimensions of disasters have been neglected. Therefore, the research that focuses on these two aspects of crises is crucial.

Following this introductory section about the structure of disaster management system in Turkish public sector, the next section will focus on the Van Earthquake that occurred in 2011 as a case study. The case will be analysed in the framework of the main three crisis management phases (preparation - management - evaluation) studied

in Chapters 3 and 4. In fact, here the synthesis of the key factors and / or tasks affecting the effectiveness of crisis management practices will be discussed with reference to an actual event. The case study will be developed through a variety of sources including post hoc official disaster investigations, articles, organizational documents and extensive semi-structured interviews with the key crisis managers and stakeholders.

### **6.3. CASE STUDY: 2011 VAN EARTHQUAKE**

#### **6.3.1. Introduction**

It is obvious that most crises occur in a locality; or - at least - start at local level. In fact, even a nation-wide crisis begins in a locality. Therefore, the researcher preferred to study a local level case in order to test his synthesis on the keys and barriers to effective crisis management. Another important reason why the researcher preferred a local level case is that - as discussed above - all crisis management policies are applied at local level even though they are made by the central government in Turkey. The researcher preferred a natural disaster to study as a case because natural disasters have common characteristics of crises such as uncertainty, unexpected threats, high level of anxiety on the side of policy-makers, the probability of violence, the assumption that crucial and immediate decisions need to be taken under the pressure and existence of incomplete information, a stressful environment, and time limitation. In other words, in the framework of the definition of the term “crisis” put forward in the

literature review chapter (Chapter 2), natural disasters emerge with little warning, result in an urgent problem with a high level of uncertainty that must be handled immediately, provoke individual emotions (such as perception, panic, fear, stress etc.) by putting people under immense pressure, require vital decisions to be made, set a new agenda for both individuals and organisations to manage, have the potential to produce negative outcomes and accusations if managed ineffectively, and have the potential to generate a great variety of invaluable lessons for both organisations and individuals to learn.

A natural disaster was chosen as a case in the research because - as mentioned in the literature review chapter (Chapter 2) - natural disasters have different types of complexity associated with crisis situations such as political, institutional, temporal, and informational complexity (*see* the classification of Stern (2000) in 2.2.2). To expand, crises in particular natural disasters generally become political depending on their impact on both political order and its actors. Natural disasters are of high salience not only to governments, but also to political oppositions and a variety of societal actors including mass media because they tend to affect the key interests of multiple actors and stakeholders (*political complexity*). On the other hand, several decision makers and agencies are drawn into an emergency situation at different moments, from different points of view, and with different purposes because they hold different perceptions stemming from differences in tasks, jurisdictions, education, geographical location, level of preparedness, and other political and administrative

considerations (*institutional complexity*). Crisis perception and behaviour are affected by prior experience of key actors and stakeholders (*temporal complexity*). Crucial information can be required to make monumental decisions within an emergency situation but there is not always perfect and complete knowledge. Therefore, natural disasters can also be characterized as information-poor situations (*informational complexity*).

After these explanations about the reasons why the researcher preferred a natural disaster at local level to study, in the next sections, following the general information about the earthquake, the case will be discussed in the framework of the main three crisis management phases: preparation- management, and evaluation.

### **6.3.2. General Information about the 2011 Van Earthquake**

Van is geographically located as a border province to Iran in the far east of the Eastern Anatolia Region. As a province, with a surface area of 19,069 sq km, it covers about 2.5% of Turkey. Its population is around 1.000.000. The city centre is located at the foot of Mount Ereğ, the east coast of the Van Lake. The Van Lake is surrounded by high mountains (such as Suphan, Nemrut, Tendurek) that are all extinct volcanic mountains (Cilacı, Aksu & Sağlam, 2012). All of the settlements around Lake Van, in fact, technically, are located on sediments, that's why they can be expressed as the areas that must not be settled. In addition to the 2011 earthquake studied in the research,

the earthquakes occurred in 1988, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2003 confirm this statement.

The earthquake measuring 7.2 on the Richter scale struck the province of Van in eastern Turkey at 13:41 local time on Sunday, 23<sup>rd</sup> October 2011. The epicentre of the earthquake was Tabanlı Village which is very close to Van city centre. Apart from Van city centre, the most affected region was the Ercis district. The disaster had an impact on 160 villages in Van and Ercis; 604 people died and more than 1,352 people were injured (Cilacı, Aksu & Saglam, 2012). 2,262 buildings were destroyed, rendering tens of thousands of people homeless (IFRC, 2011).

The search and rescue teams from The Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), private sector, NGOs and municipalities carried out search-and-rescue operations (UNORC, 2011). According to the official disaster investigation report prepared by Cilacı, Aksu and Saglam (2012), totally 140 Turkish teams (composed of 4418 volunteers) participated in search and rescue operations; 10 foreign countries gave support to the search and rescue activities with 12 teams. In addition, thousands of tents were sent to the region (totally 75.000 tents, 28.000 from the different foreign countries). About 25,000 people were temporally settled in 14 tent cities established following the earthquake.

In the meantime, it can be useful to draw attention to the fact that there was political divide between the governor and the mayor in Van

province. Putting emphasis on this political division in the disaster region is essential because it had influence on the contents of the case study. To make clear, this political divide prevented the researcher from discussing some matters such as the leadership role and performance of the mayor and vice-mayors in the disaster response, how these elected political actors managed the blame in the post-crisis period etc. However, the researcher will not mention the political context in depth because it is related to some deep-rooted issues which are beyond the scope of this research. More importantly, discussing the political context in the disaster region in the study may damage the researcher's career in Turkey (for the sensitivity of the researcher's position in Turkey *see* 5.4.2.2).

### **6.3.3. Preparation Phase**

As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, there are two main tasks to be done in pre-crisis period: planning for possible crises and detecting an upcoming crisis. This section of the case study will be designed in the framework of these tasks through a variety of sources such as post hoc official disaster investigation and extensive semi-structured interviews with the key crisis managers and stakeholders.

#### **6.3.3.1. Planning for the disaster**

##### ***Unpreparedness to the disaster***

According to the official post hoc disaster investigation made by the three civil inspectors of The Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs

(namely; Cilacı, Aksu, and Saglam) in 2012, the provincial public institutions were not prepared for this catastrophic event in advance. They did not have practical emergency plans. In other words, the contingency plans were neither applicable nor updated. Münir Karaloglu, the governor of Van, confirms this finding and explains its main reasons as follows:

Starting with the first question everybody asks would be useful: ‘Was there a preparation for an earthquake in Van?’ I wish we would answer to this question “Yes, we were completely ready”. But, unfortunately, I will say “no” to this question. Lack of preparation for the earthquake can be seen as a reflection of unpreparedness for all kinds of the disasters in Turkey. As a country, we have experienced many different types of crises so far. We manage crises somehow after occurring. Our traditional reflex has importance in our ability to manage crises. But we cannot manage the risk because we often neglect planning in any kind of management process including crisis management. That’s the problem. We didn’t have an applicable plan for the experienced disaster. Our plans were not updated. We have serious problems and deficiencies in preparation for future crises. Unless a serious crisis occurs, the preparation and planning for possible crises do not occupy our agenda. I think this is a cultural problem. (24 June 2013)

Apart from the Van Governorship, the Provincial Disaster and Emergency Management Directorate were unprepared for the disaster even though - as mentioned in 6.2.1. - it is the main responsible institution for disaster preparation and planning in Turkey. The post hoc investigation report prepared by Cilacı, Aksu and Saglam draws attention to this: ‘...as the main institution responsible for planning

and preparation for possible crises, Van Disaster and Emergency Management Provincial Directorate were not prepared for the disaster. The contingency plans of the institution were not updated. To give example, the region that had been allocated for the tent camp area in the contingency plan was announced as a new settlement area by the Van Municipality, and then lots of apartments were built in the area. However, this change was not updated in the plan.’ In addition to the report, Cafer Giyik, the director of Van Provincial Disaster and Emergency Management Directorate openly admits unpreparedness of this institution under him:

The provincial crisis centre was located within our institution. The members of the crisis desk came together within twenty five minutes after the earthquake. The governor immediately asked the disaster plan. We put it on the table. He looked at the tent camp area determined in the plan, and then he immediately checked if the area was available or not (He was experienced). He learnt that lots of new buildings (apartments, offices etc.) had been built in the places allocated as a tent camp area in the plan. To sum up, the disaster plans did not work as they were not updated, and *we were caught to the disaster unprepared and unplanned*. Therefore, the first response to the disaster was spontaneous. (24 June 2013)

On the other hand, the report (Cilacı, Aksu & Saglam, 2012) says that in addition to the Van Governorship and Disaster and Emergency Management Provincial Directorate - the other public institutions were also unprepared for the disaster, and therefore, there was a complete confusion in the all public institutions in the disaster area. For instance, The City Police Department did not have a preparation on

how to provide security, how to identify the missing personnel and materials, how to meet the costs of the personnel who came from other cities. As mentioned above (see 6.3.2.), apart from the Van city centre, Ercis District was another region affected by the earthquake. However, the public organisations in the district were caught to the catastrophic event unprepared and unplanned as well. Barboros Baran, Deputy District Governor of Ercis, confirms this: ‘...in this case, we didn’t know even how to distribute the tents because there was no criteria to decide the true victims, there was no plan to do this. You know one of the most important elements that bring success in crisis management is coordination; and successful coordination requires a contingency plan. However, to be honest, we were not good at disaster preparation. In other words, disaster planning was outright failure in this case.’ The worse, the citizens in the disaster region were aware of this unpreparedness of the public institutions. As a stakeholder, Dr. Ali Ciceksay, the Chairman of Van Active Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association points out this situation:

Van Governorship and other public organisations were unprepared for the disaster. They did not know what steps would be taken first, to make matter worse, unfortunately, the public opinion was aware of that situation. It was obvious that nobody took lesson from the past, especially from the 1999 Marmara earthquake. A city from a country which has been constantly exposed to the earthquakes was unprepared for an earthquake again.

***Impractical and outdated plans***

In addition to the lack of preparation, another important problem faced during the disaster response was that the disaster plans of the public organisations did not match with the practice. The contingency plans were neither practical nor updated. To exemplify, there were lots of buildings on the area that had been reserved for establishing a tent camp in case of an emergency situation in the plan (Cilacı, Aksu & Saglam, 2012). As the response organisations did not have the practical contingency plans, the crisis caused panic, and caused the responders to lose their motivation. Ramazan Fani, the head of crisis desk in Ercis District, points out this as follows:

Believe it or not, as a head of crisis desk, I reached the disaster plan 3 hours after the earthquake. Anyway, after I looked at the plan I understood that it was not applicable. To make clear, there were many questions I couldn't find their answers in the plan such as who would intervene to the debris, which teams would provide transportation, who would perform search and rescue operations etc. Then, I threw it and began to manage the crisis gropingly. Therefore, we found ourselves within a huge workload during the disaster response phase. More importantly, we started disaster response with a loser's manner. I felt as if I was a captain that lost his route in the middle of a storm. (15 August 2013)

***Inconsistency between various contingency plans***

In the Turkish public administration system, each public institution has to make a contingency plan for possible urgent situations. However, as there is not any coordinator agency that controls whether

there is harmony among these various plans or not, some serious coordination problems emerge during crisis response. The post hoc investigation report draws attention to this point: ‘there was no consistency between the emergency plans, and therefore, not only citizens but also public officials were confused about how to respond the disaster, what to do first, and where to go etc. Inconsistency was a problem because it led to uncertainty / confusion over what to do.’ One of the most important figures taking part in the disaster response, Yalçın Özdemir, the President of the Van Red Crescent Branch also verified this fact:

The people didn’t even know where to apply and come together after such a disaster. Neither the citizens nor the institutions and staff didn’t know what to do in such a large scale disaster because although each institution had its own disaster plan, there was no consistency among them.

### ***Lack of Volunteer Management Plan***

As stated in Chapter 4, even though one of the most important actors that takes part in crisis response are voluntary groups such as non-governmental and private actors, they are largely unknown to planners ahead of time or not considered important enough to include in crisis response plans. The investigation report (2012) confirms this point: ‘Following the earthquake, lots of search and rescue teams (most of them were volunteers) from other cities and even foreign countries came to the region. However, who they would contact, and who would guide them was not clear when they arrived to the disaster area because there was not a volunteer management plan prepared before

the disaster.’ As a volunteer who took part in rescue operations, Çiçeksay also draws attention to this situation and its negative outcomes:

Neither a small brochure about what to do after such a catastrophic event nor a map showing the location of crisis management centre was not given to us. Hence, most of the rescue teams that came to Van from other cities tried to find the crisis management centre by themselves. Nobody guided them for search and rescue activities. Therefore, some of them began to work in the first debris they came across on their own. Some couldn’t stand the victims’ insists and began to work in the debris with their guidance. *This caused disorganization and therefore delays in search and rescue services and increase in loss of life.*

***Specific problems: Fuel and vehicles***

Furthermore, Atilla Uzun, the public manager responsible for coordinating search and rescue teams, points out two more surprising problems that resulted from unpreparedness. These related to a lack of a vehicle management plan and a lack of fuel supplies. These factors obviously hampered operations. Let’s follow his explanations: ‘Within the first days after the earthquake, hundreds of lorries (loaded with tents) came from other cities and even foreign countries. They made very long convoys to empty their loads because there wasn’t any vehicle management plan prepared before. To make matter worse, lots of search and rescue machineries did not operate for a while in the first hours following the disaster because of lack of fuel. I know you wonder why? Believe it or not, there was no planning about how to

pay the fuel cost of the vehicles which will take part in search and rescue operations. I don't exaggerate. This was true. This, perhaps, increased the loss of life.'

### ***Planning for crisis: Mission Impossible?***

Nobody can deny that it was hard for the public organisations to predict all the uncertainties and complexities they faced after the earthquake due to its inconceivable and unexpected nature. However, they could foresee some possible needs (such as food, clean water, transportation, first aid etc.) that would emerge in post-crisis period, and they could take some precautions before. Yusuf Yuksel, Head of Social Services Department, draws attention to the same point as follows:

Someone claims that crisis cannot be planned in advance because of its uncertain characteristic. It is obvious that we cannot predict when a natural disaster will occur. However, we can predict its possible results. I mean, after each natural disaster the need of housing, food, shelter, and medical services etc. are likely to come out, and we can make a planning in advance about how to meet these needs.

To conclude, the findings getting from the official report and interviews show that lack of planning and preparation caused disorganization, confusion and delays in search and rescue services, and therefore, increased loss of life. Hence, it can be claimed that preparation and planning for possible crises have a great impact on the effectiveness of a crisis management process.

### **6.3.3.2. Detecting the disaster**

As mentioned in the previous chapters (see Chapter 2, 3 and 4), an ultimate objective of crisis management is to forestall a crisis or - at least - to lessen its negative outcomes, and early detection may enable organisations to prevent most crises or - at least - to cope with them more effectively. Different from other types of crises, natural disasters are unexpected and unpredictable events that occur in seconds. On the other hand, wherever people reside, particular natural events are usually known and expected. For example, while certain areas in Turkey in particular some cities in the eastern Anatolia region are more likely to undergo earthquakes, some areas in the Black sea region are more likely to experience floods. Therefore, to some extent, it may be argued that such disasters are anticipated and feed into disaster planning. Nevertheless, getting used to living without a serious event for a long time may cause people living in these localities to assume that these kinds of events will not happen again and therefore to lose the ability to detect disasters in advance. In short, complacency is one of the most important factors that hamper anticipation.

### **6.3.4. Management Phase**

According to the synthesis, there are a number of main tasks to be performed in the management phase such as organising, leading, and decision-making, managing the public perception, feelings management, and managing the agenda. This part of the case study

will be designed in the framework of these tasks through a variety of sources including extensive semi-structured interviews with the key crisis managers and stakeholders, post hoc official disaster investigations, articles, and organizational documents.

#### **6.3.4.1. Organising (Coordinating Disaster Response Efforts)**

Immediately after the earthquake, two Disaster and Emergency Management Centers (crisis desks) were established in Van and Erçis. Even though Erçis sub-provincial crisis management centre was administrated independently from Van Disaster and Emergency Management Centre, a constant communication has been made between the two crisis coordination centres. The crisis desks started to work on the basis of 24 hours since the earthquake moment on 23th of October. All interventions were tried to be coordinated through these centres. Within the first a couple of days following the earthquake there was, however, serious confusion and disorganization among the response agencies because there was not any incident command system used for providing coordination between all these agencies (Cilacı, Aksu & Sağlam, 2012). Aydoğan Kaya, who took part in the disaster response efforts as the representative of National Medical Rescue Organisation (UMKE), confirms this: ‘There were many operational teams from both public and private sector in the area, but there was no coordination between them as they had different working systems.’ Giyik, the director of Provincial Disaster and Emergency Management Institution, also draws attention to another crucial reason

why there was serious confusion and disorganization among the response agencies:

... the first response to the disaster was entirely spontaneous. It was not an organised response because each unit worked within its own rules and hierarchy. They didn't accept to be an object of a common system. (24 June 2013)

### ***A Big Challenge for Coordination: Volunteers***

The search and rescue teams from The Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), private sector, NGOs and municipalities carried out search-and-rescue operations (UNORC, 2011). 140 Turkish teams (composed of 4418 volunteers) participated in search and rescue operations; 10 foreign countries gave support to the search and rescue activities with 12 teams (Cilacı, Aksu & Saglam, 2012). Atilla Uzun, the public manager responsible for coordinating search and rescue teams, drew attention to a crucial point with regard to the volunteers: 'In order to take part in the search and rescue operations, lots of search and rescue teams from other cities and even foreign countries came to the region independently. It was hard for me to coordinate their operations because most of them were inexperienced. Some of them were so inexperienced that they began to work in the first debris they came across on their own.' Another participant, Ramazan Fani, the district governor of Ercis, both supported the Uzun's statement and pointed out why it was a big challenge to coordinate these voluntary groups' efforts with others:

Many search and rescue teams were not experienced. For example, a search and rescue team worked at the wreckage and reported that there was nobody under it. Then a citizen approached to me and said he was sure that his child was under the debris. I sent another team and could not reach anyone under the debris but the citizen insisted again. The third team I sent pulled the child out the debris at the end. This was incredible. A lot of voluntary groups came to Ercis District for the search and rescue operations. Some of them worked under our management but some did not because - they said - they had their own network. To tell the truth, as the head of crisis desk, it was a real challenge for me to coordinate these teams' efforts with others.

It is obvious that one of the most important factors that facilitate cooperation is the trust between the sides. Therefore, it can be claimed that if there is no trust between the individuals and / or groups, it is hard for them to adopt to be an object of a common system. Yuksel, head of social services department, drew attention to this point while explaining why the crisis managers failed to coordinate the voluntary teams' efforts in the case: 'If there was institutional trust established before the crisis, the voluntary and private organizations would work under formal authority.' Apart from the coordination problems experienced in the search and rescue operations, there were also coordination problems emerged during the distribution of the tents (Cilacı, Aksu & Sağlam, 2012). Çiçeksay expresses the magnitude of this problem as follows: 'In my opinion, the most serious problem faced was related to the distribution of tents. There was an obvious coordination problem in this area. To expand, while some people who were not in need were given more than one tent, the true victims were

not given any tent. This problem turned into a social problem, a chaos in a short time.’

### ***High level visits as a crucial obstacle to coordination***

The most common ritualistic task performed by high-ranking public authorities - in particular by prime ministers and ministers - is to go to the disaster region and visit the victims of disaster. Nobody can deny its positive impacts on the victims and their relatives but it must not be forgotten that this ritual may hamper to perform organising crisis response efforts in particular within the first hours after a disaster occurred. This negative aspect of high level visits cannot be ignored while time is very precious within the first hours particularly during search and rescue operations. The post hoc investigation report (2012) points out this reality: ‘Within the first days after the disaster, more than one minister - sometimes 8 ministers - visited the victims in the region at the same time. These visits were meaningful for emphasizing the importance the government gave to the victims. However, these visits made coordinating response efforts more difficult because in order to accompany the ministers during the visits, at least a few high level crisis managers had to leave crisis management centre for a long time.’ Karaloğlu, the governor of Van, the main responsible figure for the disaster management confirms this:

I wish I could impede the ministers’ visits (including the Prime Minister’s visit) within the first 72 hours after the event. To be honest, because of these visits we could not concentrate on our essential tasks, for example, we could not coordinate the search

and rescue operations; we could not coordinate tent distribution to the victims. All right, what did we do? We did nothing but to inform and accompany the ministers within these golden hours.

In addition to Karaloğlu, most of the participants criticised these visits but the criticism of the manager of search and rescue teams was rather remarkable:

The high-level statesmen's visits to the region in the first 24 hours after the event were wrong. I witnessed that - in order to see the Prime Minister or to take his photo - some journalists were on the wreckages where people died. It made our search and rescue operations more difficult.

(Atilla Uzun, 24 June 2013)

### ***Other barriers to coordinating crisis response efforts***

Apart from the high level visits to the disaster region, the participants drew attention to a number of crucial obstacles to organising disaster response efforts such as lack of experience, the staff affected by the disaster, not sharing information, lack of a common database, wrong information etc. However, here the most important ones will be discussed.

### ***Lack of Experience***

As mentioned in the fourth chapter, experience is an essential factor that affects success of crisis management process because it make easier decision-making under time pressure and uncertainty. Experience has a great impact on the effectiveness of crisis

management practices since the people who take part in crisis management often tend to base their actions on previous experiences and memories. One of the participants, Barboros Baran, deputy district governor, confirmed this through his experience: ‘One of the most important factors making coordination difficult was the staff who had never experienced an earthquake, had never worked in the earthquake before the case. They did not know what to do, how to act especially in the acute stages of disaster.’

### ***The staff affected by the disaster***

As stated before, most crises occur in a locality; or at least start at local level. Therefore, the first response to any disaster is usually given by the local people particularly by the staff in the local public organisations. There are some questions to be asked in here: if they are affected by the disaster, who will give the first response to the disaster? If they are the victims at the same time, how will they organise the disaster response efforts? Ramazan Fani, the head of the crisis desk in Ercis District, drew attention to this crucial point through his experience in the case:

...the law says, in case of an emergency, the crisis desk should gather without a call. It is good but it is not applicable because the fact that the members of crisis desk are likely to be victims is not taken into account by the lawmaker. To make this point clear, within the first hours after the earthquake occurred, as a head of crisis desk in the district I was not be able to reach some members of the crisis desk because either the members themselves or their families were affected by the event.

### *Not sharing information*

In crises especially in natural or man-made disasters, coordination difficulties are often hard to separate from inter-organisational communication difficulties (*see* Chapter 4). Most coordination issues are resulted from the unwillingness of some organisations to communicate and share information with others even in case of an emergency. Aydoğın Kaya, the representative of National Medical Rescue Organisation (UMKE), as a key figure that took part in the disaster response in Van, verifies this:

The most important reason of the coordination problems faced was lack of information sharing among organisations. To give an example I witnessed, even some units working under the Turkish Ministry of Health did not share the data with each other.

In conclusion, the findings getting from the official report and interviews reveal that there were some coordination issues faced during the response, and they were mostly resulted from the voluntary groups, high-level visits to the disaster region, inexperienced staff, and some agencies' reluctance to share information with others. Nobody can deny that these issues caused failure in the process of disaster management because - as stated before - the success of a crisis management process is centred on organising the response activities of the several public, private, and non-governmental organisations.

#### **6.3.4.2. Leading during the response**

As mentioned in 6.2.1, in Turkish public administration, the main figures responsible for managing a crisis are governors. Therefore, this section will be generally based on the interviewees' explanations with regard to the leadership styles of the Van and Erzurum governors, namely Karaloglu and Fani. In the meantime, it must be particularly stated that the researcher will not discuss the leadership styles and performance of the Prime Minister and Vice Prime Minister who took part in the first response to the disaster because he had been working as a representative of the central government (deputy governor) in Turkey before he began the research. Indeed, due to the sensitivity of the researcher's position in Turkey, he will not question the leadership styles and performance of the Prime Minister and vice Prime Minister even though they involved in the disaster response.

Likewise, as an appointed actor, the researcher will not discuss the leadership role of the elected local leaders (such as the mayor and vice-mayors) because there have been a long-standing dispute and conflict between the appointed and elected actors in the provinces and districts in Turkey, which is beyond the scope of the research. The researcher will not question the leadership styles and performance of the mayor and vice-mayors because - as mentioned in 6.3.2 - there was political divide between the governor and the mayor in Van province. Indeed, the political divide between the governor and the mayor prevented the researcher from discussing the leadership role

and performance of the mayor and vice-mayors in the disaster response.

To begin, Uzun, who took the responsibility as a mid-level public manager in the case, sees the governor displaying authoritarian leadership style successful. According to Uzun, if the governor had democratic leadership style, loss of life would increase in such a catastrophic event. On the other hand, Giyik, the director of Van Provincial Disaster and Emergency Management Directorate criticizes authoritarian leadership style the governor displayed: ‘...I had no authority to give even a tent to a person. I mean, believe it or not, even giving a tent to someone depended on the governor’s approval. I can claim that authoritarian leadership style harmed the effectiveness of our crisis response efforts as it slowed our working pace down. You know, however, in such a big crisis the most important thing we needed was to be fast.’ In the meantime, someone can see these two public officials’ assessments about the governor’s leadership style subjective as they worked under him. Therefore, it can be useful to make room for the assessment of a participant about the governor’s leading style:

...Anyway, as for evaluating the governor’s leadership, he was successful as a leader because he was constantly in the field, among the citizens. He did what was expected from him as a leader. However, he was in “I know everything” mood and therefore, he was often criticized. His authoritarian manner worsened his relations with the civil society and the private sector representatives. You can be a governor but you cannot

treat the NGOs and private sector representatives as you treat the civil servants.

(Dr. Ali Ciceksay, 24 June 2013)

### ***Leadership Skills***

It is important for crisis leaders to have many different competencies to cope with uncertain, unexpected, and complex nature of a crisis. Crisis leadership needs to have different skills as a crisis emerges with little warning, provokes individual emotions (such as perception, panic, fear, stress etc.) by putting people under immense pressure, requires vital decisions to be made under pressure, and sets a new agenda. As stated in Chapter 2 and 4, one of the most essential competencies a leader should have while managing a crisis situation is empathy. Yusuf Yuksel, who took part in the disaster response as the coordinator of the social services, drew attention to the importance of empathy through a true story he witnessed during the response:

...after the earthquake, Mr. Akdag, the Minister of Turkish Health Services, immediately went to Van. He stayed in the hospital for one week as his staff did. I mean, he empathized. He tried to understand the conditions of personnel working in the disaster region. As a leader, he, therefore, was successful.

On the other hand, another story told by an interviewee - Ramazan Fani, the governor of Erçiş District – called attention to another crucial leadership skill as follows:

From the first hours of the disaster I tried to be seen everywhere in the district. I mean, I was at the meeting with the Prime Minister and other ministers; I was at press conference; I was at

the crisis desk to coordinate the response efforts; I was on the streets to tell the people what's going on; I was at the tent camp to visit the victims; I was on the phone informing the media... In short, following the quake, I tried to seem everywhere because I knew that my visibility was very essential for the citizens to feel better themselves. I was aware of the fact that my visibility could reduce the tension of the public. I had to be visible as the people were looking to someone to do something...

Another anecdote told by Dr. Abdullah Oztoprak, deputy governor, drew attention to serving to the public as a crucial leadership skill:

Ramazan Fani, the district governor of Ercis, extinguished a fire he witnessed during his visit to a tent camp in a midnight. This is an incredible story because while the inhabitants of the tent camp that had been established after the earthquake were sleeping, a governor was awake to serve them! I think the most important reason behind the people's sympathy to him was this sensibility he had. By the way, as far as I know, Fani was awarded by the Prime Minister because of the performance he displayed during the disaster response.

Another participant, Çiçeksay, the representative of an NGO who involved in the disaster response, however, drew attention to an entirely different point about leadership competencies. Indeed, he revealed a chronic problem in the Turkish public sector while expressing his views on leadership:

Success in crisis management should not depend on the leader's skills. I mean, there should be a system running independently from the leader's personality. However, in our culture, success and / or failure in crisis management process entirely depends

on leaders rather than a system because systems are generally based on leaders themselves. Therefore, once a leader changes the system automatically collapses.

As a result, it is a reality that during a crisis situation leadership gains more importance than it has deserved in the Turkish public sector, indeed; the success in crisis management depends entirely on the skills of a leader because there is no specific system for crisis management in Turkey, and thus we leave the crisis management to leaders rather than teamwork.

#### **6.3.4.3. Decision-making under pressure**

Decision making is the most important part of any management process. In other words, the term management can be described as a decision-making process. Therefore, indecision can lead to some serious problems in particular during a crisis response. We can see a concrete example about how indecision led to the trouble in the case. Let's follow the investigation report prepared by Cilacı, Aksu & Saglam in 2012: 'On the first day after the disaster response, the crisis management team hesitated whether they would distribute tents to individuals or set up a tent camp. Due to this dilemma, establishment of tent camps was delayed and therefore, the victims protested them.' The head of crisis management team, Karaloglu, the governor of Van, confirms this event:

...my deputy governor in charge of tent distribution asked me if he would give tents to the people in need at the first evening. I said "No, we will not give tents to anybody. We will set up a

tent camp instead.” After two hours, the deputy governor called me again: “Tents were given to the local people in Ercis District. Citizens, who have learnt it, were seriously pressing us in here. It was too hard to make the public calm down. What should I do?” he said. I decided to change my first decision because under new circumstances it would lead to a new crisis (I felt a new crisis in the crisis), and I told him to distribute tents to the individuals in need. However, as I guessed, the delay in the tent distribution led to the protests against us. These protests caused a new crisis in the crisis.

### *Delegation*

It is essential that the senior management decide on strategic issues and leave the decisions about the technical issues to the operational units during a crisis. In other words, the top management should identify the main strategies and delegate mid-level managers to make decisions about more specific and technical matters. Otherwise, slowing in decision-making is likely to be unavoidable, and thus effectiveness of a crisis response is likely to decrease. The narrative of Giyik, the director of Van Provincial Disaster and Emergency Management Directorate, can make this point more understandable:

The governor, Karaloglu, was much more involved, focused, and proactive in the decision-making than his regular leadership would suggest. To give an example, as the director of AFAD, I had no authority to give even a tent to a person. I mean, believe it or not, even giving a tent to someone was decided by the governor in the first a couple of days following the earthquake, and thus - as I stated before - we were slow in the crisis response.

### ***Centralisation in decision-making***

After the first response failure, strong public, media, and interest group expectations of an upwards transfer of decision-making to the central government emerged. Therefore, from the third day of the event, 19 governors and deputy governors from the other provinces, 8 district governors from the other districts of Van (not affected by the earthquake), were assigned by the Ministry of the Interior to work in the crisis management centres in Van province and Ercis district. That is why; these centres became much more effective from the third day of the crisis response (Cilacı, Aksu & Sağlam, 2012). On the contrary, Giyik criticizes the policy of the central government: ‘You cannot manage the crisis from the outside. Decisions should be taken at the local level. We saw that most of decisions made by the actors assigned by the central government were not applicable because they were not aware of the conditions in the region, they did not know the sensitivity of the locality.’

### ***Obstacles to decision-making***

#### ***Inner Conflicts***

It is obvious that the most crucial barrier to decision making is hesitancy. One of the main factors causing hesitancy is the inner conflicts and dilemmas decision-makers face while making decision. Barboros Baran, one of the main responsible figures within the response to the disaster in Ercis District, drew attention to the same point through his own experience in the case: ‘...More importantly, it

is necessary that decision-makers minimize all kinds of conflicts particularly emotional ones they face. To give an example, during the disaster response, it was very difficult for me to make right decisions about some matters (in particular deciding the people in need) owing to justice-compassion dilemma I faced. Therefore, I can claim that we first need to manage our emotions in order to be able to decide professionally.’

### *Uncertainty*

As mentioned in the fourth Chapter, during a crisis, the problem or situation requiring a decision will likely be difficult to define due to some uncertainties. Ramazan Fani, district governor of Ercis District, pointed out this rationale:

I have to admit, as a manager, it was a big challenge for me to make decision under uncertainty, ambiguity. There were many unknowns. To expand, I was not being able to collect the data about the number of buildings collapsed, about the number of people died and injured. Now, I want to ask you: under these conditions, how could I make right and fast decisions?

### *Information Overload*

It is hard to decide under crisis circumstances because decision-makers are continually bombarded with information from various sources such as public and private response organisations, the media etc. Dr. Çiçeksay, the representative of an NGO taking part in the disaster response, drew attention to this point:

It was hard to make right decisions during the acute phase as there was much information overload. There was information overload because there was no coordination between the public agencies. I mean the public organisations did not speak with one voice.

### ***Worry of future inspection***

In order to be able to make fast decisions, public officials who take part in a crisis response should be confident about the inspectors' positive and reasonable approach during the investigation in post crisis period. Otherwise, the concern for future inspection is likely to obstruct them from making some critical decisions. Yuksel, the head of social services department shared his observation about this point:

I saw that some civil servants were avoiding making some decisions essential for the strong response to the disaster because they were concerned about future inspection.

#### **6.3.4.4. Communicating with the media and public during the response**

As stated in Chapter 4, crisis communication has a considerable impact on the effectiveness of crisis management process because it aims to establish general and broad-based understanding of the crisis circumstances, consequences, and anticipated outcomes based on available information. Crisis communication is crucial since it can foster a positive image of crisis response. This contribution cannot be underestimated due to the fact that how people perceive the crisis response is more important than crisis response itself. With regard to

the last point, the narrative of Karaloğlu, Van Governor, was rather noteworthy:

10 days after the earthquake, a few university academics visited me. They told that they had a survey data on measuring the perception in Van and Turkey in general, and wanted to share it with the public officials taking part in the crisis desk... The results of the study shocked us. Despite the fact that we had worked without sleeping and even eating properly for days - according to the survey results - the public opinion thought that we hadn't done anything. According to the survey results, we were failure in managing the crisis. I understood that we had failed to express ourselves to the public. I re-understood that how the people perceived our actions was more important than what we did...

### *The role of media*

It is obvious that the media plays a significant role in crisis communication. It is vital to communicate with the media during a crisis management process because - as Boin et al (2005) state - it enables public authorities to turn rumours, misrepresentations, and drivels produced in a crisis situation into the form of accurate, clear, and actionable information. The explanations of Giyik, the director of Van Provincial Disaster and Emergency Management Directorate, support this point: '...it is obvious that in order to communicate with the people the most useful instrument is the media, and thus we need to manage our relations with the press. If you fail to control the news spread by the media you are likely to face some problems. Let me give an example: a couple of weeks after the quake, a baseless whisper

spread by the media as "a new earthquake is likely to occur" made all local people spend the night on the streets. This made our response efforts to make the inhabitants calm down more difficult.' Communicating with the media during a crisis situation is crucial as it prevents the media from obtaining unproven information from some unofficial sources. A media representative, Fatih Sevinc, Chairman of Journalists of Van Lake Association, confirmed this:

...if media can't receive information from public authorities, it reaches the information by informal way because our business is to reach to information. I mean how we got the information is not important.

***A crucial barrier to crisis communication: High level visits***

It is commonly accepted that natural disasters are newsworthy events. In other words, natural disasters are out of the ordinary events on which public and media interests focus. It is obvious that one of the most important factors that raise the public and media interest on natural disasters is the visits of central government members particularly the visits of ministers to the disaster region. The situation was not different in the case. The report points out this reality. The members of the Turkish central government including the Prime Minister had an intensive communication with the victims, and therefore, the attention of national and international media has increased over the earthquake zone within the first days of the disaster response (Cilacı, Aksu & Saglam, 2012). There is, however, a reality that these high level visits have a potential to obstruct the crisis

managers to communicate with the media and public. Sari and Aksu (2012) called attention to the same point. According to the authors, the crisis management team failed to communicate with the media and public. The media was not informed by the team members on a daily basis. In other words, they did not share the information about the works they had done with the community and press. As the head of crisis management team, Karaloğlu, Van Governor, openly criticised the negative impacts of these high-level visits on the crisis communication:

The Prime Minister and the ministers all visited the region and they spoke to the press in the first days. Thus, as local authorities, we had no chance to express ourselves to the public and media at the beginning.

***Another barrier to effective communication: Not speaking with one voice***

As emphasised in the fourth chapter, one of the most essential things for effective crisis communication is to speak with one voice. Actually, crisis communication works best when done jointly. Although close coordination of public communication may be complicated, it ensures clear and consistent messages. Consistency of message is one important benchmark of effective crisis communication. Coordinating messages enhances the probability of consistent messages and may reduce the confusion the public experiences. Therefore, designating a spokesperson is essential for effective crisis management. Organizational spokespersons have

crucial roles in communicating with the media and public. The post hoc investigation report (Cilacı, Aksu & Sağlam, 2012) turns the spotlight on this point: ‘The daily press conferences were not hold in the framework of a plan. To expand, they were hold by the various public authorities. They were not hold at a standard time of the day. In addition, there was not a pre-determined spokesperson for the press conferences. As a result, the governmental bodies did not speak with one voice.’ Speaking with one voice in a crisis situation is crucial because it reduces information overload that hamper not only crisis communication but also crisis decision-making (see 6.3.4.3). Yalçın Özdemir, the chairman of Red Crescent of Van Branch, drew attention to this point:

Information pollution was too much because the public was not informed through a single authority.

Unlike Özdemir, Dr. Ciceksay, the chairman of an NGO voluntarily taking part in the disaster response, sees the media responsible for the info pollution: ‘...Media, unfortunately, opened a door to this info pollution intentionally or unintentionally with its publishing. Media should not act irresponsibly. Media should build bridges between the public authorities and the ordinary people.’

### ***Role of social media networks***

The recently happened earthquake in Van province of Turkey showed us how people shared critical information on the social media. Many users provided information about specific tags were used to identify

relevant information. Even official bodies or responsible organizations have spread relevant information on Twitter (Hurriyetoglu, 2012: 12). With regard to the role of social media networks in the case, the comments of Karaloğlu, Van Governor, were rather crucial:

From the first hours of the disaster, through social media networks, thousands of people followed how we responded the disaster, what we did. Thus, we were under pressure. On the other hand, we were aware of the fact that we had no chance to control the speed of diffusion of news in social media. That's why, we used the social media actively to express ourselves during the crisis management process. Consequently, we were grateful to the social media because it facilitated our job by keeping the public opinion alive to the tragedy in Van for weeks.

As a result, it can be claimed that one of the most important elements for success in crisis management is to communicate with the public. I mean - in order to be able to manage a crisis situation successfully - public authorities have to express themselves to the citizens in particular to the stakeholders through various communication channels such as mass media, social media networks etc. Otherwise, it is hard for them to be effective in crisis management process.

#### **6.3.4.5. Feelings Management**

By the definitions given in Chapter 2, crises put people under immense pressure and provoke emotional reactions. The unexpected, uncontrollable, and destructive nature of a crisis makes people lose their sense of safety and then triggers various feelings such as fear,

stress, worry, anxiety, and panic, and so on. The report prepared by the United Nations (UNORC, 2011: 2) about the Van Earthquake points out how the earthquake triggered some feelings of the both citizens and civil servants: ‘... from 23 October to 5 November, a total of 2.587 aftershocks had occurred in the affected area; 1.265 of those aftershocks with magnitudes between 2 and 3; 1.080 with magnitudes between 3 and 4; 121 with magnitude between 4 and 5, and 7 shocks with magnitudes between 5 and 6. Authorities have strictly forbidden entry to damaged buildings. Continued concerns after so many aftershocks have reportedly forced many locals to leave towards neighbouring villages and accommodate with friends or relatives. Fear is also forcing still many people including the public officials to continue sleeping in tents or in their cars outside their habitable houses.’ Now, I would like to ask: is it possible to ignore or underestimate such a prominent feeling that forced the thousands of people to live in tents or their cars? Absolutely, it is not. Therefore, managing emotions is a must in crisis situations.

During a crisis, managing individual emotions is necessary because not being able to control individual emotions is likely to cause the people to have some emotional conflicts. These emotional conflicts cannot be underestimated because one of the main factors that bring about indecision is these inner conflicts individuals undergo during decision-making (*see* 6.3.4.3). The explanations of Barboros Baran, the member of the crisis desk in Ercis District could make this point more obvious: ‘We have to possess precise data to minimize the

conflict between justice-compassion or manage the emotions of justice and mercy emerged in particular in crises. These two emotions continuously conflicted within the process of crisis management we experienced, and that's why we had serious difficulties in decision-making processes. In order to control the emotions, access to accurate data and using this data properly is essential. ...More importantly, it is necessary that decision-makers minimize all kinds of conflicts particularly emotional ones they face. To give an example, during the disaster response, it was very difficult for me to make right decisions about some matters (in particular deciding the people in need) owing to justice-compassion dilemma I faced...'

### ***Managing emotions: Mission impossible?***

Coping with humans' feelings is likely to increase the effectiveness of crisis response efforts because crisis management is a human-intensive practice and human is encircled by a great variety of emotions. However, as Dr. Çiçeksay pointed out, it is not easy to manage the feelings of a mother who lost her child during a disaster. It is very difficult to manage fear and anxiety resulted from a trauma experienced in an earthquake. In the meantime, feelings management has got two different dimensions. While one of them is related to victims, its other dimension concerns managers themselves, and there is a strong relationship between them. In fact, unless a person copes with his own emotions, it is hard for him to manage other people's ones. Ramazan Fani, the main responsible public official for the

disaster response in Erçis District, drew attention to the same point with his own narrative:

My wife and my children stayed in the car for the first three days after the quake. I had a chance to phone my mother three days later. Under these circumstances, it was not easy to control your own feelings. Now, I would like to ask a question to you: if you do not have a chance to control your own feelings could you tell me how you can manage other's emotions. (15 August 2013)

In conclusion, even though managing the feelings during a crisis situation is a big challenge, it is a crucial task because crisis management is a human-intensive practice and human is beset by various feelings. Therefore, crisis managers who ignore or underestimate humans' feelings are likely to fail in the implementation of crisis management strategies. The post hoc investigation report (Cilacı, Aksu & Sağlam, 2012) draws attention to the same point by saying 'if the public authorities took into account controlling emotions they would be more effective in the crisis management process because lots of problems that occupied the public figures' minds and agendas had originated from feelings such as panic, stress, and fear.

#### **6.3.4.6. Managing the crisis agenda: coping with new issues**

Crises in particular catastrophic ones such as natural disasters put new issues on agendas such as rescue, shelter, potable water, relief supplies, mass medical attention, etc. concerning thousands of people.

Therefore, managing a crisis requires dealing with all these issues. Indeed, managing a crisis is nothing more than coping with these issues. However, in crisis situations, managing the agenda is a big challenge for public authorities because crises, particular catastrophic ones such as natural disasters take, or at least threaten to take, agenda control from the hands of public leaders. Münir Karaloglu, the governor of Van, verified this: ‘To be successful in crisis management, you also need to manage the agenda but it is not easy especially in the acute phase as you have little chance to control the events occupying the agenda.’ On the other hand, it is essential that crisis managers take a proactive approach towards key target publics and the mass media in order to be able to control the agenda. Otherwise, as stated in the fourth chapter, the issues on the agenda are likely to be determined by the public and the media. Barboros Baran, a member of the crisis desk in Ercis District, called attention to this point:

Of course, it is more important for public agencies to set the agenda in crisis periods; because the crisis process is open to gossip and manipulation. In this case, since our public institutions had no press and public relations department (by the way, this is a major problem of Turkish public administration), the crisis agenda was set by the public and the media in particular by the social media networks. Therefore, it was hard for us to control the agenda. (10 July 2013)

As a result, managing the agenda is an essential part of a crisis management process because - by the definition given in Chapter 2 - a crisis is a situation which sets a new agenda for both individuals and

organisations to manage. Nevertheless, it is not easy task for public authorities within a crisis situation due to the fact that they have little chance to control the issues that determine the crisis agenda.

### **6.3.5. Evaluation Phase**

According to the synthesis, there are two main tasks to be performed by the crisis managers in the evaluation phase: managing the blame and drawing lessons from crisis. This section of the case study will be designed in the framework of these tasks.

#### **6.3.5.1. Managing the Blame**

Managing the blame is another essential task to be performed by public authorities in a crisis situation that often provides an attack on their credibility for public and the media. To be more specific, as stated in Chapter 4 (see 4.4.1.1), following a crisis, the public and media tend to examine the crisis management performance of the public figures that responded the crisis. They want to know what went wrong, what was (not) done to prevent and control the crisis, and who should be held responsible. In fact, once a crisis emerged, public authorities are generally accused for causing the crisis, failing to prevent it, or inadequately responding to it. The data presented in the report prepared by UNORC (2011: 1) confirm all these points: 'Bayram Hotel collapsed and - according to reports - 24 people were killed. The hotel, apparently weakened by last month's magnitude-7.2 earthquake, came down Wednesday night (on 9 November 2011, only three weeks after the first quake) when a magnitude-5.6 quake shook

the area. Angry residents protested in Van, accusing authorities of failing to properly inspect the buildings following the October 23 quake that killed more than 600 people. Police responded with pepper spray.’ A public manager’s (on anonymity) comments on this case were rather noteworthy:

As far as I remember, due to an aftershock a few hotels collapsed and a number of people staying in the hotels were died under the debris. I think both the public authorities and the hotel management knew that these hotels had been seriously damaged by the first quake occurred on 23 October. However, nobody took the responsibility. Nobody apologised. Nobody resigned from his post. Everybody blamed each other. This wrong stance shadowed the previous successes. More importantly, some public authorities lost their own credibility. From my point of view, the main reason why public authorities did not apologise or did not resign for their mistakes in this tragedy is lack of example. I mean - in the history of Turkish Republic - few public authorities apologised or resigned after the similar cases.

It can be concluded that it is essential that public authorities handle the accusations against themselves in the wake of a crisis. Otherwise, - as emphasised in Chapter 4 - it may be very difficult for public authorities to maintain their dependability and legitimacy that enables them to continue to operate after the crisis ends up.

#### **6.3.5.2. Learning from Crisis: *Lessons from the case***

Crises have great potential for learning from the successes and failures in addressing the crisis. As for the case, it is not different. There are

many lessons that can be drawn from the case but the most crucial ones will only be given here:

### ***Lessons on planning and preparation***

Planning and preparation for possible crises have a great impact on the effectiveness of a crisis management process because the lack of planning and preparation causes disorganization, confusion and delays in search and rescue services, and thus, increases the loss of life. Crisis is an event that catches us unprepared. Indeed, crises are nothing more than the cases to which we were caught unprepared. The case also revealed that there are a number of crucial things to do in order to increase effectiveness of the contingency plans. To be more specific, first of all, contingency plans should be updated and more practical. Secondly, consistency between various contingency plans should be provided. Furthermore, voluntary groups should be integrated into the contingency plans. In fact, a separate volunteer management plan should be prepared in advance. Finally, some crucial details such as managing vehicles and supplying fuels should not be omitted by the planners.

### ***Lessons on detecting the disaster***

Even though it is too hard to predict an earthquake, its possible results can be estimated and some precautions can be taken against them in advance. To make clear, as a participant indicated, the need of housing, food, shelter, and medical services etc. are likely to emerge

in the wake of a natural disaster, and it is possible to make a plan beforehand on how to meet these needs.

### ***Lessons on coordinating crisis response efforts***

The case study showed that most of the coordination issues faced during a disaster response are resulted from the voluntary groups, high-level visits to the disaster region, inexperienced staff, and some agencies' reluctance to share information with others. For this reason, public institutions need to take some steps (i.e. establishing better communication with volunteers) in order to eliminate; or at least minimise the negative impacts of these factors on the disaster response.

### ***Lessons on crisis leadership***

The case study revealed that one of the most important skills that make a good leader during a crisis situation is empathy. The case also showed that authoritarian leadership style harms the effectiveness of the crisis response efforts because authoritarian manner worsens a public leader's relations with the civil society and the private sector representatives. We have also learnt that unless there is a proper crisis management system, teamwork will remain weak, and thus, dependency on leaders is likely to continue.

### ***Lessons on crisis-decision-making***

There are a number of lessons on crisis decision-making that can be drawn from the case. First of all, decision-makers have no chance to

hesitate in a crisis situation because indecision can make the situation more complicated. Secondly, it is essential that the senior management identify the main strategies and delegate mid-level managers to make decisions about more specific and technical matters. Thirdly, decisions should be taken by the local authorities as they are aware of the conditions in the region; they know the sensitivity of the locality. Fourthly, it is hard to decide under crisis conditions because there are many unknowns and information pollution. Moreover, in order to be able to make fast decisions, public officials who take part in a crisis response should be confident about the inspectors' positive and reasonable approach during the investigation in post crisis period. Otherwise, the concern for future inspection is likely to obstruct crisis managers from making some critical decisions.

### ***Lessons on crisis communication***

In relation to crisis communication, the case study revealed that - first of all - how the people perceive a crisis response is more important than the response itself, and thus, it is essential for response agencies to express themselves to the public through various communication channels such as mass media, social media networks etc. Secondly, if public authorities do not communicate with the media during a crisis situation; in fact, if they do not have a proactive approach to the media, the media is likely to get the information from informal sources, and therefore, rumours, misrepresentations, and drivels that make the situation more complicated are likely to be unavoidable. In

addition, the visits of the central government members to the disaster region (particularly the visits of the ministers) have a potential to obstruct the crisis managers to communicate with the media and public. More importantly, speaking with one voice in a crisis situation is crucial because it reduces information overload that hampers not only crisis communication but also crisis decision-making.

### *Lessons on feelings management*

During a crisis, managing individual emotions is necessary because not being able to control individual emotions is likely to cause the people to have some emotional conflicts. These emotional conflicts cannot be underestimated because one of the main factors that lead to indecision is these inner conflicts individuals undergo during decision-making. Managing the feelings is a key task because of the fact that crisis management is a human-intensive practice and human is surrounded by various feelings. Hence, it is hard to be successful in a crisis management process without considering individual emotions. However, managing the feelings during a crisis situation is a big challenge. It is not easy to manage emotional reactions of a mother who lost her child during a disaster. It is not easy to manage fear and anxiety resulted from a trauma experienced in the wake of a natural disaster.

### *Lessons on managing crisis agenda*

Crises in particular natural disasters put new issues on agendas such as search and rescue, shelter, drinkable water, security, mass medical

attention. Managing a crisis requires dealing with all these issues. Indeed, managing a crisis is nothing more than coping with these issues. In crisis situations, managing the agenda is, however, a big challenge for public authorities because they have little chance to control the events occupying the agenda. On the other hand, in order to be able to control the agenda in a crisis, it is essential for public authorities to take a proactive approach towards key target publics and the mass media. Otherwise, the issues on the agenda are likely to be determined by the public and the media.

***Another crucial lesson: Necessity of giving up defending ourselves***

The case study showed that public authorities need to give up defending themselves. Otherwise, even weeks after a quake occur, buildings will continue to collapse and unfortunately people will continue to die under their wreckages.

***Necessity of institutional memory***

The post hoc investigation report (Cilacı, Aksu & Sağlam, 2012) draws attention to another important point as follows:

In spite of all the disasters we have experienced so far, it is hard to say that there was an institutional memory for the institutions to use during this disaster response. In order to be able to deal with future crises more effectively, it is essential that each public agency evaluate its own experiences very well, and then record them.

***A crucial barrier to learning from crisis: Characteristic of Human Memory***

It is clear that there is a close relationship between learning and human memory. In fact, learning is nothing more than storing information in the memory. Therefore, the nature of human memory has a considerable impact on learning from crisis. One of the most important characteristics of human memory is that it has an inclination to store good things rather than bad ones, and therefore, people often fail to learn from crises. One of the participants, Yusuf Yüksel, the head of social services, also pointed out this:

Human memory is re-constructive and selective. I mean it prefers to forget bad things. Therefore, we often fail to draw lessons from crises.

All the issues experienced during the disaster response can be summarised in a table (Table 6-1) as follows:

**Table 6-1** Issues & Barriers experienced within the case

<b>Planning issues</b>	the contingency plans that were neither applicable nor updated
	Availability of various contingency plans made by different institutions & Inconsistency between these plans

<b>Coordination issues &amp; Barriers to coordinating crisis response</b>	entirely spontaneous first response due to lack of a predetermined incident command system
	Various public and private organisations that had different working systems
	inexperienced staff particularly search and rescue teams
	Volunteers that had their own networks and that worked in their own hierarchy
	volunteers that were not familiar with the standard terms or directions used by public institutions
	Lack of institutional trust (established before the event) among public, private and non-governmental organisations
	Lots of high level visits to the disaster area
	Not being able to reach some members of the crisis desk because either the members themselves or their families were affected by the event.
	uncertain characteristic of the situation
	lack of information sharing among organisations
	New problems emerged following the solutions of some problems
	The media: someone's (including rescue teams) concern for visibility of on the media
<b>Coordination issues</b>	Lack of a common database used by all the institutions taking part in the response
	Fake tweets about the people under the wreckage
<b>A big issue: authoritarian style</b>	slowed the working pace down
	worsened the relations with the civil society and the private sector representatives
	impeded public to participate in the decision – making

<b>Decision-making issues &amp; Barriers to decision- making</b>	Hesitation & indecision
	Inflexibility & Rigidity
	Top managers involvement in the decision-making processes with regard to the technical matters
	Not authorising “I know everything” mood as result of authoritarian style
	Inner emotional dilemmas, inner conflicts of decision-makers
	Lack of a common database to be used for decision making
	Information overload due to lack of coordination between agencies and not being able to speak with one voice
	Public managers’ concerns for future inspection
	Central government’s intervention
<b>Communication issues</b>	Central authorities mostly used the media, so local ones had little chance to inform the media and public
	Blocked communication lines: The media was not informed by the team members on a daily basis
	The daily press conferences were not hold in the framework of a plan. They were hold by the various public authorities. They were not hold at a standard time of the day.
	Lack of pre-determined spokesperson for the press conferences.
	Information pollution due to not speaking with one voice
	The media’s irresponsible actions
	no chance to control the speed of diffusion of news in social media networks

<b>Barriers to managing people's feelings</b>	No preparation made in advance for managing emotions
	Ignoring people's emotions
	Severity of the disaster
	Public managers who could not control their own emotions
	Density of fear, anxiety, sadness resulted from losses
	Not being able to rightly analyze the factors mobilising emotions
	Continued concerns due to many aftershocks
	Not being able to get accurate data
<b>Barriers to managing the agenda</b>	Disaster itself that took agenda control
	Severity of disaster Gossips and manipulations
	Not being able to solve the problems on the agenda
<b>Barriers to learning from crisis</b>	Lack of institutional archieve
	Defending mistakes
	Selective and reconstructive human memory itself that prefers to forget bad things

#### 6.4. Summary

The chapter tried to demonstrate how the tasks in the synthesis worked in an actual crisis management process, and to find out what the main barriers to these tasks in a real process were. Indeed, the synthesis was tested, and the main obstacles to effective crisis management were examined through a real event in here. The chapter started with the discussion about the crisis management systems in the Turkish public administration. Then, it focused on the crisis management process experienced after the Van Earthquake in 2011 in

Turkey. The process was studied in the framework of the synthesis of the key factors and / or tasks affecting the effectiveness of crisis management practices. The case study was designed through a variety of sources including post hoc official disaster investigations, articles, organizational documents and extensive semi-structured interviews with the key crisis managers and stakeholders.

As for the next chapter, it will discuss the importance of the tasks in the synthesis and try to find out the main obstacles that hamper to perform these tasks in the public sector through the views of a number of Turkish policy makers. In fact, the chapter will re-test the synthesis and explore the main challenges to crisis management practices in the public sector through the findings getting from the interviews with a number of Turkish policy makers at national level such as undersecretaries, chairmen of some boards and departments, and civil inspectors, governors, deputy governors, and district governors, and so on.

## 7. POLICY MAKERS' PERSPECTIVES

### 7.1. Introduction

The previous chapter tried to demonstrate how the tasks in the synthesis worked in an actual crisis management process, and to find out what the main barriers to these tasks in a real process were. In other words, the synthesis of the major factors affecting the success of crisis management process was tested, and the main obstacles to effective crisis management were examined through a real event in the previous chapter. As for this chapter, it will discuss the importance of the tasks in the synthesis and try to find out the main obstacles that hamper to perform these tasks in the public sector through the views of various Turkish policy makers. Here the synthesis will be re-tested, and the main challenges to crisis management practices in the public sector will be explored through the findings getting from the interviews with a number of Turkish policy makers at national level such as undersecretaries, chairmen of some boards and departments, and civil inspectors, governors, deputy governors, and district governors, and so on.

The researcher needed to re-test the synthesis through the views of these policy makers because crisis management policies in Turkey are made by these authorities. The researcher needed to re-test the synthesis at national level following testing it at local level through a case study in the previous chapter (*see* Chapter 6) because it is obvious that testing validity and reliability of the synthesis at only

local level will not make much sense for scholars and practitioners. As for the structure of the chapter, it will be divided into the three main sections. In the first section, both the significance of the tasks in the synthesis and the main barriers to these tasks will be discussed through the views of various policy makers. In the second section, the lessons provided by the interviewees will be given. As for the last section, it will point out the lessons drawn by the researcher.

## **7.2. Discussing the Synthesis**

In this section, the importance of the tasks in the synthesis and the main barriers to the tasks will be discussed through the findings getting from the interviews with a number of Turkish policy makers. To remind, the synthesis of the major factors affecting the success of crisis management process was composed of three main phases so called preparation, management, and evaluation phase, and there were a number of tasks to be performed in each phase. Now, the significance of these tasks and the main obstacles to them will be discussed through the views of various public authorities, respectively.

### **7.2.1. Discussing Preparation Phase Tasks**

According to the synthesis, there are two critical tasks to be performed in preparation phase: planning for possible crises and detecting an upcoming crisis. Now, the importance of these two tasks and the main obstacles to them will be discussed through the findings from the interviews with the policy makers.

### 7.2.1.1. PLANNING FOR POSSIBLE CRISES

During the interviews, most of the policy makers underlined that planning for potential crises has a great impact on the success of a crisis management process because a well-prepared contingency plan provides an organized command structure to control the situation and enables to minimise crisis damage to both individuals and organisations. On the other hand, according to the participants, there are a number factors that make planning and preparation for possible crises difficult, and decrease the efficiency of contingency plans such as *nature of crisis, multiplicity of crisis types, narrow perspective on crisis preparation, and narrow perspective on the concept of crisis:*

#### **Main Obstacles to Planning**

##### *Nature of Crisis*

As cited in Chapters 2 & 4, crisis planning involves decision-making with regard to uncertainties and complexities that will emerge within an actual situation, and thus forces planners to predict them. However, it is very difficult for both organisations and individuals to predict the all uncertainties and complexities they are likely to face within a crisis situation because of its inconceivable and unexpected nature. One of the policy makers, on anonymity, calls attention to this as below:

It is too hard for us to make a plan for a potential crisis because we cannot exactly predict what will happen, what we will face once a crisis occurs...

The worse, destructive nature of crisis can make crisis planning and preparation meaningless. In other words, planning and preparation will not make sense if a crisis destroys both individuals and organisations who will implement the contingency plan, who will deal with the crisis situation. A participant, Abdullah Öztoprak, draws attention to this point, as well:

Due to demolishing the existing system, crises challenge the public institutions. To expand, crisis may make the system unworkable. Crisis sometimes may eliminate not only the system but also the manager responsible for crisis management, and thus may make crisis plans useless.

### *Multiplicity of Crisis Types*

On the other hand, diversity of crisis types is another important factor that obstructs to make effective contingency planning. To expand, there are a lot of crisis types (such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks, economic downturns, protests, and so on) that have different features. In other words, as mentioned in Chapter 2, there are a great variety of crisis types and each has its own causal factors, ramifications, period, rhythm, and unknowns to be considered when planning. Therefore, there are two options for planners: (1) making a general contingency plan that will be able to respond all kinds of crises (2) making a different plan for each potential crisis. However, it must be accepted it is not easy to translate these choices in particular the second one into practice. One of the participants, Abdülmüttalip

Aksoy, a civil inspector that has power to inspect crisis management practices in Turkey, draws attention to these points as follows:

Different plans need to be done for different crisis scenarios. But if we consider that the crises have thousands of types and each crisis has unique characteristics, it will be understood well how hard preparation for crises is.

### ***Narrow Perspective on Crisis Preparation***

Another important factor that impedes crisis preparation is narrow perspective that public authorities have. To expand, it is clear that planning and preparation for possible crises place large demands on resources. However, as McConnell and Drennan (2006) cited, due to the improbability of crisis impact, the expense and effort put out to prepare for crisis is perceived as an investment with little certainty of return. Therefore, some public authorities - as a participant (Memet YÜCEL METE, the chairman of Disaster communication Association) pointed out - may regard the expenses that will be made for preparation for potential crises as unnecessary. Another participant, Erdinç Filiz, both a civil inspector and a crisis management expert, points out the same rationale but in a slightly different way:

Crisis preparation is not given enough importance as its positive consequences cannot be seen in the short term.

On the other hand, according to a participant (Abdullah Öztoprak, deputy governor), before a serious crisis occurs, the preparation and

planning for possible crises do not occupy the Turkish public authorities agendas (*see* also 6.3.3.1). This is another sign indicating that there is narrow perspective on crisis planning and preparation in the Turkey.

***Narrow Perspective on the concept of crisis***

Finally, another crucial factor that decreases the efficiency of contingency plans is narrow perspective on the term crisis that public authorities have. A participant, on anonymity, points out this as follows: ‘...as the Turkish public authorities, we are locked when we meet a different kind of crisis because we have confined the concept of crisis in only natural disasters, and thus we make contingency plans for only natural disasters. However, crisis is a broader concept than natural disasters...’

**7.2.1.2. DETECTING AN UPCOMING CRISIS**

Most of the crisis management models treat this task as a crucial component of a crisis management process. To illustrate, Fink’s four-stage model (*see* 3.2.2.) defines prodromal phase as a stage in which crisis managers should attempt to identify an approaching crisis through internal and external audits. Another model developed by Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, and Sundelius in 2005 (*see* 3.2.8) cites that detecting a crisis through some signals is a critical task for crisis managers to perform in the incubation stage. Likewise, most of the policy makers drew attention to the importance of detecting an upcoming crisis for the success of a crisis management process. They

stated that if public authorities fail in predicting a crisis in advance it will be more difficult for them to effectively deal with the crisis situation.

On the other hand, as stated in Chapter 4, crises are not normally caused by a single factor but emerge from an aggregation of complex chains of events and other triggers, and therefore, detecting crises in advance requires public authorities to peruse the events, to correctly analyse the cause-effect relationships between them. One of the participants, Mehmed Aktaş, district governor, called attention to this as follows:

In order to predict the crises in advance particularly arising from political, economic and social factors public leaders need to have the ability to analyse. In short, they need to see the big picture in the small parts.

Even though early detection has a great impact on the success of a crisis management process; as mentioned in Chapter 4, it is not easy in the public sector due to a number of reasons. First of all, most public institutions are either incapable or reluctant to pay the costs of systematic check-ups that have a potential to spot emerging vulnerabilities before it is too late. Second, public agencies often fail to produce and interpret information that is essential for effective crisis recognition as the signals come into their different parts that do not share information or use different languages. More importantly, many issues including warnings of impending crises never make it to the decision-making agenda of public authorities because the policy

agenda is overcrowded with daily issues such as deficiencies with regard to roads, schools, hospitals etc. that await decision-making (for more *see* 4.2.2.2). A policy maker, Dr. Abdullah A. Öztoprak, Deputy Governor, confirms the last rationale as follows:

Excessive workload and drowning in daily routines are the most important obstacles to foresee the crisis beforehand...

### **7.2.2. Discussing Management Phase Tasks**

According to the synthesis, there are a number of critical tasks to be performed in preparation phase: organising, leading, decision-making, managing the public's perception, managing the feelings, and managing the agenda. Now, the importance of these tasks and the main barriers to them will be discussed in the framework of the findings getting from the interviews with the Turkish public authorities.

#### **7.2.2.1. ORGANISING CRISIS RESPONSE EFFORTS**

As mentioned in Chapters 2 & 4, whether a disaster is of natural or man-made origin, major crises have a potential to rapidly overwhelm the capacity of any single authority and entail support from lots of organizations, various levels of government and multiple sectors. In other words, crises require public agencies to interact with other organizations of non-professional disaster responders, volunteer groups, NGOs, government agencies, and the media, and so on. Therefore, it can be claimed that the success of crisis management process is centred on coordinating the efforts of these several

organisations from different sectors. A participant, Mehmed Aktaş, district governor, calls attention to the this point: ‘An important factor affecting crisis management success is to provide coordination between official, private and volunteer organizations taking part in the response efforts.’ Organising is a crucial function to be performed during a crisis management process because - as Gonzalez (2008) cited - lack of coordination can have negative consequences ranging from wasted resources to missed opportunities. More importantly, disorganisation in any crisis response activity may result in a new crisis in the situation. In the previous chapter, Çiçeksay, the Chairman of a non-governmental organisation (NGO) taking part in the disaster response voluntarily, verified the rationale through a concrete case: ‘...the most serious problem faced was related to the distribution of tents. There was an obvious coordination problem in this area. ...while some people who were not in need were given more than one tent, the true victims were not given any tent. This problem turned into a social problem, a chaos in a short time.’ A high-ranking policy maker, Seyfullah Hacımüftüoğlu, former undersecretary of Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs, current undersecretary of National Security Council, pointed out the main reason of such disorganisations frequently experienced during the crisis responses in Turkey as follows:

... we don’t have any model; we are trying to manage crises gropingly.

According to the policy makers, there are also a number of crucial factors that cause disorganisation and / or make coordination more

difficult during crisis response such as network diversity, reluctance to share information, volunteers, and high level visits, and so on:

## **Barriers to Coordination**

### ***Network diversity***

As crises increase in size and complexity, multiple organisations with different backgrounds are likely to involve in crisis response. Although it is a necessity, this heterogeneity in the nature of responders - as seen in the case study of the earthquake – may make crisis coordination more complicated when response agencies prefer working within their own rules and hierarchy, and do not accept to be an object of a common structure (*see* the explanations of Giyik in 6.3.4.1). A practitioner, Hamza Demiralp, the Provincial Disaster and Emergency Management Institution in Malatya, draws attention to this as follows:

The most important factor that complicates coordinating of crisis response efforts is existence of various organisations working in their own hierarchical structure.

### ***Reluctance to share information***

According to the participants, most coordination issues are resulted from the reluctance of some agencies to share information with others even in the wake of a crisis situation (*see* also the Kaya's explanations in Chapter 6). As mentioned before, one of the most crucial reasons why some organisations and individuals do not want to share

information with each other is lack of trust among them (*see* 4.3.1.2.). A participant, Mustafa Aygün, Police Chief of Malatya, as the senior public administrator that coped with several crises throughout his career, both supports this rationale and calls attention to another significant reason behind being reluctant to share information as follows:

One of the major reasons of failure in crisis management is the lack of sharing information among institutions or individuals taking part in the crisis response. The most important reason of that is institutional bigotry and distrust between individuals. Because corporate chiefs don't come together except for official meetings, they don't recognize and trust each other enough... Knowledge makes its owner strong, and thus public authorities want to have power as much as possible, and thus they are reluctant to share it.

Likewise, another participant, Sezer Işıқтаş, Deputy Governor, draws attention to the same reason behind the public institutions' unwillingness to information sharing as follows: 'The most important reason for lack of coordination is that each organization wants itself to become the most important institution during the crisis response, and thus doesn't need to share information.'

### ***Volunteers***

As discussed in Chapter 4, another important challenge for crisis coordination is voluntary actors that involve in crisis response because - first of all - they are largely unknown to planners ahead of time or not considered important enough to include in crisis response plans. Secondly, volunteers may have varying skill levels and lack

familiarity with organizational routines or operating procedures used by public agencies (*see* 4.3.1.2). More importantly, as seen in the case study, once the volunteers form their own informal network, coordinating these volunteer groups' activities becomes a big challenge for the main coordinator public agency in the crisis response (*see* Chapter 6). A participant, Hamza Demiralp, the Provincial Disaster and Emergency Management Institution in Malatya, points out this as follows: 'The most important factor that complicates coordinating of crisis response efforts is existence of various organisations working in their own hierarchical structure.'

### ***High level visits***

As mentioned in the fourth chapter, images, symbols and rituals can play a vital role in the dynamics of crises. The most common ritualistic task performed by prominent officials - in particular by ministers - is to go to the disaster region and visit the victims of disaster. Its positive impacts on the victims and their relatives cannot be denied but - as seen in the case study in the previous chapter - these visits have a potential to impede to coordinating crisis response efforts in particular organising search and rescue operations. One of the interviewees, Abdullah Öztoprak, deputy governor, calls attention to this point as follows:

The visits of high-level government officials to the area in the early hours of the disaster affect crisis response and decision-making process negatively.

### ***Other Barriers***

The participants also drew attention to a number of factors that cause coordination failure such as impractical contingency plans, inexperienced and unskilled staff taking part in crisis response, lack of crisis management experts in the public sector, the interruption of communication following the disaster, and vagueness in the Turkish law. To make the last point clear, in case of an emergency the main responsible authority for the response is not explicitly described in the Turkish legislation, and therefore, disorganisation becomes unavoidable in many cases.

#### **7.2.2.2. LEADING**

Crisis and leadership are closely related terms. Therefore, it can be claimed that crisis management is a leadership issue. A high-ranking policy maker, namely Ulvi Saran, the former Governor of Malatya, current Undersecretary of Public Order and Security Institution, points out the same reality with the different words: ‘Leadership is the most important function for success of crisis management because all the management functions like organization, planning, control, etc. make sense with leadership. They are shaped in the hands of leaders.’ Another participant, Abdülmüttalip Aksoy, a civil inspector, draws attention to the same point in a different way: ‘The failure is related to the leadership directly as the main factor that determines an effective crisis management is leadership.’ Similarly, a high-ranking participant, Vasip Şahin, the former governor of Malatya, current

Istanbul Governor, supports the last point: ‘...There is a reality that a leader could deepen a crisis by his attitudes.’

On the other hand, the case study revealed that leadership has been given more importance than it deserves in Turkey, in fact; the success in crisis management depends entirely on the skills of a leader because there is not a proper crisis management system in Turkey. One of the interviewees, on anonymity, draws attention to the same point as follows: ‘Since there is no specific system for crisis management in Turkey, leadership gains more importance than it has deserved. Therefore, the success in crisis management depends entirely on the skills of the leader. We leave the crisis management to the leader rather than teamwork. Naturally, in the crisis, we see the leader as someone who knows how to play every instrument in an orchestra, not as an orchestra chief. So, everything is anticipated from leaders. Success and failure as well... This is actually a cultural problem in our country...’ The participant also points out another crucial reason why leadership is so significant in Turkey:

...Another important reason why leadership is so dominant in our country is the lack of qualified personnel in public institutions or around leader. Maybe that's why everything is expected from the leader or depends on the leader. Leader is perceived as a saviour. To give an example, Kemal Derviş was perceived as a hero by the society in the 2001 financial crisis. Thereupon he explained "I'm not a hero, we will solve the current crisis as a team". Kemal Derviş was a Turkish person, but he had acquired this different approach when he worked in international organizations abroad.

***What makes a good leader during crisis?***

As a crisis - by the definition - emerges with little warning, provokes individual emotions, requires vital decisions to be made under pressure, and sets a new agenda, crisis leadership requires to have a variety of competencies such as empathy, sincerity, self-awareness, thinking paradoxically, being able to be calm under pressure, and flexibility, and so on (for further *see* 2.5 & 4.3.2.1). The participants underline the importance of these features for crisis leadership, as well. To illustrate, while a mid-level policy maker, Nureddin Dayan, district governor, states that leaders should empathize in crisis times; a high - ranking policy maker, Seyfullah Hacımüftüoğlu, former undersecretary of Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs, current undersecretary of National Security Council, draws attention to sincerity by saying ‘...the most important feature that makes a leader successful is to get worried sincerely for others.’ Likewise, while a senior participant, namely Vasip Şahin, current Istanbul Governor, underlines the importance of being calm during a crisis situation; another participant draws attention to how important being flexible is.

In addition, while Mehmed Aktaş, points out the importance of having analysis skill by saying ‘...public leaders need to have the ability to analyse. They can see the big picture in the small parts’; another participant underlines the necessity of being realistic by saying ‘...a leader needs to be aware of his own limits, his task’s limits...’ Furthermore, while a senior participant, Mustafa Aygun, emphasises the necessity of being respectful for diversity by saying ‘To be

successful in crisis response, public authorities should consider different religious beliefs and cultural fabric'; another participant, Nesim Babahanoğlu, district governor, draws attention to necessity of having teamwork and communication skills. Finally, while a high-ranking policy maker, Seyfullah Hacımüftüoğlu, the current undersecretary of National Security Council, puts emphasis on the necessity of establishing a good rapport with community in normal times; another participant, Latif Memiş, deputy governor, draws attention to both the necessity of teamwork and a big challenge to teamwork in Turkey:

It is obvious that the success or failure in crisis response depends on the performance of the team around the leader. However, as you know, in our public administration system, governors or other public authorities have little chance to choose their own teams.

***What leadership style should be displayed?***

As discussed in previous chapters (*see* Chapter 2 & 4), there are two main leadership styles that can be displayed in crisis situations: democratic and authoritarian. Democratic style is generally preferred by the staff because it enables them to participate in decision-making. However, as a participant (on anonymity) pointed out, this style may impede rapid decision making, and thus may give rise to less effective response (*see* also Uzun's explanations in Chapter 6). On the other hand, contrary to democratic style, authoritarian style is less preferred by the team members because it obstructs them to take part in

decision-making process. In fact, authoritarian leaders do not want to share the power with someone else. Nevertheless, as an interviewee mentioned, authoritarian leading style may affect crisis response efforts negatively because it may slow the operational team's working pace down (*see* also Giyik's explanations in Chapter 6). As can be seen from the discussions so far, both styles have a potential to reduce the effectiveness of crisis management process in different ways. In order to minimise the risk, it is, therefore, essential for public leaders to use both styles in different parts of the process. A participant, on anonymity, supports this point as follows:

... when making decisions a leader should show a participatory and democratic style. And later on, he should show an authoritarian attitude while implementing the decisions taken in this way. It's not a contradiction. I mean, he shouldn't compromise on the implementation of decisions. Flexibility in the implementation causes confusion and may cause different crisis. In addition, when the experts who were consulted while taking that decision see the compromise in the implementation of the decisions may be reluctant to contribute to the leader in a subsequent decision.

### **7.2.2.3. DECISION-MAKING**

By the definition given in the second chapter, a crisis is a situation which..., requires vital decisions to be made... It can be, therefore, claimed that there is a strong relationship between the effectiveness of a crisis management process and decision-making. Both successes and failures of crisis management are often related to decisions taken because management is nothing more than decision-making. One of

the participants, Nebi Tepe, the director of Social Solidarity Foundation, calls attention to the same rationale through his own definition on the term crisis management as follows: ‘We can define a crisis management process as an immediate and accurate decision-making process.’ Likewise, another participant (Mustafa Aygun, a senior public administrator that coped with several crises throughout his career), draws attention to the importance of decision-making under crisis conditions as follows:

Based on my experience, I can say that the most essential thing in crisis response is to take the right decision in the shortest time.

Hence, it can be claimed that indecision could lead to some serious management problems in crisis situations (for concrete examples *see* 6.3.4.3). On the other hand, as mentioned in 4.3.3, there are two basic models of decision making: the rational model and the bounded rationality model. According to rational model, individuals decide under certainty. They know their alternatives; they know their outcomes; they know their decision criteria; and they have the ability to make the optimum choice and then to implement it. Contrary to rationale model, bounded rationality model implies that decisions will always be based on an incomplete and, to some degree, inadequate comprehension of the true nature of the problem being faced. The second model is more fitted to crisis decision-making because - as a participant, on anonymity, pointed out - it is hard for individuals to reach all necessary data for making decision in crisis situations.

On the other hand, throughout the interviews, the participants pointed out a number of factors which are essential for making accurate and rapid decisions under crisis situations. One of them was having right decision-making criterion that enables crisis managers to make more accurate decisions and thus, to minimize the losses. The experience of a senior participant (Mustafa Aygün, Police Chief of Malatya) can make this point more obvious:

3000 protesters walked in Malatya to support last Gezi Park protests<sup>2</sup>. Although there were about 250 marginal people among them, we preferred to establish a dialogue with the protesters instead of using force to disperse them because we could not put all the protesters in the same basket with marginalized groups. I mean, according to our philosophy, even if there is only one innocent out of ten people in a ship, you cannot sink the ship. I knew if we used force, this marginalised group would have a chance to provoke others and thus, the problem would become more serious and complicated.

Another essential factor emphasised by the participants was experience. Experience is central to decision-making because individuals often tend to base their decisions on previous experiences

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<sup>2</sup> A wave of demonstrations and civil unrest in Turkey began on 28 May 2013, initially to contest the urban development plan for Istanbul's Taksim Gezi Park. The protests were sparked by outrage at the violent eviction of a sit-in at the park protesting the plan. Subsequently, supporting protests and strikes took place across Turkey. 3,5 million of Turkey's 80 million people were estimated to have taken an active part in almost 5000 demonstrations across the country connected with the original Gezi Park protest. 11 people were killed and more than 8000 were injured, and more than 3000 arrests were made. The overall absence of government dialogue with the protesters was criticised by some foreign countries and international institutions (en.m.wikipedia.org).

and memories in order to determine what to do in the current situation. Indeed, the information at the hand is usually interpreted in line with the previous experiences whether they are rational or irrational. Therefore, as a participant (Mehmed Aktaş, district governor), pointed out, it is essential for public institutions to have archives for decisions made in earlier crises. The participants also drew attention to the necessity of working with a small advisory group to make right decisions under crisis conditions. To illustrate, while a participant, on anonymity, put emphasis on this point by saying ‘Before deciding on a matter a leader should surely get the idea of the experts...’; another participant, Nureddin Dayan, district governor, emphasised this as follows:

...A leader who doesn’t consult when making decisions during a crisis is bound to lose no matter how strong he is.

### **Challenges to decision-making in crises**

#### ***Information Overload and Deficiency***

Both as stated in Chapter 2 & 4 and as seen in the case study (*see* the explanations of Dr. Ali Çiçeksay in 6.3.4.3), on the one hand, information overload is a crucial obstacle that impedes making right decisions under crisis conditions. A participant, on anonymity, draws attention to this point as below:

The most important factor that hampers making accurate decision in a crisis is information pollution. For example, information pollution

led to excessive use of force by police in the Gezi Park protests, and it has increased the severity of protests.

On the other hand, lack of essential information is another important barrier that impedes making accurate and rapid decisions under pressure. A practitioner calls attention to this as follows: ‘the most important reason for making wrong decisions in crisis is... and information shortage.’ As for the main reasons behind information shortage faced in crisis situations, they were discussed before (*see* 7.2.2.1).

### ***Worry of Accountability***

As seen in the case study in previous chapter (*see* the explanations of Yusuf Yuksel in 6.3.4.3), the concern of future inspection may also prevent individuals from making decisions in a crisis situation. The explanations of a participant, Abdullah Oztoprak, a mid level Turkish public manager, draw attention to this, as well: ‘...as a crisis manager, I may need to go beyond the routine and I may have to take non-routine, may be illegal decisions. However, I know that I will give an account for them in the future. Therefore, even though it’s necessary - I don’t make such risky decisions to manage the crisis. I mean I don’t take risk. You must take risk for crisis management, but the worry of accountability prevents you from taking this risk. However, it’s not easy to provide effectiveness in crisis management without taking risk. This is a serious dilemma.’

### *Other barriers*

The participants also drew attention to a number of obstacles such as stress, time pressure, powerful interest groups especially political parties, high level visits to the crisis region, being unable to analyse internal and external developments, and so on.

#### **7.2.2.4. MANAGING THE PUBLIC'S PERCEPTION**

As mentioned in previous chapters (*see 2.5 & 3.2.8 & 4.3.4*), managing the public's perception (crisis communication) has a considerable impact on the success of a crisis management process because it refers to attempts to direct people's beliefs and expectations about the situation, attempts to shape the agenda within the situation, attempts to influence the public's understanding of the crisis, and attempts to reduce the public and political uncertainty caused by the crisis itself. Crisis communication is crucial due to the fact that how the public see the crisis response is more important than crisis response itself. It is vital to communicate with the public within crisis situations because crises produce a strong demand from citizens especially from stakeholders to learn what is going on and to ascertain what they can do to protect their own interests. For this reason, as a policy maker - on anonymity - stated, crisis managers should communicate with the public in particular with the victims and their relatives without delay in the wake of a crisis.

The participants also stated that communicating with the media has a significant role in crisis communication, and therefore it has a

considerable impact on the success of a crisis management process due to a few reasons. To begin, communicating with the media proactively can prevent the media and public from obtaining wrong information from some informal sources. Public authorities' using the media properly and effectively can prevent information pollution. This is very important point because - as mentioned in previous section - information pollution has a potential to deepen crises through leading to wrong action and gossips etc. In addition, communicating with the media enables crisis managers to repair their own images. Apart from using the media, the participants also drew attention to a number of crucial factors that have an influence on crisis communication such as social media networks, honesty and credibility, preparedness, getting accurate and coherent information, and speaking with one voice, and so on.

## **Crucial Factors for Crisis Communication**

### ***Social Media Networks***

In this age of instant communication and rapid information flow, communicating through the social media networks during crisis situations is also critical because the people affected by a crisis do not just receive information; they also send it through these networks. To expand, thanks to the social media services like Twitter and Facebook, the people in a disaster zone have a chance to post real-time information, to post and tweet the messages about their urgent needs. A participant, on anonymity, points out this as follows: ‘...not only the victims but also crisis managers can actively utilise the social media

networks in order to call for help, to inform others about the tragedy they faced in the wake of a natural disaster...’. Nevertheless, there is a fact that the social media networks can sometimes turn into a very hazardous instrument during a crisis situation. The explanations of a participant, Mehmed Aktaş, District Governor, can make this point more obvious:

...If we consider the reality that the people met on social media platforms before on the streets in the recent crisis (Gezi Park protests), we can realise much better that how the social media might sometimes become a threat to the public order...

### ***Honesty and Credibility***

Honesty is really the best policy in crisis communication. Public authorities do not have to tell the public and media everything they know, but everything they say must be accurate. Such honesty, in the long term, fosters credibility which is another essential factor for effective communication. Credibility is crucial for effective communication because messages that lack credibility are likely to be ignored. Therefore, during the initial phase of an event, response organizations need to take steps to establish their credibility. It should, however, be kept in mind that organizations that fail to develop credible, trusting relationships with the public before a crisis are likely to fail to do so during the crisis. One of the participants, Mustafa Aygün, Police Chief, draws attention to this point as follows: ‘Administrators should have been able to establish constructive

relations with the citizens in normal times to manage their perception in crisis times.’

### ***Preparedness***

Once a crisis emerged, response organisations are literally overtaken by events, as well as by the fact that in most cases the mass media’s initial responses are much quicker and more powerful in terms of generating images of the situation for mass consumption (‘t Hart, 1993), and thus, they easily fall into a reactive mode “fire-fighting”, which causes them to lose both track of the big picture and control over crisis communication (Boin et al, 2005). Hence, response organisations should prepare specific messages that range in scope from minimal risk to the worst-case scenario before a crisis occurred. Otherwise, they are likely to lack time to prepare for informing the public and the media about the situation, and thus lose speed and coherence in communication. Such communication failures are likely to make the situation worse and to negatively affect the stakeholders’ perception about the situation and how it is being managed. A participant, Abdullah Oztoprak, points out this as follows:

The messages should not be spontaneous; because the messages given unconsidered, unplanned may cause another crisis.

### ***Getting Accurate and Coherent Information***

Crisis situations have a potential to produce a variety of inaccurate and inconsistent data. As Durodié and Wessely (2002) emphasised, the release of wrong and incoherent information has the potential to

increase levels of demoralisation, and can lead to misunderstanding, suspicion, and resistance to future warnings that ultimately inhibit relief efforts. Therefore, getting accurate and coherent information is essential for effective communication with the public during crisis situations. A senior participant, M. Niyazi Tanılır, Former Undersecretary of Public Order and Security Institution, Current Ambassador of Turkey to Montenegro, calls attention to this point, as well: ‘Crisis managers need to get right information in order to establish good communication with the public.’

### ***Speaking with one voice***

Informing the public through a single authority during a crisis situation is vital since it prevents information overload (*see* also Özdemir’s explanations in 6.3.4.4). Speaking with one voice has a considerable impact on the success of crisis communication because it enhances the probability of consistent messages and - as a senior policy maker (Ulvi Saran, Undersecretary of Public Order and Security Institution) cited - ‘reduces the confusion during the crisis response.’

### ***Other Factors***

The participants also drew attention to a number of factors that have an influence on crisis communication. To illustrate, while some pointed out the necessity of establishing professional public relations units in the public institutions, some called attention to the necessity

of benefiting from community leaders for being able to establish good rapport with the people - in particular - with the stakeholders.

### **7.2.2.5. MANAGING THE FEELINGS**

The unexpected, uncontrollable, and destructive nature of crises makes people lose their sense of safety and then provoke their some emotional reactions such as fear, stress; worry, anxiety, and panic etc. (*see* also 6.3.4.5). On the other hand, as mentioned in the fourth chapter, different emotional reactions to different crises depend on the stakeholder's perception about what caused the crisis, the degree of violence it produced, and the extent to which the victim was involved with its effects. These emotional reactions cannot be ignored because they have a potential to produce some negative consequences which make the crisis response more difficult. To give a number of examples, fear that comes out during a crisis impairs individuals' ability to act decisively. Similarly, stress that often follows crises damages individuals' ability to make consistent decisions and adversely affects performance in circumstances that demand high levels of attention and creative solutions to emergency problems (for further *see* 4.3.5). Therefore, as most of the participants cited, it is hard to be successful in a crisis management process without coping with these emotional reactions. Nevertheless, as a participant (Abdullah Öztoprak) pointed out, it is not easy to deal with these emotions under crisis conditions.

### *What to do to cope with feelings in crises?*

During the interviews, most of the participants drew attention to the things which are essential to cope with emotional reactions. To give a number of examples, while a high-ranking participant, Vasip Şahin, Current Istanbul Governor, pointed out the both the necessity of reaching accurate information and the need of establishing good rapport with the community beforehand; a mid level participant, Nureddin Dayan, district governor, pointed out the necessity of analysing the factors that mobilise individual emotions. Likewise, while a participant, Latif Memiş, deputy governor, drew attention to the need of employing some experts such as psychologists and sociologists; another participant, Erdinç Filiz, civil inspector, drew attention to the need of a strong response to the crisis. Furthermore, while Mehmed Aktaş, district governor, called attention to the necessity of displaying a peaceful style to the stakeholders; Latif Memiş pointed out the necessity of repairing broken glasses, detached sidewalks that trigger vandalism immediately. Let me finish this section with a senior participant's (Mustafa Aygun, Police Chief) noteworthy comments:

Public authorities cannot manage but suppress the emotions because they have to take side. Therefore, public authorities should make use of public opinion leaders who can take the pulse of the community, and know the social fabric. Also, they must investigate the ways of walking with the protesters side by side. Walking side by side reduces the perceived speed. If you

antagonize them, the speed is doubled and there is a risk of collision.

#### **7.2.2.6. MANAGING THE AGENDA**

Managing a crisis requires dealing with all the issues that emerged during the crisis. Indeed, crisis management is nothing more than managing the issues on the crisis agenda. Managing the agenda during crises requires crisis managers to take a proactive approach towards key target publics and the mass media. Otherwise, as a participant, on anonymity, stated, the public and media are likely to control the agenda. As for the most important thing which is essential for managing the agenda during crises, it is - as a participant, on anonymity, cited - ‘to work out the issues composing the crisis agenda as soon as possible.’ In other words, a rapid and accurate response is the finest way of controlling the crisis agenda. Let me finish this section with the comments of a participant, (Abdullah Öztoprak, deputy governor) on the subject:

Managing the agenda is very important during crisis. But the methods and techniques used in agenda management may vary according to the type and severity of the crisis. For example, to inform the victims of a natural disaster about how to sustain their lives may be sufficient to manage the agenda. So you cannot manipulate the agenda much in natural disasters. But leaders can manipulate the agenda easily in some kind of crises resulted from protest, riot etc. Also, techniques for managing the agenda may differ according to stages of a crisis. I mean the techniques used in the acute phase of a crisis may be different from ones in the post-crisis stage.

### **7.2.3. Discussing Evaluation Phase Tasks**

To remind, according to the synthesis, there are two main tasks to be performed in evaluation phase: managing the blame and learning from crisis. Here the importance of these two tasks and the main obstacles that impede to perform them will be discussed in the framework of the findings getting from the interviews with the Turkish public authorities.

#### **7.2.3.1. MANAGING THE BLAME**

As mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, in the wake of a crisis the public opinion, the mass media, and political opponents tend to examine the crisis management performance of incumbents. They want to know what went wrong, what was (not) done to prevent and contain the crisis, and who should be held responsible. Indeed, once a crisis emerged, public authorities are generally accused for causing the crisis, failing to prevent it, or inadequately responding to it (*see* also 6.3.5.1). Managing the accusations is, therefore, another essential task to be performed by public authorities in a crisis situation that often provides an attack on their credibility for public and the media. Managing the blame during crises is crucial since it enables public authorities to continue their legitimacy through repairing their images. Managing the blame is vital because - as a participant (on anonymity) stated - ‘...if public managers fail to cope with the accusations, some new crises are likely to become unavoidable and thus, the situation is likely to become more unmanageable.’

## **Blame Management Strategies**

### ***Inquiry***

As mentioned in the fourth chapter, public authorities can set up an inquiry in order to cope with the accusations directed against them in the wake of a crisis. Such a move is practical because good practice in crisis management requires investigation into what went wrong and then a process of learning and reform to reduce vulnerabilities in the future. This strategy, however, has not been preferred much in the Turkish public sector because - as a high-ranking participant (Vasip Şahin, Istanbul Governor) cited - it requires the public authorities to be transparent.

### ***Apology***

Apology is another instrument that can be used for managing the blame. As mentioned before, a timely and sincere admission of responsibility by a governmental body with a willingness to undertake corrective action can expedite the public institution's effort to rebuild its legitimacy (*see* 4.4.1.2). However, as a participant (Abdullah Oztoprak) pointed out, apology of a public authority will not be enough if its mistake leads to serious losses and destruction. Let me finish this section with a participant's (on anonymity) noteworthy comments on the topic:

...apology may eliminate the crisis or; at least may reduce its severity... but because we don't have apology culture, sometimes very small crises grow and deepen. On the other

hand, there is a belief in the Turkish society such like: “If a leader makes a mistake, that’s due to the people who inform him wrong.” Because of this belief, the society expects a leader to punish those around him - in one aspect, the scapegoat- instead of his apology. I think, therefore, apology mechanisms do not have a proper function in the Turkish public sector.

### 7.2.3.2. LEARNING FROM CRISIS

Managing a crisis also requires learning what went wrong. Therefore, learning from crisis was studied as a crucial component of a crisis management process in various crisis management models such as Mitroff’s five - staged model, Augustine’s six-staged model, Boin,‘t Hart, Stern and Sundelius’ five staged model etc. (*see* Chapter 3). Learning plays a major role for the success of crisis management because it enables both individuals and organisations to improve their problem solving capacities, to reduce the personal and organizational weaknesses, to increase communication with stakeholders, and to find ways to speed up the decision making processes, and so on. Crisis-induced learning is important because - as a participant (Abdülmuttalip Aksoy, civil inspector) cited - it makes public authorities more prepared for future crises, and thus prevents them from making (same) mistakes while responding these crises.

#### **Why Turkish public authorities cannot learn from crises?**

The participants drew attention to a number of barriers that prevent the Turkish public authorities from drawing lessons from crises as follows:

***Forgetfulness: weakness of individual and institutional memory***

During the interviews, most of the participants put emphasis on forgetfulness as the main factor that prevents the Turkish public authorities from learning from crises. To give a number of example, while a senior policy maker, Seyfullah Hacımüftüoğlu, Undersecretary of the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs, called attention to this point by saying ‘We don’t draw lessons from the crisis, because we forget...Unless we change our mentality as a whole... we will continue to lose’; Abdullah Oztoprak, pointed out that by saying ‘We cannot learn from crises as our social and institutional memory is very weak. In other words, we, both society and public institutions, forget crises we experienced very easily, and thus we make the same mistakes many times.’ Another participant, on anonymity, ironically drew attention to the same point:

As Turkish public authorities, in the wake of a disaster we classically say: ‘*wounds will be bandaged urgently.*’ But, to be honest, we don’t know what to do; we don’t know how to achieve that because we have neither a plan nor a system... The worse, as we have forgotten what we experienced, what we did during the disaster, a few years later a new disaster catches us unprepared again, and - once more - we don’t know what to do but to say our motto: ‘*wounds will be bandaged urgently.*’

***No feedback***

As mentioned before, crisis induced learning is a dynamic and interactive process, which requires both individuals and organisations to receive feedback from people particularly from the stakeholders. A

participant (on anonymity) pointed out the main reasons why the Turkish public authorities cannot receive feedback as follows:

...some Turkish public authorities miss the opportunity to get feedback in the evaluation phase because - first of all - they underestimate the ordinary people's views. More importantly, they see criticism as a potential threat to their career.

### *Nature of Human Memory*

It is obvious that there is a close relationship between learning and human memory. Indeed, learning is nothing more than storing information in the memory. Therefore, the nature of human memory has a considerable impact on learning from crisis. One of the most important characteristics of human memory is that it has a tendency to store good things rather than bad ones, and thus, individuals often fail to learn from crises. A participant, Yusuf Yüksel, a policy maker at national level, draws attention to this point as below:

Human memory is re-constructive and selective. I mean it prefers to forget bad things. Therefore, we often fail to draw lessons from crises.

### *Hostility to the old & Lack of analysis skills*

Another participant, Mehmed Aktaş, district governor, put emphasis on the different reasons why the Turkish authorities cannot learn from crises:

Among the main factors that prevent us to draw lessons from crises, we can count..., destroying all the old stuff with the

conviction that new is always better, ...growing the generations with lack of the ability to analyze events.

### **7.3. Lessons provided by the interviewees**

This section will draw attention to the lessons provided by the participants in relation to both my framework and the main challenges to crisis management practices in the public sector.

#### *Lessons on planning and preparation for future crises*

The findings getting from the interviews with the policy makers showed that planning and preparation for potential crises have a great impact on the success of a crisis management process because a well-prepared contingency plan provides an organized command structure to control the situation and enables to minimise crisis damage to both individuals and organisations. The findings also revealed that although planning for future crises in preparation phase should be an essential element of institutional and policy toolkits, it is hard to translate this ideal into practice due to a number of barriers. In fact, there are a number factors that make planning and preparation for possible crises difficult, and decrease the efficiency of contingency plans such as nature of crisis, multiplicity of crisis types, narrow perspective on crisis preparation etc. To expand, it is very hard to make an effective plan for a potential crisis because - first of all - it is too hard to exactly predict what will happen, what we will face once a crisis occurs. Secondly, there are lots of crisis types and the nature of each crisis is different. More importantly, crisis preparation is not given enough

importance in the public sector; no sufficient budget for planning and preparation for potential crises have been allocated since its positive consequences cannot be seen in the short term. In fact, public authorities have a narrow perspective on crisis preparation.

*Lessons on detecting a crisis in advance*

The interviews revealed that - first of all - if public authorities fail in predicting a crisis in advance it will be more difficult for them to effectively deal with the crisis situation. Secondly, most crises emerge from an aggregation of various internal and external factors, and thus, correctly analysing the relationships between these factors is essential to detect an upcoming crisis. In other words, early detection requires public authorities to have the ability to analyse internal and external developments that lead to crises. In fact, they need to see the big picture in the small parts. In addition, excessive workload and drowning in daily routines are the most important obstacles that hamper to foresee crises in advance. In fact, as long as the public authorities' agenda is overcrowded with daily matters, they are unlikely to be successful in detecting an upcoming crisis.

*Lessons on organising crisis response efforts*

We learnt that one of the most important factors affecting the success of a crisis management process is to provide coordination between official, private and volunteer organizations taking part in the response efforts. In other words, the success of a crisis management process is centred on coordinating the efforts of several organisations from

different sectors. We learnt that unless an incident command system is used during a crisis response, disorganisations are likely to be unavoidable. There are also a number of crucial reasons behind disorganisations faced during crisis responses. To begin, response agencies taking part in a crisis management process may prefer working within their own rules and hierarchy, and may not accept to be an object of a common structure. Secondly, there is no information sharing among institutions or individuals taking part in a crisis response due to lack of trust among them. In addition, the visits of high-level government officials particularly ministers to a disaster region within the first hours after the disaster, the staff affected by the disaster, lack of experienced and qualified staff are the other factors that bring about disorganisations during a crisis response.

#### *Lessons on crisis leadership*

The explanations of the policy makers indicated first of all, leadership is the most important function for the success of a crisis management process because all the management functions like organizing, planning, controlling etc. make sense with leadership. In fact, all these functions are shaped in the hands of a leader. Secondly, crisis leadership is crucial because a leader has a potential to deepen a crisis by his behaviours and attitudes. Thirdly, unless there is a specific system or a crisis management model used, leadership is likely to gain more importance than it has deserved. In fact, if there is no corporate structure, success in crisis management practices naturally depends on individuals rather than teamwork. Fourthly, unless there are

experienced and qualified personnel in the public institutions or around leaders, everything will naturally be anticipated from leaders once a crisis occurs. In fact, a leader will be seen as a saviour. Fifthly, it is essential that public managers be given a chance to make their own teams during a crisis response. Sixthly, as a crisis usually emerges with little warning, provokes individual emotions, requires vital decisions to be made under pressure, and sets a new agenda, crisis leadership requires having a variety of competencies such as empathy, sincerity, self-awareness, thinking paradoxically, being able to be calm under pressure, flexible, rational, being capable of rapid decision-making, teamwork and communication skills, and so on. More importantly, crisis leadership requires taking into consideration the culture and values of the stakeholders because people detect events and form attitudes against these events under the influence of the society in which they live. Finally, it is essential for a leader to display both leadership styles (democratic and authoritarian) during a crisis response.

#### *Lessons on decision making in crises*

I have learnt that there is a strong relationship between the effectiveness of a crisis management process and decision-making because crisis management process is nothing more than decision-making process. In relation to crisis decision-making, there are also a number of lessons that I have drawn from the interviews with the policy makers. To begin, it is hard for individuals to reach all necessary data for making decision in crisis situations. In other words,

one of the most important reasons for making wrong decisions in crises is information shortage. Likewise, it is hard to decide under crisis conditions due to information pollution. Thirdly, having right decision-making criterion enables crisis managers to make more accurate decisions and thus, to minimize the losses. Fourthly, as people have a tendency to base their decisions on previous experiences and memories, it is essential for public institutions to have achieves for decisions made in past crises. Fifthly, no matter how powerful a leader is, he is bound to lose unless he consults when making decisions during a crisis. Furthermore, in order to be able to make fast decisions, public managers who take part in a crisis response should be confident about the inspectors' positive and reasonable approach during the investigation in post crisis period. Otherwise, the concern for future inspection is likely to prevent them from making some critical decisions during the crisis response.

#### *Lessons on crisis communication*

The explanations of the participants showed that - first of all - it is essential for public authorities to communicate with the people in particular with the victims and their relatives without delay in the wake of a crisis. Secondly, communicating with the media has a significant role in crisis communication because it prevents information pollution that has a potential to deepen crises through leading to wrong action. Thirdly, even though the people in a disaster zone have a chance to post real-time information, to post and tweet the

messages about their urgent needs thanks to the social media services like Twitter and Facebook, these networks have a potential to make the situation more complicated, to deepen the crisis. Fourthly, public administrators who established good rapport with the public before crises are likely to become more successful in crisis communication. Fifthly, the messages given by the public institutions during a crisis response should not be spontaneous. Sixthly, it is essential for the governmental bodies to employ professional public relations teams and qualified spokespersons. Seventhly, establishing good communication with the public during crisis situations requires public authorities to get accurate data. Moreover, speaking with one voice in a crisis situation is crucial because it reduces information overload and confusion. Finally, benefiting from community leaders enables public officials to communicate with the victims and their relatives more effectively.

#### *Lessons on feelings management*

I have learnt that although managing the feelings during a crisis situation is a big challenge, it is a key task due to the fact that crisis management is a human-intensive practice and human is surrounded by a variety of feelings such as fear, anxiety, stress, and panic, and so on. It is, therefore, hard to be successful in a crisis management process without taking into account individual emotions. I have also learnt that coping with emotional reactions during crises requires public authorities to reach accurate information, to establish good rapport with the public, to analyse the factors that mobilise emotional

reactions, to employ some experts such as psychologists and sociologists, to display a peaceful approach to the stakeholders, to remove the factors (such as broken glasses, detached sidewalks etc.) that trigger vandalism without delay, and to benefit from community leaders, and so on.

#### *Lessons on managing the agenda*

The interviews revealed that - first of all - managing the agenda is very important during a crisis because crisis management is nothing more than managing the issues on the crisis agenda. Secondly, managing the crisis agenda requires public managers to take a proactive approach towards the public and the mass media. Otherwise, the agenda is likely to be controlled by the public and media. Thirdly, the most important thing which is essential for managing the crisis agenda is to work out the issues on the agenda immediately. In other words, a rapid and accurate response is the finest way of controlling the crisis agenda. Furthermore, agenda management techniques may vary according to the type and stages of a crisis.

#### *Lessons on managing the blame*

The comments of the participants showed that - first of all - if public managers fail to cope with the accusations in the wake of a crisis, some new crises in the crisis are likely to become unavoidable and thus, the situation is likely to become more complicated. Secondly, public authorities can set up an inquiry in order to cope with the accusations directed against them following a crisis. Such a move can

be practical as good practice in crisis management requires investigation into what went wrong. Public authorities, however, may not prefer this strategy because it requires them to be transparent. On the other hand, they can apologise for the mistakes. Apology may eliminate the crisis or; at least may reduce its severity. Nevertheless, public leaders may not prefer using this strategy if there is a belief in the society such like leaders do not make a mistake but they are forced to do by their followers. More importantly, if apology mechanisms do not have a proper function in the public sector, many small crises grow and deepen.

#### *Lessons on crisis-induced learning*

The interviews have revealed that crisis-induced learning is crucial because it makes public institutions more prepared for potential crises, and thus prevents these organisations from making the same mistakes in future responses. The participants also drew attention to some crucial points. First of all, public organisations cannot be good at learning from crises unless they have strong institutional memories. Secondly, as long as public officials see criticism as a potential threat to their own career, they do not want to get feedback in the evaluation phase; and thus, they are likely to miss the chance to learn from crises. Thirdly, as human memory usually prefers to forget bad things, individuals often fail to draw lessons from crises. In addition, both destroying all the old things with the conviction that new is always better and lack of analysis skills are the other two key factors that prevent people from drawing lessons from crises.

To conclude, according to the policy makers' judgments, all the tasks in the synthesis are crucial to efficiently cope with crises but there are various barriers such as (having narrow perspective on crisis preparation, information overload and deficiency, reluctance to share information, not speaking with one voice, defensive behavioural tendencies, and worry of accountability, and so on) that hamper doing these tasks in the public sector. Unless these barriers are removed, it is hard for public organisations to effectively deal with crises. In other words, unless these obstacles are removed, crises are likely to continue to challenge public institutions in future.

The main challenges that have been explored so far can be summarised in a table (Table 7-1) as below:

**Table 7-1** Main barriers to effectiveness of crisis management practices in the public sector

<b>Barriers to crisis planning and preparation</b>	Nature of crisis
	Multiplicity of crisis types
	Narrow perspective on crisis preparation, and thus not allocating budget for crisis preparation
<b>Barriers to early detection</b>	Confining the concept of crisis in only natural disasters
	Not being able to analyse cause-effect relationship between the events (not being able to see the big picture)
	Excessive workload and drowning in daily routines

<b>Barriers to organising crisis response efforts</b>	Network diversity
	Reluctance to share information various organisations working in their own hierarchical structure
	High-level visits to disaster area
	impractical contingency plans
	inexperienced and unskilled staff taking part in crisis response
<b>Barriers to crisis decision-making</b>	Information pollution
	Information shortage
	Not having right decision-making criterion
	Lack of experience
	Worry of accountability
	Stress, time pressure
	Pressure from powerful interest groups
	being unable to analyse internal and external developments
<b>Barriers to crisis communication</b>	Lack of credibility
	Dishonesty
	spontaneous messages (unpreparedness) Not having good relations with community leaders
<b>Barriers to crisis communication</b>	Not being able to reach accurate information
	Not speaking with one voice
	Ignoring individual emotional reactions
<b>Barriers to managing the blame</b>	Lack of transparency
	Forgetfulness: weakness of individual and institutional memory

<b>Barriers to learning from crisis</b>	Wrong perspective on criticism (defensive behavioural tendencies)
	Unwillingness to receive feedback
	Hostility to the old

#### **7.4. Lessons drawn by the researcher**

Planning involves organizing and making as many decisions as possible before a crisis actually occurs, and thus forces organisations to predict potential crises. Even though it is hard to completely predict all the types of crisis an institution may face, it is possible to forecast their potential common results such as emergence of the need of housing, food, and medical services, and so on. Therefore, instead of making a specific plan for each type of crisis, it can be more practical to make a generic plan to meet these needs that usually emerge in the wake natural disasters.

Planning and preparation for possible crises place large demands on resources. However, expenditures made for planning for possible crises in Turkey is regarded as unnecessary because its positive consequences cannot be seen in the short term. Hence, it is essential for Turkish public authorities to change their approaches to crisis preparation. It is also essential for planners to consider both short-term and long-term results of each decision that will be made during a crisis response because although a decision is practical in the short term, it may lead to some new problems in the long term.

The most important aim of crisis management is to detect a crisis in advance. It is, therefore, essential for public authorities to increase their capacity of crisis sense-making. There can be lots of ways of raising the crisis sense-making capacity but - without doubt - the most important one is to remove the barriers that hamper detecting crises before they occur. Secondly, individuals in a public institution should be encouraged to share information because - as Boin et al (2005) stated - the signals of an approaching crisis are likely to come into very different corners of the institution that do not share information. Thirdly, it is essential to read human behaviour accurately because most crises are resulted from human behaviours. Furthermore, detecting future crises requires combating with human nature since it has a tendency to see only positive things, and prefers focusing on the moment available rather than the future not in hand. More importantly, as stated by Boin et al (2005), it is crucial for public authorities to be alert to what has been omitted by their advisers. In other words, they need to go beyond the information given.

It is understood that success of crisis management process is centred on coordinating the efforts of various response organisations from different sectors. The research revealed that most coordination issues are resulted from the unwillingness of some response agencies to communicate and share information with others even in the wake of a disaster. The most important reason why response agencies do not communicate and share information with each other is lack of trust among them. It is, therefore, vital to establish trust between

responders beforehand. Establishing trust between response agencies is essential because it also makes easier for them to adopt to become an object of a common system, and thus, facilitates the assignment of responsibilities during the crisis response.

The research showed that leading is one of the most important tasks to be performed during a crisis response because - as Boin et al (2005) emphasised – people have a natural tendency in a crisis situation to look to leaders to do something. Leadership is crucial because all management functions such as planning, organising etc. are shaped in the hands of a leader. Crisis leadership requires having various skills such as empathy, being visible, serving to the public, reliability, acting responsibly, self-denial, being flexible, making hard decisions under pressure etc. More importantly, a leader should not lose his control during a crisis response because if the public notice the leader's crisis-induced tension it will be more difficult for him to control the situation.

On the other hand, there is a very close link between effectiveness of a crisis management process and decision-making. Indeed, crisis management is nothing more than decision-making. In order to make fast and accurate decisions during a crisis situation, public authorities should - first of all – benefit from past experiences as much as possible because experience is central to decision-making. Secondly, they should give the priority to human life while making decision. Thirdly, public authorities should consider the type of crisis. Indeed, it is essential for them to choose decision-making strategies appropriate

for the type of crisis. Furthermore, they should abandon their individual concerns and interests while making decision. More importantly, it is essential that decisions be taken by local authorities because they are aware of the conditions in the region; they know the sensitivity of the local people.

Once a crisis emerged, response agencies are likely to be overtaken by events. Therefore, as Heide (1989) pointed out, they should prepare specific messages that range in scope from minimal risk to the worst-case scenario before a crisis occurred. Otherwise, they are likely to lack time to prepare for informing the public and the media about the situation, and thus lose speed and coherence in communication. It should be kept in mind that public authorities do not have to tell the public everything they know, but everything they say should be accurate. Such honesty, in the long term, increases credibility which is another essential factor for effective crisis communication.

By the definition given in Chapter 2, crises put people under immense pressure and provoke emotional reactions. The unexpected, uncontrollable, and destructive nature of a crisis makes people lose their sense of safety and then triggers various feelings such as fear, stress, worry, anxiety, and panic, and so on. During a crisis, disregarding these emotional reactions is likely to cause a chain reaction of new crises. Managing emotions is a kind of communication activity, and thus, listening and understanding the stakeholders in a crisis situation are very important. If a crisis manager does not try to understand what they said, it is hard for him to cope

with their emotions. As for the most influential strategy for coping with emotional reactions that emerged in the wake of a crisis situation, it is - without doubt – giving a strong and effective response to the crisis.

Crisis is the situation which sets a new agenda for both individuals and organisations to manage. Crises in particular catastrophic ones such as natural disasters put new issues on agendas such as search and rescue, shelter, potable water, relief supplies, mass medical attention, etc. concerning hundreds of people. Managing a crisis requires public authorities to work out these issues as soon as possible. Indeed, crisis management is nothing more than managing the issues on the crisis agenda.

Crises provide opportunities to draw lessons for improving future crisis responses. There are a number of essential things to be done to in order to increase crisis-induced learning capacity. First of all, it is essential for public authorities to give up denying responsibility for the mistakes they made during crisis situations. It is also essential for them to give up blaming others. Last but not least, public authorities should avoid some opportunist behavioural tendencies (i.e. exaggerating their role in the success of the crisis management process) which inhibit learning from crises (Stern, 2000).

### **7.5. Summary**

The main aim of this chapter was to reflect the viewpoints of a number of Turkish policy makers on both the synthesis and the main

challenges to crisis management practices in the public sector. In fact, the chapter aimed to discuss the importance of the tasks in the synthesis and tried to find out the main obstacles that hamper to perform these tasks in the public sector through the findings getting from the interviews with a number of policy makers at national level such as undersecretaries, chairmen of some boards and departments, and civil inspectors, governors, deputy governors, and district governors, and so on. The chapter was based on the main three sections. In the first section, the synthesis was discussed through the views of various policy makers. In the second section, the lessons provided by the policy-makers in relation to both the researcher's synthesis and the main challenges to crisis management practices in the public sector were given. As for the last section, it pointed out the lessons drawn by the researcher.

## 8. CONCLUSIONS

Although crisis is often defined as a negative phenomenon, it also represents some opportunities for organisations - in particular - for public ones. Crises are source of lessons for planning and preparation for future crises. As Boin & 't Hart (2003) emphasise, crises are opportunities to study the performance of public institutions under extreme conditions. In their enormity, ambiguity, and sensitivity, crises threaten the status quo and delegitimize the policies and institutions underpinning the status quo (Cortell & Peterson, 1999). More importantly, as Boin et al (2005) point out, political learning and change processes which take place at a slower rate under normal circumstances may be radically accelerated under crisis conditions because the normal inertia and resistance to change is often overcome by societal and political dynamics. It is, however, clear that turning crises into opportunities for public institutions depends on managing them effectively and properly. Therefore, the research aimed to examine the key factors that influence effectiveness of a crisis management process in public sector. To achieve this aim, two research questions were formulated: Firstly, *'what are the key tasks that influence the effectiveness of a crisis management process in public sector?'* Secondly, *'from the public sector perspective, what are the main barriers to an effective crisis management process? In other words, why do crises challenge public institutions?'*

In order to deal with the first research question, the researcher focused on some major models that handled crisis management as a process.

Focusing on various crisis management models revealed that although a crisis management process had been divided into various stages and these stages had been identified in different ways in these models, it was possible to symbolize a crisis management process by the major three phases: preparation, management, and evaluation. It was also revealed that while preparation phase was often related to dealing with issues such as planning, training, mitigation, avoiding the crisis, and recognising a crisis (sense making), and so on; management phase was generally associated with dealing with issues such as coordinating crisis response efforts, damage containment, containing the crisis, deciding critical response choices and their implementation, leading, and communicating with the stakeholders (meaning making) etc. Likewise, evaluation phase was mostly related to the accountability process which includes managing the accusations, and assessing the crisis management process for lessons. Therefore, the researcher developed a synthesis of the key tasks that influence the effectiveness of a crisis management process based *mainly* on these models (*see* 3.4). The synthesis was based on three stages and included a number of tasks for each phase: planning for possible crises and detecting an upcoming crisis in preparation phase; organising, leading, decision-making, managing the public's perception, managing emotions (included by the researcher), and managing the agenda (included by the researcher) in management phase; managing the blame and learning from crisis in evaluation phase.

After developing the synthesis, the researcher focused on exploring potentials and limitations of the tasks in the synthesis. Indeed, he focused on questioning why and / or to what extent these tasks have the potential to influence the effectiveness of a crisis management process, and examining the main obstacles that hamper performing these tasks in order to address the second research question about the main barriers to an effective crisis management process. To achieve this, following a thorough literature review, on the one hand, the crisis management process experienced after the Van Earthquake that occurred in 2011 in Turkey was studied as a case. The researcher preferred a natural disaster to study as a case because natural disasters have common characteristics of crises such as uncertainty, unexpected threats, high level of anxiety on the side of policy-makers, the probability of violence, the assumption that crucial and immediate decisions need to be taken under the pressure and existence of incomplete information, a stressful environment, and time limitation. On the other hand, a series of interviews with some Turkish policy makers such as undersecretaries, chairmen of some boards and departments, and civil inspectors, governors, deputy governors, and district governors etc. were conducted. In fact, after testing how the synthesis worked in an actual crisis management process and searching the main barriers in a real process; the researcher re-tested the synthesis and examined the main challenges to crisis management practices through the findings getting from the interviews with a number of public figures that make the crisis management policies in Turkey.

To summarise the findings;

*Planning for possible crises* has a great impact on the success of a crisis management process because a well-prepared contingency plan provides an organized command structure to control the situation and enables to minimise crisis damage to both individuals and organisations. Planning has a potential to increase the chance of an effective crisis response as it prevents disorganization, confusion and delays in response efforts (i.e. search and rescue services), and thus, minimises the loss of life. Therefore, planning for future crises in preparation phase should be an essential element of institutional and policy toolkits. It is, however, hard to translate this ideal into practice due to a number of barriers such as nature of crisis, multiplicity of crisis types, narrow perspective on crisis preparation etc. To expand, it is very hard to make an effective plan for a potential crisis because - first of all - it is too hard to exactly predict what will happen, what we will face once a crisis occurs. Secondly, there are lots of crisis types and the nature of each crisis is different. More importantly, crisis preparation is not given enough importance in the public sector; no sufficient budget for planning and preparation for potential crises have been allocated because its positive consequences cannot be seen in the short term. In truth, the governmental bodies have a narrow perspective on crisis preparation.

An ultimate objective of crisis management is to forestall a crisis; or - at least - to lessen its negative outcomes, and *early detection* has a potential to prevent most crises or - at least - to cope with them more

effectively if it is accompanied by a will to address the issues they represent. Most crises emerge from an aggregation of various internal and external factors, and thus, correctly analysing the relationships between these factors is essential to detect an upcoming crisis. In other words, early detection requires public authorities to have the ability to analyse internal and external developments that lead to crises. Indeed, they need to see the big picture in the small parts. However, excessive workload and drowning in daily routines often obstruct them to analyse internal and external developments that lead to crises. Public agencies often fail to detect crises in advance because the signals come into their different parts that do not share information or use different languages.

Another important task that influences the effectiveness of a crisis management process is to provide *coordination* between official, private and volunteer organizations taking part in the response efforts. Indeed, the success of a crisis management process is centred on coordinating the efforts of these several organisations from different sectors. On the other hand, there are a number of crucial reasons behind disorganisations faced during crisis responses. First of all, some response agencies taking part in a crisis response may prefer working within their own rules and hierarchy, and may not accept to be an object of a common structure. More importantly, there is no information sharing among institutions or individuals taking part in a crisis response due to lack of trust among them. As for the other crucial factors that cause disorganisations during a crisis response,

they are the visits of high-level government officials particularly ministers to a disaster region within the first hours after the disaster, the staff affected by the disaster, experienced and qualified staff shortage.

*Leadership* is the most important function for the success of a crisis management process because all the management functions such as organizing, planning are shaped in the hands of a leader. Crisis leadership is crucial because a leader has a potential to deepen a crisis by his behaviours and attitudes. In relation to crisis leadership, there are also a number of key findings. First of all, unless there is a specific system or a crisis management model used, leadership is likely to gain more importance than it has deserved. In other words, if there is no corporate structure, success in crisis management practices obviously depends on individuals rather than teamwork. Secondly, unless there are experienced and qualified personnel in the public institutions or around leaders, everything will be anticipated from leaders once a crisis occurs. A leader is likely to be seen as a rescuer. Thirdly, it is essential that public managers have a chance to make their own teams during a crisis response. In addition, as a crisis usually emerges with little warning, provokes individual emotions, requires vital decisions to be made under pressure, and sets a new agenda, crisis leadership requires having a variety of competencies such as empathy, sincerity, self-awareness, thinking paradoxically, being able to be calm under pressure, flexible, rational, being capable of rapid decision-making, teamwork and communication skills, and so on. More importantly,

crisis leadership requires considering the culture and values of the stakeholders because people perceive events and form attitudes against these events under the influence of the society where they live.

There is a strong relationship between the effectiveness of a crisis management process and *decision-making* because crisis management process is nothing more than decision-making process. In relation to crisis decision-making, there are also a number of crucial findings getting from the empirical studies. To begin, it is essential that the senior management identify the main strategies and delegate mid-level managers to make decisions about more specific and technical matters. Secondly, decisions should be taken at the local authorities as they are aware of the conditions in the region; they know the sensitivity of the locality. Thirdly, it is hard for crisis managers to reach all necessary data for making decision in crisis situations. One of the most important reasons for making wrong decisions in crises is, therefore, information shortage. Likewise, it is hard to decide under crisis conditions due to information pollution. Fourthly, having right decision-making criterion enables crisis managers to make more accurate decisions and thus, to minimize the losses. Fifthly, as people have a tendency to base their decisions on previous experiences and memories, it is essential for public institutions to have achieves for decisions made in past crises. Furthermore, no matter how powerful a leader is, he is bound to lose if he does not consult while making decisions during a crisis. More importantly, worry of accountability has a potential to prevent public authorities from making some critical

decisions during the crisis response. Hence, public authorities should be convinced that inspectors have flexible and positive approach to the decisions they made under pressure.

It is essential for response agencies to express themselves to the public through various communication channels (such as mass media, social media networks etc.) because how the people perceive a crisis response is more important than the response itself. *Crisis communication* has a great impact on the success of a crisis management process because it prevents the public from getting the information from informal sources, and therefore, prevents information pollution that makes the situation more complicated. In relation to crisis communication, there are also a number of key findings getting from the empirical studies. First of all, even though the people in a disaster zone have a chance to post real-time information, to post and tweet the messages about their urgent needs through the social media services like Twitter and Facebook, these networks may sometimes make the situation more problematical. Secondly, visits of the central government members to the disaster region have a potential to obstruct the local authorities - the main responsible figures for managing the crisis - to communicate with the media and public. Thirdly, public authorities who established good rapport with the community before crises have more chance to become successful in crisis communication. Fourthly, the messages given by the public institutions during a crisis response should not be spontaneous. Fifthly, effective crisis communication requires

governmental bodies to employ professional public relations teams and qualified spokespersons. In addition, benefiting from community leaders enables public officials to communicate with the victims and their relatives more effectively. More importantly, speaking with one voice in a crisis situation is vital as it reduces information pollution that hampers not only crisis communication but also crisis decision-making.

*Managing emotions* is a key task to be performed in a crisis management process because crisis management is a human-intensive practice and human is surrounded by a variety of feelings such as fear, anxiety, stress, and panic, and so on. It is hard to be successful in a crisis management process without taking into account these emotions since they have a potential to cause indecision and / or making wrong decisions during crisis response. Managing these emotional reactions during a crisis situation requires public authorities to reach accurate information, to establish good rapport with the public, to analyse the factors that mobilise them, to employ some experts such as psychologists and sociologists, to display a peaceful approach to the stakeholders, to remove the factors (such as broken glasses, detached sidewalks etc.) that trigger vandalism without delay, and to benefit from community leaders, and so on. It should, however, be kept in mind that it is not easy to manage emotional reactions of a mother who lost her child during a disaster. It is not easy to manage fear and anxiety resulted from a trauma experienced in the wake of a natural disaster.

On the other hand, crises in particular natural disasters put new issues on agendas such as search and rescue, shelter, drinkable water, security, mass medical attention. Managing a crisis requires dealing with all these issues. Indeed, managing a crisis is nothing more than coping with these issues. Therefore, the most important thing which is essential for *managing the crisis agenda* is to work out the issues on the agenda as soon as possible. In other words, a rapid and accurate response is the finest way of controlling the crisis agenda. On the other hand, managing the agenda in a crisis is a big challenge for public authorities because they have little chance to control the events that determine the crisis agenda.

If public managers fail to *cope with the accusations* in the wake of a crisis, some new crises in the crisis are likely to become unavoidable and thus, the situation is likely to become more complicated. Public authorities can - on the one hand - set up an inquiry in order to cope with the accusations directed against them following a crisis. Such a move can be practical as good practice in crisis management requires investigation into what went wrong. Public authorities, however, may not prefer this strategy because it requires them to be transparent. On the other hand, they can apologise for the mistakes. Apology may eliminate the crisis or; at least may reduce its severity. Nevertheless, public leaders may not prefer using this strategy if there is a belief in the society such like leaders do not make a mistake but they are forced to do by their followers. Unless apology mechanisms have a proper function, many small crises are likely to grow and deepen.

The findings have revealed that *crisis-induced learning* is crucial because it makes governmental bodies more prepared for potential crises, and thus prevents them from making the same mistakes in future responses. The findings have also revealed that - first of all - public organisations cannot be good at learning from crises unless they have strong institutional memories. Secondly, defensive behavioural tendencies public authorities have prevent them from learning from crises. Thirdly, as long as public officials see criticism as a potential threat to their own career, they do not want to get feedback in the evaluation phase; and thus, they are likely to miss the opportunity to learn from crises. Fourthly, as human memory often prefers to forget bad events, individuals naturally fail to draw lessons from crises. What is more, both destroying all the old stuff with the conviction that new is always better and lack of analysis skills are the other two crucial factors that obstruct individuals from crisis-induced learning.

In conclusion, the findings have indicated that all the tasks in the synthesis are essential to effectively deal with crises but there are various obstacles (such as having narrow perspective on crisis preparation, network diversity, information overload and deficiency, reluctance to share information, pressure of interest groups, not speaking with one voice, ignoring individuals' emotions, defensive behavioural tendencies, and worry of accountability, and so on) that hamper carrying out these tasks in the public sector. Unless these barriers are removed, it is hard for public institutions to effectively

cope with crises. Unless these obstacles are eliminated, crises are likely to continue to challenge public authorities in future.

### **8.1. Policy Recommendations**

In the light of the empirical findings, it could be useful to make some recommendations for improving crisis management practices in the Turkish public sector.

It is clear that the first step of a crisis management process is to make a plan in which possible risks are identified, assessed, and reduced. It is, thus, essential for the Turkish public institutions to make effective and practical plans for possible crises. To achieve this, as Heide (1989) pointed out, planners should take into consideration what people are likely to do, rather than what they should do once a crisis occurs. In other words, a crisis plan should be established on well-founded assumptions in relation to human behaviours. More importantly, it is, essential for the public authorities to test and update contingency plans because - as Heide (1989) stated - contingency plans are an illusion of preparation unless accompanied by training and testing.

The study has revealed that the most important aim of crisis management is to predict a crisis before it emerges. It is, therefore, essential for the Turkish public authorities to increase their capacity of early crisis detection. To do this, first of all, it is crucial for them to learn how to read human behaviour accurately because most crises are resulted from human behaviours. Secondly, it could be useful to

establish a separate unit in the public organisations and to employ strategists within these units. It could also be useful for both the Turkish central and local authorities to benefit from past experiences as much as possible because early crisis detection is a kind of decision-making process and experience is central to decision-making. More importantly, as Mahoney (2010) pointed out, central and local governments should recognize crises with a will to address the issues they represent.

It has been found that the most important reason why the response agencies in Turkey do not communicate and share information with each other even in the wake of a disaster is lack of trust among them. Hence, it is crucial to take steps in order to establish trust between them in advance. Another important factor that leads to coordination issues are heterogeneity in the nature of responders, language, working environments, and rules and regulations. As crises increase in size and complexity, they require greater capacities, which imply a larger and more diverse network of responders. It is, therefore, essential that participating organizations be made familiar with each other and develop a common language by means of joint planning and training activities.

The findings showed that both successes and failures of crisis management are often related to decisions taken because management is nothing more than decision-making. In order to make more effective and precise decisions during a crisis situation, public authorities in Turkey should - first of all - put respect to human life in

the centre. Secondly, they should abandon their individual concerns and interests, and give the priority to social benefit. In addition, they should decide on strategic issues and leave the decisions about the technical issues to the operational units during a crisis. In other words, the top management should identify the main strategies and delegate mid-level managers to make decisions about more specific and technical matters.

The study has revealed that it is vital to communicate with the public within crisis situations because crises produce a strong demand from stakeholders to learn what is going on. For effective crisis communication, public authorities in Turkey should avoid a number of communication pathologies as follows:

- the impression of a slow or ineffective response
- the impression of having something to hide, i.e. the ‘no comment’ trap
- accidentally or purposefully giving out false information
- inconsistent messages from different actors or layers of government (*not speaking with one voice*)
- trying to cover up mistakes, mislead the press, or withhold critical information about a disaster
- denying that there is problem
- expressing lack of sympathy
- using technocratic language that ordinary people generally do not understand (Heide, 1989).

On the other hand, crisis management is a human-intensive practice and human is beset by a great variety of feelings. Therefore, it is essential for the Turkish public authorities to manage individual emotions during a crisis situation. To achieve this, they should first take into consideration humans' feelings. Secondly, they should avoid giving provocative and polarizing messages to the public. Thirdly, there is a reality that it is hard to manage the feelings of those who lost their relatives and / or properties. Public institutions in Turkey should, therefore, employ psychologists in the wake of a crisis. In addition, in some cases particularly in ones resulted from civil unrest and political issues, protesters are likely to have a hard stance against the public authorities, and thus, benefiting from the community leaders can be better for reducing the tension.

Crises are opportunities to draw lessons in order to improve future management and crisis response, and to diminish the risk of future crises. In order to draw lessons from crises it is essential for public authorities to give up denying responsibility for the mistakes they made during crisis situations. It is essential for them to give up blaming others because such behavioural tendencies obstruct learning and thus, cause them to make the same mistakes in future crises. It is also essential for public institutions to evaluate their crisis experiences very well, and then to store them in some sort of organizational memory.

On the other hand, disaster response agencies in Turkey should take into account specific demographic, cultural, and social factors in

which a disaster occurred because these factors have a considerable impact on the people's attitudes towards disasters. Last but not least, the priority should be given to preparation for possible crises. Indeed, preparation for future crises should come first because crises are nothing more than the cases that catch us unprepared.

## **8.2. Directions for Future Research**

Following this research that focused on exploring the main barriers that reduce effectiveness of a crisis management process, future studies can focus on how to remove these barriers. In other words, future studies can focus on what can be done to improve crisis management performance of public authorities. Secondly, the synthesis of the key tasks that influence the effectiveness of a crisis management process can be tested in different countries. Likewise, the synthesis can be questioned through different cases, particularly through different crisis types. The researcher's synthesis can also be tested through the cases experienced in private sector. More importantly, the synthesis can be tested in the middle of a crisis. Indeed, the ways of generalising the synthesis can be examined. Last but not least, the role of individual emotions in a decision-making process under crisis circumstances can be studied.

## **8.3. Academic Contributions**

This research makes a number of contributions to the literature in several ways. First of all, it gains the views and experiences of various practitioners and policy makers to the crisis management literature.

Secondly, unlike other studies, this study makes a connection between some basic management functions (such as planning, organising, and leading) and crisis management. Indeed, it draws attention to the fact that there is not much difference between a crisis management process and any management process. By doing so, it provides a new perspective for future studies. Thirdly, even though crisis management is a human-intensive practice and human is beset by a great variety of emotions which motivate him to act, very few studies have considered the role of emotions in crisis management. This study turns the spotlight on this under-researched link. Similarly, although managing a crisis is nothing more than managing the agenda, few studies have made a connection between crisis management and agenda management. This research addresses this under-researched area, as well.

**Appendices**

**Appendix A**

**CONSENT FORM (V1)**

**Study title:** Managerial Effectiveness in Crisis Management in Public Sector

**Researcher name:** Sukru Ozcan

**Ethics reference:** 6369

*Please initial the box(es) if you agree with the statement(s):*

I have read and understood the information sheet (29/05/2013 dated and V.1) and have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study.

I agree to take part in this research project and agree for my data to be recorded and used for the purpose of this study

I understand my participation is voluntary and I may withdraw at any time without my legal rights being affected

**Data Protection**

I understand that information collected about me during my participation in this study

will be stored on a password protected computer and that this information will only be

used for the purpose of this study.

Name of participant (print name).....

Signature of participant.....

Date.....

(29 May 2013- V1)

## **Appendix B**

### **Participant Information Sheet**

**Study Title:** Managerial Effectiveness in Crisis Management in Public Sector

**Researcher:** Sukru Ozcan  
**number:** 6369

**Ethics**

**Please read this information carefully before deciding to take part in this research. If you are happy to participate you will be asked to sign a consent form.**

#### **What is the research about?**

I am a Post-Graduate Researcher at the University of Southampton in the United Kingdom. I have also been working as a district governor for approximately 13 years in Turkey. My research has been sponsored by the Turkish Ministry of Interior Affairs. This study will be a part of the research project of my PhD degree in Politics and International Relations at Southampton University.

The study I have been conducting aims to explore how managerial effectiveness in managing a crisis is succeeded. Therefore, you will be mainly asked about the crucial managerial tasks to be done for managing a crisis situation and regarding the fundamental barriers to effectiveness in crisis management efforts in public sector. You can see all questions attached to this sheet. As a participant in this study, you will be asked to allow the researcher to conduct an interview regarding your role, experience, and opinions in crisis management. The purpose of the interview will be to gather information regarding your experiences during a crisis situation or regarding your opinions about crisis management. In order to identify the main managerial tasks to be performed and obstacles to effectiveness in crisis management, the answers you will give are vital for this project.

**Why have I been chosen?**

You have been chosen as participants because you experienced a large-scale disaster in 2011. The Van Earthquake occurred two years ago can be regarded as an exemplary case for the study because there were all main characteristics of a crisis situation such as uncertainty, urgency, threat to basic values, and so on. You have been chosen as you took part in the case at either managerial or operational level. It is clear that there can be some differences between the theory and practice. You must have gained invaluable experiences through planning and managing this true crisis and both these experiences can be very useful for testing the findings obtained from the literature.

On the other hand, you have been chosen as a public authority even if you have never dealt with a crisis so far since you are first responsible figure for potential crises according to Turkish legislation. Your approach to crisis management will enable the researcher to compare and contrast the findings obtained from those who experienced a disaster mentioned above.

**What will happen to me if I take part?**

You will be asked some questions about crisis management in the framework of a semi-structured interview. The interview will last for approximately one-hour. However, if more time is needed, or additional interviews are required, they can be scheduled at your convenience. You can feel free to answer the questions and you will not have to answer all questions. Your responses will be anonymous and will not be used unless you consent. There will not be question about sensitive topics. More importantly, you will be given a chance to review your responses before they are used for academic purposes.

**Are there any benefits in my taking part?**

There will be no individual benefit. However, understanding the managerial effectiveness in a crisis situation is crucial because exploring the key factors affecting effectiveness in managing crisis through this project can allow public authorities to assess their

readiness for a crisis and give insight into how to improve their managerial capacities to be more efficient in potential crisis responses.

### **Are there any risks involved?**

As a being a part of this study you will not face any risk arising from the study and in any part of the study you have right to withdraw at any time without your legal rights being affected. Moreover, you will have right not to answer a question if you feel stress and/or discomfort.

Confidentiality in the interview will be provided by the researcher. All the data obtained from the interview will be used for academic purposes only and will be protected by the researcher on a secure place. The data obtained from this study will not be passed to the third party. You will also have an opportunity to review your responses before used in the study.

### **Will my participation be confidential?**

Confidentiality in the interview will be provided by the researcher. Your name will not be used in any stage of the study unless you consent. All confidentiality requirements you want will be met by the researcher.

All the data and information obtained from the interview will be kept in secure way to provide the confidentiality. All the data obtained from the interview will be used for academic purposes only. In the study all data will be stored in a secure place or on a password protected computer by the researcher.

### **What happens if I change my mind?**

You have right to withdraw at any time without your legal rights being affected because the participation is voluntary not compulsory.

### **What happens if something goes wrong?**

If the participant has any concern or any complaints about this study, they may contact with:

Dr. Martina Prude  
Head of Research Governance,  
mad4@soton.ac.uk

### **Where can I get more information?**

For any other possible questions and concerns, the contact details of the researcher as follows:

Sukru Ozcan

Postgraduate Research Student  
Politics & International Relations  
Social Sciences  
University of Southampton  
so4g12@soton.ac.uk

## Appendix C

### BASIC INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. What were your most important memories of the earthquake?
2. How important do you think crisis management is?
3. According to your experience, why do crises challenge public institutions?
4. What are the crucial managerial tasks to be done for effective crisis management in public sector?
5. While uncertainty is a key characteristic of a crisis, how can a well-established contingency planning be prepared?
6. It is important for crisis leaders to have many different competencies to handle crises. What makes a good leader during a crisis?
7. Both successes and failures of crisis management are often related to monumental decisions. In your opinion, what are the main barriers to decision-making under crisis conditions?
8. According to your experience, must critical decisions in a crisis situation be made by central governments or local authorities? Why?
9. How important do you think is media management during a crisis? Is social media a friend or a foe during crises?
10. As crises put people under immense pressure and provoke emotional reactions, there are a number of feelings (such as fear, worry, stress etc.) to be managed by public leaders in a crisis. What strategies can public leaders use for managing these emotions?
11. What do you think is best for crisis managers to respond to failures and blame in the aftermath of managing a crisis?
12. Could you discuss the main barriers to learning from crisis?

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